Full Opinion

IN THE Indiana Supreme Court FILED Supreme Court Case No. 26S-OR-265 Oct 02 2026, 11:08 am CLERK State of Indiana ex rel. Indiana Department Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court of Transportation, Relator, –v– Harrison Circuit Court and the Honorable Justin B. Mills, Special Judge, Respondents. Decided: October 2, 2026 Petition for Writ of Mandamus under Indiana’s Rules of Procedure for Original Actions Per Curiam Opinion Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa and Goff concur. Justices Slaughter and Molter dissent, believing an original action is improper because the State had an available appellate remedy under Appellate Rule 14(B) that it chose not to pursue. Per curiam. In a condemnation proceeding, the appraisers’ award becomes final if no party files exceptions within 45 days. Ind. Code § 32-24-1-11; see State v. Universal Outdoor, Inc., 880 N.E.2d 1188, 1190 (Ind. 2008) (holding that “[i]f no exceptions are timely filed, the appraisers’ award in the filed report becomes final.”). Here, when no party filed exceptions to move this matter toward mediation, Relator—the Indiana Department of Transportation (“the State”)—sought judgment on the appraisers’ award. The trial court denied this motion and instead sought to hold the State’s counsel in contempt for “intentionally disobeying an order of this court” to mediate damages. The State now seeks a writ ordering the trial court to enter judgment and vacate its orders directing the parties to mediate damages. Because we find that the State is entitled to judgment on the appraisers’ award, we grant this writ and order the trial court to (1) vacate and cease enforcement of its orders directing the parties to mediate damages; and (2) enter judgment memorializing the appropriation for the property and disburse the funds deposited with the clerk. I. Background and Procedural History As part of a project to improve State Road 11 in Harrison County, the State sought to appropriate a parcel of Jeremy Willis’s property. When Willis disagreed with the offered price, the State filed a complaint for appropriation in January 2025. Special Judge Justin Mills accepted jurisdiction. After an extension of time, Willis filed an objection to the taking; the judge overruled the objection and denied Willis’s motion to dismiss in May 2025. Willis moved to reconsider. After a hearing, the judge emailed the parties to inform them that he planned to deny the motion. The judge also informed the parties that “[t]he matter is going to be sent to mediation, however I believe appraisers and an evaluation all need to be set in place and completed beforehand. Can the parties agree on a mediator or do I need to set a panel?” Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-OR-265 | October 2, 2026 Page 2 of 9 The State’s counsel indicated that, before mediation, the parties needed to go through the appropriation process as a starting point. She also informed the parties that she “will ask for internal approval” on Willis’s suggested mediator “and get back to [counsel].” The trial court then issued an order denying Willis’s motion to reconsider and reaffirming the order to mediation. In late 2025, the State filed its instructions for appraisers and other forms and refiled its motion for appropriation and appointment of appraisers. In January 2026, Willis’s counsel contacted the State to ask if their suggested mediator had been approved. The State’s counsel replied that she had “not yet confirmed with INDOT about [the mediator] because the court has not yet appointed appraisers. It is possible that the appraisal report will give a sum that is acceptable to both parties and mediation will not be necessary. The State does not schedule mediation before exceptions have been filed in condemnation cases.” After a telephone conference, the trial court appointed appraisers, who filed their joint report on March 25, 2026. The trial clerk sent the report to the parties later that day. Under Indiana Code § 32-24-1-11(b)(2), the parties had until Monday, May 11 to file exceptions to the report. That section provides in relevant part that “[a]ny party … aggrieved by the assessment of benefits or damages in a report of the appraisers may file written exceptions… . Exceptions to the assessment must be filed by a party: (1) after the report of the appraisers is filed with the court; and (2) not later than forty-five (45) days after the date the circuit court clerk mails the report[.]” On May 18, after the parties did not file exceptions, the State deposited Willis’s compensation ($20,840) and the appraisers’ fees ($12,400) with the trial court. And on June 1, the State moved for judgment, citing S. Ind. Gas Elec. Co. v. Decker, 307 N.E.2d 51, 53 (Ind. 1974) (noting that the Supreme Court “has consistently held that when no exceptions are filed within the statutory period the trial court is without jurisdiction to try the issue of damages.”). Decker, in turn, cites State ex rel. Agan v. Hendricks Super. Ct., 235 N.E.2d 458 (Ind. 1968), where we vacated the trial court’s denial of the landowner’s motion to strike the State’s exceptions, which were filed after the statutory period (then 10 days) elapsed. Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-OR-265 | October 2, 2026 Page 3 of 9 The next day, Willis’s counsel asserted in an email to the State’s counsel that the motion for judgment was a “bad faith motion” because Willis “has been trying to get this mediation set” since September 2025. Willis’s counsel further claimed that “[t]he Judge’s order to mediation tolls any requirements to object to the Appraisers Report.” The State’s counsel replied that the order did not remove the obligation to file exceptions that would trigger the next stage of litigation, and the time to do so had expired by statute. Willis’s counsel then filed an objection and request for sanctions, reiterating his position that the September 2025 mediation order “was essentially a stay of all proceedings” except for the filing of the appraisers’ report. The judge issued two orders on June 15, 2026. The first denied the State’s motion for judgment and ordered the parties to complete mediation. The second scheduled a hearing on sanctions against the State’s counsel. The State objected to the order to mediate, arguing that it was entitled to judgment on the appraisers’ award and the judge could not order mediation when damages had already been set. The judge denied the State’s objection and ordered the State’s counsel “to show cause as to why a finding of contempt should not be entered for intentionally disobeying an Order of this Court regarding mediation as well as misleading the Court as to the State of Indiana’s effort to achieve mediation.” The State then filed this original action, arguing that the respondent judge failed to act when under a duty to act by refusing to enter judgment on the appraisers’ award. After response and reply briefing, the matter is ripe for our consideration. II. The State is entitled to judgment under Indiana Code section 32-24-1-11. The State seeks a writ (1) requiring the respondent court to vacate its orders directing the parties to mediate damages; and (2) prohibiting the court from exercising further jurisdiction “other than to enter judgment memorializing appropriation and compensation already fixed for the property and for disbursement of funds already deposited with the clerk.” Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-OR-265 | October 2, 2026 Page 4 of 9 A. If no party files exceptions to an appraiser’s award, the award is conclusive as to damages. Appellate precedent holds, without exception, that an appraiser’s award is binding if—as here—no party timely files exceptions. See, e.g., Universal Outdoor, 880 N.E.2d at 1190 (defining when the exception period begins to run and noting that this “is crucial because the failure to file exceptions within the articulated time frame deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to hear the issue of damages.”); Lehnen v. State, 693 N.E.2d 580, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that if neither party files exceptions, the appraisers' award is conclusive), trans. denied; Decker, 307 N.E.2d at 53. While these cases rely on an imprecise use of the term “jurisdiction”— that is, characterizing “a claim of procedural error as one of jurisdictional dimension”—the principle remains the same. K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Ind. 2006). Willis’s damages became fixed by statute when he did not file exceptions within 45 days of the appraisers’ report. Willis asserted, and the respondent judge appears to agree, that the September 2025 mediation order tolled any requirement to object to the appraisers’ report. But as we held in Clear Creek Conservancy Dist. v. Kirkbride, 743 N.E.2d 1116, 1119 (Ind. 2001), the trial court lacks authority to relieve landowners from failing to file their exceptions by the statutory deadline. And while the respondent judge characterizes the State’s actions as “gotcha” litigation, the State remained consistent about the order of proceedings that I.C. § 32-24-1-11 lays out — the court appoints appraisers, the appraisers provide their report, the parties file exceptions, and, if necessary, the parties mediate. In January 2026, before appraisers were appointed, the State’s counsel informed Willis’s counsel that the State “does not schedule mediation before exceptions have been filed[.]” When no party filed exceptions here, the path to mediation was truncated. B. The petition meets Indiana’s original action requirements. The State has a compelling argument that it is entitled to judgment under I.C. § 32-24-1-11 and the cases that apply it. But there are other Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-OR-265 | October 2, 2026 Page 5 of 9 requirements for a writ to issue, and the respondent judge argues that not all have yet been met. More specifically, he asserts that the State has an adequate appellate remedy on both interlocutory and direct appeal. Original Action Rule 3(A) requires all petitions to be verified and state facts showing clearly that: (1) the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the matter as an original action; (2) the petition is made expeditiously after the respondent court’s jurisdiction became an issue; (3) the respondent court has exceeded its jurisdiction or the respondent court has failed to act when it was under a duty to act; (4) the absence of the respondent court’s jurisdiction or the court’s failure to act when it was under a duty to act has been raised by a written motion filed therein and brought to the attention of the respondent judge, and the written motion has been denied or not ruled on timely …; (5) the denial of the petition will result in extreme hardship; and (6) the remedy available by appeal will be wholly inadequate. On the face of the pleadings, the State has established elements (1) through (4). The State filed its petition about two weeks after the trial court’s order denying its request for judgment and setting a show cause hearing. As explained in Section II(A), the respondent court failed in its duty to act by refusing to enter judgment when the law is clear that the appraisers’ award becomes final if exceptions are not filed. And the State raised this issue to the court in its June 23 motion, which was promptly denied. Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-OR-265 | October 2, 2026 Page 6 of 9 1. Denial of the petition will result in extreme hardship. The State argues that denying its petition will result in extreme hardship by subjecting it to unlawful orders beyond the court’s authority. It adds that it finds itself in an ethical Catch-22, where complying with the judge’s orders (under threat of sanctions and contempt) requires it to act adversely to its client’s interests and the law. We have declined to find extreme hardship in cases where an appeal would be time-consuming or costly, holding that “[w]here the matter lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, this Court will not consider applications for writs of mandate and prohibition since the legal remedy of an appeal is adequate.” State ex rel. Neese v. Montgomery Cir. Ct., 399 N.E.2d 375, 376 (Ind. 1980) (citing State ex rel. Shelbyville Newspapers, Inc. v. Shelby Super. Ct., 396 N.E.2d 337, 339 (Ind. 1979)); see also State ex rel. Petty v. Super. Ct. of Marion Cnty., Room 3, 378 N.E.2d 822, 823 (Ind. 1978). But here, the trial court lost its discretion to deny the State’s motion for judgment when Willis failed to timely file exceptions to the appraisers’ report. This, combined with the ethical conundrum the State finds itself in if it is compelled to mediate a judgment amount that has already been fixed by law, is sufficient to establish extreme hardship. 2. Though the State has an appellate remedy, it meets the “wholly inadequate” threshold. As we noted in State ex rel. Thoe v. Marion Super. Ct. 5, 260 N.E.3d 882, 886–87 (Ind. 2025), some writ petitions merit relief because the appellate remedy is not just inadequate, but nonexistent. See also State ex rel. Commons v. Pera, 987 N.E.2d 1074 (Ind. 2013) (granting writ to prevent a non-merit-selected judge’s assignment to the juvenile division). But absolute inadequacy, not impossibility, is the standard. For example, trial courts can certify for interlocutory appeal the denial of a motion for change of judge, yet the last two original action petitions the full Court has considered involve change-of-judge motions. Orig. Act. R. 2(E); see State ex rel. Frounfelter v. Cass Super. Ct. 1, 276 N.E.3d 1261 (Ind. Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-OR-265 | October 2, 2026 Page 7 of 9 2026) (denying writ); State ex rel. Campos-Frutos v. Cass Cir. Ct., 264 N.E.3d 636 (Ind. 2025) (granting writ). Here, the State could have sought discretionary interlocutory appeal of the order denying its motion to enter judgment, though the trial court would have discretion to deny certification. The State could also have proceeded to mediation and then appealed any final judgment entered. But as the State noted in its reply brief, two things could happen if the case goes to mediation: First, setting aside ethical barriers, the parties could agree to a different compensation amount. Having agreed to that amount, the State could not request a return to the current compensation on appeal. Or second, considering ethical barriers, the parties would not reach a settlement, and the case would go to trial. Then the landowner’s compensation would be set by a jury, and … that number would be the subject of an appeal. In short, if the case goes to illegal mediation, then the legal damages are not coming back. Reply Br. at 12. The first potential path sets aside the ethical conflict of the State’s potential acquiescence to a different compensation amount than that fixed by law. But that conflict is significant when this would waive the State’s ability to return to the statutory damages on appeal. And the respondent court’s refusal to render a judgment mandated by statute— requiring the parties to pursue mediation, appeal, and remand simply to get to square one—makes relief appropriate on appellate-remedy grounds. See State ex rel. Randolph v. Hancock Cir. Ct., 182 N.E.2d 248, 250 (Ind. 1962) (holding that “[s]ince the respondent court refused to render judgment, mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the rendering of judgment.” (internal citation omitted)). Conclusion Finding that the State is entitled to judgment on the appraisers’ award, we grant this writ and order the trial court to (1) vacate and cease enforcing its orders that direct the parties to mediate damages; and (2) enter judgment Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-OR-265 | October 2, 2026 Page 8 of 9 memorializing the appropriation for the property and disburse the funds deposited with the clerk. This opinion terminates the original action proceedings in this Court. No petitions for rehearing or motions to reconsider are allowed. Orig. Act. R. 5(C). Rush, C.J., and Massa and Goff, JJ., concur. Slaughter and Molter, JJ., dissent, believing an original action is improper because the State had an available appellate remedy under Appellate Rule 14(B) that it chose not to pursue. ATTORNEYS FOR RELATOR, IND. DEP’T OF TRANSPORTATION Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Angela N. Sanchez Chief Counsel of Appeals Jesse R. Drum Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT, HON. JUSTIN B. MILLS Tyler D. Helmond Voyles Lukemeyer Baldwin Webb & Helmond Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR INTERESTED PARTY, JEREMY J. WILLIS Gordon D. Ingle Evan Bardach Ingle Bardach Law Office Corydon, Indiana Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-OR-265 | October 2, 2026 Page 9 of 9