In the Interest of T.L., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-0471 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of T.L., Minor Child, J.L., Father, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Rachael E. Seymour, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Cole J. Mayer, Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, attorney for appellant father. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Nicole Garbis Nolan of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Ahlers, P.J. 1 AHLERS, Presiding Judge. A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child born in 2019.1 He challenges the statutory basis for the juvenile court’s decision to terminate his rights; argues termination is not in the child’s best interests; contends the juvenile court should have applied a permissive exception to preclude termination; and argues the juvenile court should have reopened the record to permit additional evidence.2 On our review, we affirm. We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021). Although we are not bound by the juvenile court’s factual findings, we give them respectful consideration, especially when assessing the credibility of witnesses. Id. Our review follows a three-step process of determining whether statutory grounds for termination exist, whether termination is in the children’s best interests, and whether an exception should apply to prevent termination. Id. at 294. “After addressing any challenged steps of the three- step process, we then address any additional claims raised by a parent.” In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). 1 The mother died from a drug overdose during the pendency of the underlying child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings. 2 The father’s petition on appeal makes passing reference to two other issues: (1) whether the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services should have placed the child with fictive kin; and (2) whether the department should have granted him additional visitation time after the termination hearing. Because the father did not develop a cogent, more-than-perfunctory argument on these issues, we deem them to be forfeited. See State v. Jackson, 4 N.W.3d 298, 311 (Iowa 2024) (“A party forfeits an issue on appeal when the party fails to make more than a perfunctory argument in support of the issue.”). 2  When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on multiple statutory grounds, we can affirm based on any ground supported by the record. Id. Here, the juvenile court terminated the father’s rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ) and (l) (2025). We elect to focus on section 232.116(1)(f ). That ground permits termination upon sufficient proof that (1) the child is four years of age or older; (2) the child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance; (3) the child has been removed from the physical custody of the parent for at least twelve of the last eighteen months; and (4) the child cannot be returned to the custody of the parent. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f ). The father concedes all but the last element—whether the child could have been safely returned to his custody at the time of the termination hearing. See In re R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d 620, 626 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (interpreting “at the present time” as used in section 232.116(1)(f )(4) to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”). Following our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court that the child could not be safely returned to the father’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. The department became involved with this family following reports from the mother’s older child that the family home was unsanitary, the father bit the mother’s older child, and the parents were using intravenous drugs in the home.3 Upon investigation, the child at issue tested positive for fentanyl. The child was removed from parental custody, and for a time the father made some progress. He enrolled in a medication assisted treatment program that provided him with two weeks of daily methadone doses at a time. But he failed to complete requested drug tests in October and 3 The mother’s older child is not at issue in this appeal. 3 November 2025 prior to the December termination hearing. And he began to show indications of drug use, including increased anger, lack of self- control, and weight loss. At the termination hearing, his caseworker—who is a certified international alcohol and drug counselor—opined that the father was avoiding the drug screens because he was actively using again. She explained that methadone can be abused by those on the treatment program. And she noted the father’s recent lack of consistent involvement with the child, explaining that he only attended seven out of the last sixteen visits offered with the child. Additionally, the father was dishonest numerous times during his testimony at the termination hearing. He claimed not to be dating anyone but conceded he spends several nights a week at the same woman’s home. And when asked if the child had met the woman, the father denied they had ever met. Then he qualified his answer and said that the child had met the woman over video. He only admitted that he had introduced the child to the woman when confronted with a photo of them together. And he admitted that the child met the woman again at the woman’s child’s birthday party, during which he had unapproved, unsupervised contact with the child. More concerning is the fact that the father denied he had ever used fentanyl. He was then confronted with a substance-use evaluation that noted he reported daily use of the drug, and the court ordered a brief recess for the father’s counsel to discuss the need to be truthful. It was only at that point that the father stopped denying his historic fentanyl use. The juvenile court ordered the father to submit to a drug screen over the lunch hour of the termination hearing and left the record open for the limited purpose of receiving those results. When the results came in, they 4 showed the father tested positive for methadone as expected but at an unusually high level. In addition to his unaddressed substance-use issues, the father’s housing stability is in question. His landlord petitioned for forcible entry and detainer (FED). The magistrate granted the FED order to remove the father from his apartment and issued a writ of removal. On the day of the termination hearing, the assistant county attorney inquired with the landlord about whether the father had yet been evicted, and the property manager noted the writ and explained that “[h]is eviction will be impending.” The father’s denials of substance use are not credible given his missed tests and behavioral indicators of illicit substance use. Couple that with his attempts to deceive the court about his relationships, who he has allowed access to the child without department knowledge, his housing instability, and his refusal to acknowledge his history of fentanyl use, and we conclude that the child could not be returned safely to his custody at the time of the termination hearing. As such, a statutory ground for termination is satisfied under section 232.116(1)(f ). Next, we address the father’s claim that termination is not in the child’s best interests. When making a best-interests determination, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). And we recognize that a child’s safety and need for permanency are “the defining elements in a child’s best interests.” In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011) (citation omitted). We conclude that the child’s interests are best served through 5 termination of the father’s parental rights to free the child for eventual adoption. The father complains that there is no concurrent plan for adoption and reasons his parental rights may as well be maintained. We disagree. The child had been placed with the paternal grandfather and step-grandmother. They were being considered for adoptive placement until the termination hearing when the department discovered that the paternal grandparents had allowed the father unsupervised access to the child and had become hesitant about adoption. Those issues were largely caused by the father, and they prompted the change in placement for the child and resulting lack of concurrent adoptive plan. So, the father’s actions are at the root of the delay in ultimate permanency for the child. And as previously stated, we do not believe the father can safely parent the child. This leads us to conclude that severance of the parent-child relationship is necessary for the child to be able to reach permanency without the father’s interference. Termination of the father’s rights is in the best interests of the child. The father also argues that the juvenile court should have applied a permissive exception to termination under section 232.116(3)(c) due to the strength of the bond between the father and child. Application of a statutory exception to termination is permissive, not mandatory, and it is the parent’s burden to prove that the exception should be applied. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 475–76 (Iowa 2018). Section 232.116(3)(c) gives the court discretion to forgo termination when the bond between parent and child is so strong that “termination would be detrimental to the child.” The father cannot establish a bond of such magnitude. See In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021). While the record does contain evidence of a bond between the father and child, the evidence convinces us that preservation of the parent-child relationship would be more detrimental to the child than its severance. We decline to apply this permissive exception to termination. 6  Finally, we address the father’s remaining claim that the juvenile court should have reopened the record on his motion that was filed over seven weeks after the termination hearing ended. “We review the denial of motions to reopen the record for an abuse of discretion.” In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Iowa 2019). “In order to show an abuse of discretion, a party must show the juvenile court’s action was unreasonable under the attendant circumstances.” Id. At the hearing on the father’s motion, the father’s counsel provided the following basis for the father’s motion: [A]s far as the motion to reopen the record, Judge, following our hearing in December, I think my client’s understanding or belief was that there was going to be subsequent hearings where he could present additional evidence if he so chose. Upon explaining to him that the record was submitted when those drug screens came back, he—he would like to make the request to the court to reopen the record to submit additional evidence that he—that we did not present at the original termination hearing, and that would likely be in the forms of testimony of other people. So I—that’s—that’s the basis of his request. I think—in order to have a—a full complete record and—because there was a misunderstanding as far as the record being closed or not. The court inquired as to what the evidence would entail, asking counsel: And so I just want to make sure this record is clear, the evidence, if this court reopened the record, would be directed at other people he believes could be potential placement that are less restrictive than foster care, which is where the child currently is, or—and his relationship with the child? Counsel responded, “Correct.” And counsel agreed with the juvenile court “that any evidence that [the father] would be presenting . . . was all available when [the] court had the record open” at the termination hearing. The court denied the motion because the evidence sought to be introduced could have 7 been presented at the termination hearing.4 We find nothing unreasonable about the juvenile court’s refusal to reopen the record and thus find no abuse of its discretion. As we find no merit in any of the father’s claims, we affirm. AFFIRMED. 4 To the extent the father now argues that the juvenile court should have reopened the record to allow the father to contextualize or refute the results from the drug test done on the day of the termination hearing, that argument is not preserved because the father did not request to reopen the record for that purpose. 8