In the Interest of S.S. and J.S., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-1359 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of S.S. and J.S., Minor Children, D.S., Mother, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mills County, The Honorable Ashley West-Joons, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Katie E. Johnson of Katie Johnson Law, Shenandoah, attorney for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Ivan E. Miller of Billings & Mensen Law, Red Oak, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Buller, P.J., Sandy, J., and Vogel, S.J. Opinion by Vogel, S.J. 1 VOGEL, Senior Judge. A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two children, S.S. and J.S., arguing the State failed to prove grounds for termination, termination was not in the children’s best interests, and discretionary impediments to termination apply.1 On our de novo review, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights to both children. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. The mother has a history of involvement with the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) due to allegations of improper supervision. In 2018, she consented to the termination of her parental rights to two older children, including her oldest child, E.S. The mother gave birth to S.S. in 2019 and J.S. in 2020. In January 2025, these children came to the attention of HHS due to allegations that they did not have enough food to eat and that S.S. was getting up, getting ready, and getting on the school bus by herself while the mother was asleep and unaware the child had left the home. While investigating these allegations, HHS learned that the mother, despite being aware of E.S.’s problematic sexual behavior, was allowing E.S. to reside in her home and be around S.S. and J.S. unsupervised. HHS discovered that E.S. had been sexually abusing the children, and the mother was not protecting them. HHS issued a founded child abuse assessment against the mother based on the sexual-abuse allegations. The mother was subsequently 1 The children’s fathers’ parental rights were also terminated; neither father appeals. 2 arrested and charged with child endangerment. She was held in jail from February 26 until March 24 while the charges were pending. A no-contact order was entered between the mother and the children in the mother’s criminal case, which prevented the mother from having visits with the children for several months. On February 27, the children were removed from the mother’s custody. The children have remained out of the mother’s care for the duration of this case. On April 16, the children were adjudicated children in need of assistance (CINA) under Iowa Code section 232.96A(3)(b) and (4) (2025). The mother was ordered to participate in services. In late July, the mother began participating in supervised visits with the children. By late August, the mother had pled guilty to the child endangerment charges and was waiting to be sent to a residential correctional facility (RCF) to serve her sentence, which began shortly thereafter. As of December, the mother had made “little progress” in the case and did not show an ability to protect the children. She “continued to be dishonest,” stating that she did not know what was expected of her from HHS, and when HHS would explain, she would “act as if it is the first time hearing it.” HHS recommended that the goal in the case be changed from reunification to termination. By mid-February 2026, the mother had been released from the RCF. At that time, HHS noted that the mother did “not understand the importance of basic parenting,” including keeping the children safe and making safe decisions. HHS noted that she had not “taken accountability for the severity of [her] actions when [the] children were touched inappropriately while in [her] care.” 3  On February 19, the juvenile court entered a permanency order, noting that the mother “does not take accountability for her behavior in why her children were removed from her care.” The court found that most importantly, “it is clear that [the mother] has not been able to internalize what she should be learning in therapy and treatment. The importance of keeping her children safe is not her priority.” The mother had “made no meaningful progress toward reunification,” and instead was “[c]hecking the boxes.” The court directed the State to proceed with filing petitions to terminate the mother’s parental rights, which the State did in late March. The juvenile court held a termination hearing on June 17. On July 24, the court entered its order terminating the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d), (e), (f ), and (i) (2026). The court concluded termination was in the children’s best interests and no impediments to termination applied. The mother appeals. II. Standard of Review. We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). While we are not bound by the juvenile court’s findings, we do give them weight, especially regarding credibility determinations. In re Z.K., 973 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). III. Analysis. We review termination of parental rights cases using a three-step analysis. First, we consider whether the State proved grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1). L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 532. If so, we next consider whether termination is in the children’s best interests under section 232.116(2). Id. Finally, we consider whether the parent has 4 established that any impediments in section 232.116(3) should be applied to prevent termination. Id. On appeal, the mother challenges all three steps in the analysis.2 We consider her arguments in turn. A. Statutory Grounds for Termination. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d), (e), (f ), and (i). The mother argues that the State failed to prove any of the statutory grounds for termination. “On appeal, we may affirm the juvenile court’s termination order on any ground that we find supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). We elect to focus on the grounds set forth in Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ), which provides that termination is appropriate if the State can prove the following: (1) The child is four years of age or older. (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96. (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102. 2 The mother’s petition on appeal does not make separate arguments regarding best interests and statutory impediments to termination, and she sparingly cited law applicable to those arguments. We caution parents that they risk waiver of an argument if they fail to cite authority in support of it. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3) (“Failure to cite authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”). 5  The mother challenges only the final element: that the children could not be returned to her custody “at the present time.” Our courts have interpreted “at the present time” to mean at the time of the termination hearing. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014). We conclude the State proved that the children could not be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. The primary issues in this case were the mother’s failure to provide proper care and supervision and inability to protect the children from unsafe people and situations, which included sexual abuse by the mother’s oldest child. Despite the mother’s participation in services throughout most of this case, she did not make meaningful progress in her ability to safely parent the children. For example, during a visit in September 2025, the mother allowed the children to take and eat cookies from a stranger in a park. At other visits, the mother would report that the children had no behavioral problems, despite one of the children biting her and trying to shove the other child into traffic. Shortly before the petition for termination was filed, the mother also had a relationship with a man who had a violent criminal record, and she did “not understand the impact [the relationship] has on her own safety and that of her children.” The mother also had not taken accountability for her actions that permitted E.S. to be around the children unsupervised. In short, the issues that brought the family to HHS’s attention continued to exist at the time of termination. Additionally, the mother also did not demonstrate stability in her housing or employment. The mother quit or was terminated from several jobs during this case. At a visit in March 2026, the mother told the children “that she will be homeless sleeping on a bench and hungry,” which the children found “very upsetting.” By the time of the termination hearing, the 6 mother was living with her mother in Lincoln, Nebraska, and working at a fast-food restaurant. The mother was looking for her own housing but anticipated that it could take at least six months. Importantly, when asked whether she could take custody of the children at the termination hearing, the mother responded, “Not today. But in the future, yes.” We conclude that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. For that reason, the State proved grounds for termination under section 232.116(1)(f ). B. Best Interests. The mother next argues that termination of her parental rights is not in the children’s best interests. In considering best interests, we must “give primary consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010). We conclude termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. At the beginning of this case, both children had significant behavioral and emotional issues. From the work the children have done in therapy and the dedicated care from their placements throughout this case, the children’s behavior and ability to regulate their emotions have improved significantly. By all accounts, the children are thriving in their current placements. For that reason, termination of the mother’s parental rights is in their best interests. 7  C. Impediments to Termination. Finally, the mother argues that a relative having custody of the children and the closeness of the parent-child bond should impede termination. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(a), (c). It is the mother’s burden to prove a discretionary impediment to termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 322 (Iowa 2021). Regarding the first alleged impediment to termination, Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(a) provides that the court need not terminate the mother’s parental rights if “[a] relative has legal custody of the child[ren].” This provision does not serve as an impediment to termination in this case because HHS, not a relative, has legal custody of the children. See A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 113. Next, we need not terminate the mother’s parental rights if we determine that “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child[ren] at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child bond.” Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). In making this determination, “our consideration must center on whether the child will be disadvantaged by termination.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709. We cannot conclude that termination would be detrimental to the children based on the parent-child bond. As noted, the children have thrived in their placements, and their behavioral issues have significantly reduced. Further, the mother has not demonstrated an ability to properly care for and protect the children. While the children love their mother, and she loves them, we cannot agree that termination would be detrimental to the children based on their bond with the mother. For those reasons, section 232.116(3)(c) does not serve as an impediment to termination in this case. 8  IV. Conclusion. We conclude the State proved grounds for termination and that termination was in the children’s best interests. The mother failed to prove that any statutory impediments to termination apply to preclude termination. For those reasons, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights to both children. AFFIRMED. 9