Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1677 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ Alexander Scott Guy, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Samantha Ann Myers, Defendant–Appellee. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Montgomery County, The Honorable Amy Zacharias, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ P. Shawn McCann and Kailey Coughran of McGinn & McCann, P.L.C., Council Bluffs, attorneys for appellant. Krisanne C. Weimer of Weimer Law, PC, Council Bluffs, attorney for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ. Opinion by Ahlers, J. 1 AHLERS, Judge. Alexander Guy and Samantha Myers are capable parents of a child born in 2023. They agreed to joint legal custody of the child, but they disagreed about who should have physical care. Following a trial, the district court placed the child in the mother’s physical care. The father appeals. He contends the parents should be granted joint physical care of the child, or if only one parent is granted physical care, he argues it should be him. The mother asks us to affirm the decision to place the child in her physical care and to order the father to pay her appellate attorney fees. I. Physical Care We conduct de novo review of physical-care determinations. Randall v. Trier, 15 N.W.3d 809, 813 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024). With de novo review, we give weight to the district court’s factual findings, especially as to witness credibility, but we are not bound by them. Id. Iowa Code chapter 600B (2023) governs custody and care disputes regarding children of unmarried parents. However, when making a physical- care determination, we apply the same standards as those applied to children of married parents and provided for in Iowa Code section 598.41. See Iowa Code § 600B.40(2). “ʻPhysical care’ means the right and responsibility to maintain a home for the minor child and provide for the routine care of the child.” Id. § 598.1(7). When, as here, the parents are awarded joint legal custody, the court must decide who receives physical care of the child. See id. § 598.41(5). The court can either place the child in the parents’ joint physical care, or it can place the child in the physical care of one parent. Id. 2 Physical-care determinations are based on the best interest of the child. In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 695 (Iowa 2007). The resolution of a physical-care dispute is based on what is best for the child, not on perceived fairness to the parents. Id. The goal is to place the child in the environment most likely to promote the child’s physical and mental health as well as to bring the child to social maturity. Id. Making a physical-care determination requires us to consider the factors listed in Iowa Code section 598.41(3) as well as those enumerated in In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166–67 (Iowa 1974). Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 696. A. Joint Physical Care Early in this case, the district court entered an order on temporary matters that placed the child in the joint physical care of the parents. The parents followed a temporary, joint-physical-care schedule through trial, exchanging the child on a week-to-week basis. But when making a final physical-care determination, the district court placed the child in the mother’s physical care. On appeal, the father challenges the district court’s decision not to continue a joint physical care arrangement.1 In determining whether to grant joint physical care, we consider historic patterns of caregiving (referred to as the approximation principle), the parents’ ability to communicate and show mutual respect, the degree of conflict between the parties, and general agreement about the parents’ 1 The mother contends the father failed to preserve error on this challenge because his pleadings only sought an order placing the child in his physical care, not a joint physical care determination. Because the father testified without objection that he was requesting joint physical care as an alternative, and the court ruled on that request, we find error preserved. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (requiring an issue to be raised and decided to preserve error). 3 approach to daily matters. Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 697–99. Following our de novo review, we agree with the district court that both parents are capable caregivers for the child and both have cared for the child before and after separation. Both parties acknowledge the other as an important part of the child’s life, and both support the child’s relationship with the other parent. There are no concerns about the child’s safety when in the care of either party. Additionally, the child was too young to offer any preference at the time of trial. Though the record indicates communication difficulties, we find that both parents contributed to those difficulties and both have room for improvement. But the parents still effectively co-parent, as neither parent is, in the words of the district court, “particularly contentious to the other.” Ultimately, the district court decided against joint physical care primarily because the parents live approximately 150 miles from each other. We agree with the district court that the distance makes joint physical care unworkable here. See Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(h) (listing “geographic proximity of the parents” as a factor to consider); see also Teggatz v. Ellingson, No. 19–1816, 2020 WL 2065944, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020) (affirming the denial of joint physical care because the parents lived almost an hour apart); In re Marriage of Scurr, No. 11–1905, 2012 WL 2122306, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jun. 13, 2012) (affirming grant of physical care to one parent because travel between the parental homes took forty-five minutes). That is especially so given the evidence that the child struggled to return to his usual behaviors during the first few days after an exchange. Moreover, we find an additional detail supports our determination that joint physical care is not in the child’s best interests. The child has some developmental delays with concerns of possible autism. The mother arranged to have home-based services provided to the child, which involves 4 a teacher coming to the mother’s home to work with the child and mother to demonstrate activities they can do and ways to encourage the child’s speech. The program is designed to help the child close his developmental gap before he starts school. Further, the program is designed such that when the child turns three, he will be able to go to school to continue with the services. Given the distance between the parties, the child’s developmental delays, and the benefit of consistent services to help overcome those delays, we find it to be in the child’s best interests to not grant joint physical care to the parents. Instead, we find it to be in the child’s best interests to grant physical care to one parent. This leads us to the father’s final challenge—his claim that, if joint physical care is not granted, he should be the parent granted physical care. B. Deciding Which Parent Is Granted Physical Care The father contends that he has a longer history of stability, the mother’s conduct indicates she would undermine the relationship between the child and father, and that he is better equipped to address the child’s needs. The mother argues that the district court appropriately determined the child’s best interest would be served by granting physical care to her. The district court’s decision to grant physical care to the mother was based on who could provide the most stability and continuity to the child and who would “most likely bring the child to healthy physical, mental, and social maturity.” The district court was able to observe the testimony from both parties and other witnesses, which is why, even with de novo review, we give weight to the court’s fact and credibility findings. See Randall, 15 N.W.3d at 813. Based on our de novo review with weight given to the district court’s fact and credibility findings, we agree with the district court’s decision to grant the mother physical care. The mother lives with her fiancé, his parents 5 who support her, the child, and the child’s younger half-sibling.2 The mother stays at home with the child and is present for services provided to help with his developmental delays. The father is employed while attending college in Missouri and lives with his fiancée, but he has no family nearby. While the father testified that he was willing to move closer and enroll the child in local educational services, the district court noted that no definitive plan was offered. The parties’ child is fortunate that he has two loving and capable parents. But, for the reasons previously noted, joint physical care is not in the child’s best interests at this time. The additional support available to the mother along with her active involvement in securing and partaking in services to help overcome the child’s developmental delays persuade us that the child’s best interests can be better served by placement in the physical care of the mother. So, we affirm the district court’s decision to place the child in the mother’s physical care. II. Appellate Attorney Fees The mother requests appellate attorney fees. Iowa Code section 600B.26 permits us to award appellate attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action to determine custody or visitation under chapter 600B. Benson v. Sullens, No. 24-0376, 2024 WL 4619745, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2024). Appellate attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing party at our discretion, not as a matter of right. Id. To determine whether to award such fees, we consider the needs of the prevailing party, the other party’s ability to pay, and whether the party was obligated to defend the district court’s decision on appeal. Id. The mother was obligated to defend the 2 The mother and her fiancé have a child together. 6 district court’s ruling on appeal, but the mother and father are both young and have financial constraints. We decline to award the mother appellate attorney fees. AFFIRMED. 7