Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-1328 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of A.B., Minor Child, J.B., Father, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, The Honorable Rebecca L. Petig, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Michael M. Lindeman of Lindeman Law, Cedar Rapids, attorney for appellant father. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Julie Trachta, Cedar Rapids, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ. Opinion by Badding, J. 1 BADDING, Judge. A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to a son he has never met. In his virtual testimony from an Arizona prison, the father told the juvenile court that he was eager to develop a relationship with the boy and that “had I not been incarcerat[ed], I would have been in Iowa months ago.” But by the termination hearing in July 2026, the father had known about the child for more than seven years. He had been in prison for less than two. Finding the father had never been a part of the child’s life and could not take custody at the time of the hearing, the juvenile court terminated his rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(b), (e), and (f ) (2026). The father now contends he “was never given the chance to be a father to A.B.” He alleged at the hearing that prior tests had excluded him as the child’s biological parent, and so—despite the mother’s insistence that the boy was his son—he chose to “cut ties” in 2019. The father claims he only learned of his mistake in September 2025, when the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services confirmed his paternity. But the department’s case manager testified that attempts to contact him after that date went unanswered and that he did not express an interest in services until March 2026. We have considered each claim raised in the father’s petition on appeal, which appears to challenge the juvenile court’s findings at every step in the termination analysis. See In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 322–24 (Iowa 2021) (outlining and applying the familiar statutory framework). Upon our de novo review, we find no reason to disturb the court’s order. Clear and convincing evidence supports the statutory grounds for termination. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(b), (e), (f ). And that outcome is in the best interests of the child, who is thriving in a long-term placement that his mother 2 described as “happy and safe.”1 See id. § 232.116(2). No permissive exception applies. See id. § 232.116(3). Our law guarantees every biological parent a fair chance to defend against termination. See id. §§ 232.2(48), .112, .113; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982). But that does not mean parenthood can be “turned . . . on like a spigot.” In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990). We decline to spare this father’s rights so that he may intervene in the life of a seven- year-old boy with whom he shares only a genetic connection. AFFIRMED. 1 The mother consented to the termination of her own parental rights, noting A.B. was “doing really well” in his placement and that it was “where [she] hope[d] he stays.” She does not appeal. 3