Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 24-1474 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Kevin Richard Lane, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Discretionary Review from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, The Honorable Karen Kaufman Salic, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Leah Patton (argued) of Patton Legal Services, LLC, Ames, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua Henry (argued), Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Heard at oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Buller, JJ. Opinion by Tabor, C.J. 1 TABOR, Chief Judge. A jury convicted Kevin Lane for interference with official acts. He challenges that simple misdemeanor conviction on three grounds. First, he claims the magistrate should have granted his motion to suppress. Second, Lane contends the marshaling instruction did not track the statutory elements. Third, he claims the State presented insufficient evidence of his guilt. Finding no legal errors, we affirm his conviction. I. Facts and Prior Proceedings Around 6:00 a.m., two officers from the Mason City Police Department were dispatched to the home of Lane’s ex-wife. Lane was outside banging on her door, and she wanted him to go away. When the officers asked Lane to leave, he did so. As Lane left, Officer Lucas Akemann followed to see if he was driving because the officer knew Lane’s license was barred. Meanwhile, Officer Seth McChesney stayed behind to speak with Lane’s ex-wife. She asked Officer McChesney to issue a trespass notice banning Lane from her property. While trailing Lane, Officer Akemann learned from dispatch that Lane had “a civil paper that needed to be served.” Officer McChesney also radioed Officer Akemann to notify him about the trespass notice. Officer Akemann repeatedly called for Lane to stop. But Lane did not comply. When Lane eventually paused, Officer Akemann asked him to wait until a deputy arrived to serve him with the civil papers. Lane said the deputy could serve him at his home and again walked away. Still following, Officer Akemann told Lane that he needed to stop at the patrol car waiting across a bridge so that they could issue the trespass notice. When they reached the end of the bridge, Officer Akemann directed 2 Lane toward Officer McChesney’s car. Lane walked in the opposite direction and refused to stop. Officer McChesney exited his car and told Lane: “This is a lawful order for you to stop. You have a civil paper. Kevin, this is a lawful order for you to stop.” Again, Lane refused to stop. The officers grabbed Lane to prevent him from walking away. The officers told Lane he was being detained. Lane resisted, and there was a struggle. The officers took Lane to the ground, and he resisted their attempts to handcuff him. “[H]e, what we call, turtled up. He basically grabbed his belt underneath him so we could not get his hands behind his back.” During the scuffle, Officer McChesney smelled alcohol on Lane’s breath and told him that he was under arrest for public intoxication. Soon Officer Nadia Bahnsen arrived to assist the officers struggling with Lane on the ground. After they handcuffed him and led him to the police car, Lane refused to get into the back seat. The officers instructed Lane many times to sit in the car. After several rounds of refusal, Officer Akemann told Lane it would be another offense for refusing to sit in the car. The officers arrested Lane for interference with official acts and public intoxication. The State charged Lane by trial information with interference with official acts resulting in bodily injury, a serious misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code section 719.1(1)(c) (2023). Lane pleaded not guilty. Later, the State amended the charge to a simple misdemeanor in violation of section 719.1(1)(b). Lane moved to adjudicate a point of law and to suppress evidence gathered during his encounter with police, arguing that the officers “did not have the authority to detain [him] to serve him civil process, and therefore 3 [he] has common-law immunity to the charge in this case.”1 Lane also asked the magistrate to overrule State v. Thomas, which held “a person may not resist an arrest reasonably effected by one whom the arrestee knows . . . is a peace officer, despite legality or illegality of the arrest.” 262 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 1978). The magistrate denied the motion to suppress and refused to overrule Thomas. At the close of the State’s case, Lane moved for judgment of acquittal, alleging insufficient evidence that the officers could have served him with the trespass notice or the civil papers. The magistrate denied the motion. Lane also objected to the marshaling instruction and proposed his own version. But the magistrate rejected his proposal. A jury found Lane guilty of interference with official acts. The magistrate sentenced him to thirty days in jail with credit for time served and imposed a minimum fine and corresponding surcharge. Lane appealed to the district court, alleging: (1) the magistrate erred in denying his motion to suppress, (2) the marshaling instruction did not follow the statute, and (3) the State offered insufficient evidence of his guilt. The district court affirmed the magistrate’s rulings. Lane sought discretionary review. The supreme court granted review and transferred the case to us. Lane now reprises the arguments he advanced in the district court. II. Motion to Suppress Because Lane’s suppression claim involves his constitutional rights, “our standard of review is de novo.” State v. Brown, 890 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Iowa 2017). 1 Lane relies on Iowa Code section 331.652(8), which lists the general power of the sheriff to appoint civil process servers. 4 Lane argues the magistrate erred in denying his motion to suppress because the officers did not have authority to execute civil process. Lane adds that the officers were not in possession of the trespass notice or the civil papers to be served when they ordered him to stop. Lane contends the officers acted illegally in detaining him to serve civil papers or the trespass notice, and thus he has common law immunity to the interference charge. But, recognizing “adverse authority” against his claim, Lane asked the supreme court to retain this case to overrule Thomas. Because the supreme court transferred the case to us, and we cannot overrule Thomas,2 there is little of Lane’s argument left.3 The alleged illegality of his detention was not a valid basis for suppressing the evidence arising from the officer’s orders for him to stop. The magistrate properly denied Lane’s motion to suppress. And the district court was correct to affirm the magistrate’s ruling. We, too, affirm. III. Marshaling Instruction We review the magistrate’s refusal to submit Lane’s proposed jury instruction for correction of errors at law. See State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 694 (Iowa 2017). We examine the instructions as a whole to decide whether they correctly state the law. Id. “[L]ower courts in Iowa are [not] at liberty to anticipatorily overrule [the 2 supreme court’s] precedent.” Bomgaars v. State, 967 N.W.2d 41, 48 n.4 (Iowa 2021). 3 Not until his reply brief did Lane argue that Thomas applies only to arrests and not to a detention like his encounter with police. But we decline to entertain that distinction because an issue cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Young v. Gregg, 480 N.W.2d 75, 78 (Iowa 1992). 5 The magistrate gave the jury this marshaling instruction: The State must prove all of the following elements of Interference with Official Acts. 1. On or about the 17th day of October, 2023, [Lane]: a. Knew Lucas Akemann, Seth Mc[C]hesney, or Nadia Bahnsen was a peace officer who was attempting to arrest [him]; or, b. Knew Lucas Akemann, Seth Mc[C]hesney, or Nadia Bahnsen was a peace officer who was attempting to serve a trespass ban notice on [him]; or c. Knew Lucas Akemann, Seth Mc[C]hesney, or Nadia Bahnsen was assisting in the service of civil process on [him]. 2. [Lane] knowingly resisted or obstructed Lucas Akemann, Seth Mc[C]hesney, or Nadia Bahnsen in arresting, or serving [him] a trespass ban notice, or in assisting with the service of civil process. Lane argues the marshaling instruction did not accurately reflect section 719.1(1)(a). That section states: A person commits interference with official acts when the person knowingly resists or obstructs anyone known by the person to be a peace officer . . . in the performance of any act which is within the scope of the lawful duty or authority of that officer, . . . or who knowingly resists or obstructs the service or execution by any authorized person of any civil or criminal process or order of any court. (emphasis added). Lane offers three reasons why the marshalling instruction was incorrect: (1) it did not include a requirement that he knew the officers were acting within the scope of their lawful duty or authority; (2) it assumed the officers had the authority to assist in the service of civil process when it should have been a jury question; and (3) the statute does not include the 6 words “assisting in the service of civil process” so they should not have been included in the instruction. Lane’s proposed instruction included a requirement that he knew the officers were acting within the scope of their duty or authority and knew the officers were “authorized to serve the defendant civil or criminal process.” A. Knowledge Requirement First, Lane claims that the State must prove not only that he knew the status of the police officers but also that he knew they were acting within the scope of their lawful duty or authority. We decline to read that extra element into section 719.1(1)(a). Lane contends that State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Iowa 1996), supports his position. True, in Buchanan, the trial court instructed the jury that the State needed to prove Buchanan “kn[e]w [the officer] was acting within the scope of his lawful duty or authority.” 549 N.W.2d at 293. But the issue there was not whether Buchanan believed the officer was acting within the scope of his lawful duty or authority. Instead, Buchanan argued “the requirements of ‘knowingly’ resisting and ‘intentionally’ opposing or hindering official acts creates a specific-intent crime entitling him to a specific-intent instruction.” Id. The court rejected Buchanan’s argument. Id. at 294. The Buchanan court’s quotation of the jury instruction was not an endorsement of Lane’s statutory interpretation. The court included the instruction only to show the language used in that trial. Buchanan does not support Lane’s position. Section 719.1(1)(a) requires proof that the defendant knowingly resisted or obstructed someone they knew to be a peace officer. The statute does not require proof that the defendant knew the peace officer was acting 7 within the scope of their lawful duty or authority. For the first part of section 719.1(1)(a), the legislature structured the statute to include three components: (1) resistance or obstruction, (2) of a peace officer, (3) who is performing an act within the officer’s lawful duty or authority. The statute includes a knowing requirement for the first two components but is silent on the third. Because the legislature chose to include a knowing requirement for the first two components, we believe it would have included a knowing requirement for the third component if it intended for the statute to require knowledge that an officer is acting within their lawful duty or authority. See State v. Lind, 37 N.W.3d 23, 29 (Iowa 2026) (“We find a statute’s meaning in its text, the words that the legislature enacted.”). For the second part of section 719.1(1)(a), there are two components: (1) resistance or obstruction, (2) of the service or execution by any authorized person of any civil or criminal process or court order. Again, the legislature included a knowing requirement for the first component, but not the second. The purpose of section 719.1(1) “is to enable officers to execute their peace-keeping duties calmly, efficiently, and without hindrance.” Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d at 294 (citing State v. Hauan, 361 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984)). “Allowing an individual to make his or her own judgment as to whether an officer is acting ‘within the scope of the lawful duty or authority,’ and to resist or obstruct if the individual believes the answer to be ‘no,’ is not consistent with this purpose.” United States v. Clark, No. CR15-3030, 2015 WL 5184490, at *6 (N.D. Iowa Sep. 4, 2015). The State’s marshaling instruction was correct in not including a requirement that Lane know the officers were acting within the scope of their lawful duty or authority. 8 B. Authorization to Serve Civil Process Lane next argues the instruction assumed that the officers were authorized to serve civil process when instead it should have been an issue for the jury and that the language “assisting in the service of civil process” was not in the statute so it should not have been included in the instruction. The State contends that Lane did not preserve his challenge on this portion of the marshaling instruction. “To preserve error on jury instruction, counsel must timely and specifically object to the instruction, or request a different instruction.” State v. Lillibridge, No. 21-0494, 2022 WL 1488562, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2022). Lane broached the issue of whether the officers were authorized to serve process. In his motion to suppress and adjudicate a point of law, he asked the magistrate to rule that the officers were not authorized to serve civil process. The magistrate ruled that whether the officers were authorized was a jury question.4 Lane’s proposed marshaling instruction did not state that the jury needed to decide whether the officers were authorized to serve process. Rather, it required the jury to decide whether Lane knew the officers were authorized to serve process. The two questions are distinct. The parties addressed the issue at the instruction conference. The prosecutor stated, I do think he’s correct in that—as your previous order had stated, I think . . . the jury question is whether there’s evidence that what they were doing was within their legal authority. But it wasn’t whether the defendant knew it. It’s whether it actually, I guess, was part of their duties. So I think that is a jury question.” 4 We take no position on the accuracy of that ruling. 9 But we need not decide whether that issue was preserved because the instruction does not assume the officers were authorized to serve civil process. Instead, it states that Lane interfered with their efforts to assist in the service of process. On that point, Lane argues the statute does not include the words “assisting in the service of civil process” so the magistrate should not have included that language in the instruction. “Although an instruction need not contain or mirror the precise language of the applicable statute, it must be a correct statement of the law.” State v. Schuler, 774 N.W.2d 294, 298 (Iowa 2009). True, the statute does not mention assisting in the service of civil process, but assisting in the service of process falls within an officer’s “lawful duty or authority.” As the State pointed out, the instruction is “not arguing that they were authorized to be process servers, it’s that at the Mason City Police Department, the police officer is supposed to [assist]. . . . So that’s just a way they were being obstructed in doing their duties.” Officer Akemann testified: “So our official duty when it comes to civil papers is the deputies are the ones that serve them, and if we have a subject that needs to be served a paper, we hold them for deputies.” Officer McChesney shared similar information: “[W]e don’t serve them. A deputy will come on scene and serve them. We do assist with, once we locate somebody, to keep them at the premises until they can be served.” This procedure is supported by the fact that dispatch informed the officers that Lane had a civil paper that needed to be served. Because assisting with the service of civil process fell within the officers’ lawful duty or authority, the marshaling instruction was a correct statement of law. 10 IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence Lane next argues there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for interference with official acts. We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence “for the correction of errors at law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.” State v. Brown, 996 N.W.2d 691, 695–96 (Iowa 2023). “In conducting that review, we are highly deferential to the jury’s verdict” and we are bound by the verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence. State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). “Evidence is substantial if it would convince a rational fact finder that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 197 (Iowa 2002). In its appellee’s brief, the State notes that Lane’s sufficiency argument is limited to the third ground: whether the officers had authority to serve civil papers. Because the jury returned a general verdict, the State urges us to affirm on its alternative theories: that Lane interfered by knowingly resisting or obstructing the officers in arresting him and serving a trespass notice. In response, Lane argues for the first time in his reply brief that he “challenges all three theories for interference with official acts.”5 We do not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Iowa 2009). In his opening brief, Lane only challenged the sufficiency of evidence for the third alternative: interfering with the officers’ efforts to assist in the service of civil process. Because Lane did not contest the other theories of guilt, we can affirm on 5 The State moved to strike the reply brief, arguing that Lane’s new claims were not properly before the appellate courts. Instead of striking the entire reply brief, we decline to consider those arguments not raised in the opening brief. 11 those grounds. See Iowa Code § 814.28; State v. Triplett, No. 19-1902, 2021 WL 3074475, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 21, 2021). We will not disrupt the jury’s general verdict. AFFIRMED. 12