Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. FILED Oct 13 2026, 8:49 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana In the Matter of K.J. (Minor Child), Child in Need of Services, and J.J. (Father), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner October 13, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-JC-667 Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court The Honorable Faith Graham, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 79D03-2508-JC-000132 Opinion by Judge Felix Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JC-667 | October 13, 2026 Page 1 of 16 Judge Bradford concurs. Chief Judge Tavitas concurs in result with separate opinion. Felix, Judge. Statement of the Case [1] K.J. (“Child”) is the biological child of J.J. (“Father”) and B.B.-S. (“Mother”). A child in need of services (“CHINS”) petition was filed, and after a hearing, the juvenile court granted that petition and adjudicated Child a CHINS. Father now appeals 1 and raises two issues for our review: 1. Whether the juvenile court clearly erred by adjudicating Child a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1; 2 and 2. Whether the juvenile court clearly erred by adjudicating Child a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-3(a). [2] We reverse and remand with instructions. Facts and Procedural History [3] In August 2025, Father had established paternity of Child, Mother and Father did not live together, and they had equal parenting time with Child. On the 1 Mother does not participate in this appeal. 2 On July 1, 2026, a new version of Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 became effective. 2026 Ind. Acts 150. That amendment does not significantly alter the substance of Section 31-34-1-1 for purposes of this case. See id. (adding proviso regarding a child engaging in “independent activity”). Compare Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1 (effective July 1, 2019, to June 30, 2026), with id. § 31-34-1-1 (effective July 1, 2026). We therefore do not include effective date parentheticals when referring to Section 31-34-1-1. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JC-667 | October 13, 2026 Page 2 of 16 morning of August 11, Child was exchanged from Mother’s care to Father’s care. That night, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Child 3 was a victim of neglect and Mother had sexually abused her. One week later, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS under Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 and 31-34-1-3(a). Child remained in Father’s care. On September 16, Father filed a petition in the paternity cause to obtain legal and physical custody of Child. [4] On October 22, the juvenile court held a factfinding hearing on the CHINS petition. At the outset of that hearing, the juvenile court declined to consider Father’s custody modification request because the juvenile court “didn’t know [the motion] had even been filed[] because the CHINS Court wasn’t even alerted about that.” Tr. Vol. II at 6. Numerous witnesses testified about Child’s sexual abuse disclosures. The DCS family case manager (“FCM”) testified that Child “needs home based case management[,] which she is receiving those services,” and “needs therapy[,] and she is receiving therapy[,] as well.” Tr. Vol. II at 115. The FCM also testified that Child’s “needs are being met” in Father’s home. Id. at 117. Nevertheless, the FCM believed the coercive intervention of the juvenile court was necessary due to the allegations against Mother and the need to have her parenting time supervised. 3 Child was born on January 2, 2022. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JC-667 | October 13, 2026 Page 3 of 16 [5] On February 17, the juvenile court issued its order adjudicating Child a CHINS under Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 and 31-34-1-3(a). The next day, the juvenile court held the dispositional hearing, 4 and it issued the dispositional order a few weeks later. This appeal ensued. Discussion and Decision [6] Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s conclusion that Child is a CHINS under Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 and 31-34-1-3(a). Although there is “a certain implication of parental fault in many CHINS adjudications, the truth of the matter is that a CHINS adjudication is simply that—a determination that a child is in need of services. Standing alone, a CHINS adjudication does not establish culpability on the part of a particular parent.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). [7] We will reverse a CHINS determination only if the juvenile court’s decision was clearly erroneous. In re R.L., 144 N.E.3d 686, 689 (Ind. 2020) (citing In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017)). “A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if [the juvenile court] applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. (quoting D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578). “[W]e review issues not covered by the findings under the general judgment standard, meaning we will affirm the court’s decision if it can be 4 At a December 2025 status hearing, the juvenile court scheduled the dispositional hearing for February 18, 2026. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JC-667 | October 13, 2026 Page 4 of 16 sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” In re E.K., 260 N.E.3d 901, 909 (Ind. 2025) (citing In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). “[W]e neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id. (citing S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1286). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings that Father does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep’t Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)). 1. The Juvenile Court Clearly Erred by Adjudicating Child a CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 [8] Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 provides that in order to adjudicate a child a CHINS thereunder, DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision: (A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or (B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and (2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that: (A) the child is not receiving; and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JC-667 | October 13, 2026 Page 5 of 16 (B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court. See Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. [9] Father contends that DCS presented insufficient evidence to prove that Child is endangered and that the juvenile court’s coercive intervention is necessary. Because the coercive intervention challenge is dispositive, we do not address the endangerment challenge. [10] The “coercive intervention” element of CHINS statutes “guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families ‘where parents lack the ability to provide for their children,’ not merely where they ‘encounter difficulty in meeting a child’s needs.’” In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 580 (Ind. 2017) (emphases in original) (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287). When determining CHINS status generally, but especially the “coercive intervention” element specifically, courts “should consider the family’s condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” Id. (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290). [11] The juvenile court’s order here is silent as to why it concluded coercive intervention is necessary in this case, so we review under our general judgment standard. 5 See E.K., 260 N.E.3d at 909 (citing S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287). The 5 The absence of findings in support of a coercive intervention conclusion is not error because no statute requires special findings in a CHINS factfinding order, and none of the parties requested special findings under Indiana Trial Rule 52. See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1288 (Ind. 2014). However, even minimal Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JC-667 | October 13, 2026 Page 6 of 16 record demonstrates that Child needs and is receiving therapy, Child needs and is receiving home-based case management services, Child’s needs are being met in Father’s care, Father is the noncustodial parent, and Mother’s parenting time with Child needs to be supervised due to the sexual abuse allegations. 6 Nothing in the record indicates that absent a court order, Child will not continue receiving therapy and home-based case management services. The question then is whether Father’s status as the noncustodial parent, in light of the need for Mother’s parenting time to be supervised, is sufficient to justify the court’s coercive intervention. That is, is the need for coercive intervention sufficiently supported by the legal possibility that not adjudicating Child a CHINS means that she would go back to Mother’s unsupervised care? [12] When a child is removed from the custodial parent’s care and the noncustodial parent is ready, willing, and able to care for the child, “the legal possibility of the child[] returning to [the custodial parent]’s care does not alone mean that the child[] required services.” In re M.M., 118 N.E.3d 70, 75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). For example, in In re S.A., the child was removed from his mother’s care, and when the CHINS petition was filed, his father was on active duty in the U.S. Navy and had yet to establish paternity. 15 N.E.3d 602, 605 (Ind. Ct. findings “are very helpful to our review, and we recommend that trial courts’ best practice would be to enter findings on each necessary element.” Id. 6 To support the CHINS adjudication, particularly the coercive intervention element, DCS relies in part on unsupported statements of fact and evidence presented at the dispositional hearing. We decline DCS’s invitation to consider evidence not before the juvenile court at the time of factfinding. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JC-667 | October 13, 2026 Page 7 of 16 App. 2014) [hereinafter S.A. I], aff’d on reh’g, 27 N.E.3d 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) [hereinafter S.A. II]. The mother admitted the child was a CHINS. S.A. I, 15 N.E.3d at 606; S.A. II, 27 N.E.3d at 289. By the time of the factfinding hearing, the father had established paternity, been discharged from the Navy, moved to the child’s hometown and obtained employment, been in contact with DCS and the court-appointed special advocate, and begun developing a relationship with his child. S.A. I, 15 N.E.3d at 606; S.A. II, 27 N.E.3d at 290. The father had also filed a motion to modify custody. S.A. II, 27 N.E.3d at 292. The juvenile court determined coercive intervention was necessary because of the father’s “disinterest in establishing paternity and supporting his [c]hild” and his “history of PTSD.” S.A. I, 5 N.E.3d at 610; S.A. II, 27 N.E.3d at 290. [13] On appeal, this court disagreed that the father’s prior lack of involvement and history of PTSD required the juvenile court’s coercive intervention. S.A. I, 5 N.E.3d at 610–12; S.A. II, 27 N.E.3d at 290–91. DCS claimed on rehearing that reversing the CHINS adjudication when there was no custody order in the father’s favor meant that the child would be sent back to his mother, who had admitted he was a CHINS. S.A. II, 27 N.E.3d at 292. The S.A. panel was “unsympathetic” to this claim because the juvenile court “had an opportunity to modify custody to [the f]ather but did not do so.” Id. [14] Similarly, in In re M.M., the father was the noncustodial parent, and his children were removed from their mother’s care. 118 N.E.3d at 72–73. At the time of the CHINS factfinding hearing, the father intended to but had not yet filed paperwork “to restrict the [m]other’s access outside of a DCS case” and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JC-667 | October 13, 2026 Page 8 of 16 requested a continuance to file the same. Id. at 73. DCS did not object to the continuance request, but the trial court denied it. Id. During the factfinding hearing, DCS stated it “had no issue with [the c]hildren being in [the f]ather’s care” but still believed coercive intervention was necessary because the mother “still had legal custody of the children, and, absent the CHINS proceedings, the children legally could be returned to [her] care.” Id. Mother had not significantly complied with services provided through an informal adjustment just prior to the CHINS proceedings. Id. The juvenile court adjudicated the children CHINS, and the father later obtained custody in a separate proceeding. Id. at 74. This court reversed because without other evidence demonstrating the children would not receive necessary services in the father’s care, “the legal possibility of the children returning to [the m]other’s care [did] not alone” require the court’s coercive intervention. Id. at 75. [15] This court’s decision in In re N.C., 72 N.E.3d 519 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), is also instructive. There, the child was removed from his mother’s care, and before DCS filed a CHINS petition, the child’s father, who did not have custody of him, filed a motion to modify custody in the parties’ dissolution cause. Id. at 521. Before the CHINS factfindings hearing, the dissolution court temporarily modified custody but did not permanently modify it due to the ongoing CHINS matter. Id. “DCS had no concerns about [the father] or about [the child]’s placement with him” at the factfinding hearing. Id. at 525. “[W]hatever neglect [the child] experienced due to [the m]other’s issues at the outset of [the] case was rectified by being placed in [the f]ather’s home . . . .” Id. And the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JC-667 | October 13, 2026 Page 9 of 16 temporary nature of the custody order did not require the juvenile court’s coercive intervention. Id. at 526. “Had the juvenile court discharged [the child] without first adjudicating him a CHINS, the custody question could have been answered in the [dissolution cause] with due haste.” Id.at 526 n.6. [16] Like the fathers in S.A. and N.C., Father did not have permanent custody of Child but had taken substantial steps to obtain custody of her. And like the juvenile court in S.A., the juvenile court here had an opportunity to modify custody to Father but did not do so. Furthermore, as in N.C. and M.M., DCS had no concerns about Father or Child’s placement with him. On these facts, the legal possibility of Child being returned to Mother’s unsupervised care absent a CHINS adjudication is not sufficient to support the juvenile court’s conclusion that its coercive intervention is necessary. The juvenile court therefore clearly erred by adjudicating Child a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. 2. The Juvenile Court Clearly Erred by Adjudicating Child a CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-3(a) [17] Indiana Code section 31-34-1-3(a) provides that in order to adjudicate a child a CHINS under that section, DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the child is the victim of certain offenses and (2) “the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that . . . the child is not receiving” and “is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.” See I.C. § 31-34-12-3. Father contends only that DCS presented insufficient evidence to prove the coercive intervention element under Section Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JC-667 | October 13, 2026 Page 10 of 16 31-34-1-3(a)(2). As before, the juvenile court did not make specific findings supporting this element, so we review under our general judgment standard. See E.K., 260 N.E.3d at 909 (citing S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287). For the reasons stated above, there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s conclusion that Child is unlikely to receive necessary services without the coercive intervention of the court. See supra ¶ 16. The juvenile court therefore clearly erred by adjudicating Child a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34- 1-3(a). 3. Juvenile Courts Should Prioritize Pending Custody and Parenting Time Matters that May Negate the Need for a CHINS Case [18] Prior to issuing this Opinion, we stayed this appeal for the juvenile court to rule on Father’s motion to modify custody. Order, J.J. v. Ind. Dep’t Child Servs., No. 26A-JC-667 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2026). The resolution of that motion has no bearing on our decision regarding the CHINS adjudication. 7 It was nevertheless necessary, given the record before us, for the juvenile court to rule on the custody motion before we issued this decision in order to protect Child from being returned to Mother’s unsupervised care without the juvenile court’s approval. 7 On September 3, 2026, the juvenile court awarded Father sole legal and primary physical custody of Child, and it ordered Mother’s parenting time to be fully supervised by a third-party agency with two facilitators at every visit. Even if the juvenile court had not modified custody in this or a similar manner, we would still reverse the CHINS adjudication because there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s conclusion that Child is unlikely to receive necessary services without the coercive intervention of the court. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JC-667 | October 13, 2026 Page 11 of 16 [19] Indiana “recognize[s] the importance of family and children in our society, including the parenting rights of a parent,” I.C. § 31-10-2-1(1), and our courts should not interfere with and disrupt family life and autonomy except to the extent reasonably necessary to protect a child and the community, id. § 31-34- 19-6. See also S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287 (citing In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1255 (Ind. 2012)) (“Not every endangered child is a child in need of services, permitting the State’s parens patriae intrusion into the ordinarily private sphere of the family.”). Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-30-1-13, the juvenile and paternity courts here had concurrent original jurisdiction such that either court could have ruled on Father’s motion. Providing juvenile and paternity courts with concurrent original jurisdiction reflects a policy of not putting a child’s life on hold while a CHINS case is pending. Our courts undoubtedly face time constraints in CHINS cases, see, e.g., I.C. § 31-34-11-1 (factfinding must be held within 60 days of CHINS petition being filed), and sometimes the statutorily imposed deadlines may not allow for resolution of other pending matters. But a child’s best interests are at the heart of every CHINS proceeding. Courts should therefore prioritize the resolution of pending paternity, custody, and parenting time matters when, as here and as in S.A., N.C., and M.M., doing so would likely prevent the risk of Child being returned to an unfit parent. [20] Here, because Father filed his custody modification motion weeks before the CHINS factfinding hearing—and months before the juvenile court adjudicated Child a CHINS—the juvenile court could have ruled on that motion prior to determining whether Child was a CHINS. If the juvenile court had granted the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JC-667 | October 13, 2026 Page 12 of 16 motion, as it eventually did, there would have been no risk of Child being returned to Mother’s unsupervised care. Conclusion [21] In sum, DCS did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the juvenile court’s coercive intervention is necessary in this case, so the juvenile court clearly erred by adjudicating Child a CHINS under Indiana Code sections 31- 34-1-1 and 31-34-1-3(a). We reverse and remand with instructions for the juvenile court to vacate those adjudications. [22] Reversed and remanded. Bradford, J., concurs. Tavitas, C.J., concurs in result with separate opinion. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Carlos I. Carrillo Carrillo Law LLC Greenwood, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Katherine A. Cornelius Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JC-667 | October 13, 2026 Page 13 of 16 Tavitas, Chief Judge, concurring in result. [23] I concur in result. The coercive intervention of the court is not necessarily appropriate when a child is removed from a custodial parent and the non- custodial parent has a pending petition to modify custody. That is the situation we have here, and it was the situation presented in each of the cases the majority cites. See In re M.M., 118 N.E.3d 70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019); In re N.C., 72 N.E.3d 519 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017); In re S.A., 15 N.E.3d 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d on reh’g, 27 N.E.3d 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. [24] The concurrent-jurisdiction statute, Indiana Code Section 31-30-1-13, grants concurrent jurisdiction to both the CHINS court and the paternity court. This concurrent jurisdiction is precisely what eliminates the “legal possibility” problem identified by the majority—when a non-custodial parent has a pending petition to modify custody, the legal possibility of the child returning to the custodial parent can be eliminated via the paternity action without requiring a CHINS adjudication. See M.M., 118 N.E.3d at 75. Here, Father filed a petition to modify custody and, rather than allowing that petition to be heard and ruled on, the juvenile court proceeded to find Child to be a CHINS. Had the court instead ruled on Father’s pending petition to modify custody, the coercive intervention of the State and the court would not have been necessary. [25] We stayed the proceedings in this appeal to allow the juvenile court to rule on Father’s pending petition to modify custody. The resolution of the custody Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JC-667 | October 13, 2026 Page 14 of 16 matter, therefore, confirms that the State’s coercive intervention in the CHINS matter was unnecessary. [26] Paragraph 18 of the majority’s opinion is, to me, contradictory and incorrect. See, ante, at 11 (“The resolution of [Father’s petition to modify custody] has no bearing on our decision regarding the CHINS adjudication. . . . It was nevertheless necessary . . . for the trial court to rule on the custody [petition] before we issued this decision in order to protect Child from being returned to Mother’s unsupervised care without the juvenile court’s approval.”). [27] Contrary to footnote 7 of the majority opinion, I do rely on the custody determination in finding that the CHINS finding was improper. Had Father not followed through with his pending custody modification, or if Father’s petition to modify custody had been denied, the coercive intervention of the court would have been necessary—Child would have lacked a proper custodian, and Child clearly could not have been returned to Mother's unsupervised care without the State's intervention. [28] But the cases the majority cites teach us that the State cannot use its coercive powers while a parent’s petition to modify custody remains pending and unresolved. Once those proceedings have concluded, the possibility of a CHINS proceeding may not be necessary as is the case here, now that Father has been granted custody. I would, therefore, hold, consistent with the cases cited by the majority, that a CHINS finding is premature when a pending Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JC-667 | October 13, 2026 Page 15 of 16 petition to modify custody has been filed by a parent about whom DCS has no concerns. 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