Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0548 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Arnel Dizdarevic, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Joseph Seidlin, Judge. _______________ CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED, SENTENCE REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS _______________ Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Mary K. Conroy, Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Mullins, S.J. Opinion by Mullins, S.J. 1 MULLINS, Senior Judge. A pawnshop security camera recorded Arnel Dizdarevic accepting $2,000 cash for a stolen diamond pendant. After comparing that evidence to footage of a similarly dressed man breaking into the pendant-owner’s apartment earlier the same day, a jury found Dizdarevic guilty of third-degree burglary and second-degree theft. See Iowa Code §§ 713.6A, 714.2(2) (2024). The district court sentenced him to prison. Dizdarevic now appeals, arguing the State’s evidence failed to place him at the scene of the burglary. He also challenges the legality of a “victim offender dialogue” required by the district court’s sentencing order. We review both issues for correction of legal error. See State v. Montgomery, 25 N.W.3d 309, 313 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (sufficiency of the evidence); Anderson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 989 N.W.2d 179, 181 (Iowa 2023) (illegal-sentence claims). I. Sufficiency of the Evidence We begin with Dizdarevic’s claim that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. In considering such a challenge, “[o]ur only task is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s conclusion.” Montgomery, 25 N.W.3d at 316. That standard is satisfied “when the evidence would convince a rational fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Iowa 2021) (cleaned up). We review the whole record in the light most favorable to the State. Id. And we do not attempt to reweigh the evidence or decide questions of credibility—those are duties for the jury. Montgomery, 25 N.W.3d at 316. 2 The trial evidence showed that on October 10, 2024, an Ankeny resident alerted police that her ground-floor apartment had been burglarized. She had returned home from work to find her bedroom blinds broken, her front door ajar, and several items missing from the unit—including a safe that housed a diamond pendant with the initials “D.K.” Police canvassed the apartment complex for leads. Recordings from a neighbor’s security camera soon revealed that two men had visited the unit earlier that day. Although the view is limited by the camera’s angle and resolution, footage introduced at trial depicts a man wearing a color-block jacket, dark pants, and white shoes peering into the apartment and attempting to open a car parked outside. The man then removes an object roughly the size of a window screen before disappearing into the unit. A second man soon approaches the apartment and enters through the front door. After a few minutes, both men exit and depart out of frame. One carries an object the size and shape of a personal safe. Investigators traced the D.K. pendant to a pawnshop in Des Moines. Store security tape from the afternoon of the burglary was also introduced at trial. That footage shows two men—later identified as Dizdarevic and Brian Lee—waiting on a transaction at the pawnshop sales counter. Eventually, an employee passes Dizdarevic and Lee a stack of bills, and both depart the store with cash in hand. A pawnbroker would later testify that the money (totaling $2,000) was paid in exchange for the D.K. pendant, which Dizdarevic claimed belonged to him. In the footage from the shop, Dizdarevic wears a color-block jacket with dark pants and white shoes. The red, white, and black jacket details are consistent with those visible on a burglar at the scene: 3 Screenshot from Apartment Security Footage Screenshot from Pawnshop Security Footage From this evidence, the jury found that Dizdarevic was one of the two men who entered the pendant-owner’s apartment and removed the safe.1 Dizdarevic contends that inference is unsupported. Although he does not deny that he was filmed in the pawnshop, he claims he was there to collect a debt from Lee and that he was unaware of the pendant’s stolen status. Dizdarevic argues there was “nothing . . . unique” about his clothing that day, and so the similarity of his outfit is not enough to identify him as one of the burglars. He also attacks the credibility of the pawnbroker, whose recollection of the transaction differed slightly from what is shown on store security footage. Given these issues with the State’s proof, Dizdarevic claims a rational jury would accept his version of the facts instead. The problem is that the jury heard Dizdarevic’s account at trial, and it did not believe him. See State v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012) (“Inherent in our standard of review of jury verdicts in criminal cases is the recognition that the jury is free to reject certain evidence, and credit other evidence.” (cleaned up)). We are not at liberty to override that determination when it is supported by substantial proof. Considering Dizdarevic’s presence 1 The district court instructed the jury that it could find Dizdarevic guilty of theft and burglary as a principal or, alternatively, as an aider and abettor. Because the general verdict does not specify which theory the jury found persuasive, we must affirm if either is supported by substantial evidence. See Iowa Code § 814.28. 4 at the pawnshop when the pendant was sold, his undisputed receipt of the proceeds, and the uncontroverted video evidence showing a similarly dressed man entering the apartment just a few hours earlier, a rational jury could infer that Dizdarevic participated in the burglary. It could further infer that Dizdarevic either personally removed the owner’s safe or aided and abetted its removal. See State v. Hearn, 797 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Iowa 2011) (explaining evidence of a defendant’s “presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense is committed may be enough” to infer aiding and abetting (cleaned up)). We therefore affirm Dizdarevic’s convictions for burglary and theft. II. Victim-Offender Dialogue Dizdarevic also contends the district court exceeded its authority by ordering him to take part in a victim-offender dialogue (VOD) in addition to his prison sentence. Specifically, the court’s dispositional order required Dizdarevic to “participate in a VOD session with the actual victim of the crime if the victim chooses to participate, and/or . . . with a person who has been trained to serve as a community representative.” Some states’ legislatures have authorized remedies of this nature. E.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.27(A)(12) (permitting a sentencing court to order “victim- offender mediation” as an alternative sanction in misdemeanor cases). There is no such statute in Iowa. District courts “may only impose punishment authorized by the legislature.” State v. Louisell, 865 N.W.2d 590, 598 (Iowa 2015). For class “D” felonies like Dizdarevic’s, our code prescribes an indeterminate sentence of up to five years, along with a fine. See Iowa Code §§ 902.3, 902.9(1). In some cases, that sentence may be suspended or deferred. See id. §§ 901.5, 907.3. But nothing permits the court to fashion additional terms, 5 no matter how well-intentioned. Here, the State concedes the district court exceeded its authority by ordering Dizdarevic to participate in a victim- offender dialogue.2 Unauthorized sentences “are illegal and void.” Louisell, 865 N.W.2d at 597. That said, when an illegality is severable from the balance of a defendant’s sentence, we may vacate the challenged portion without disturbing the rest. See Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 702 (Iowa 2010); State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 1997). Because both parties agree that the district court’s victim-offender dialogue requirement is severable, we vacate that provision and remand for entry of a corrected sentencing order. See State v. Reed, No. 24–0256, 2025 WL 2793578, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025). The remainder of Dizdarevic’s sentence will stand. CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 2 The State contends that it is within a sentencing court’s authority to order a victim-offender dialogue as a condition of probation. See Iowa Code § 907.6; State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 404 (Iowa 2015) (noting a defendant’s probationary sentence required, among other things, her participation in a victim-offender reconciliation program). Dizdarevic takes no position on this issue, and we do not address it. 6