Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1477 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ Wesley Jones and Mandy Jones, Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. Mary Boas, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Davis County, The Honorable Dustin Hite, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Billy J. Mallory (argued) and Trevor A. Jordison of Mallory Law, Urbandale, attorneys for appellant. James C. Larew (argued) of Larew Law Office, Iowa City, attorney for appellees. _______________ Heard at oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ. Opinion by Ahlers, J. 1 AHLERS, Judge. Wesley and Mandy Jones own farmland adjacent to Mary Boas’s farmland. The parties dispute the location of an easement that provides access to an adjoining farm. The district court determined that a prescriptive easement existed over Boas’s land, and she appeals. She challenges the district court’s determination that a prescriptive easement was established and the court’s denial of her claims for quiet title and declaratory judgment. We affirm. I. Background Facts and Proceedings This dispute involves three parcels of land: (1) the parcel currently owned by Boas (the Boas Property); (2) the parcel currently owned by the Joneses (the Jones Property); and (3) a third parcel directly to the south of the Boas Property previously owned by Richard and Charlotte Goeken (the Goeken Property). Before 1992, a county-owned road generally ran north- south along the boundary between the Jones Property and the Boas Property.1 Once reaching the southern boundary of those two properties, the road turned to the west around the point of entry to the Goeken Property. In 1992, Davis County decided to abandon part of the road between the Jones Property and the Boas Property. Concerned about access to their property, one of the owners of the Goeken Property objected to the abandonment. To resolve the access issue, the owner of the Jones Property, the owner of the Boas Property, and the owner of the Goeken Property entered and recorded an easement agreement. 1 In 1992, Wesley Jones’s grandparents owned the Jones Property and Boas’s mother owned the Boas Property. Throughout this opinion, references to the owners of the respective properties refer to the current owners or their predecessors in interest. 2 The agreement granted the owner of the Goeken Property a thirty-foot wide perpetual easement for roadway purposes along the boundary line between the Jones Property and the Boas Property. Fifteen feet of the easement passed through the Jones Property and fifteen feet passed through the Boas Property. The easement agreement required the owner of the Jones Property to install and maintain a fence along the eastern boundary of the easement and the owner of the Boas Property to install and maintain a fence along the western boundary of the easement. In the easement agreement, the owner of the Jones Property and the owner of the Boas Property agreed not to erect any buildings, obstructions, or improvements on the land covered by the easement. By the express terms of the agreement, the easement ran with the land and was binding on the successors to the owners of the Jones Property and the Boas Property. After the easement agreement was executed, the abandoned road was bulldozed, the owners of the Jones Property erected a fence fifteen feet from the center of the abandoned county road, and the owners of the Boas Property did the same fifteen feet west of the center of the abandoned county road.2 The owner of the Boas Property also moved buildings to clear the area covered by the easement. 2 Boas testified that no area between these fences equals thirty feet. But she later testified her mother moved the fence back about twenty-five to thirty feet from the Jones’s fence line when the easement was created. Jones contends this area is roughly thirty feet wide and so does a long-time renter who used the easement for a little over ten years. Because the district court’s findings indicate this distance is about thirty feet and Jones was more credible, we do not disturb those findings. See Johnson v. Kaster, 637 N.W.2d 174, 177–78 (Iowa 2001) (explaining that on de novo review, we give deference to the district court’s factual and credibility determinations). 3 Eventually, all three properties were sold to new owners. Boas and her husband purchased the Boas Property in 1999. The Joneses purchased the Jones Property in 2014 and the Goeken Property in 2022. The dispute that spawned this case arose in 2023 when Boas blocked the entrance to the road between the fences with farm vehicles. The Joneses filed suit, asserting claims for breach of contract, slander of title, quiet title, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. Boas denied each claim and counterclaimed for trespass, breach of contract, slander of title, quiet title, and declaratory judgment. During the course of the suit, the district court granted a temporary injunction prohibiting Boas from blocking the roadway. The photo below depicts the disputed area. 4 The red strip labeled “Boas Strip” and the area between the two solid black lines is where the road currently lies.3 The Joneses contend the area between the fences where the current road lies is the property described in the easement agreement and, even if it isn’t, there is now a prescriptive easement through that area because it has been used as a road for thirty-one years. Boas contends the space between the black line and white dotted line is the area described in the easement agreement. She contends the Joneses need to move the fence fifteen feet farther east on their property to reflect the eastern edge of the property covered by the easement agreement. After trial, the district court issued a ruling finding that Wesley Jones’s testimony was credible and that it was bolstered by a disinterested witness who the court found to be “entirely credible and truthful.” The district court further declared that the Joneses, as owners of the Goeken Property, have an express easement and a prescriptive easement for ingress and egress over the Boas Property where the roadway currently exists. The remaining claims brought by the Joneses and Boas were dismissed. In a subsequent order addressing Boas’s post-trial motion, the district court amended its ruling to clarify the location of the boundary between the Jones Property and the Boas Property and that it found the Joneses proved the elements of a prescriptive easement by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. 3 This photo was entered as an attachment to exhibit 107 and is referenced as “Exhibit A” within the contents of that exhibit. The exhibit was admitted without objection. Both parties referenced the photo during the presentation of testimony at trial. The labels on the photo were added by Boas’s attorney, but there is no report by a licensed surveyor or other witness to verify the accuracy of the lines or labels in relation to the actual property line. The photo is included in this opinion only to aid in understanding the dispute, not for the accuracy of the labels created by Boas’s attorney. 5 Boas appeals. She argues the district court (1) improperly found a prescriptive easement, (2) incorrectly rejected her quiet title action, and (3) erred in dismissing her declaratory judgment action to have the fence moved fifteen feet farther east on the Jones property. II. Standard of Review Actions to establish prescriptive easements are generally claims in equity, and the parties agree this case was tried as an equitable action; as such, our review is de novo. See Johnson, 637 N.W.2d at 177 (noting that the claim for a prescriptive easement “will be reviewed in equity and as such our review is de novo”). On de novo review, we examine the facts and law to decide the issues anew. Id. We give weight to the district court’s fact findings, especially as to witness credibility, but we are not bound by them. Id. at 177–78. III. Easement The district court found that an express easement exists—and the parties are bound by the easement agreement—but the record was unclear whether the land used as a road between the current fences is the land described in the easement agreement. The court went on to find that, even if the land used as a road between the current fences is not the land described in the easement agreement, there is a prescriptive easement over the land used as a road between the current fences. Boas challenges these findings. A. Express Easement An easement restricts an owner’s property rights for a particular purpose. Gray v. Osborn, 739 N.W.2d 855, 861 (Iowa 2007). One way to create an easement is by express agreement in writing. Johnson, 637 N.W.2d at 178. Neither the Joneses nor Boas disputes the existence of an express 6 easement for ingress and egress to the Goeken Property. In fact, both parties relied upon the express easement during trial testimony and in their legal arguments to the district court. The easement agreement describes the burden on the Jones Property as “[c]ommencing at the center of Section 21, Township 69 North, Range 13 West of the 5th P.M thence East 15 feet, thence North to the South end of the public road, thence West 15 feet, thence South to place of beginning.” The agreement describes the burden on the Boas Property as “[c]ommencing at the center of Section 21, Township 69 North, Range 13 West of the 5th P.M. thence West 15 feet, thence North to the South end of the public road, thence East 15 feet, thence South to the place of beginning.” The district court determined the boundary between the Jones Property and the Boas Property as “the north-south line that divides Section 21, Township 69, Range 13 into an east and west half.” While the easement agreement would normally be enforceable and potentially end this dispute, neither the Joneses nor Boas presented any evidence that they had the property surveyed or otherwise presented evidence of where the roadway lies in relation to the land described in the easement agreement. This lack of evidence prevents us from being able to resolve the dispute based on the express agreement alone. As the district court correctly noted, a survey of the disputed land would have “answered the question of whether or not the roadway currently being used is accurately described in the [easement agreement] recorded in 1992.” Regardless of our inability to determine whether the current road is the land described in the easement agreement, we agree with the district court that this matter can be resolved on the alternative basis of a prescriptive easement. This is because an express easement can be expanded by prescription. See Schwenker v. Sagers, 230 N.W.2d 525, 527–28 (Iowa 1975). 7 So we turn our attention to Boas’s challenge to the district court’s finding of an easement by prescription. B. Prescriptive Easement A prescriptive easement exists when someone uses another’s property “under claim of right or color of title, openly, notoriously, continuously, and hostilely” for ten years or more. Anderson v. Yearous, 249 N.W.2d 855, 861 (Iowa 1977). Prescriptive easements are similar to the concept of adverse possession, so we consider those principles in determining the creation of one. Johnson, 637 N.W.2d at 178. But easement by prescription concerns only the use of property, not the acquisition of title by possession. Id. While an express easement or permissive use can be extended, “[c]ontinued use does not, by mere lapse of time, become hostile or adverse.” Mensch v. Netty, 408 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Iowa 1987). Instead, without relying on use, the party claiming a prescriptive easement must prove the party’s claim over the area with evidence distinct and independent of use. Iowa Code § 564.1 (2023); Johnson, 637 N.W.2d at 178–179. The party claiming a prescriptive easement also needs to prove a claim of right and that the other owner had express notice of the claim of right. Johnson, 637 N.W.2d at 178. “The precise evidence to support the requirements of a prescriptive easement can vary,” meaning each case must be decided on its own facts. Collins Tr. v. Allamakee Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 599 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Iowa 1999). Ultimately, “the claimant must establish his cause of action by evidence that is clear, convincing, and satisfactory, and we have said on occasion it must be conclusive.” Webb v. Arterburn, 67 N.W.2d 504, 514 (Iowa 1954). Boas argues on appeal there was insufficient proof to establish a prescriptive easement over the current road because (1) there were insufficient findings in the district court’s decision, (2) the district court 8 misapplied section 564.1 by allowing permissive use as proof of hostility, (3) the district court failed to identify any act distinct from use of the easement, and (4) there was no evidence of a claim of right from 2013 to 2023. We summarily reject Boas’s argument about the sufficiency of the district court’s fact findings, as the court’s thorough twenty-five-page ruling contains a plethora of fact findings that makes Boas’s claim meritless. Her other arguments are addressed as we discuss each element of the Joneses’ prescriptive-easement claim. 1. Hostility and Claim of Right The elements of hostility and claim of right are closely related. Collins Tr., 599 N.W.2d at 464. Evidence of a claim of right must show the party claimed the easement as a right. Id. Where a party demonstrates regular expanded use, makes improvements, or otherwise informs the other party of their right to use the property, there will be a claim of right sufficient to grant a prescriptive easement. See Schwenker, 230 N.W.2d at 528 (holding the defendant’s proof of regular use and refusal to stop based on asserted right to use was sufficient to expand the granted easement); Johnson, 637 N.W.2d at 179 (finding proof of continued improvements and repairs as sufficient for a claim of right). Hostility refers to declarations or acts that reveal a claim of right to the land, not necessarily ill-will. Collins Tr., 599 N.W.2d at 464 (applying adverse possession concepts to prescriptive easements). Specific acts or conduct associated with use, such as maintaining or improving the land, will give rise to a claim of right. Id. Where there is evidence of a party installing fixtures or maintaining the area in such a way that an owner of land would, there is sufficient evidence of hostility. See id. at 464–65. Here, there is clear and convincing evidence of hostility and claim of right beyond mere use of the roadway. The owner of the Boas Property 9 demolished a building and built a fence on the Boas side of the road to accommodate access to the Goeken Property. The owners of the Jones Property installed a fence on their side of the road and maintained the fence by periodically clearing the brush from the fence line. The owner of the Boas Property allowed cattle to graze in the roadway, but when entry to the Goeken Property was needed, the cattle were removed to allow such access. Lastly, when Boas began blocking the road, the Joneses asserted their claim to the sheriff’s office and local county attorney in an effort to regain access. All of this evidence is proof of hostility and claim of right independent and distinct from the use of the road. See Schwenker, 230 N.W.2d at 528 (finding objection to threats to close off the area over which an easement was claimed as part of the proof needed to show hostility); Johnson, 637 N.W.2d at 179 (finding maintenance of the area over which an easement was claimed as part of the proof needed to show hostility); Collins Tr., 599 N.W.2d at 464–65 (same). The district court properly found the Joneses proved a hostile claim of right. 2. Open and Notorious Use The Joneses also had to establish the easement was used in an open and notorious way for ten years or more and the owner of the Boas Property had notice of such. See Johnson, 637 N.W.2d at 180. These elements “exist to help place the true owner of land on notice of the adverse use of the land by another.” Collins Tr., 599 N.W.2d at 465. This requirement ensures the true owner “knows another’s use of the property is claimed as a right hostile” to the owner’s interest because otherwise the owner “may incorrectly assume the other’s use results merely from [the true owner’s] willingness to accommodate the other’s desire or need to use the land.” Larman v. State, 552 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Iowa 1996). “[W]here the easement is open and visible, the purchaser of the servient tenement will be charged 10 with notice.” Johnson, 637 N.W.2d at 180 (citation omitted). When a party discusses the right of use with the true owner or acts in a manner that would attract the attention of the true owner, there is sufficient evidence of open and notorious use. See Anderson, 249 N.W.2d at 861. Additionally, when the true owner uses the road and has knowledge about damage and repairs to the area by the adverse party, they also have sufficient notice. See Collins Tr., 599 N.W.2d at 465. The owners of the Boas Property were on notice of open and notorious use of the road in the location marked by the fences. By erecting a fence to mark the western edge of the road, demolishing a building within the fenced area, and watching as Davis County bulldozed the fenced in area to clear it for use, the owners of the Boas Property were on notice of open and notorious use of the road as marked by the fences. Likewise, the installation and maintenance of the fence on the eastern edge of the road by the owners of the Jones Property gave the owners of the Boas Property notice that the owner of the Jones Property was making an open and notorious claim of right to use the road. Like in other cases where knowledge of open and notorious use provided sufficient notice, the district court correctly concluded the owner of the Boas Property had express notice of the open and notorious use of the property by the owner of the Jones Property. See Anderson, 249 N.W.2d at 861–62 (finding open and notorious use by notification of problems in the disputed area with demands to fix them); Collins Tr., 599 N.W.2d at 465 (finding maintenance and installation of improvements to the disputed area sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement of section 564.1). 3. Ten-Year Period Boas also contends there is no evidence of continuous use for the ten- year period between 2013 and 2023. But the “ten-year continuous possession 11 requirement may be established by ʻtacking’ onto the claimant’s possession time by his predecessors in interest.” Johnson, 637 N.W.2d at 181. Once a prescriptive easement is established, it “can only be lost by at least ten years of continued nonuse accompanied by facts and circumstances clearly indicating an intentional relinquishment.” Anderson, 249 N.W.2d at 863. Here, there was no evidence of ten years of non-use such that the Joneses indicated their desire to relinquish the easement. Instead, the evidence clearly established that the road has existed between the fences erected in 1992 for over thirty years. At no time did the road become overgrown, impassable, or otherwise abandoned for a period of ten years or more. See id. Rather the record establishes that the Joneses have been regularly maintaining the fence since at least 2002. Additionally, the record shows that the farm tenants of the Goeken Property have been using the road since the early 1990s to access the farm. Since the Joneses can rely on their own actions during the ten years immediately prior to this suit and the history of use dating back to 1992 when renters began using the road, the district court appropriately found there was enough continuous use to establish a prescriptive easement. See Johnson, 637 N.W.2d at 181. IV. Quiet Title Actions The district court denied each party’s quiet title claim. On appeal, Boas claims the district court should have granted her quiet title claim over land outside that described in the easement agreement because the court improperly found a prescriptive easement. A quiet title action “may be brought by anyone, whether in or out of possession, having or claiming an interest therein, against any person claiming title thereto, though not in possession.” Iowa Code § 649.1. This language is permissive in nature, leaving it in the district court’s discretion 12 whether it would be an equitable remedy for the controversy. See id. Granting a request to quiet title establishes title for one party while barring anyone else from having any claim of right over the property. See Smith v. Cretors, 164 N.W. 338, 339 (Iowa 1917) (“The naked fact that in an action to quiet title there is a decree quieting title in plaintiff operates as a decision that defendant has no title or claim.”). As discussed above, the Joneses have established a prescriptive easement over the road. This defeats Boas’s quiet title claim, so we find no error in the dismissal of it. V. Declaratory Judgment Boas requested declaratory relief to require the Joneses to move their fence fifteen feet to the east. The district court denied the requested relief, and Boas challenges that denial on appeal. Because Boas’s claim is based on her claim that the Joneses do not have an easement over the fenced-in roadway and we have rejected that claim, Boas’s challenge to the declaratory judgment ruling fails as well. VI. Conclusion Having rejected each of Boas’s claims on appeal, we affirm the district court’s ruling. AFFIRMED. 13