In the Interest of P.V., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-0720 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of P.V., Minor Child, C.V., Father, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sioux County, The Honorable Jessica Noll, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Jared R. Weber of Weber Law Office, Orange City, attorney for appellant father. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Debra De Jong of De Jong Law Firm, P.C., Orange City, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Langholz, J. 1 LANGHOLZ, Judge. A father appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights to his young son.1 He argues that the State proved neither a statutory ground for termination nor that termination is in the son’s best interest. And he contends that after the court returned the son to the mother’s custody, it should have dismissed the related child-in-need-of-assistance (“CINA”) proceeding or closed that proceeding with a bridge order rather than conducting a permanency hearing and directing the filing of a termination petition. Most of these arguments rest on his assertion he never had custody of the son because he was not married to the mother when the son was born, and he had not filed a custody action under Iowa Code chapter 600B (2025) to establish custody. On our de novo review, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination order. The State proved a statutory ground for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) because the father had physical custody of the son when the son was removed from that custody, and the father’s continued mental-health struggles and patterns of violence prevented a return to the father’s custody. These safety and stability concerns also show that termination of the father’s parental rights is in the son’s best interest. And to the extent that any part of the father’s final argument is properly before us, we agree with the juvenile court that a bridge order was not appropriate here—again because of the safety and stability concerns. 1 We avoid using the parties’ names to respect their privacy because this opinion— unlike the juvenile court’s orders—is public. Compare Iowa Code § 232.147(2) (2025), with id. §§ 602.4301(2), 602.5110; see also Iowa Ct. R. 21.25. 2 I. Background Facts and Proceedings The unmarried father and mother tried to maintain their troubled relationship following the birth of their son in April 2023. The father financially supported the new family, and both parents cared for the infant son. But after a domestic violence incident between the parents in August 2024, law-enforcement officers removed the infant son from their custody. The four-month-old son was present for and physically affected by the incident, and officers found illicit substances within reach of the child. The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) successfully requested an emergency ex parte removal order from the juvenile court. HHS placed the son in the care of a relative. And the son was eventually adjudicated as a child in need of assistance. The father and mother ended their relationship after the incident. The mother then began to put her life in order. She attended therapy and took medication to manage her mental-health conditions. She completed family- services classes. And her visits with the son went well, with the two bonding over time. The guardian ad litem was “encouraged with the forward progress” the mother made, and HHS remarked that she had “demonstrated an ability to provide a safe and appropriate environment” for the son. So, the juvenile court returned custody of the son to the mother in June 2025. But she had setbacks too. She faced continued financial pressures. Her mental health remained a hurdle to overcome. And her new boyfriend abused her in front of the son, though the mother ended that relationship after the incident. HHS thus continued to oversee the mother’s path to providing the son a stable home. The father’s life took a different course. He too was “struggling significantly with his mental health,” but his progress on anger management 3 and substance use was limited. He could experience episodes of “blackout rage.” He had “longstanding aggressive outbursts and impulse disorder.” He consistently deceived those around him. He was also twice hospitalized for suicidal thoughts and actions. And a psychological evaluation in June 2025 revealed that the father had notable “neurodevelopmental vulnerabilities” and several conditions to manage. His psychologist recommended therapy, medication, and cautious reunification with the son. But the psychologist also noted the father’s potential to be a capable parent. And the interactions between father and son went well; they developed a deep bond. Yet, against the advice of his mental-health specialists, the father embarked on a half-dozen romantic relationships. His mental condition resulted in “hyperlove when he’s in [a] relationship with his children—with his son and with his girlfriends” and “hyperaggression when he feels as though he’s being deserted.” When one relationship with a girlfriend broke down, the father “threatened to hurt her dog and hurt her loved ones.” With another girlfriend, he made threats to kill himself and harm her. He approached yet another girlfriend’s apartment with a baseball bat and broke her bedroom window because he “felt like losing her was the end of the world.” And another relationship ended after a girlfriend lost a child and the father taunted her with the child’s clothes “to feel the emotional hurt that [he] was feeling.” That same girlfriend’s other young child was so seriously injured under the father’s supervision that medical personnel suspected abuse. And so, the father was ultimately convicted of stalking, domestic abuse, harassment, and felony child endangerment causing bodily injury— and incarcerated for the convictions from July 2025 until the following April. While the father was still in jail, the juvenile court held a contested permanency hearing over several days in October 2025. The father 4 unsuccessfully moved to cancel the hearing and consider the issuance of a bridge order instead. See Iowa Code § 232.103A(2). And after the hearing, the juvenile court directed the State to petition for termination of the father’s parental rights. The court emphasized the father’s mental instability, lack of progress, violence, threats, and criminal behavior resulting in harm to another child as precluding a safe relationship with the son. After a January 2026 termination hearing, the court terminated the father’s parental rights, finding that the State had proved statutory grounds under paragraphs “e” and “h” of Iowa Code section 232.116(1) and that termination was in the son’s best interest. The father now appeals. II. Statutory Grounds for Termination Termination of parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 takes three steps. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). First, the State must show a statutory ground for termination. See id. Second, the State must prove termination is in the best interest of the child. See id. And third, the parent has the burden to demonstrate that a discretionary exception applies and prevents termination. See id.; In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). We need not address any steps not challenged by a parent. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). And our review of a termination decision is de novo, giving “respectful consideration” to the juvenile court’s factual findings, particularly those based on credibility determinations. In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021). The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights under paragraphs “e” and “h” of Iowa Code section 232.116(1). “To affirm, we need to find facts to support just one of the grounds.” In re J.E., 907 N.W.2d 544, 546 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017). We choose to focus on paragraph “h,” which has four elements. The father concedes the first and second elements—the 5 age of the child and the CINA adjudication. But he challenges the third and fourth elements—whether the son “has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for” six of the last twelve months and whether there is “clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(3)–(4). According to the father, because he and the mother “were unwed” and he “never initiated custody rights under [chapter] 600B,” “he has no legal or custodial rights.” So he contends that “the removal was [a] nullity after the court placed legal custody with [the mother]” and similarly that the son “cannot ‘return’ to the custody of [the father].” But whatever the merits of the other links in the father’s argument challenging these elements, it collapses at the start because the father had custody of the son after he acknowledged paternity within a reasonable time of the son’s birth. See Iowa Code § 600B.40; In re T.D.E., 796 N.W.2d 447, 453 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011); In re B.L., 470 N.W.2d 343, 346 (Iowa 1991). Even before the birth, the mother and father lived together with the father’s parents. They continued to live together with their son after his birth. He cared for the son, paid for the bulk of the son’s expenses, and generally acted as a father to the son. This easily amounts to acknowledgment. See B.L., 470 N.W.2d at 346; T.D.E., 796 N.W.2d at 453; In re J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d 311, 319 (Iowa 1984). So both the father and mother had legal and physical custody of the son in August 2024 when the son was removed from their physical custody. And the son’s removal from the father was continuous and still ongoing at the time of the termination hearing in January 2026—well over the required six of the last twelve months. The State proved the third element. 6  Similarly, because the father had physical custody before removal, even if it would be an improper extension of the statute to apply this ground to a parent who never had custody, it is proper here. And we agree with the juvenile court that the son could not have been returned to the father’s custody at the time of termination. Violence and threats may prevent a child’s return. See In re K.R., No. 10–1950, 2011 WL 441971, at *8–9 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011). So too may unresolved mental-health issues. See In re G.C., No. 03–1096, 2003 WL 21919900, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2003). And the father’s mental health inhibited his ability to parent. He consistently failed to apply knowledge and skills from therapy and other services to improve as a parent. He routinely lied about his actions and intent. And the father’s mental-health struggles made him impulsive and likely to react with anger to setbacks, which are common in parenting. He also had a recent history of threats and violence, sometimes with his son present. And he was incarcerated after pleading guilty to child endangerment causing bodily injury that occurred while this CINA proceeding was pending. At bottom, the father did not address his mental health and anger, which remain serious risks to his son. The son could not be safely returned to his custody. We thus agree with the juvenile court that the State proved a statutory ground for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h). III. Best Interest of the Child The best interest of the child is the “paramount concern in a termination proceeding.” L.B., 970 N.W.2d at 313. We consider both the long-range and immediate interest of the son. See In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997). And we must give “primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and 7 needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2); see also In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 224 (Iowa 2016). We again agree with the juvenile court that termination is in the son’s best interest. The father’s mental-health and anger issues linger on. He has longstanding and significant mental-health concerns and has routinely ignored the advice of his mental-health specialists. He repeatedly threatened to harm himself and others. And his pattern of destructive and violent behavior has persisted, with criminal consequences. Simply put, the father is not ready to be a safe parent to his son. Meanwhile, the mother has made progress. To be sure, she still faces challenges with her mental health and long-term financial stability. And she has stumbled as a parent. But she has consistently tried to improve and had earned the recognition of the guardian ad litem and HHS that the son was safe in her care at the time of the father’s termination hearing. The father correctly points out that even with the termination of his parental rights, the mother’s custody of the son remained under HHS’s supervision, and the ultimate outcome of the ongoing CINA proceeding was uncertain. But that does not mean that delaying the termination of his parental rights is in the son’s best interest. The termination of each parent’s rights must be decided independently. See In re N.M., 491 N.W.2d 153, 155–56 (Iowa 1992); In re D.G., 704 N.W.2d 454, 459–60 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). And when it is in the best interest of the child to terminate one parent’s rights while the other is still working towards possible permanent reunification, we will not wait to take a step towards the safety and stability that the child needs. See In re A.G., No. 22-0157, 2022 WL 952871, at *2 & n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2022) (finding termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest even while the father “was still involved with 8 [HHS] and reunification services”); In re E.C., No. 22-1918, 2023 WL 4755574, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 26, 2023) (finding termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest even while giving the father more time and refusing to wait for the “remote possibility” that a bridge order might later be appropriate because “[c]hildren are not equipped with pause buttons” (cleaned up)). And so, on our de novo review, we find the son’s best interest served by termination of the father’s parental rights. IV. Request for a Bridge Order The father frames his last argument as a challenge to the juvenile court’s decision in the related CINA proceeding to hold a permanency hearing and direct the State to file this petition to terminate his parental rights rather than dismissing the case or closing it with a bridge order once the court placed the son back in his mother’s custody. See Iowa Code § 232.103A(1) (authorizing the juvenile court to “close a child in need of assistance case by transferring jurisdiction over the child’s custody, physical care, and visitation to the district court through a bridge order” when certain criteria are met). This challenge to the permanency hearing and order is largely “subsumed in the termination proceeding.” In re T.H. No. 20-0267, 2020 WL 4201816, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. July 22, 2020) (cleaned up). Even if it were properly before us, we have already rejected the foundation for much of the father’s argument—that because he never had legal custody, the son had not been removed from it. But during the termination hearing, the father arguably renewed his claim that the court should close the case with a bridge order. Assuming that this argument is properly before us even though the court did not expressly deny his request again in the termination order, we agree with the juvenile court that a bridge order is not appropriate here. 9  One of the requirements for entering a bridge order is the juvenile court’s finding that “the child in need of assistance case can safely close once orders for custody, physical care, and visitation are entered.” Iowa Code § 232.103A(1)(e); see also In re B.D., No. 22-0361, 2022 WL 1234903, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2022) (noting concerns for a child’s safety bar a bridge order). And the threat to the son’s safety precluded a bridge order here. The father has a recent pattern of violence. His previous domestic abuse occurred with the son present. He has numerous new criminal convictions, one stemming from serious harm to a child. He made limited progress addressing his mental health. And when dysregulated, his mental health renders him “not able to access the thinking part of his brain.” His “hyperlove” for a person can quickly switch to “hyperaggression,” which has spurred destructive behavior and remains a significant risk to the son. He also has a history of deception. So, despite the clear bond the father has with the son, the son would not be safe in the father’s custody, in his physical care, or during visitation. Thus, a bridge order was not a viable option for case resolution. Because none of the father’s challenges to the juvenile court’s order succeed, we affirm the court’s termination of the father’s parental rights. AFFIRMED. 10