C J W v. T H

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED C.J.W., Oct 16 2026, 10:06 am Appellant-Respondent CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court v. T.H., Appellee-Petitioner October 16, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-AD-1225 Appeal from the Gibson Circuit Court The Honorable Jeffrey F. Meade, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 26C01-2411-AD-1849 Opinion by Judge DeBoer Judges Foley and Felix concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 1 of 25  DeBoer, Judge. Case Summary [1] T.H. (Stepfather) filed a petition to adopt his minor stepson (Child). Child’s mother, M.H. (Mother), consented to the adoption, but Child’s biological father, C.J.W. (Father), opposed it. Ultimately, the trial court determined Father’s consent was not required, found adoption was in Child’s best interest, and granted the adoption petition. Father appeals, raising three issues which we restate as: 1) Whether Stepfather was prohibited from adopting Child because of a previous conviction for Level 5 criminal recklessness; 2) Whether the trial court clearly erred in concluding Father’s consent was not required; and 3) Whether the trial court clearly erred in concluding adoption by Stepfather was in Child’s best interest. [2] The first issue presents a novel question of statutory interpretation, which we answer by holding Stepfather could adopt Child because his conviction was more than five years old when the court granted the petition. On the second and third issues, we find the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, does not necessarily lead to conclusions opposite those made by the trial court. We therefore affirm the court’s decision. Facts and Procedural History [3] Child was born in June 2020. Father and Mother never married, had a mentally and physically abusive relationship, and they broke up about a month Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 2 of 25  before Child’s first birthday. Mother started dating Stepfather shortly after that and married him in October 2021. Since 2021, Stepfather has lived with Mother, Child, and Mother’s grandparents. [4] Father last saw Child at his first birthday party in June 2021. Over the next three years, Father maintained residences in Indiana but often left the state, spending months at a time in California, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. In July 2021, Mother obtained a protective order against Father, which prohibited him from contacting her, Stepfather, and Child. The protective order was issued while Father was in California, and on July 27, 2021, the unserved order was returned to the court. Consequently, Father was not initially aware that the protective order had been issued. Paternity Proceedings [5] In October 2021, the State initiated a paternity action against Father. 1 Mother and Father appeared for a hearing on December 7, 2021, during which Father learned of the protective order. Ater the hearing, the paternity court issued a support order providing, in part: Mother has no objection to Father having supervised parenting time. Therefore, Father . . . shall be given supervised parenting time at Mother’s discretion . . . . Both Mother and Father recognize that the Protection Order currently in effect supersedes 1 Though copies of records from the paternity action were not admitted into evidence, the trial court took judicial notice of them at the final hearing in this matter on April 2, 2026. We’ve accessed the paternity proceedings using our Odyssey Case Management System. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 3 of 25  this case and supervised parenting time will not occur until the protective order is no longer in effect.[ 2] The protective order expired in July 2023, but Father never had parenting time with Child after that date. Adoption Petition [6] On November 4, 2024, Stepfather filed a petition seeking to adopt Child, to which Mother consented. The petition alleged Father’s consent was not required because, amongst other reasons, Child had been out of Father’s custody for more than a year, during which time Father “failed, without justifiable cause, to communicate significantly with [Child] when able to do so.” Appellant’s Appendix at 14. In the petition, Stepfather disclosed convictions for Level 5 felony criminal recklessness under Cause Number 26D01-2002-F5-257 and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated under Cause Number 26D01-1903-CM-261. 3 [7] Later that month, Father filed a pro se objection to the adoption in which he alleged he had tried to communicate with Child but did not have Mother’s current contact information and did not know where Child was living. Father also expressed a desire to be a part of Child’s life. After an initial status hearing in December, a public defender was appointed to represent Father in the 2 Support Order at 1 (December 17, 2021) (No. 26C01-2110-JP-205). 3 The criminal recklessness conviction was entered on June 25, 2020, and the operating while intoxicated conviction on March 20, 2019. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 4 of 25  adoption matter. The court bifurcated the proceedings, meaning it would first resolve whether Father’s consent was required before holding a hearing on whether the adoption was in Child’s best interest. Consent Hearing [8] On March 18, 2025, the parties appeared for a hearing on the issue of consent. Stepfather called three witnesses in his case-in-chief, including Father, Mother, and Father’s stepfather (Grandfather). Father acknowledged he had not seen Child (who was almost five years old at the time of the hearing) in person since his first birthday. Father claimed that while he was in California and Oklahoma, Mother allowed him to speak with Child on video calls, but that contact stopped after Mother blocked him on Facebook. [9] When asked to describe “all of the things [he’d] done to try to see [Child] in th[e last] four years,” Father said that six months before the consent hearing, he tried to file a motion with the paternity court “to have visitation rights.” Transcript at 11. He claimed he was unable to file that motion because he didn’t know Mother’s address, and he admitted he hadn’t tried again to file anything in the paternity action. He also claimed that at some point he tried to contact Mother through her grandmother, but those attempts were unsuccessful. [10] Father said his relationship with Mother was “toxic[,]” and he described how he frequently argued with her while they were together. Id. at 14. He admitted to “smack[ing] her” on one occasion and, on another, calling the police to their Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 5 of 25  home after she punctured the tire on his vehicle. Id. He claimed, however, that Child never witnessed his arguments with Mother. [11] Mother testified that during their relationship, Father subjected her to mental and physical abuse on a daily basis. She described some of the injuries Father had inflicted on her, including bite marks, a busted lip, bruises on her legs, and an earring ripped from her ear. According to Mother, Father had punched her in the head one time when she was pregnant with Child, and the incidents of abuse continued after she gave birth. [12] Mother described filing for the protective order because she was afraid Father would kill her, Child, and Stepfather. Father also threatened “to take [Child] and never give him back.” Id. at 33. Given her fear of Father, Mother intentionally concealed her whereabouts from Father by telling his grandmother she had moved. Mother testified that after the protective order expired, Father did not reach out to schedule supervised parenting time. Had he done so, Mother said she would have allowed him to exercise supervised visitation. [13] Grandfather confirmed that Father and Mother’s relationship was “pretty toxic” but claimed he did not witness any physical abuse. Id. at 47. He then described “a big blow up” between Mother and Father in April 2021. Id. at 48. After that incident, Grandfather sent a text message to Mother advising her to “get [Child] and stay somewhere tonight that [Father] isn’t familiar with” because Father was “talking pretty crazy stuff” and might “go off the deep end.” Id. When asked why he sent that message, Grandfather said Father had Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 6 of 25  threatened to kill Mother, her family, and himself, and Grandfather “thought that he was going to by the way he was talking.” Id. at 51. [14] During his presentation of evidence, Father called his grandmother (Great- Grandmother 1), sister (Aunt), and mother (Grandmother). Great- Grandmother 1 described driving from her home in West Virginia to visit Child in mid-2022. At the end of the visit, which lasted about forty-five minutes, Mother told Great-Grandmother 1 she was “not allowed to see [Child] anymore because it would confuse him if [she wasn’t] going to be in his life all the time.” Id. at 57. Great-Grandmother 1 did not try to see Child again, even after she moved to Indiana in 2023. [15] Aunt described trying to contact Mother and Stepfather three or four times on social media platforms and through text messages, but they never responded. She also claimed that she believed Mother and Stepfather had blocked her social media accounts. Grandmother similarly claimed that Mother blocked her on Facebook in 2021, though she did not try to contact Child again after learning about the protective order in December 2021. [16] After the close of evidence and hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial judge ruled from the bench that Stepfather had shown by clear and convincing evidence that for more than a year, Father had failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with Child. The court considered that although Father claimed he did not have a way to contact Mother, he failed to file anything in the paternity action seeking visitation after the protective order Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 7 of 25  expired. After the hearing, the court issued a written order finding Father’s consent was “not required for the adoption to proceed.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 30. Father’s Motion to Deny Adoption Petition [17] On April 30, 2025, Father filed a Motion to Deny Adoption Petition alleging Stepfather did “not meet the statutory requirements of Indiana Code [section] 31-19-11-1(c).” Id. at 31. That statute bars an adoption if the petitioner was convicted of certain “nonwaivable” offenses, including felony criminal recklessness, “within the immediately preceding five (5) year period.” Ind. Code § 31-19-11-1(c)(3) (2026). 4 According to Father, Stepfather’s June 2020 criminal recklessness conviction was less than five years old when he filed the adoption petition in November 2024, making him ineligible to adopt. Stepfather responded by arguing, in part, that the five-year disqualification period was set to expire on June 25, 2025, which at that time was less than two 4 Minor amendments were made to Indiana Code section 31-19-11-1 while this appeal was pending. Because those amendments do not affect the substance of the statute, we elect to apply the current version. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 8 of 25  months away. The trial court took no action on Father’s motion and moved forward with the second phase of the proceedings on April 2, 2026. 5 Best-Interest Hearing [18] Stepfather called four witnesses at the April 2026 best-interest hearing: Mother, Father, Mother’s Grandmother (Great-Grandmother 2), and himself. Mother described living with Stepfather in Great-Grandmother 2’s home shortly before Child’s first birthday and that Stepfather has been Child’s father figure since that time. Mother and Stepfather had another son after getting married, and he and Child have a strong bond, sleep in bunkbeds, and enjoy hiking, mushroom hunting, bike riding, and swimming together. Mother testified she “absolutely consent[ed] to th[e] adoption.” Tr. at 88. She also explained Father had never requested visitation with Child. She reiterated she would not have denied a request for visitation if Father had made one after the protective order expired in 2023. [19] Mother spoke more about the verbal and physical abuse she suffered during her relationship with Father, which continued through the first ten months of 5 Attorney conferences were held on May 15, June 6, and July 22, 2025. At the May 15 conference, Father’s counsel indicated the parties wanted to “make argument[s]” but asked for a continuance to “continue to do some research and . . . exchange information.” Tr. at 81. It is unclear from the record before us whether Father’s counsel was referring to a need to hold argument on the motion to deny the adoption, or another pending motion about Father’s standing to participate in the second phase of the proceedings. On June 6, Father’s counsel indicated the parties agreed to reset the conference again, moving it to July. We were not provided with a transcript of the July 22 conference, but the hearing journal entry provides that the parties discussed whether Father could participate “after consent [was] found not to be required . . . .” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 6. The court ultimately ruled that Father could participate in the second phase, but that order did not address Father’s motion to deny the adoption. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 9 of 25  Child’s life. Because of that abuse, Mother has PTSD and attends therapy twice per month. Mother’s PTSD has affected her relationship with Stepfather, particularly during one incident in September 2022. That night after work, Mother was using the bathroom while Stepfather was in the shower. Stepfather got out of the shower and reached around Mother for a towel, which made Mother panic because she thought Stepfather was going to hit her. She crumpled to the ground, flailed her arms, and struck herself in the face. Great- Grandmother 2 heard this incident, but did not see it, and the police were called to the scene. Stepfather was charged with domestic battery, but the case was later dismissed. At the best-interest hearing, Mother denied any domestic violence between her and Stepfather. [20] Father testified about his time outside of Indiana in the years after his relationship with Mother. He described being convicted of driving under the influence in Oklahoma and having an active warrant there for violating the terms of his probation. He again acknowledged his tumultuous relationship with Mother but denied hitting her while she was pregnant. He also claimed that after the September 2022 incident, Mother called him, said Stepfather “beat her up,” and asked Father “to come have drinks with her at a bar.” Id. at 112. Father said he refused to meet with Mother because of the protective order. [21] As for Mother’s claim that he had not tried to have visitation with Child, Father said he contacted the supervised visitation center to schedule visits approximately three or four times in the past year. When those requests went unanswered, he blamed his failure to take action in the paternity case on his Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 10 of 25  lack of legal training and his inability to afford an attorney to help him. Father conceded Child deserves stability and consistency, and he had “not been able to give consistency to him.” Id. at 118. [22] Great-Grandmother 2 explained that Mother and Stepfather lived with her since they married, have a stable relationship, and are “very loving [to] their children.” Id. at 122. When asked to describe Stepfather’s relationship with Child, she said “[h]e takes good care of [Child]” and often spends time with him fishing, hunting, and doing other outdoor activities. Id. She said that while Mother and Stepfather occasionally had loud arguments, she had never seen any violence between them. In contrast, when Mother and Father were together, Great-Grandmother 2 often heard hitting and crying coming from their room. Great-Grandmother 2 also said on two occasions, her entire household had to leave home for the night because she thought Father would hurt her, Mother, Child, and other family members. She added that Father had not tried to get in contact with her since shortly after Child’s first birthday in 2021. [23] Next, Stepfather testified that he never hit Mother, including during the incident in 2022. Stepfather also explained that the circumstances surrounding his November 2020 criminal recklessness conviction occurred before he met Mother and stemmed from a depressive episode he went through in February of that year where he fired a gun at the ground and threatened to commit suicide. After that incident, Stepfather began attending therapy and taking medication Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 11 of 25  for anxiety and ADHD. He then discussed his 2019 OWI conviction, testifying that he successfully completed probation and participated in AA. [24] Finally, Stepfather testified that he has a close bond with Child, he “raised” Child, and Child has “always called [him] Dad.” Id. at 136. He said raising Child became his “main focus” after he began dating Mother, and he worries about his children (including Child) “more than anything in the world.” Id. at 147. According to Stepfather, Mother had never prevented Father from communicating with Child, and Father’s absence was “attributable to a lack of effort by [Father].” Id. at 140. The Trial Court’s Judgment [25] On April 9, 2026, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order granting Stepfather’s petition to adopt Child and terminating Father’s parental rights. Father now appeals. Discussion and Decision [26] A trial court’s authority to grant or deny an adoption petition is governed by Indiana Code section 31-19-11-1. Under that statute, the court must grant the petition if it finds, as relevant here, “the adoption requested is in the best interest of the child;” “proper consent, if consent is necessary, to the adoption has been given;” and “the petitioner for adoption is not prohibited from adopting the child as the result of an inappropriate criminal history described in subsection (c) . . . .” I.C. § 31-19-11-1(a)(1, 7-8). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 12 of 25 [27] When reviewing an adoption decree, “we presume that the trial court’s decision is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption.” In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 972 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re Adoption of J.L.J., 4 N.E.3d 1189, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied). In family law matters, we show considerable deference to the trial court, recognizing “the trial judge is in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, ‘get a feel for the family dynamics,’ and ‘get a sense of the parents and their relationship with their children.’” Id. at 973 (quoting MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938, 940 (Ind. 2005)). We will not disturb the trial court’s decision “unless the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial judge reached an opposite conclusion.” In re Adoption of C.A.H., 136 N.E.3d 1126, 1128 (Ind. 2020) (quoting In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014)). [28] We will reverse the trial court’s findings and judgment only if they are clearly erroneous. Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 973. Clear error occurs “when there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment.” Id. (quoting In re Paternity of K.I., 903 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2009)). We examine only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and will neither reweigh evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We show no deference, however, to the court’s legal conclusions. In re Adoption of A.M., 930 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 13 of 25  1. Stepfather’s Criminal Recklessness Conviction [29] Father first argues the trial court should have denied Stepfather’s petition because of his criminal recklessness conviction. An adoption petition cannot be granted if the petitioner has been convicted of any “nonwaivable offense . . . ,” I.C. § 31-19-11-1(c), including felony criminal recklessness, Ind. Code § 31-9- 2.1-168(11) (2026). 6 But such a conviction is not disqualifying “if the date of the conviction did not occur within the immediately preceding five (5) year period.” 7 I.C. § 31-19-11-1(c). The parties here disagree on the meaning of the phrase “immediately preceding five (5) year period.” According to Father, subsection (c) prohibited Stepfather from adopting because his conviction was less than five years old when he filed the petition. But Stepfather argues the petition was properly granted because the conviction was more than five years old “when the court act[ed] on the petition . . . .” Appellee’s Br. at 20 (emphasis added). [30] Because no Indiana appellate court has previously addressed what date subsection (c) sets as the anchor to calculate the five-year disqualification period, it is an issue of first impression. Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo. R.R. v. State, 106 N.E.3d 1037, 1040 (Ind. 2018). Our 6 The definition of “nonwaivable offense” was previously provided by Indiana Code section 31-9-2-84.8, which was repealed and recodified as section 31-9-2.1-168 effective July 1, 2026, while this appeal was pending. Because recodification did not change the substance of the definition, we again elect to apply the current statute. See supra note 4. 7 The statutory definition of “nonwaivable offense” similarly excludes felony criminal recklessness if the conviction was not “within the past five (5) years.” I.C. § 31-9-2.1-168(11). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 14 of 25  goal is to carry out the legislature’s intent by giving an unambiguous statute “its clear and plain meaning.” Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1194 (Ind. 2016) (quoting State v. Evans, 810 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Ind. 2004), reh'g denied). We resort to rules of statutory construction only if a statute is ambiguous, meaning it “admits of more than one interpretation.” Id. In our review, we must “examine the statute as a whole,” reading “sections of an act together so that no part is rendered meaningless if it can be harmonized with the remainder of the statute.” Alvey v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1031, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d on reh’g by 15 N.E.3d 72. [31] We begin with the text and structure of section 31-19-11-1, which we find to be unambiguous. Subsection (a) outlines various elements that, if satisfied, require the court to “grant the petition for adoption and enter an adoption decree.” I.C. § 31-19-11-1(a). Subsections (b), (c), and (d) then describe circumstances under which the petition “may not” be granted, each of which negates an element of subsection (a). Subsection (b), for instance, requires denial if an affidavit has not been filed indicating whether a putative father is entitled to notice of the proceedings. This mirrors subsection (a)(4)’s requirement that such an affidavit must be filed for the petition to be granted. Under subsections (c) and (d), an adoption may not be granted if the petitioner has been convicted of certain offenses, which reflects subsection (a)(8)’s requirement that the petitioner must not be “prohibited from adopting . . . as the result of an inappropriate criminal history described in subsection (c) or (d).” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 15 of 25 [32] The fact that subsection (c) relates back to subsection (a)(8) gives us a clear anchor date for determining whether a conviction was “within the immediately preceding five (5) year period.” Subsection (a) provides that its elements must be satisfied “whenever the court has heard the evidence . . . .” (emphasis added). By instructing the court to rule on the merits only after it “has heard the evidence,” the statute requires that the petition be granted if the court, after the close of evidence, finds the elements of subsection (a) to be satisfied. A necessary corollary is that under subsection (c), the petition must be denied if the petitioner’s criminal history makes him ineligible to adopt when the court enters its final order, regardless of his eligibility at the time the petition was filed. [33] This conclusion finds further support in the plain text of subsection (c). Subsection (c) limits the trial court’s power to enter an adoption decree by providing that “the court may not grant an adoption if a petitioner for adoption has been convicted of a nonwaivable offense” unless “the date of the conviction did not occur within the immediately preceding five (5) year period.” I.C. § 31- 19-11-1(c). Because subsection (c) is concerned with the court’s power to grant an adoption petition rather than the petitioner’s eligibility to file, it’s clear the phrase “immediately preceding five (5) year period” refers to the date the court rules on the petition, not the filing date. Indeed, if the legislature intended otherwise, it could have explicitly referred to the date the petition was filed, as it did elsewhere in the adoption statutes. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(1) (2023) (providing parental consent is not required “if the child is adjudged to have Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 16 of 25  been abandoned or deserted for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition for adoption”) (emphasis added). [34] Father’s contrary arguments are not persuasive. In his opening brief, Father claimed that notwithstanding the plain text of section 31-19-11-1, section 31-19- 2-7.5 “reveals that the anchor point is no later than the start of the first hearing on the adoption petition.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. Under section 31-19-2-7.5, a petitioner must have a criminal history check done through DCS or a licensed child-placing agency, and the results of that check must then be reported to the court under Indiana Code section 31-19-8-5. On their face, these statutes do not affect a petitioner’s eligibility to adopt; they merely ensure the trial court has the necessary information to determine whether the petitioner satisfies section 31- 19-11-1’s criminal history requirements. [35] Yet Father points to Indiana Code section 31-19-8-9, which provides that “[a]s soon as possible after” the criminal history check (among other requirements) “have been satisfied, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the petition for adoption.” Father reads “as soon as possible after” to mean a petitioner’s eligibility to adopt is determined by the date “of the first hearing on the . . . petition,” which cannot happen until after the criminal history report is filed. Appellant’s Br. at 14. But this argument fails on its own terms. Here, the court bifurcated the proceedings and did not hear evidence about Stepfather’s eligibility to adopt until April 2, 2026, at which time more than six months had passed since the five-year anniversary of Stepfather’s conviction. Indeed, the child-placing agency didn’t file Stepfather’s criminal history report until Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 17 of 25  January 6, 2026, at which time Stepfather’s criminal history no longer made him ineligible to adopt under section 31-19-11-1(c). [36] Apparently recognizing this pitfall, Father took a different tack in his reply brief. There, Father argued public policy considerations require setting an anchor date “fixed at a point unaffected by the pace of litigation.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5. According to Father, the criminal history requirements are intended “to keep a specific class of recent, serious convictions out of the adoption process altogether,” a policy best served by making petitioners “wait out the remainder of the five-year period before filing at all.” Id. at 6-7. [37] While we understand Father’s policy concerns, “[i]t is not a proper function of this court to, in effect, rewrite a statute in order to render it consistent with our view of sound public policy,” let alone Father’s version of sound public policy. Robinson v. Monroe Cnty., 663 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), on reh’g of 658 N.E.2d 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. We reiterate that if the legislature intended to make petitioners wait to file until section 31-19-11-1(c)’s five-year disqualification period expired, it could have required as much. But there is no such requirement in section 31-19-11-1. While the adoption statutes require a petitioner to disclose certain convictions, mandate criminal background checks, and bar the adoption if the petitioner’s criminal history is disqualifying, nothing prevents a person with prohibitive convictions from filing the petition in the first instance. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 18 of 25  2. Father’s Lack of Consent [38] Father next challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the adoption could be granted without his consent. Given the fundamental importance of the parent- child relationship, “[a] natural parent enjoys special protection in any adoption proceeding, and courts strictly construe our adoption statutes . . . .” In re Adoption of I.B., 163 N.E.3d 270, 274 (Ind. 2021). Among those protections is a requirement that when a petitioner seeks to adopt a child born out of wedlock, consent must generally be given by both the mother and biological father (if paternity has been established). Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1(a)(2) (2023). [39] But “‘under carefully enumerated circumstances,’ the adoption statutes allow ‘the trial court to dispense with parental consent and allow adoption of the child.’” Adoption of I.B., 163 N.E.3d at 274 (quoting In re Adoption of N.W., 933 N.E.2d 909, 913 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), opinion adopted on trans. by 941 N.E.2d 1042). One such circumstance is relevant here: Consent to adoption . . . is not required from . . . [a] parent of a child in the custody of another person if for a period of at least one (1) year the parent . . . fails without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with the child when able to do so. I.C. § 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(A). Stepfather, as the party alleging Father’s consent was not required, had the burden to prove this circumstance applied by clear and convincing evidence. Adoption of I.B., 163 N.E.3d at 274. [40] Several key facts are undisputed, including that Child has been out of Father’s custody for more than a year and Father has not significantly communicated Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 19 of 25  with Child since Child’s first birthday. Father argues, however, that he had justifiable cause for this lack of communication because Mother thwarted his and his family members’ efforts to communicate, and he lacked resources or knowledge of the law necessary to file a motion in the paternity action. Stepfather contends, among other things, that even after the protective order expired in July 2023, Father made no effort to communicate with Child until the adoption proceedings began in November 2024. [41] Our appellate courts have struggled to define a standard for determining whether a non-custodial parent had justifiable cause for failing to communicate with his child. See E.B.F. v. D.F., 93 N.E.3d 759, 764 (Ind. 2018). In E.B.F., our Supreme Court offered some guidance but nonetheless explained the question “is highly dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case” and requires an examination of “the totality of the circumstances . . . .” Id. at 764-65. One relevant circumstance is whether the custodial parent “assumed [an] obligation to put forth a good-faith effort in arranging communication . . . .” Id. at 766. While the custodial parent generally doesn’t have that obligation, the E.B.F. Court found the custodial parent assumed it by agreeing parenting time would be “at such times and upon such conditions as the parties [were] able to mutually agree.” Id. (alteration in original). [42] Here, Father contends Mother similarly “assumed the obligation to put forth a good-faith effort to arrange communication between Father and Child because [she] had complete control over whether Father was permitted to contact Child Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 20 of 25  or see Child at all under the paternity court’s order.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. He then points to several facts he claims show Mother failed to act in good faith: she concealed her location from Father; she blocked Father and his family members on social media; and Father’s requests for parenting time went unanswered. [43] But Father omits from his analysis that the protective order was issued months before the December 2021 support order. Mother and Father explicitly agreed the protective order “supersede[d]” the support order and “supervised parenting time [would] not occur until the protective order [was] no longer in effect.” 8 As such, even if Mother was obligated to exercise her discretion in good faith to permit Father to have supervised visitation with Child, that obligation did not go into effect until the protective order expired in July 2023. Indeed, Mother’s admitted efforts to cut off contact with Father and shield her and Child’s whereabouts from him while the protective order was in place were reasonable under the circumstances, including Father’s repeated infliction of physical abuse, threats to kill Mother and her family, and his statement that he intended to take Child and not return him to Mother. [44] We also note that neither Father nor his family members described trying to contact Mother after the protective order expired. 9 Grandmother, for example, 8 Support Order, supra note 2, at 1. 9 While Aunt described attempting contact after the protective order expired, Stepfather denied she had done so. We will not reweigh that conflicting evidence. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-AD-1225 | October 16, 2026 Page 21 of 25  said she did not try to speak with Child after December 2021. Great- Grandmother 1 admitted she last saw Child in mid-2022 and made no further effort to see him despite moving to Indiana in 20