In the Interest of J.G., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-1269 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of J.G., Minor Child, J.G., Father, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, The Honorable Christine Dalton, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Jennifer Triner Olsen, Davenport, attorney for appellant father. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Jean Capdevila, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Buller, JJ. Opinion by Schumacher, J. 1 SCHUMACHER, Judge. The district court terminated the parental rights of both the mother and father to J.G., a female child born in late 2024. Only the father appeals. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the statutory grounds relied on by the district court for termination and alleges termination is not in the best interests of the child. Upon our de novo review, we affirm. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS This family’s involvement with the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (the department) was initiated in November 2024 when J.G. was born testing positive for methamphetamine and THC. J.G. was placed with her maternal great-grandmother under a safety plan on November 11. After the mother again tested positive for methamphetamine and tested positive for amphetamine, the State initiated proceedings to adjudicate J.G a child in need of assistance. J.G. was adjudicated as such and removed from parental custody. The district court placed custody of J.G. with her paternal great-grandmother by order of April 1, 2025. A dispositional hearing took place later that month. At the time of the dispositional hearing, the father had not started participating in services and did not appear at the hearing.1 It was reported that the parents rarely attended supervised visits and concerns existed that the relative placement was allowing unauthorized contact. 1 The State made two unsuccessful attempts for personal service on the father. He was served via publication prior to the dispositional hearing. The disposition report indicated that the mother refused to provide contact information for the father, although she was in contact with him. 2  By a July 2025 review hearing, the father had still not engaged in services. He did not appear at the hearing and had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. The court’s review order noted little progress for the father and stressed that the father needed to “step up or he may lose his child.” In August 2025, an ex parte removal order was entered due to concerns that the placement was not supervising the mother around the child and the mother was actively using controlled substances. Following a removal hearing, custody of J.G. was granted to the department, for placement with J.G.’s paternal grandmother. Shortly after this removal, the father and his mother met with the department about engaging in services. The father indicated he planned to turn himself in on the warrant. He participated in a drug test, which was positive for cocaine, although he denied use of the drug. In a subsequent review hearing held in October 2025, the court noted: [The father] still avoids his responsibilities to his daughter. He has demonstrated no ability to care for her, hasn’t visited her, hasn’t participated in any services. It is unknown if he is using drugs as he has not participated in drug testing or treatment since testing positive for Cocaine. . . . He has not handled his outstanding warrants, further delaying his ability to resume care of his daughter. He too is homeless and unemployed. The placement with the paternal grandmother was short-lived as, in January 2026, the mother and father were stopped by law enforcement at 12:30 a.m. with the child in the vehicle, sans a car seat. The father was arrested on his warrant and charged with possession of controlled substance (second offense), open container, driving while license was revoked, and tinted windows. The placement was not present and had not reported that 3 the parents had removed the child from her care. Following this traffic stop, the child tested positive for THC. J.G. was placed in foster care in February 2026, where she remained at the time of the termination hearing. Given the lack of progress from the parents and the passage of time for the child, the district court entered a permanency order in February 2026, changing the permanency goal from reunification to termination and adoption. At the permanency hearing, the father had yet to engage in substance-use treatment and had only drug tested for the department once in August 2025.2 The court also noted that he had only seen his daughter twice under the approved visitation schedule. By the termination hearing in July 2026, the father had engaged in drug testing three times for the department, although all three tests were positive for methamphetamine. While he completed a substance-use evaluation in April 2026, he was discharged from treatment due to lack of engagement. Following the hearing, the district court terminated both parents’ parental rights under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d), (h), and 232.117 (2026). The father appeals. ISSUES ON APPEAL I. Grounds for Termination We employ the familiar statutory framework analysis on our de novo review of this case. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39–40 (Iowa 2010). But “if a parent does not challenge a step in our analysis,” then “we need not address 2 The father provided urine samples for his probation officer for scheduled drug tests, which were negative. 4 it.” In re J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020). The father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the grounds for termination under section 232.116(1)(d) and (h). We elect to focus on 232.116(1)(h). See In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999) (noting when the court “terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find grounds to terminate under one of the sections cited by the juvenile court to affirm”). Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) allows a court to terminate parental rights if all the following have occurred: (1) The child is three years of age or younger. (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96. (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time. The father challenges the fourth element, which requires clear and convincing evidence that the child could not be safely returned to his custody “at the present time.” In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Iowa 2018) (interpreting “present time” to mean “the time of the termination hearing”). At the termination hearing, the father argued that J.G. could be returned to his custody at that time. We disagree. The father resisted services until the eleventh hour and has been unable to demonstrate sobriety, highlighted by his recent drug tests that were positive for methamphetamine. He has failed 5 to participate in other services designed to promote reunification. We conclude that clear and convincing evidence exists in this record to support termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h), and we affirm on the father’s statutory challenge. II. Best Interests We turn next to the father’s second challenge, whether termination of his parental rights is in J.G.’s best interests.3 J.G.’s first months after her birth were fraught with considerable upheaval, being moved back and forth between relative placements that were unable to ensure her safety. At the time of the termination hearing, J.G. was eighteen months old and living with a foster family that expressed interest in making J.G. a permanent part of their family through adoption. While still very young, the department has been involved in her life since birth, with the father making very little, if any, progress toward reunification with J.G. Terminating the father’s parental rights so that J.G. can have a permanent, stable home gives primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional needs of the child under section 232.116(2). It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child. In re Dameron, 306 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Iowa 1981). We empathize with the devastation a parent must feel when 3 We note that the State’s response to the father’s petition on appeal addresses permissive exceptions, yet the father did not raise that issue on appeal. We therefore do not include analysis concerning application of a permissive exception pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(3) in this opinion. 6 faced with a permanent severance of rights to a child. But we must place the best interests of this young child first, given the father’s inability to regain custody of J.G. in the timeframes mandated by our legislature. Termination of the father’s parental rights is in J.G.’s best interests. We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights. AFFIRMED. 7