Harve Hensley v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. FILED Oct 16 2026, 9:20 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Harve Hensley, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff October 16, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-CR-586 Appeal from the Jefferson Superior Court The Honorable Blaine S. Goode, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 39D01-2510-F6-001062 Opinion by Judge Felix Chief Judge Tavitas and Judge Bradford concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 1 of 21  Felix, Judge. Statement of the Case [1] Despite numerous decisions from courts of this State, Harve Hensley has continued to claim ownership of certain real property and to harass its true owner. Hensley was charged with and convicted of stalking and perjury, and he was sentenced to a total of six years of incarceration. Hensley appeals and raises several issues for our review, which we reorder and restate as follows: 1. Whether the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to amend the charging information; 2. Whether the trial court clearly erred by denying Hensley’s Indiana Trial Rule 41(B) motion; 3. Whether the stalking conviction relies on a fatal variance; 4. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Hensley’s perjury conviction; and 5. Whether Hensley’s sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). [2] We affirm. Facts and Procedural History [3] In 2006, Hensley’s father Bronson Hensley, Sr. (“Bronson Sr.”) created a revocable living trust (the “Trust”). The Trust did not name Hensley as a beneficiary “[u]pon the death” of Bronson Sr. Ex. Vol. IV. at 206. Instead, the Trust indicated that Bronson Sr. had “paid $3,576.96” to Hensley during Bronson Sr.’s life. Id. The Trust named Bronson Hensley, Jr. (“Bronson Jr.”), another one of Bronson Sr.’s sons, as a successor trustee to Bronson Sr. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 2 of 21 [4] After Bronson Sr.’s death in 2017, Bronson Jr. was appointed trustee. In July 2019, the trial court administering the trust proceedings granted Bronson Jr.’s petition to sell Trust-owned property (“the Property”) in West Deputy, Indiana. The petition was granted over Hensley’s opposition. Hensley had claimed that he was the trustee and sole beneficiary of the Trust.1 The trial court rejected this claim, finding that Hensley was “not . . . the trustee of the Trust” and Hensley’s interest in the Trust had been “ade[emed]” through “inter vivos cash gifts” from Bronson Sr. 2 Ex. Vol. II at 39. [5] On October 7, 2019, acting as trustee, Bronson Jr. sold the Property to Gabrielle Hubbard. Days later, Hensley went to the Property at night, confronted Hubbard and her parents, and insisted that the Property belonged to him. [6] In October 2020, Hensley called Hubbard’s father Mark Nay and accused him of “stealing” timber from the Property. Tr. Vol. II at 156. Also that month, Hensley posted on Facebook, “If anyone sees that piece of sh[*]t, bankruptcy filing, slug on society [Mark,] tell him that Harve Hensley is looking for him 1 Hensley claimed this was so under the “doctrine of acts of independent significance” because (1) he was “named as a child of issue” in Bronson Sr.’s will but was “not named as a member of the remainderman class of beneficiaries in the Trust,” (2) he was “not omitted” in Bronson Sr.’s will, (3) he “only received a cash gift under the Trust,” and (4) “the terms of the trust instrument specifically create a position for an individual person to be sole beneficiary and Trustee.” Ex. Vol. II at 31. 2 Hensley’s appeal of this and related rulings was dismissed. Hensley v. Hensley, 150 N.E.3d 1089, No. 19A- TR-2376 (Ind. Ct. App. July 17, 2020) (mem.). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 3 of 21  and that I got something for him. I’ll be in the Deputy area until I get up with him.” Ex. Vol. I at 90. [7] Between late 2019 and 2020, Hensley changed his postal address to the Property and received mail there. In December 2020, Hensley attempted to record several quitclaim deeds purporting to transfer the Property along with other properties from the Trust to himself. Hensley was convicted of forging the documents. During his sentencing hearing, Hensley said that after he was released from prison, he planned to live at the Property, which was “available” to him. Ex. Vol. VI at 26. This court affirmed Hensley’s forgery conviction, concluding that “he was both aware that he did not possess the authority to convey the Propert[y] and that he was not entitled [to] receive the conveyances.” Ex. Vol. III at 160; see Hensley v. State, 225 N.E.3d 173, No. 23A-CR-601, slip op. at ¶ 10 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2023) (mem.), trans. denied, 230 N.E.3d 889 (Ind. 2024). [8] In February 2021, Hensley purported to be the Trust’s sole trustee, leased the Property to a farmer, and collected an up-front payment. Hensley was convicted of theft after refusing to return the payment when the farmer learned that Hensley did not own the Property. This court affirmed Hensley’s theft conviction, rejecting his claim that he “believed in good faith that he was the sole valid trustee” of the Trust and “thought he had the authority to lease” the Property. Ex. Vol. III at 202; see Hensley v. State, 219 N.E.3d 122, No. 22A-CR- 2056, slip op. at ¶ 18 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2023) (mem.). While this was happening, in April 2021, Hensley paid taxes on the Property. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 4 of 21 [9] In June 2021, Hubbard obtained a protective order against Hensley for herself and her family. During the hearing on the protective order, Hensley “said that he ha[d] been on the [P]roperty before,” insisted that it belonged to him, and called Hubbard a “heathen.” Tr. Vol. II at 88. [10] In 2022, Hensley filed a certification of trust in the trust proceedings. The trial court in the trust proceedings stated, “Any Certification of Trust filed by Harve Hensley stating that he is the trustee or a beneficiary of the residue of the [Trust] is a nullity and shall be considered null and void. Any recording of such Certification of Trust, executed by Harve Hensley, shall be considered a nullity and of no force or effect.” Ex. Vol. II at 88. [11] In May 2023, the trial court extended the protective order through 2028. In February 2024, Hensley filed in the protective order case a different certification of trust purporting to be trustee of the Property. In April, Hensley paid taxes on the Property. In September, Hensley filed an amended certification of trust in the protective order case, still purporting to be trustee of the Property. [12] In April 2025, Hensley again paid taxes on the Property. On September 22, Hensley filed another certification of trust (“Certification Under Oath”), this time in the Jefferson County Auditor’s Office, purporting to be trustee of the Property. In the document, Hensley “declare[d] under penalty of perjury that” his claims were “true and correct.” Ex. Vol. I at 11. [13] The next day, Hensley purported to be the “Landowner” of the Property and mailed a “10 Day Notice to Vacate” the Property to Hubbard’s attorney. Ex. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 5 of 21  Vol. I at 81. Hensley claimed Hubbard was “an unauthorized occupant/tenant” and that her possession of the Property was “unlawful.” Id. In October, Hensley filed an eviction action against Hubbard. 3 [14] Hubbard felt “terroriz[ed]” and “harass[ed]” by Hensley, and she “fear[ed]” him because he was “constantly trying to take” the Property from her. Tr. Vol. II at 120. Hubbard removed the Property’s mailbox because she was scared that Hensley would “show up at the [P]roperty to get his mail.” Id. at 115. Hubbard also tore down the Property’s residence and barn so that “there’s nowhere for [Hensley] to hide over there or say he even lives there.” Id. at 116. Before traveling to the Property, Hubbard informs others of her travel arrangement because she is “scared for [her] life.” Id. at 114. [15] On October 3, 2025, the State charged Hensley with stalking as a Level 6 felony 4 and perjury as a Level 6 felony 5. The State alleged the stalking occurred “between February 20, 2024[,] and September 26, 2025,” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 17; the State alleged the perjury was based on Hensley’s filing of the Certification Under Oath in the county auditor’s office. On December 11, 27 days before trial, the State filed a motion to amend the stalking charge to a 3 The trial court took judicial notice of this action, as do we. See Ind. Evidence Rule 201(a)(2)(3) (providing that the court may take judicial notice of “records of a court of this state”). 4 Ind. Code § 35-45-10-5(a). 5 I.C. § 35-44.1-2-1(a)(1). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 6 of 21  Level 5 felony 6. The trial court granted the motion on December 16 after holding a hearing. 7 [16] During the bench trial, Hensley represented himself. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Hensley made an oral motion for dismissal under Trial Rule 41(B), which the trial court denied. Hensley then testified in his own defense, arguing that when Bronson Sr. died, the Trust “bec[a]me irrevocable and the living trust expired [and] bec[a]me a separate trust,” of which Hensley was the sole trustee and beneficiary. Tr. Vol. II at 170. [17] The trial court found Hensley guilty as charged. In finding Hensley guilty of stalking, the trial court “considered” 11 of Hensley’s actions: • In 2020, (1) attempting to record the quitclaim deed regarding the Property; • In 2021, (2) changing his mailing address to the Property, (3) renting the Property, and (4) paying taxes on the Property; • In 2024, (5) filing the certification of trust in the protective order case, (6) paying taxes on the Property, and (7) filing the amended certification of trust in the protective order case; and • In 2025, (8) paying taxes on the Property, (9) again paying taxes on the Property, (10) sending the notice to vacate the Property to Hubbard’s attorney, and (11) filing the eviction action. Tr. Vol. II at 194. The trial court stated that Hensley’s actions would be “entirely lawful” if Hensley was the Property’s owner, Tr. Vol. II at 196, but 6 I.C. § 35-45-10-5(b)(2). 7 No transcript for this hearing is included in the appellate record. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 7 of 21  they were “harassing and unlawful” because he was not, id. at 197. As for the perjury count, the trial court found that Hensley falsely claimed to be trustee because there was “one trust” and trusteeship thereof “ha[d] been litigated” already. Id. at 199. [18] During the sentencing hearing, Hensley maintained he was “the rightful owner” of the Property. Tr. Vol. II at 215. The trial court sentenced Hensley to consecutive prison sentences of five years for stalking and one year for perjury. This appeal ensued. Discussion and Decision 1. Hensley Has Waived His Claim that the Trial Court Erred by Granting the State’s Motion to Amend the Charging Information [19] Hensley contends the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to amend the charging information to allege stalking as a Level 5 rather than a Level 6 felony. But Hensley did not include or request a transcript of the hearing on the State’s motion, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 9(F)(5). This rule requires an appellant’s Notice of Appeal to designate “all portions of the Transcript necessary to present fairly and decide the issues on appeal.” Ind. Appellate Rule 9(F)(5). [20] “[A]lthough not fatal to the appeal, failure to include a transcript works a waiver of any specifications of error which depend upon the evidence.” Lifeline Youth & Fam. Servs., Inc. v. Installed Bldg. Prods., Inc., 996 N.E.2d 808, 814–15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting In re Walker, 665 N.E.2d 586, 588 (Ind. 1996)). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 8 of 21  Furthermore, although we have a well-established preference for deciding cases on their merits rather than on procedural grounds like waiver, Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Roberts v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 897 N.E.2d 458, 469 (Ind. 2008)), if a party’s failure to comply with the Appellate Rules is “sufficiently substantial to impede our consideration of the issue raised,” we will not address the merits of that issue, id. (quoting Guardiola v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ind. 1978)). [21] The issue Hensley raises requires us to be able to review the transcript from the hearing. Without a transcript, we cannot determine whether Hensley even objected to the State’s motion, much less verify Hensley’s claim that the trial court “failed to conduct any prejudice inquiry,” Appellant’s Br. at 29. Hensley’s failure to request a transcript of the hearing substantially impedes our consideration of his argument and results in waiver. 2. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err by Denying Hensley’s Trial Rule 41(B) Motion [22] Hensley also argues that the trial court erred by denying his Trial Rule 41(B) motion for dismissal. We review the denial of a Trial Rule 41(B) motion for clear error. Williams v. State, 892 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Thornton-Tomasetti Eng’rs v. Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Pub. Libr., 851 N.E.2d 1269, 1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)), trans. denied. [23] In a criminal bench trial, once the State has completed its case-in-chief, the defendant “may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the weight of the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 9 of 21  evidence and the law” the State has not met its burden of proof. T.R. 41(B). Such a motion “is essentially a test of the sufficiency of the State’s evidence.” Workman v. State, 716 N.E.2d 445, 448 (Ind. 1999) (citing State v. Vowels, 535 N.E.2d 146, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)). The trial court should grant the motion if the State “fail[s] to prove the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Vowels, 535 N.E.2d at 147.) In ruling on the motion, the trial court “may reconcile, reject, accept or weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. (quoting Vowels, 535 N.E.2d at 147). [24] Hensley only challenges the denial of his Trial Rule 41(B) motion regarding his stalking conviction. To convict Hensley as charged of stalking as a Level 5 felony, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Hensley knowingly or intentionally harassed Hubbard repeatedly or continually; (2) Hensley’s conduct would have “cause[d] a reasonable person to feel” and “actually cause[d]” Hubbard “to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened,” Ind. Code § 35-45-10-1; and (3) a protective order had been issued to protect Hubbard from Hensley. See id. § -5(b)(2). “Harassment” means “conduct directed toward a victim that includes but is not limited to repeated or continuing impermissible contact that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.” I.C. § 35-45-10-2. Neither stalking nor harassment includes “statutorily or constitutionally protected activity.” Id. §§ -1, –2. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 10 of 21 [25] The State’s evidence proved that the trial court in the trust proceedings appointed Bronson Jr., not Hensley, as trustee and ruled that Hensley had no interest in the Trust. Hensley participated in the proceedings and was aware of the trial court’s ruling. Bronson Jr. obtained authorization to sell the Property, and he lawfully sold it to Hubbard. Although Hensley had no interest in the Property, he listed the Property as his address, frequented the Property, paid taxes on it, attempted to file a quitclaim deed on it, and rented it out from beneath Hubbard. Hensley also made threatening social media posts about Hubbard’s father. Due to Hensley’s actions, in 2021, Hubbard obtained a protective order, which was extended in 2023. [26] Despite the protective order, Hensley did not stop engaging in conduct that Hubbard believed was harassing and/or intimidating. In 2024, he again paid taxes on the Property and filed in the protective order case a certification of trust asserting ownership of the Property, as well as an amended document to the same effect. In 2025, Hensley again paid taxes on the Property and sent a letter to Hubbard’s attorney demanding that she vacate the Property. [27] Given Hensley’s history of actions regarding the Property, his conduct between February 20, 2024, and September 26, 2025, was sufficient to prove stalking through repeated harassment. The actions demonstrate repeated conduct directed toward Hubbard to assert Hensley’s unfounded interest in the Property and dispossess Hubbard of it. The actions would cause a reasonable person to suffer and did cause Hubbard to suffer emotional distress—she felt “terroriz[ed]” and “harass[ed]” by Hensley and “fear[ed]” him because he was Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 11 of 21  “constantly trying to take” the Property from her, Tr. Vol. II at 120. Hubbard removed structures from the Property so Hensley could not “hide” there, id. at 116, and she does not feel safe going to the Property without taking precautions. [28] Hensley argues that his actions cannot constitute stalking because they were “lawful.” Appellant’s Br. at 20. Hensley’s actions were not lawful because he did not own the Property or have any interest therein. Hensley further argues that he had a reasonable belief in his status as Trustee and that he had an interest in the Property. Had this belief been reasonable, Hensley’s conduct might have been something other than stalking. Hensley’s “beliefs,” however, disregarded numerous clear rulings from courts of this state. A belief not grounded in reality, in other words, a delusional belief, that results in repeated harassment, as it did here, is sufficient to establish stalking. [29] The trial court did not clearly err by denying Hensley’s Trial Rule 41(B) motion. Moreover, the evidence was sufficient to support Hensley’s stalking conviction. 3. Hensley’s Stalking Conviction Does Not Rely on a Fatal Variance [30] Hensley argues that his stalking conviction relies on a variance between the charging information and the trial court’s findings. “Because the charging information advises a defendant of the accusations against him, the allegations in the pleading and the evidence used at trial must be consistent with one another.” Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 569 (Ind. 2014) (citing Simmons v. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 12 of 21  State, 585 N.E.2d 1341, 1344 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)). “A variance is an essential difference between the two.” Id. (citing Mitchem v. State, 685 N.E.2d 671, 677 (Ind. 1997)). “Not all variances, however, are fatal.” Id. (citing Mitchem, 685 N.E.2d at 677). “Relief is required only if the variance (1) misled the defendant in preparing a defense, resulting in prejudice, or (2) leaves the defendant vulnerable to future prosecution under the same evidence.” Id. (citing Winn v. State, 748 N.E.2d 352, 356 (Ind. 2001)). We review variance claims as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence because “the defendant’s essential argument is the evidence produced at trial so differed from the charging information that it was insufficient to convict him as charged.” Id. at 565 (citing Mathews v. State, 978 N.E.2d 438, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied). [31] Hensley argues that his stalking conviction relies on a fatal variance because, whereas the charging information alleged that the stalking occurred “between February 20, 2024, and September 26, 2025,” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 17, the trial court relied on Hensley’s conduct outside these dates—in 2020, 2021, and October 2025. “A charging information must only state ‘the date of the offense with sufficient particularity to show that the offense was committed within the period of limitations applicable to that offense.’” Blount, 22 N.E.3d at 569 (quoting I.C. § 35–34–1–2(a)(5) (2014)). “Where, as here, time is not an element of the offense, the State is not required to prove the offense occurred on the precise date alleged, and its presentation of evidence is not limited to events on that date.” Id. (citing Neff v. State, 915 N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), adhered to on reh’g, 922 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 13 of 21 [32] Even if we assume that the State had to prove the stalking occurred exactly between the charging dates of February 20, 2024, and September 26, 2025, no fatal variance occurred. The trial court “considered” five of Hensley’s actions that took place outside the dates in the charging information. Tr. Vol. II at 194. Those actions included Hensley attempting to record a quitclaim deed regarding the Property, changing his mailing address to the Property, renting the Property, paying taxes on the Property, and filing the eviction action. The trial court also considered six of Hensley’s actions that took place within the charging information dates: Hensley thrice paid taxes on the Property, he filed a certification of trust and an amended certification of trust in the protective order case, and he sent a letter to Hubbard’s attorney demanding that she vacate the Property. [33] The six actions that took place within the charging information dates are sufficient to support Hensley’s stalking conviction. See supra ¶¶ 22–29. The five actions that took place outside the charging information dates provide context for Hensley’s other conduct and were not the basis for independent convictions. Any variance between the charging information and the trial court’s findings is not fatal and does not warrant reversal. 4. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Hensley’s Perjury Conviction [34] Hensley argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his conviction for perjury. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows: Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 14 of 21  “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Hancz- Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024)]. Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783). [35] To convict Hensley as charged of perjury as a Level 6 felony, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hensley made a “false, material statement under oath or affirmation, knowing the statement to be false or not believing it to be true.” I.C. § 35-44.1-2-1(a)(1). The State alleged that Hensley perjured himself in the Certification Under Oath. In this document, Hensley “declare[d] under penalty of perjury that” he was the “one (1) named Sole Beneficiary” and “one (1) Sole Trustee” of the Trust. Ex. Vol. I at 11. The document disregards the trial court’s rulings in the trust proceedings that Hensley was “not . . . the trustee of the Trust” and that Hensley’s interest in the Trust had already been adeemed. Ex. Vol. II at 40. [36] Hensley claims his statements do not constitute perjury because they were “disputed legal interpretations,” Appellant’s Br. at 21, regarding “ongoing civil Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 15 of 21  litigation” in the trust proceedings, id. at 22. Hensley relies on Goble v. State, which held that “[a] statement as to the legal effect of certain facts, or mere conclusion of law, ordinarily will not constitute perjury.” 766 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Blackburn v. State, 495 N.E.2d 806, 808 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), reh’g denied, trans. denied). [37] Trusteeship and Hensley’s interest in the Trust had already been adjudicated in the trust proceedings in which Hensley was an active participant. Hensley had been instructed in those proceedings that any certification of trust he filed claiming to be trustee of the Trust would be “null and void.” Ex. Vol. II at 88. Whether or not Hensley believed he should be the trustee or a beneficiary of the Trust, the fact remains he was neither. Similarly, several appellate decisions reiterated that Hensley was neither the trustee of the Trust nor held any interest in the Property. Hensley was aware of these rulings; he chose to disregard them. The trial court could reasonably find that Hensley knowingly made a false, material statement under oath. The State thus presented sufficient evidence to support Hensley’s perjury conviction. 5. Hensley’s Sentence Is Not Inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B) [38] Last, Hensley argues that his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). 8 The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to independently review and 8 Hensley also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by “relying on improper aggravating factors” and “failing to find appropriate mitigating factors.” Appellant’s Br. at 25. Hensley, however, does not identify which aggravators that the trial court found are erroneous, nor does he identify which mitigating factors the trial court should have found. Hensley has waived his abuse-of-discretion argument by not Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 16 of 21  revise a trial court’s sentencing decision. Tillett v. State, 278 N.E.3d 359, 366 (Ind. 2026) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6), reh’g denied (July 9, 2026). That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B). The defendant must produce compelling evidence that the sentence is inappropriate based on the nature of the offense, the defendant’s character, or both. Id. (quoting Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006)); Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). [39] Whether a sentence is inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)). “[W]e are not limited to the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court,” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014), and we focus on the aggregate sentence rather than its components, Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). Considering the trial court’s wide discretion on sentencing matters, only “exceptional cases” warrant sentence revisions, Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 856 (Ind. 2024), cert. denied). providing cogent reasoning in support thereof. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a); Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). Hensley has similarly waived his argument that his sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate because he fails to present a cogent argument supported with citations to authority. App. R. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 17 of 21 [40] A trial judge may impose any sentence within the statutory range without regard to the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). When considering the nature of the offense, we start with the advisory sentence. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4 (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494). Here, Hensley was convicted of and sentenced on one Level 5 felony and one Level 6 felony. “A person who commits a Level 5 felony . . . shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between one (1) and six (6) years, with the advisory sentence being three (3) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b) (emphasis added). On his Level 5 felony conviction, the trial court sentenced Hensley to five years of incarceration. “A person who commits a Level 6 felony . . . shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) months and two and one-half (2 ½) years, with the advisory sentence being one (1) year.” Id. § 35-50-2-7(b) (emphasis added). On his Level 6 felony conviction, the trial court sentenced Hensley to one year of incarceration. [41] The trial court found as aggravators (1) that the “harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by [Hubbard] was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense”; (2) Hensley’s criminal history; (3) the offenses were “premeditated”; and (4) Hensley showed a lack of remorse. Id. at 224. The trial court found no mitigators. Hensley was ordered to serve his sentences consecutively, for a total of six years in prison, which is above the advisory sentence. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 18 of 21 [42] We first look to the nature of Hensley’s offenses and consider, among other things, “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence,” T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)), as amended (May 26, 2023). We also consider whether the offense was “accompanied by restraint, regard and lack of brutality.” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)). [43] Hensley’s offenses form only the most recent chapter in his multi-year campaign to dispossess Hubbard of the Property. Hubbard purchased the Property more than six years ago. Not only has Hubbard been unable to enjoy it, but she also lives in fear due to Hensley’s prolonged, premeditated, and incorrigible actions. The nature of Hensley’s offenses counsels against revision of his sentence. [44] In considering the character of the offender, “we engage in a broad consideration of a defendant’s qualities,” T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (citing Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on reh’g), including whether the defendant has “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character,” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 19 of 21 [45] Despite felony forgery and theft convictions related to his unfounded interest in the Property, Hensley continues to claim ownership thereof at Hubbard’s expense. Hensley’s offenses were premeditated, and he expressed no remorse for them. Though he claims he “pursued” his rights “through legal processes,” Appellant’s Br. at 26, Hensley disregarded legal process. The record does not reveal compelling evidence demonstrating that the nature of Hensley’s offense or his character renders his sentence inappropriate. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d 119; Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 855–56. Conclusion [46] In sum, Hensley has waived his claim that the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to amend the charging information, the trial court did not clearly err by denying Hensley’s Trial Rule 41(B) motion, Hensley’s stalking conviction does not rely on a fatal variance, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Hensley’s convictions, and Hensley’s sentence is not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). We affirm the trial court on all issues raised. [47] Affirmed. Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Jonathan D. Harwell Harwell Criminal Defense Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 20 of 21 Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-586 | October 16, 2026 Page 21 of 21