Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1897 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ Geordany Diaz Cabeza, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Packers Sanitation Services, Inc., LTD, a/k/a PSSI, Defendant–Appellee. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, The Honorable Eric J. Nelson, Judge. _______________ REVERSED AND REMANDED _______________ Thomp J. Pattermann (argued) and Morgan E. Pattermann of Gallner & Pattermann, P.C., Council Bluffs, attorneys for appellant. Zachary J. Hermsen (argued) and Bryn E. Hazelwonder of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Heard at oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Langholz, J. Dissent by Greer, P.J. 1 LANGHOLZ, Judge. Geordany Diaz Cabeza slipped and fell on the stairs at his workplace early one morning. Packers Sanitation Services, Inc., is the contractor who washes the stairs even earlier every morning. And so, Diaz Cabeza sued Packers Sanitation for negligence seeking damages from the fall. The district court granted summary judgment for Packers Sanitation—ruling that Diaz Cabeza had failed to present sufficient evidence to generate a disputed factual question on the causation element of his negligence claim because it was merely “speculation” whether Packers Sanitation caused Diaz Cabeza’s fall rather than “any other possible cause.” On appeal, Diaz Cabeza argues that the court erred. And we agree. True, Diaz Cabeza had no direct evidence that a Packers Sanitation employee left water on the stairs. But the circumstantial evidence that he presented was more than speculation. It was sufficient—even if just barely—that a reasonable jury could conclude that more likely than not a Packers Sanitation employee caused Diaz Cabeza to slip and fall on the stairs. We thus reverse the summary-judgment ruling and remand for further proceedings. I. Diaz Cabeza worked at a meat-processing facility at the time of his fall. Packers Sanitation is a sanitation company that Diaz Cabeza’s employer contracts with to clean the facility. There is a staircase inside the facility leading from the main level to a hallway, a laundry area, and a raw-meat- processing area on the lower level. A Packers Sanitation employee washes and squeegees the staircase early every morning before the facility’s meat- processing workers arrive. There is also a boot-washing station on the lower level between the raw-meat-processing area and the staircase, which anyone 2 entering or leaving the meat-processing area is required to use to clean their shoes. A few minutes before 5:00 a.m. on December 7, 2019, Diaz Cabeza— who had recently arrived at the facility to start his shift—slipped and fell while descending the staircase. Two years later, he sued Packers Sanitation for negligence.1 In his petition, Diaz Cabeza alleged that Packers Sanitation “employees dumped water with chemicals down the stairs” and failed to warn “that the area was unsafe” before his fall, which resulted in “severe and permanent injuries.” Packers Sanitation denied liability and eventually moved for summary judgment, arguing that there were no genuine issues of material fact and Diaz Cabeza’s negligence claim failed as a matter of law because he could not “meet his burden to produce evidence showing [Packers Sanitation] ‘dumped water with chemicals down the stairs’ and thereby caused a hazard on the stairs that caused [Diaz Cabeza] to slip and fall” (cleaned up). 2 In support of its summary-judgment motion, Packers Sanitation submitted two affidavits from its current site manager 3 at the meat-processing facility; photos of the boot-washing station; and excerpts from the parties’ initial disclosures, answers to interrogatories, and responses to requests for production of documents. 1 Diaz Cabeza later amended his petition to add a claim for exemplary damages. 2 Packers Sanitation also argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because “any alleged moisture on the stairs on December 7, 2019, if such moisture existed, was open and obvious to workers at [the meat-processing facility], including [Diaz Cabeza], and [Diaz Cabeza]’s claim is accordingly barred” (cleaned up). Packers Sanitation does not renew this alternative argument on appeal. 3 He was not the site manager at the facility at the time of Diaz Cabeza’s fall. 3 Diaz Cabeza resisted the summary-judgment motion, arguing that there were genuine issues of material fact and he had produced “evidence which [was] sufficient enough for a jury/fact finder to find in [his] favor.” In support of his resistance, Diaz Cabeza submitted his own affidavit; deposition testimony of the Packers Sanitation site manager; a surveillance video showing his fall4; deposition testimony of Raul Hernandez Olvera, the Packers Sanitation employee who routinely cleaned the staircase where Diaz Cabeza fell; and a copy of Hernandez’s timecard showing that he was working at the time of Diaz Cabeza’s fall. After the summary-judgment hearing, the district court found it was “undisputed that [Packers Sanitation] employee Raul Hernandez Olvera cleaned the stairs the morning of [Diaz Cabeza]’s fall and that the cleaning process involved the use of water being applied to the stairs. What is disputed is whether the alleged water on the stairs when [Diaz Cabeza] fell was due to the cleaning process.” And the court concluded: Here, there is no evidence that the [Packers Sanitation] cleaning process caused [Diaz Cabeza]’s fall. Assuming there was, in fact, water on the stairs when [Diaz Cabeza] fell, there is nothing in the record that would support a finding this presence of water was due to [Packers Sanitation] and not any other possible cause. Therefore, the Court finds that summary judgment is proper regarding causation, and the claim of negligence must fail as a matter of law. 4 The twenty-eight-second video only shows the fall itself and the immediately surrounding seconds—not anything else that happened on the stairs leading up to the fall. In his summary-judgment resistance, Diaz Cabeza asserted that he “was only provided footage of the exact time of his fall and no footage of the hour prior, even though [he] did request video footage or photographs from [Packers Sanitation] depicting the stairs for two hours prior, at the time of, and for two hours subsequent.” 4 The court thus granted summary judgment for Packers Sanitation and dismissed Diaz Cabeza’s petition. Diaz Cabeza filed a motion to reconsider under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904. But the court also denied that motion, reasoning: There is no evidence in the record of what occurred on or to the stairs between the cleaning and the fall. The Court cannot see how [Diaz Cabeza] would have personal knowledge regarding the stairs before he began to descend them. And without this knowledge, his conclusion that the water must have been from the cleaning is speculative. To infer that because the stairs were wet and had a chemical odor it had to be due to the actions of [Packers Sanitation] stretches the inference far beyond what the evidence supports. Therefore, the Court declines to reconsider its prior order finding that [Diaz Cabeza]’s claim of negligence fails as there is insufficient evidence regarding causation. Diaz Cabeza now appeals. II. We review the district court’s summary-judgment ruling for correction of errors at law. Peak v. Adams, 799 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Iowa 2011). The district court must grant a motion for summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” submitted in support or resistance of the motion “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). The nonmoving “party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(5). 5 On our review, we “must look at the facts in a light most favorable to the [nonmoving] party” and “consider on behalf of the nonmoving party every legitimate inference that can be reasonably deduced from the record.” Peak, 799 N.W.2d at 542–43 (cleaned up). But even so, “[s]ummary judgment is not a dress rehearsal or practice run for trial but rather the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a nonmoving party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events.” Buboltz v. Birusingh, 962 N.W.2d 747, 754–55 (Iowa 2021) (cleaned up). “And if, after considering all that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no reasonable mind could differ on how the factual issues should be resolved—and the law applied to those facts compels judgment for the moving party—summary judgment must be granted.” In re Est. of River, 6 N.W.3d 13, 17–18 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024). To succeed on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) the existence of a duty, (2) failure to conform to that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages. See Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Iowa 2009). Only the third element—causation—is at issue here.5 Whether a plaintiff can prove causation is typically “a question for the jury.” Id. at 836. But “[w]hen a jury is left to speculate on whether the defendant’s conduct in fact caused the plaintiff’s damages, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of [causation].” Hasselman v. Hasselman, 596 N.W.2d 541, 546 (Iowa 1999); see also Schantz v. Wild Rose Emmetsburg, LLC, No. 19-0509, 2020 WL 375941, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2020) (“[T]he proof in any case must 5 Causation has two components: factual cause and scope of liability. See State v. Roach, 920 N.W.2d 93, 101 (Iowa 2018) (“The defendant’s conduct is a [factual cause] of the plaintiff’s harm if, but-for the defendant’s conduct, that harm would not have occurred.” (cleaned up)); Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 837–39 (adopting the scope-of-liability test articulated in the Restatement (Third) of Torts in place of the proximate-cause test). 6 be such that the fact finder is not left to speculate about who the negligent culprit is.”); Hlubek v. Pelecky, 701 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Iowa 2005) (“Speculation is not sufficient to generate a genuine issue of fact.”). And while “[i]nferences can assist in establishing a basic fact, . . . they cannot in and of themselves create evidence.” Schantz, 2020 WL 375941, at *3 (cleaned up). Diaz Cabeza contends that the district court erred “by failing to recognize reasonable inferences which could lead a reasonable jury to conclude” that Packers Sanitation caused his fall, and thus, summary judgment was improper. Viewing the facts in the summary-judgment record—and drawing all reasonable inferences from them—in the light most favorable to Diaz Cabeza, we agree. True, Diaz Cabeza did not produce direct evidence affirmatively showing that Packers Sanitation—and not another culprit—caused him to slip and fall. But circumstantial evidence can be enough to generate a jury question on causation in slip-and-fall cases. See Perkins v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 817, 820–21 (Iowa 1994) (concluding that although the plaintiff was unsure how she fell and no one saw her fall, debris on her hands and clothing coupled with the store’s failure to do required sweeping provided sufficient evidence to generate a jury question on causation); Randol v. Roe Enters., Inc., 524 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Iowa 1994) (concluding that although the plaintiff was unsure how she fell and no one saw her fall, the drop-off between a paved and graveled portion of the parking lot generated a jury question on causation given the mechanics of her fall); Schantz, 2020 WL 375941, at *3 (concluding that although “other than by implication, the record show[ed] no identified defendant caused the bathtub/shower to be slippery,” a jury question on causation was generated because the plaintiff “developed circumstantial evidence that the bathtub/shower condition may not have 7 been safe”). And we conclude that the circumstantial evidence in this summary-judgment record was enough—even if just barely—that a reasonable jury could infer that a Packers Sanitation employee left water on the stairs while cleaning them, which caused Diaz Cabeza’s fall. It is undisputed that a Packers Sanitation employee cleaned the staircase where Diaz Cabeza fell early every morning before the facility’s meat-processing workers arrived. The Packers Sanitation site manager testified at his deposition that “on the weekends, they would apply chemicals and wash” to the stairs. Raul Hernandez Olvera, the Packers Sanitation employee who routinely cleaned the stairs and who was working on the morning of Diaz Cabeza’s fall, testified that he would use “the pressure washer and hot water” and “a little bit of bleach” to wash the stairs before rinsing and squeegeeing them.6 The day of Diaz Cabeza’s fall was a Saturday, so according to the testimony of both Packers Sanitation employees, the stairs would have been washed using water and chemicals that morning. And in his affidavit, Diaz Cabeza said that “[a]fter [he] fell and was on the ground, [he] could feel the stairs were still wet,” and he “smelled the bleach or other pungent cleaning chemical in the water.” While the parties do not dispute that the stairs were cleaned on the morning of Diaz Cabeza’s fall, they do dispute the timeline of the cleaning process. The site manager said in his affidavit that Packers Sanitation “cleaned the stairs where Mr. [Diaz] Cabeza fell . . . at 4 AM every day, give or take a few minutes,” and “[a]ny remaining dampness on the stairs would be dried within approximately 11–15 minutes” (cleaned up). But Hernandez testified that he is usually done cleaning the stairs “between 4:15 and 4:30,” 6 Hernandez did not remember the specific day of Diaz Cabeza’s fall, but he described his routine process for cleaning the stairs in his deposition testimony. 8 it takes “20 minutes” for the stairs to dry, and he removes wet floor signs at the top of the stairs at “about 5:00 a.m.” According to the timestamp on the surveillance video showing his fall, Diaz Cabeza fell on the stairs at 4:56 a.m. And according to Diaz Cabeza’s affidavit, “the stairs were still wet” at that time, and “[t]here were no signs warning of wet floors anywhere near the stairs.” What’s more, Diaz Cabeza said in his affidavit that the “boot washing station does not use bleach water, or a cleaning chemical with a similar smell. The boot wash uses soap without the strong smell that I smelled in the water on the stairs.” Diaz Cabeza also said that when he fell on the stairs, “it was during downtime and before shift change so no one was using the boot wash yet.” The site manager testified that only the facility’s maintenance workers were present between 1:00 and 5:00 a.m., quality assurance inspected the facility’s equipment around 5:00 a.m., and production started at 6:00 a.m. And Hernandez testified that the facility’s production workers “go down [and] wash their boots before they start their shift” at “about 5:30 [or] 6:00 in the morning,” but “there [aren’t] people really going up or down” the stairs before then when he is cleaning. All these facts together, viewed in the light most favorable to Diaz Cabeza, were enough for a jury to reasonably infer that any water on the stairs at the time of Diaz Cabeza’s fall more likely came from the Packers Sanitation cleaning process than from the boot-washing station or some other, unknown source. Of course, Packers Sanitation may be able to convince a jury otherwise. But this is a classic factual question for the jury to decide at trial. Because Diaz Cabeza generated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Packers Sanitation caused him to slip and fall on the stairs, the 9 district court erred in granting summary judgment. We thus reverse the summary-judgment ruling and remand for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Buller, J., concurs; Greer, P.J., dissents. 10 GREER, Presiding Judge (dissenting). The district court got it right, so I dissent. Geordany Diaz Cabeza’s theme that he fell because there was water on the stairs left by Packers Sanitation, the cleaning contractor, at the raw-meat-processing plant, is not supported by sufficient evidence, relies upon speculation, and thus, cannot survive summary judgment, even though the majority concluded it “barely” could. As an employee at the meat-processing facility, Diaz Cabeza alleges that Packers Sanitation (1) provided negligent cleaning and (2) failed to warn of dangerous conditions when it “dumped water with chemicals down the stairs” at the facility before his fall. He seems to argue that if he can show there is a possibility that Packers Sanitation did not dry the stairs before the fall, his case survives summary judgment. In his briefing, he relies upon Iowa cases that addressed slip-and-falls on water in a store and icy conditions at a hospital parking lot to show a jury question was presented by his facts. See generally Wieseler v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 540 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1995); Coleman v. Monson, 522 N.W.2d 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). I would note that the duties alleged here involved a contractor working in a facility with conditions that might require heightened awareness related to the plant’s operation, so cases involving falls outside of a workplace are not instructive. For example, tripping over boards on the floor in a retail store might require a different liability analysis than tripping over boards stacked at a construction project. As for the cases referenced by Diaz Cabeza related to workplace injuries, I do not find them compelling. For example, he cites to a New York case involving a slip-and-fall at a work site addressing New York labor laws, but notes that the jury question on causation related to expert evidence over 11 “industry standards for safe scaffolding.” See O’Brien v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 74 N.E.3d 307, 311 (N.Y. 2017). Expert evidence about the cleaning product or the cleaning process might convince me that a jury question was generated here, but we find nothing of the sort in this record. Instead, as the district court found, “there is no evidence that the [Packers Sanitation] cleaning process caused [Diaz Cabeza’s] fall,” so, a jury would only be left with speculation about the causation claims made by Diaz Cabeza. To establish a negligence claim under Iowa law, Diaz Cabeza has to prove “the existence of a duty to conform to a standard of conduct to protect others, a failure to conform to that standard,” factual cause, scope of liability, and damages. McCormick v. Nikkel & Assocs., Inc., 819 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Iowa 2009)). In his brief, Diaz Cabeza lists three disputed possibilities arising from the facts that require jury determination on the causation question: “1. There was no water at all; 2. PSSI’s water still remained on the stairs at 4:56 a.m., coupled with no warning signs; 3. Water was on the stairs from [the processing facility’s] workers.” True, given the facts developed here, when considered in the light most favorable to Diaz Cabeza, there is the possibility that the stairs in the plant were wet when he fell. Yet, as the district court opined, although Diaz Cabeza stated in his affidavit that “the stairs were slippery due to [Packers Sanitation’s] cleaning” he could “not state how he draws this conclusion.” It found no evidence that Packers Sanitation’s cleaning process caused the fall and there is no evidence the process used was improper. That’s because there is none. See Easton v. Howard, 751 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2008) (noting fault “is not to be assumed from the mere fact of an accident and an injury”). We know from the undisputed facts that moisture does exist on the steps used by the facility’s employees. 12 As I see this case, the core causation allegation centers around whether Packers Sanitation left water on the stairs and that its cleaning process made the steps slippery. This record only addresses the basic speculation that water remained on the steps. True, the district court found speculation in whether the actions of Packers Sanitation created wet conditions on the steps, but it also noted that Diaz Cabeza’s proof failed in showing that the stairs were slippery due to the cleaning. What we do know from the summary judgment record is that no one testified what “chemicals” were used on the steps, if the chemicals were the type that made the steps slippery, or if the manner in which Packers Sanitation performed the cleaning process breached some standard of cleaning in the industry. We do know the steps were often wet because the plant workers were required to have their boots washed when coming and going from different parts of the plant.7 Plus, there were other maintenance workers on site from 1:00 until 5:00 a.m. And we know that the steps had skid-resistant surfaces, likely to consider the possibility that water might exist on the surface, even during the day. And since Packers Sanitation was not tasked with the step design or managing the operation of the plant, those are not themes of liability before us. If the issue is that water caused the fall, then the inherent danger involved rests with the processing facility who had control of the stairs and could control if moisture on the steps created a hazardous condition because once the contractor finished its work and left, the employer had full control of the site and its safety. See DeSousa v. Iowa Realty Co., 975 N.W.2d 416, 421 (Iowa 2022) 7 It was mandatory that anyone entering or leaving the processing facility process their footwear through the “boot bath” that was near the bottom of the stairs to avoid cross-contamination between the raw food processing area and the cooked food department areas. 13 (noting “[t]he party in control of the work site is best positioned to take precautions to identify risks and take measures to improve safety.”). But to return to Packers Sanitation’s liability, no one even testified that a slippery condition occurred because the steps were wet as opposed to the general flooring conditions found at a raw-meat-packing plant. It was noted that special skid-proof footwear was required in the plant, not the sneakers worn by Diaz Cabeza. Tellingly, Diaz Cabeza acknowledges the general condition of the steps and attempts to distance the fall as occurring as if no water would be on them, by stating “[w]hile [Packers Sanitation] blames any liquid accumulation on [the plant’s] employees using the boot wash, [Packers Sanitation’s employee] confirmed other people are not typically using the steps when he is cleaning them.” To me that is a concession that the plant had conditions involving wet flooring. So, in the end, “[w]hen a jury is left to speculate on whether the defendant’s conduct in fact caused the plaintiff’s damages, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of [causation].” Hasselman v. Hasselman, 596 N.W.2d 541, 546 (Iowa 1999). “[I]t is not enough there is a mere possibility that the injury is chargeable to the negligence of defendant, and a recovery may not rest wholly on conjecture.” Easton, 751 N.W.2d at 6 (citation omitted). At the summary judgment “put up or shut up” stage of litigation, I cannot find sufficient facts raised that could lead a reasonable jury to do more than speculate about who caused the conditions that allegedly caused Diaz Cabeza to fall. Slaughter v. Des Moines Univ. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 925 N.W.2d 793, 808 (Iowa 2019). In my view, summary judgment was warranted. 14