In the Interest of Z.C. and Z.C., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-0012 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of Z.C. and Z.C., Minor Children, B.F., Mother, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Susan Cox, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Stephen K. Allison of Stephen Allison Law, PLLC, Des Moines, attorney for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Bridget M. Bott, West Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Langholz, J. 1 LANGHOLZ, Judge. A mother appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her three-year-old son and one-and-a-half-year-old daughter.1 She argues that the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification and that “termination was not the least restrictive means of achieving permanency.” But because the mother did not raise any objections to HHS’s reunification efforts until the termination hearing, she may not now challenge the sufficiency of the services provided to her. And generously interpreting the mother’s second argument as a request for more time to work toward reunification, we find that delaying permanency with another six-month extension would not be appropriate. We thus affirm the juvenile court’s termination order. I. Background Facts and Proceedings HHS became involved with this family in October 2024 after law enforcement reported that the mother drank “a bottle of vodka with her prescribed medication” and “was found passed out in the bathtub and foaming at the mouth” while caring for the children—then two years old and six months old. 2 The mother was charged with two counts of child endangerment due to this incident. With the mother’s consent, the juvenile court ordered that the children be temporarily removed from her custody. HHS placed the children with their maternal grandparents, where they have The juvenile court also terminated the father’s parental rights. He does not 1 appeal. We avoid using the parties’ names to respect their privacy because this opinion— unlike the juvenile court’s orders—is public. Compare Iowa Code § 232.147(2) (2025), with id. §§ 602.4301(2), 602.5110; see also Iowa Ct. R. 21.25. 2 The mother had just been released from a substance-use commitment the day before. 2 remained throughout this case.3 And the State petitioned for the children to be adjudicated as children in need of assistance (“CINA”). Over the next few months, the mother completed substance-use and mental-health evaluations and participated in intensive outpatient substance- use treatment and mental-health therapy. The juvenile court entered its CINA adjudication order in December, and the mother entered a residential sober-living facility that month. The mother did not have any visits with the children during this time because of a criminal no-contact order stemming from the child endangerment charges. In January 2025, the criminal no-contact order was modified to allow supervised visits between the mother and the children. Following the dispositional hearing that month, the juvenile court ordered HHS “to provide the mother with at least two professionally supervised visits per week,” “to talk to the maternal family about a potential additional visit,” and “to provide the [mother] with drug testing opportunities—including patch testing.” The juvenile court also advised the mother “that failure to identify a deficiency in services may preclude [her] from challenging the sufficiency of services in a termination of parental rights proceeding.” The mother was removed from the sober-living facility “because she had alcohol in her purse” in February. She was also arrested for public intoxication. Then in March, she started inpatient treatment for her alcohol- use disorder at a recovery center. She successfully completed that treatment program in early April. 3 The children were already living with the grandparents when they were removed from the mother’s custody. Indeed, they have lived with them their entire lives. 3  At the April permanency hearing, HHS recommended that the mother be granted a six-month extension to continue working toward reunification based on her recent treatment progress. Consistent with that recommendation, in its permanency order, the juvenile court determined “that the primary permanency goal for the child[ren] remains reunification with [the mother] under a six-month extension.” The court noted that the mother had requested child-parent psychotherapy. And the court again advised the mother “that failure to identify a deficiency in services may preclude [her] from challenging the sufficiency of services in a termination of parental rights proceeding.” The mother re-entered the residential sober-living facility in mid- April. But she left the facility again when she “relapsed on alcohol” about two weeks later. She also stopped attending visits with the children and stopped communicating with HHS and her service providers around that time. In July, the mother started inpatient substance-use treatment at another facility and resumed visits with the children. But she was no longer attending mental-health therapy. At the July permanency-review hearing, HHS changed its recommendation from family reunification to termination of parental rights. In its report to the court, HHS noted: Despite consistent engagement and coordination with [the mother], ongoing substance[] use remains the primary barrier to reunification. [The mother] has participated in several intensive treatment programs . . . . While [the mother] has demonstrated periods of short-term sobriety, she continues to relapse following each treatment discharge. These patterns have raised significant concerns regarding her ability to maintain long-term stability and provide a safe and consistent environment for her children . . . . The children’s guardian ad litem echoed these concerns. 4  Consistent with HHS’s recommendation, the juvenile court changed the permanency goal to termination of parental rights. The court noted that it “inquired of the parties as to the sufficiency of services being provided” and that “no additional services [were] requested.” Still, the court ordered HHS “to provide the mother with random alcohol testing—at least two urine drug tests per month.” And the court again advised the mother “that failure to identify a deficiency in services may preclude [her] from challenging the sufficiency of services in a termination of parental rights proceeding.” In August, the mother was discharged from inpatient substance-use treatment due to “an incident in which [she] and a group of patients were found in possession of a vape.” Around that time, the mother started participating in recovery court. Then in September, the mother entered another sober-living facility but was soon discharged “due to relapse.” The State petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights later that month. The termination hearing took place over two days in October 2025. At the start of the hearing, the mother requested “that this matter be . . . continued for a short period of time to allow [her] the opportunity to prove to the court that she’s not using alcohol, . . . to continue making progress in recovery court, and to continue utilizing services that have been asked of her.” She also requested that the court order her to wear an alcohol- monitoring bracelet “in the interim time” if it granted a continuance. But the court denied those requests, reasoning: “These children are ages three years old and one year old. They have been removed from their parents’ custody for five days short of one year, [and] the permanency guidelines of permanency for this age within six months [have] far passed.” 5  During the termination hearing, the court heard testimony from the mother, 4 her probation officer, the HHS case worker, the recovery court worker, and two staff members from the sober-living facility the mother entered in September. The HHS case worker recommended terminating the mother’s parental rights rather than granting another six-month extension. But the mother asked for more time to continue working toward reunification. She testified that she was engaging in services through recovery court and had started another inpatient substance-use treatment program. She believed that she “would be able to have a residence and maintain [her] sobriety” within three to six months. In her closing argument, the mother contended that the “evidence in this case demonstrates that while services were nominally provided, the State failed to make reasonable efforts to coordinate those services effectively.” Ultimately, she requested that the court “deny the State’s petition for termination and instead order an extension of time, 3–6 months, for reunification services with a review hearing in approximately six weeks to monitor progress.” Two months later, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights to both children—concluding that HHS provided reasonable efforts toward reunification, the State proved a ground for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2025), termination is in the children’s best interests, no permissive exceptions to termination should apply, and neither a guardianship nor another six-month extension would be appropriate. The mother now appeals. 4 The juvenile court “did not find the mother to be credible based upon her demeanor and inconsistent/confusing statements.” 6 II. Reasonable Efforts Terminating parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 follows a three-step process. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). First, the State must prove a statutory ground for termination. Id. Second, the State must show that termination is in the best interests of the children. Id. And third, the parent bears the burden to show whether a permissive exception applies that should preclude termination. Id.; see also In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). We need not address any step not challenged by a parent. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). We review a termination decision de novo, giving “respectful consideration” to the juvenile court’s factual findings, especially when based on credibility determinations. In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021). Rather than directly challenging any of these steps, the mother first argues that HHS failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. She claims that HHS “fail[ed] to provide effective alcohol monitoring” and provided “inadequate coordination between systems of care.” Iowa Code section 232.102(6) requires HHS to “make every reasonable effort to return the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the best interests of the child.” But “the reasonable efforts requirement is not viewed as a strict substantive requirement of termination.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). “Instead, the scope of the efforts by [HHS] to reunify parent and child after removal impacts the burden of proving those elements of termination which require reunification efforts.” Id. Thus, the “State must show reasonable efforts as a part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent.” Id.; see also In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 527–28 (Iowa 2019). 7  Our supreme court has “repeatedly emphasized the importance for a parent to object to services early in the [CINA] process so appropriate changes can be made.” C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493–94. “If a parent has a complaint regarding services, the parent must make such challenge at the removal, when the case permanency plan is entered, or at later review hearings.” In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002). “In general, if a parent fails to request other services at the proper time, the parent waives the issue and may not later challenge it at the termination proceeding.” Id. Despite the juvenile court’s repeated warnings during the CINA process “that failure to identify a deficiency in services may preclude [her] from challenging the sufficiency of services in a termination of parental rights proceeding,” the mother did not raise any objections to the adequacy of HHS’s reunification efforts until the termination hearing. Because the mother failed to object at the proper time, she may not now challenge the sufficiency of the services provided to her. See id. And so, we cannot consider the merits of her reasonable-efforts challenge. III. The Mother’s Second Challenge Second, the mother argues that “termination was not the least restrictive means of achieving permanency.” But unlike CINA proceedings, “termination proceedings are not bound by choosing the least-restrictive disposition.” In re T.H., No. 21-1444, 2022 WL 108471, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2022). Instead, the best interests of the children “take precedence over family reunification” at the termination stage. L.T., 924 N.W.2d at 529. Because the least-restrictive-disposition standard does not apply to the issues here, we generously interpret the mother’s second challenge as a request for another six months to work toward reunification. See T.H., 2022 WL 108471, at *4 (taking a similar approach). 8  The mother contends that her recent participation in recovery court, “combined with the availability of suitable relative placement, constituted sufficient grounds to grant an extension.”5 The court may give a parent six more months to work toward reunification “only if the need for removal ‘will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.’” In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b)); see also In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). The court “must also consider whether the further delay is in [the children]’s best interests.” W.T., 967 N.W.2d at 323. We commend the mother’s recent participation in recovery court. But given her unfortunate pattern of engaging in alcohol-use treatment for short periods of time before relapsing and withdrawing from services throughout this case, we agree with the juvenile court that it is not “reasonably likely that the children can be returned to [her] custody within the next six months.” See In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 2000) (“The future can be gleaned from evidence of the [mother’s] past performance and motivations.”). And because these young children had already been removed from the mother’s custody for well over six months at the time of the termination hearing, we must view the termination proceedings “with a sense of urgency.” See C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 494–95. So, we cannot find that further delaying permanency is in the children’s best interests. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014) (“[W]e cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has 5 The mother also mentions in passing that the “juvenile court declined to consider guardianship . . . as a viable permanency option.” To the extent that she intended to raise this issue on appeal, we do not consider it. See In re J.H., No. 25-2099, 2026 WL 519684, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2026) (reiterating that “sprinkled mentions of an issue are insufficient to raise legal claims for our consideration” (cleaned up)). 9 proved a ground for termination . . . by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” (cleaned up)). We thus affirm the juvenile court’s denial of the mother’s request for more time and the termination of her parental rights to both children. AFFIRMED. 10