Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1990 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Rodrico Tyrell Jones, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, The Honorable Brandon Schrock, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Mary K. Conroy, Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua Henry, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Buller, JJ. Opinion by Buller, J. 1 BULLER, Judge. Rodrico Jones appeals the sentence following his guilty pleas to two counts of disseminating obscene material to a minor, aggravated misdemeanors in violation of Iowa Code section 728.15 (2023), and one count of exhibition of obscene material to a minor, a serious misdemeanor in violation of section 728.2. He argues the sentencing court impermissibly considered unproven allegations. We disagree and affirm. In his written guilty plea, Jones admitted to knowingly disseminating obscene material by telephone on two separate dates and to exhibiting obscene material on a third date. He agreed the minutes of testimony were “substantially correct insofar as necessary to provide a factual basis,” and they establish he sent or showed pornographic material to his paramour’s early-teens daughter and one of her friends. At sentencing, the State recommended prison based in part on the nature of the offenses. Jones requested a deferred judgment based primarily on his lack of criminal history and family support. In allocution, Jones described his conduct as a “mistake” and told the court he was “not a monster nor a predator.” Victim impact statements described harm to the victims’ mental and emotional health and their “sense of safety.” The court imposed a prison sentence. In explaining its reasoning, the court emphasized that Jones made “repeated” communications to the minors and that what happened wasn’t really a “mistake”—observing that term didn’t reflect the seriousness of his actions. The court said it had reviewed “the entirety of the court file,” the presentence investigation report, the nature of the offenses, the parties’ recommendations, Jones’s allocution, and the victim impact statements. The court also expressly said it did “not consider any nonadjudicated or dismissed allegations.” 2 On appeal, Jones claims the court considered unproven allegations from the minutes. The basis for this claim is apparently the court’s reference to “the entirety of the court file,” some loose language in the State’s recommendation, and the court’s reference to “repeated” communications. “[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). To show an abuse of discretion, a defendant bears the burden to affirmatively show that the district court relied on improper factors or clearly untenable grounds. State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 759 (Iowa 1998). With this backdrop, we conclude Jones did not carry his burden to prove the court considered unproven allegations. First, we believe the reference to the “entirety of the court file” was a boilerplate statement indicating the court prepared for the hearing; it does not affirmatively demonstrate reliance on improper factors. The same goes for the State’s arguably loose language in its recommendation, which the court did not repeat. And the court’s use of “repeated” is best understood as referring to the two separate-date dissemination counts. Beyond that, the court expressly disclaimed considering unproven allegations. See State v. Davis, No. 24-0837, 2025 WL 2803725, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025) (“[W]e generally believe a district court when it says it is not relying on an improper factor.” (also collecting cases)). On this record, we have no reason to believe the court considered anything improper. Cf. State v. Lovell, 857 N.W.2d 241, 242–43 (Iowa 2014) (per curiam) (court relied on improper factor at resentencing, then disclaimed it, after being reversed for that improper consideration). AFFIRMED. 3