Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0974 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ Keith Van Elson Jr., Applicant–Appellant, v. State of Iowa, Respondent–Appellee. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, The Honorable Michael Harris, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Des C. Leehey of Cameron Leehey Law Firm, PLLC, Cedar Rapids, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Buller, JJ. Opinion by Schumacher, J. 1 SCHUMACHER, Judge. “Keith Elson abducted a nineteen-year-old clerk at knifepoint from the Cedar Rapids convenience store where she was working the overnight shift. He took her to his apartment where he sexually assaulted her and held her for seven hours.” State v. Elson, No. 11-2085, 2013 WL 751288, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2013). Following a bench trial, the district court found Elson guilty of first-degree kidnapping and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. This court affirmed Elson’s conviction on direct appeal, rejecting Elson’s claim that he was “too intoxicated to form specific intent to commit the crime.” Id. at *1, *3–6. Elson filed an application for postconviction relief (PCR) in February 2016, raising several ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims and claiming “[m]andatory sentence of life in prison for non-homicide offense for person subject to severe mental health problems violates Art. I, Section 17 of the Iowa Constitution.” Following a hearing on Elson’s PCR application held in January 2025, the district court denied Elson’s application. Elson appeals.1 1 We observe that our courts construe an untimely illegal-sentence claim raised in a PCR application as a motion to correct an illegal sentence, from which there is no appeal as a matter of right, and treat an appeal from such as a petition for writ of certiorari. See Dorsey v. State, 975 N.W.2d 356, 360 (Iowa 2022); Puckett v. State, No. 25-0654, 2026 WL 1815401, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 24, 2026). Here, however, Elson’s PCR application was timely filed. See Iowa Code § 822.3 (2016) (stating a PCR application “must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued”). Accordingly, Elson’s claim falls under Iowa Code section 822.2, which applies PCR procedure to determine an applicant’s claim that “[t]he conviction or sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this state.” Id. § 822.2(1)(a); see also generally Martin M. Volz, Jr., Iowa Practice Series: Methods of Practice, Postconviction Procedure–Where Applicable § 44:2 (West Aug. 2025 Update). We therefore proceed to 2 Elson raises only one issue on appeal—that his life sentence without the possibility of parole is grossly disproportionate to his crime. A gross- disproportionality challenge compares the harshness of a particular sentence with the seriousness of the crime. State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 647 (Iowa 2012). To support his claim, Elson focuses on his specific background, including his history of trauma caused by his father and childhood abuse that “developmentally stunted” him. We employ a three-step test to decide whether Elson’s sentence is grossly disproportionate to his crimes. See Dorsey, 975 N.W.2d at 363–64. First, we balance the gravity of the crimes against the severity of the sentence. Id. at 364. If we find no inference of gross disproportionality, our inquiry ends. State v. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d 554, 572 (Iowa 2018). “So three steps can turn into one.” State v. Dominguez-Schiesl, No. 21-1402, 2023 WL 5949177, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 13, 2023). Elson fails to satisfy the threshold test. In reaching this determination, we give “substantial deference to the penalties the legislature has established for various crimes.” Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 650. First-degree kidnapping is a class “A” felony, see Iowa Code § 710.2 (2010), which the legislature has mandated is punishable by imprisonment “for the rest of the defendant’s life,” see id. § 902.1(1). “Our supreme court has considered the constitutionality of this sentence for first-degree kidnapping and determined it does not violate prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment.” State v. Poland, No. 17-0189, 2018 WL 3302201, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. July 5, 2018); accord Lamphere v. address Elson’s claim on appeal, which we review de novo. See State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Iowa 2014). 3 State, 348 N.W.2d 212, 220–21 (Iowa 1984). And the court has also determined that although the mandatory minimum is unconstitutional for juvenile offenders, that holding “has no application to sentencing laws affecting adult offenders.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 403. “We are not at liberty to overturn Iowa Supreme Court precedent.” State v. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). We affirm. AFFIRMED. Tabor, C.J., concurs; Buller, J., dissents in part and concurs in part. 4 BULLER, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in part and dissent in part. I concur because, if the merits were properly before us, I would find Elson is owed no relief. But I dissent because this is not really a postconviction case and there is no appeal as a matter of right. Treating this case as what it really is—a petition for writ of certiorari— I would deny the petition and dismiss the attempted appeal. Unlike the majority, I would apply controlling case law. This case involves two reoccurring procedural wrinkles: Is an illegal- sentence challenge styled as a postconviction application really a motion to correct an illegal sentence that should be filed in the criminal case? And if it’s not a postconviction action, how should the appellate courts review attempted appeals? Tying together two strands of case law, the supreme court unequivocally answered both questions in 2022: When an offender files an application for postconviction relief and complains his sentence is illegal[,] the claim is not a postconviction relief action. Instead, the application for postconviction relief is treated as a motion to correct an illegal sentence. We therefore construe [this] application for postconviction relief as a motion to correct an illegal sentence. There is no appeal as a matter of right from the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Dorsey v. State, 975 N.W.2d 356, 360 (Iowa 2022) (cleaned up). This is a clear statement of law in a controlling case regulating our treatment of the issue. Yet the majority’s first footnote purports to manufacture a novel distinction, asserting Dorsey’s holding doesn’t apply to timely postconviction actions. Dorsey doesn’t say that. Neither does any other case ever decided by our court or the supreme court. The only other case the majority cites in support is Puckett v. State, No. 25-0654, 2026 WL 1815401, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 24, 2026). But Puckett doesn’t talk about timeliness. At the end of 5 the footnote, the majority cites State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Iowa 2014)—but it doesn’t address timeliness either. And more importantly, Lyle pre-dates controlling cases requiring appellate review of illegal-sentence claims be through certiorari. See Dorsey, 975 N.W.2d at 360; State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 96–97 (Iowa 2017). So where is the majority’s purported distinction coming from? The only other sources the majority cites are the statutory language the supreme court construed in Dorsey (section 822.2) and a “methods of practice” secondary source. We cannot interpret a statute the opposite of how the supreme court has, so the statute can’t be what the majority relies on. 2 See State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). And the treatise doesn’t say anything about this specific issue; rather inexplicably, it doesn’t cite Dorsey at all. There is a lesson here for practitioners: even a published secondary source isn’t necessarily a good authority, especially when it doesn’t cite the controlling cases. To me, this is not an area with wiggle room. The plain text of the controlling cases draws a bright line and has nothing to do with timeliness. At risk of repeating what the supreme court has already said cleanly, a few of the consistent holdings:  “When an offender files an application for postconviction relief and complains his sentence is illegal . . . the claim is not a postconviction relief action.” Dorsey, 975 N.W.2d at 360 (cleaned up). 2 I will admit one reading of the majority is that it is reading section 822.2(1)(a) the opposite of how the supreme court did in Dorsey—it’s the same statutory section and the same type of gross-proportionality claim, but the majority is applying a different form of appellate review. 6  “Bonilla filed a postconviction relief action. Because he complains his sentence is illegal, however, the claim is not a postconviction relief action.” Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Iowa 2010) (cleaned up).  “A claim that a sentence is illegal goes to the underlying power of the court to impose a sentence, not simply to its legal validity. As a result, Veal’s claim does not constitute a postconviction relief action . . . .” Veal v. State, 779 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa 2010) (cleaned up). While the law has many ambiguities, I don’t see any here. Even setting the controlling-case point aside, the majority’s purported distinction doesn’t make much sense to me. If you misfile your illegal- sentence claim two years after conviction you get an appeal as of right, but if you misfile it after four years you get certiorari review? And if you correctly file your motion in the criminal case number, you never get appeal as of right? The reason we treat appellate review of illegal-sentence claims as certiorari is doctrinal, not as a get-out-of-untimeliness escape hatch. See Propps, 897 N.W.2d at 96–97. Timeliness just isn’t relevant for an illegal-sentence claim. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(5)(a). For all these reasons, I reject the majority’s footnote one as divorced from the law. I would apply Dorsey and the other controlling cases, as we are required to do, and treat Elson’s appellate papers as a petition for writ of certiorari. See 975 N.W.2d at 360. Contrary to the rules of appellate procedure, Elson offers no justification for issuing the writ and granting extraordinary appellate review. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.107(1)(e)(4). My independent review of the record confirms there is no reason this case warrants granting certiorari. I would deny the writ rather than entertain a meritless—if not frivolous— appeal. 7