Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1592 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ Justin Paul Atkins, Applicant–Appellant, v. State of Iowa, Respondent–Appellee. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, The Honorable Nicholas Bailey, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ John C. Heinicke of Kragnes & Associates, P.C., West Des Moines, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Chicchelly, J. 1 CHICCHELLY, Judge. Justin Paul Atkins appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief (PCR) after pleading guilty to second-degree burglary as a habitual offender, domestic assault causing bodily injury, trespass causing injury or damage, and two counts of fourth-degree criminal mischief. Atkins asserts two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because Atkins did not show his trial counsel breached any essential duties in representing him, we affirm. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS In September and October 2022, the State filed charges against Atkins in three separate cases, alleging a series of criminal acts. Atkins was later arraigned, and the district court filed an “Order Following Arraignment” in each case. The orders noted that Atkins had appeared in person with trial counsel, entered a plea of not guilty, and “waived speedy trial.” Upon receiving the orders, Atkins did not contest that he had waived speedy trial. Trial was continued three times over the following months. Atkins requested two of the continuances. The district court set trial for March 2023. But before it began, the parties reached a plea agreement. In May 2023, Atkins pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary as a habitual offender, domestic assault causing bodily injury, trespass causing injury or damage, and two counts of fourth-degree criminal mischief. Atkins was sentenced to a suspended nineteen-year prison term and placed on probation. His probation was later revoked. Atkins filed a PCR application, raising two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following the PCR trial, at which Atkins and his trial counsel testified, the district court denied the application. Atkins appeals. 2 STANDARD OF REVIEW “We ordinarily review PCR rulings for correction of errors at law.” Brooks v. State, 975 N.W.2d 444, 445 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022). “However, when the applicant asserts claims of a constitutional nature, our review is de novo.” Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001) (en banc). “Thus, we review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo.” Id. While we are not bound by the PCR court’s determination, “we give weight to the [PCR] court’s findings concerning witness credibility.” Sothman v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2021) (quoting King v. State, 797 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Iowa 2011)). DISCUSSION I. Speedy Trial Atkins first argues that his guilty pleas were not made voluntarily and intelligently because trial counsel should have advised him that the charges were subject to dismissal for lack of speedy trial. Under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b), a defendant must be brought to trial within 90 days after indictment or the district court must order the indictment be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary is shown. This rule applies “unless the State proves (1) defendant’s waiver of speedy trial, (2) delay attributable to the defendant, or (3) ‘good cause’ for the delay.” State v. Taylor, 881 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 2016) (quoting State v. Winters, 690 N.W.2d 903, 908 (Iowa 2005)). Atkins claims that he did not waive his right to a speedy trial, while the State contends that he did. The State first asserts that the orders following Atkins’s arraignment prove that speedy trial was explicitly waived. “In order to show waiver, there must be a showing of ‘an intentional relinquishment or 3 abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” Id. at 78 (quoting State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908, 911 (Iowa 1973) (en banc)). “[I]n order to waive speedy trial rights, the defendant must do so knowingly and intelligently.” Id. at 79. It is uncontested that Atkins received copies of the arraignment orders. However, there is nothing in the record that shows a written waiver was filed by Atkins or his trial counsel to waive the deadline. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33(2)(d). Trial counsel testified at the PCR trial that he did not have a specific recollection of the arraignment and that he had no evidence of a signed waiver of speedy trial at the arraignment. Atkins testified he did not sign a waiver of speedy trial. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that Atkins orally waived his right to speedy trial at the arraignment.1 We dealt with a similar situation in State v. Jentz. See 853 N.W.2d 257 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013). In Jentz, the State asserted the defendant had waived his right to speedy trial because a court order stated, “Defendant now waives speedy trial in all cases.” Id. at 269. While the waiver dealt with the defendant’s right to a one-year speedy trial, we found that the order, on its own, was not enough to show waiver. See id. at 270–71. Rather we stated, “the ‘waiver’ cited by the State is a notation on an order, and no further 1 The arraignment was not recorded, and thus a transcript of the arraignment does not exist. But even without a transcript, a party can still make a record of what happened by creating a statement of the proceedings under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.806. “This rule permits a party to file a statement describing the evidence ‘prepared from the best available means, including the party’s recollection,’ with the opposing party permitted to file objections or proposed amendments to the other party’s statement within ten days.” State v. Brown, 16 N.W.3d 484, 487 (Iowa 2025) (quoting Iowa R. App. P. 6.806(1)). However, neither Atkins as the appellant nor the State—the party with the burden to show Atkins waived his right—took advantage of this rule to create a record. 4 record accompanies it. This is not enough evidence showing [defendant] waived his right . . . .” Id. at 271. Like Jentz, the only evidence in this case that Atkins explicitly waived his speedy trial rights are the arraignment orders. Absent additional evidence, we cannot conclude that Atkins explicitly waived his speedy trial rights. The State contends that even if Atkins did not explicitly waive speedy trial, he implicitly waived it, caused the delay, or his actions established good cause for the delay. As noted above, after arraignment, the case was continued three times, with two of the continuances requested by Atkins before the parties reached a plea. Atkins’s first motion to continue, while made before the speedy trial deadline, pushed the trial date past the deadline. In support of the motion, Atkins stated that he planned on filing an application for an investigator and needed more time to gather information and formulate defenses. Atkins also noted in the motion that he had recently received discovery from the State and hoped that a continuance would allow the parties to exhaust all potential settlement remedies. Furthermore, Atkins’s second motion to continue was made after the speedy trial deadline had run. Moreover, at the PCR trial, trial counsel testified that he worked to slow the case down so that the State would offer a plea deal that did not include prison and was litigating the case as if speedy trial was not an issue. While Atkins was facing a potentially serious prison sentence, he was not imprisoned at the time. As trial counsel testified, “I don’t think we had any offers initially on this case either. I think it took a little while until we started getting offers that weren’t supporting or relating to prison time . . . [s]o we 5 weren’t really looking to do anything until we had something along those lines.” Trial counsel further testified that it was around March 2023 when the State made a plea offer involving probation. Atkins admitted that it was a lengthy process before he got the offer he was looking for but denied that the plea he got was beneficial for him.2 The record shows many reasons why Atkins moved for the continuances. As trial counsel’s testimony shows, the most significant reason was to secure a plea offer from the State that did not include a prison sentence. By getting the continuances, the State eventually offered Atkins a plea he found acceptable. Because trial counsel was acting within the scope of his authority by requesting the motions to continue, we find that Atkins’s speedy trial rights were implicitly waived. [T]he statutory right to speedy trial . . . is not a personal right that can be waived only be the defendant. Defense counsel acting within the scope of his or her authority may waive this right on the defendant’s behalf without the defendant’s express consent. In the present case defense counsel . . . waived this right by the succession of continuance motions. Defense counsel’s action was within the scope of his authority, and the delay thereby was in no way attributable to the State. State v. LeFlore, 308 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Iowa 1981); see also State v. Weber, No. 12–0621, 2013 WL 988924, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2013) (“Though the record is not clear that trial counsel expressly waived [the defendant’s] right to a speedy trial as in LeFlore, we think the case applies to agreements to continue the case and to schedule guilty plea proceedings.”); State v. Davis, No. 18-0616, 2019 WL 1300413, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2019) (“Speedy trial rights can be waived by continuance motions made by the Defense, not merely those made by defendant.” (cleaned up)). 2 The PCR court did not find Atkins’s testimony credible. 6 For the reasons explained above, we also conclude delay was attributable to Atkins, thereby constituting good cause for the delay. See State v. Elder, 868 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (“Delay attributable to the defendant may constitute good cause preventing the State from carrying out its obligation to bring the defendant to trial in a timely manner.”); see also Taylor, 881 N.W.2d at 77 (“The good-cause test under our speedy trial rules relies on only one factor: the reason for the delay.”) Importantly, Atkins’s actions went beyond mere acquiescence in setting a date for trial. See Taylor, 881 N.W.2d at 77. And Atkins “may not actively, or passively, participate in the events which delay his trial and then later take advantage of that delay to terminate the prosecution.” State v. Finn, 469 N.W.2d 692, 694 (Iowa 1991). Therefore, because the charges were not subject to dismissal for lack of speedy trial, we hold that trial counsel did not breach an essential duty. II. Trespass Causing Injury Atkins next argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by allowing him to plead guilty to trespass causing injury without a sufficient factual basis for the plea. As part of the plea agreement, Atkins pled guilty to one count of trespass causing injury or damage in violation of Iowa Code sections 716.7(2) and 716.8(7) (2022). The plea agreement stated, “I did enter the property of another and cause[d] her injury, through mental distress . . . .” Iowa Code section 716.8(2) states: Any person committing a trespass as defined in section 716.7, other than a trespass as defined in section 716.7, subsection 2, paragraph “a”, subparagraph (6), which results in injury to any person or damage in an amount more than three hundred dollars to anything, animate or inanimate, located thereon or therein commits a serious misdemeanor. 7 Atkins argues that mental distress is not an injury under the statute, so there was not a sufficient factual basis for his guilty plea.3 On the other hand, the State argues that mental distress can constitute an injury under the statute because it imposes no requirement that the injury be physical. The State points out that when the legislature wants an injury to only encompass physical harm, it expresses that with specific terms. See, e.g., State v. McKee, 312 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Iowa 1981) (defining bodily injury as “physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition”). Although the statute does not define injury, the legislature’s use of “injury” and not “bodily injury” is dispositive. Had the legislature wanted to limit the statute to injuries involving physical harm, it could have used “bodily injury” or a similar term. See Belmond-Klemme Cmty. Sch. Dist., 760 N.W.2d 454, 456 (Iowa 2009) (“Legislative intent is determined from the words chosen by the legislature, not by what it should or might have said.”). Instead, the legislature used the term injury in the statute. Therefore, because Atkins admitted in the plea agreement that he caused an injury to the victim, we conclude that there was a sufficient factual 3 In his brief, Atkins raises additional reasons as to why the plea was defective. However, these arguments were not made at the PCR trial and therefore are not preserved on appeal. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”). Even if these arguments had been preserved, Atkins cites no authority in his brief to support them. See State v. Jackson, 4 N.W.3d 298, 311 (Iowa 2024) (“A party forfeits an issue on appeal when the party fails to cite any authority in support of the issue.”). 8 basis for the plea, and that trial counsel did not breach an essential duty by allowing Atkins to plead guilty. AFFIRMED. 9