Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this opinion until it is certified. FILED Oct 16 2026, 9:31 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Brian L. Walls, Appellant-Respondent v. Stacy M. Walls, Appellee-Petitioner October 16, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-DC-221 Appeal from the Hamilton Circuit Court The Honorable Andrew R. Bloch, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 29C01-2401-DC-661 Opinion by Judge Brown Judges Bailey and Weissmann concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 1 of 29 Brown, Judge. [1] Brian L. Walls (“Husband”) appeals from the trial court’s decree of dissolution of marriage and raises issues regarding child support, the division of marital property, and child custody. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. Facts and Procedural History [2] Stacy M. Walls (“Wife”) and Husband were married in 2007 and have three children, born in 2011, 2013, and 2017. In 2007, Husband was employed as a paralegal at Simon Property Group, and Wife was employed as a paralegal for the Marion County Prosecutor’s Office. In 2008, Husband was the mall manager at Hamilton Towne Center. In 2009, he accepted a promotion as a mall manager for another Simon Property Group mall, and the parties relocated to Tulsa, Oklahoma. In Oklahoma, Wife worked as an advocate for the Tulsa County Prosecutor’s Office. In October 2011, Husband accepted another promotion as a mall manager for another Simon Property Group mall outside Chicago, Illinois, and the parties relocated to the Chicagoland area. The parties decided that it was best for Wife to leave the workforce. In August 2013, the parties moved to Indianapolis, and Husband joined Keter Environmental Services (“Keter”). [3] In November 2021, a private equity firm acquired Keter, and Husband’s ownership interest in the company yielded him approximately $3.6 million, of which he reinvested or “roll[ed] forward” $1.0 million back into the company. Transcript Volume III at 8. Husband’s employment with Keter ended in Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 2 of 29 January 2024, and his separation agreement provided that his compensation would extend for approximately six months. Husband’s most recent position with Keter was Chief Integration Officer, and his annual salary when his employment ended was approximately $244,000 plus bonuses. [4] On January 22, 2024, Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. On March 6, 2024, the parties filed a provisional agreement, which the trial court approved. The agreement provided that Wife would have primary physical custody of the children subject to Husband’s parenting time, the parties would share legal custody with Wife having final decision-making authority if the parties reached an impasse, Wife would have possession of the marital residence and Husband would pay all costs associated with the marital residence, and Husband would pay child support of $596 per week. 1 In June 2024, Husband purchased an ownership interest in Indy Trash Guy, LLC using funds from his Keter severance payment, and he earns monthly gross income of $5,000 from the company. [5] On July 18, 2024, Husband filed a petition to modify provisional agreement arguing that his severance income was ending on July 31, 2024, he was unable to secure employment earning the same as his previous employment, and there had been a substantial and continuing change of circumstances since the parties’ provisional agreement. In August 2024, Wife obtained employment as 1 The child support obligation worksheet attached to the agreement included weekly gross income amounts of $4,615.38 for Husband and $961 for Wife. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 3 of 29 a paralegal earning an annual salary of about $50,000. Wife filed a petition for contempt and to enforce the provisional agreement alleging Husband violated various provisions of the provisional agreement including that he did not pay or reimburse her for certain expenses or provide certain information as required. In a supplemental petition for contempt, Wife alleged that Husband unilaterally reduced his child support payments to $120.39 for the weeks of August 16 and 23, 2024. [6] On October 21, 2024, the court held a hearing. On December 12, 2024, the court issued an “Order of October 21, 2024 Hearing” (the “December 2024 Order”) stating Husband “is Ordered to resume payments at the $596.00 per week rate, and pay [Wife] the amounts of past due child support owed under the prior provisional Order” and, “[a]lthough the amount of child support is modifiable at any time, neither Party shall modify the amounts payable by way of unilateral act.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 44. The order also found Husband’s obligation to carry health insurance for the children had lapsed due to the cessation of available health insurance under his severance package, ordered Wife to carry coverage for the children, and required Husband to pay eighty-three percent of the premiums for the children’s health insurance. 2 [7] On January 13, 2025, Husband filed a “Motion to Correct Error” arguing that his child support obligation under the provisional agreement was based on his 2 The court’s dissolution decree states that the December 2024 Order found Husband in contempt, but the order did not make such a finding. The court should correct this error on remand. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 4 of 29 “current salary, which he will receive for a finite period” and his obligation was “fully modifiable at any time” and that his July 18, 2024 petition alleged that “his severance income was about to cease” and he “was unable to secure employment at the same previous rate and was now earning $60,000.” Id. at 47-48. He argued, when his “severance income ceased, paying child support at $596 per week and payment of all the marital expenses on a gross income of $5,000 per month was wholly unreasonable.” 3 Id. at 49. He argued that he filed his modification petition “approximately twenty-seven days prior to his reduction in support payments to [Wife] on August 16, 2024.” Id. at 51. He argued that he did not cease payments, but abated his payments. He argued the court erred in denying his request to modify his support obligation. The court denied Husband’s motion. [8] The trial court held a final hearing over two days in September and October 2025. The multi-million dollar marital estate included the marital residence without a mortgage, rental properties, investment and retirement accounts, automobiles, a boat, cryptocurrency, and Husband’s interest in Keter. The parties submitted proposed findings and conclusions. [9] On January 20, 2026, the court entered a decree of dissolution of marriage. The court found that Wife rebutted the presumption of an equal division of the 3 Husband also argued that his income “was not the only substantial change between March 6, 2024, and October 21, 2024—[Wife] obtained employment. So, while $961 per week was imputed to her in the original provisional support calculation, she was actually receiving $961 per week in gross income at the time of hearing.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 51. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 5 of 29 marital estate and that a distribution which resulted in Wife receiving fifty-five percent of the marital estate was just and reasonable. The court awarded physical custody of the children to Wife and awarded Husband parenting time of every other weekend from Fridays after school until Sundays, every Wednesday evening, and holidays, special days, and extended parenting time in the summer as set forth in the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. It ordered that the parties share joint legal custody and that, if the parties reach an impasse, Wife shall have final decision-making authority. The court also ordered Husband to contribute $15,000 toward Wife’s attorney fees. Discussion [10] Husband challenges the trial court’s denial of his request to modify child support, its division of marital property, and its custody determination. Because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, our review is for clear error. Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026). In conducting this review, we determine whether the evidence supports the court’s findings and whether those findings support the court’s judgment. Id. We do not reassess witnesses’ credibility or reweigh evidence. Id. We will reverse only if the findings lack factual support in the record or if the judgment applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id. A finding or conclusion is clearly erroneous if the appellate court’s review leaves it with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020). A. Child Support Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 6 of 29 [11] Husband argues the court erred in denying his request to modify his support obligation, his income fell from approximately $4,700 per week to $1,153.85 per week, he paid a reasonable amount based on the parties’ actual incomes while the petition was pending, and he did not act unreasonably as his income had dropped by more than seventy-five percent. Wife argues that Husband resigned from Keter of his own volition and reduced his support payment by nearly eighty percent without judicial approval. [12] Ind. Code § 31-15-4-15 provides “[t]he terms of a provisional order may be revoked or modified before the final decree on a showing of the facts appropriate to revocation or modification.” The provisional agreement provided: [Husband] shall pay provisional child support in the amount of $596/week, pursuant to the [child support obligation worksheet] incorporated herein, beginning February 16, 2024, and each Friday thereafter, with the issue of retroactive child support a reserved issue. The parties acknowledge that said sum is based on [Husband’s] current salary, which he will receive for a finite period. Both parties agree that provisional child support is fully modifiable at any time. Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 40. [13] Husband filed his petition requesting a modification of his support obligation on July 18, 2024. Husband’s child support obligation of $596 per week was based on his annual income of approximately $244,000 from Keter, and his petition to modify provisional agreement stated that his severance income Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 7 of 29 ended on July 31, 2024. Also, we note that Husband’s severance agreement contained a two-year non-compete provision. Husband purchased an ownership interest in Indy Trash Guy, LLC in June 2024, and he receives $5,000 per month in earnings from the company. Wife’s income is about $50,000 per year. The parties expressly acknowledged in their provisional agreement that they anticipated a reduction in Husband’s income and that Husband’s support obligation was modifiable. Further, the court’s decree found that the parties did not disagree as to their incomes for child support purposes and referred to their exhibits stating weekly gross incomes of approximately $1,153.85 for Husband and $961.54 for Wife. Based on the evidence, we conclude the trial court erred in denying Husband’s July 18, 2024 request to modify his child support obligation. We remand with instructions to calculate Husband’s weekly support obligation from July 31, 2024, 4 through the date of the dissolution decree based on his weekly gross income of $1,153.85 during that period and to determine the extent to which Husband is entitled to credit for any overpayment. 5 4 As noted, Husband’s petition to modify provisional agreement stated that his severance income ended on July 31, 2024. 5 Husband further argues the court’s December 2024 Order directed Wife to carry health insurance for the children and required him to pay a portion of her premiums even though he had obtained comparable coverage for the children. The child support worksheet attached to the provisional agreement included a credit for Husband for the payment of premiums associated with the children’s health insurance. The December 2024 Order found that Husband’s obligation to carry health insurance for the children had lapsed, ordered Wife to carry coverage for the children, and required Husband to pay a percentage of the premiums for the health insurance. The court on remand should calculate the cost of the children’s health insurance coverage after July 18, 2024, the portion of the premiums for which Husband was responsible based on his weekly gross income of $1,153.85, and any credit to which Husband is entitled. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 8 of 29 [14] Further, Husband argues that the decree “failed to allocate the child-related income tax benefits between the parties.” Appellant’s Brief at 36. Husband’s proposed order included a suggested allocation of the tax benefit. The court on remand should determine the allocation of any such benefit and enter an appropriate order. B. Marital Property [15] We next address the valuation and division of marital property. We review a trial court’s division of marital property for an abuse of discretion. Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 225 (Ind. 2022). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision stands clearly against the logic and effect of the facts or reasonable inferences, if it misinterprets the law, or if it overlooks evidence of applicable statutory factors. Id. When the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court may set aside the trial court’s judgment only when clearly erroneous. Id. The party challenging the trial court’s division of marital property must overcome a strong presumption that the court considered and complied with the applicable statute. Id. [16] The division of marital property involves a two-step process. Id. at 226. First, the trial court must identify the property to include in the marital estate. Id. at 226-227. This consists of both assets and liabilities and encompasses “all marital property,” whether acquired by a spouse before the marriage or during Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 9 of 29 the marriage or procured by the parties jointly. Id. at 227. Once the court identifies the marital estate, it must then distribute the property in a “just and reasonable” manner. Id. (citing Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5). The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. A party, however, may rebut this presumption with relevant evidence showing that an equal division would not be just and reasonable. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227 (citing Ind. Code § 31-15-7- 5). This evidence may include: • each spouse’s contribution to the property’s acquisition, regardless of whether the contribution produced any income; • the extent to which a spouse acquired property, either before the marriage or through inheritance or gift; • each spouse’s economic circumstances at the time of divorce; • the parties’ conduct during the marriage, as it related to the disposal or dissipation of assets; and • the parties’ respective earnings or earning ability. Id. (citing Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5). This statutory list is nonexclusive, and no single factor controls the division of property. Id. “So long as it expressly considers all assets and liabilities, and so long as it offers sufficient findings to rebut the presumptive equal division, a trial court need not follow a rigid, technical formula in dividing the marital estate and we will assume that it applied the law correctly.” Id. at 229. We review a trial court’s valuation of an asset in a marriage dissolution for an abuse of discretion. Bingley v. Bingley, 935 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 10 of 29 N.E.2d 152, 154 (Ind. 2010). A trial court has not abused its discretion if sufficient evidence and reasonable inferences support that valuation. Id. 1. Marital Residence [17] Husband claims the trial court erred in its valuation of the marital residence. The record contains appraisals of the marital residence of $750,000, $770,000, and $880,000. The court valued the residence at $798,000. 6 Husband testified that, unlike the other two appraisals, the appraisal for $750,000 did not assign a value to the boat dock and improvements on the property. 7 He testified that he made improvements to the dock by adding a lift and a canopy and that the improvements cost about $25,000. As the appraisal for $750,000 did not specify a value for the boat dock and improvements, we remand with instructions to amend the dissolution decree to value the marital residence at $825,000, which is the average of the other two appraisals, and to recalculate the portion of the parties’ brokerage account to be awarded to Wife (or to divide other property) to effect an aggregate division resulting in Wife receiving fifty-five percent and Husband receiving forty-five percent of the marital estate. 2. Personal Property 6 Wife’s proposed findings included a value for the residence of $798,000. 7 The appraisal for $770,000 indicated an adjustment for the dock improvements of $25,000. The appraisal for $880,000 indicated an adjustment for the improvements of $10,000. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 11 of 29 [18] With respect to the parties’ vehicles, Husband argues that Wife did not obtain an appraisal of the Ford Bronco and included an inflated valuation of the Bronco in her proposed division, and he maintains that his “valuation was comparing apples to apples, while [Wife’s] was comparing apples to rotten oranges or spoiled milk.” Appellant’s Brief at 32. Husband introduced Kelley Blue Book estimates valuing the parties’ Ford Bronco at $38,336 and their Ford Explorer at $8,609. 8 A spreadsheet submitted by Husband summarizing the parties’ assets and debts indicated a liability associated with the Ford Bronco of $49,352.66. Wife introduced an appraisal, dated September 4, 2025, of the Ford Explorer indicating a value of $6,500 based on the vehicle having 145,891 miles. The record also includes a Kelley Blue Book valuation of the Bronco indicating an estimated value of $46,351. 9 When asked on cross-examination, the “real balance [of the debt on the Bronco] as of September 13, 2025, are you aware, is $38,209.70,” Husband stated, “I’m not aware of the exact balance.” Transcript Volume III at 98. When asked, “[a]re you aware that [the Ford Explorer] has 150,000 miles on it,” Husband stated, “I am not.” Id. at 99. On redirect examination, Husband indicated that he used Kelley Blue Book to estimate the fair market values of both vehicles, that he was asked on cross- examination about the miles on the Explorer as of the date of the hearing, that 8 The estimate for the Explorer was based on the vehicle having 130,000 miles. The estimates for both vehicles stated, “Valid . . . through 7/18/2025.” Exhibits Volume VI at 93, 97. 9 This exhibit appears to be a screenshot which does not include a date or the mileage upon which the estimate was based. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 12 of 29 it had been nineteen to twenty months since he and Wife separated, and that Wife did not obtain an appraisal of the Bronco in his possession. The trial court valued the Ford Bronco at $46,351 with a debt of $38,209.70 and the Ford Explorer at $6,500. 10 We find that the values the court assigned to the vehicles were within the evidence and find no abuse of discretion. See Miller v. Miller, 265 N.E.3d 529, 531 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (“[T]he trial court has discretion in valuing the marital assets to set any date between the date of filing the dissolution petition and the date of the hearing.”) (citing Eyler v. Eyler, 492 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ind. 1986)), trans. denied. [19] Husband also argues the court erred in assigning the value of jewelry to him “when the evidentiary record contains no testimony that [he] possessed any jewelry or that jewelry was located in [his] possession rather than at the marital residence.” Appellant’s Brief at 36. Wife responds, “[e]ven assuming arguendo that this assignment was erroneous, any error was harmless” and “[t]he jewelry was valued at $5,000 in a marital estate with a net worth exceeding $6.1 million.” Appellee’s Brief at 45 n.2. The court’s schedule of assets valued the parties’ jewelry at $5,000 and assigned the value to Husband. To the extent the parties did not present testimony of the value of the jewelry or that Husband possessed the jewelry, the court on remand should correct its schedule and 10 The court’s schedule listing and providing values for the parties’ assets and debts appears to be nearly identical to the schedule in Wife’s proposed findings. The schedule in Wife’s proposed findings, in assigning the value of the Ford Explorer to Wife, appears to have mistakenly used a figure of $500 instead of $6,500. The schedule in the court’s findings includes the same mistake. The court on remand should correct this error. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 13 of 29 adjust the funds awarded to Wife to maintain an aggregate division resulting in her receiving fifty-five percent of the marital estate. 3. Keter [20] Husband argues, “[i]n light of the uncontroverted facts regarding the speculative nature and illiquidity of the Keter reinvestment, the trial court committed reversible error in both its valuation of the asset and the assignment of the asset, at an improper value, solely to [him].” Appellant’s Brief at 31. [21] Husband had an ownership interest in Keter, and a private equity firm purchased the company in November 2021. During the examination of Husband, the following exchange occurred: Q What did that yield? Or what did that look like for you? A So I think the number was like my share equated to about $3.6 million. But they wanted all of us to roll over, roll forward a minimum of $1 million, so you were basically required to roll forward $1 million and then we got a check for $2.6 million. ***** Q What does that look like for you moving forward? A I have zero control over it. It will – it’s payable when the company next sells. So the current private equity company when they next sell to either a strategic buyer or another PE firm, it’s payable in some short window after that, I’m not sure if it’s 30 days or what that is. And it could be worth $500,000. It could be worth $2,000,000. I have no idea. I do not control it and will not know until it actually sells. If it sells. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 14 of 29 Transcript Volume III at 8-9. [22] When asked if he thought it was fair to place “that entire $1 million in your column” on the balance sheet, Husband replied, “I do not” and testified: It’s not liquid. It can’t be liquidated. It’s not even – like real estate isn’t liquid, but you can liquidate it if you control it. There is zero control over this. . . . [T]he value it could be worth zero or it could be worth two and a half million. I have no way of knowing. So I don’t think it’s fair to assign a $1,000,000 valuation on a $6 million maybe estate that’s completely out of control with unknown future value. Id. at 9. When asked, “[w]hat’s your proposal with respect to that reinvestment,” Husband responded, “[t]hat we basically pull it off to the side, split everything else, and then when that’s transaction, if and when that occurs split whatever the proceeds are.” Id. [23] The trial court assigned a value to Husband’s interest in Keter of $1.0 million. We have found that a trial court is able under certain circumstances to determine the value of a spouse’s ownership interest in light of marketability and minority shareholder discounts. See Alexander v. Alexander, 927 N.E.2d 926, 937-939 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. However, Husband did not present evidence regarding the extent to which his interest should have been discounted or the proper basis for any such discount. Moreover, the court’s valuation was not speculative and was based on the evidence that Husband’s “share equated to about $3.6 million” and that, as part of the private equity firm’s purchase of Keter in 2021, he “roll[ed] forward $1 million” of the proceeds he received into Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 15 of 29 the business. Transcript Volume III at 8. We cannot say the court abused its discretion in valuing Husband’s interest in Keter or awarding the asset to him. 4. Post-Filing Increase [24] Husband argues his brokerage account “reflected approximately $2.1 million as of the balance sheet date,[11] but an additional approximately $500,000 in post- filing investment returns was also present in the account as of the time of final hearing” and he “proposed that the post-filing investment returns from his management of the account—built through his active investment strategy over the course of the marriage—be allocated to him, as they resulted from his labor and skill rather than from marital capital alone.” Appellant’s Brief at 34. He also argues, “[s]imilarly, the trial court used present values for the mortgage balances on the parties’ real estate investments rather than the mortgage balances as of January 2024,” and that, “[b]y including the growth in the marital estate, the trial court improperly divided [his] post-filing income.” Id. [25] In the decree, the court found Husband “excluded approximately $500,000.00 of market gains from Fifth Third Brokerage account . . . , suggesting that he should receive that value due to his co-management of that account with [Husband’s broker] at Fifth Third Bank.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 25. It also found Husband “used the date of filing mortgage balances on the 11 At trial, Husband referred to his summary of the marital assets which contained a date of January 22, 2024. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 16 of 29 parties’ five investment [] homes even though the rental income self-funded payment of those mortgages, resulting in lower values for those assets assigned to him.” Id. [26] During his testimony, Husband indicated that he managed the investments in the brokerage account. When asked, “[s]o you’re doing the direct trading in that account,” Husband answered affirmatively. Transcript Volume III at 11. The following exchange occurred: Q Your value is just a little bit north of $2.1 million, is that correct? A Correct. Q And then [Wife’s counsel’s] proposed value is a little bit more the $2.6 million, is that correct? A Correct. Q What accounts for the difference in those two values? A Stocks that I’ve purchased. ***** Q So if you had to tell [the court] why that account has grown by about half a million dollars, what would you tell him? A I manage it every single day. Seven days a week. I look at the account, review the opportunities available, make or don’t make trades. A lot of it is not make a trade when the world’s panicking and whatever April 1st this year was called with tariff day and the market went, you know, lost a couple hundred thousand dollars . . . . Not selling when things looked really bleak. And then finding opportunistic buying opportunities to add to it. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 17 of 29 Id. at 11-12. On cross-examination, Husband stated, “I would say that if that should be part of the marital estate, then I’m happy to split it.” Id. at 104. [27] This Court has noted a distinction between an increase in the value of marital assets attributable to accumulated interest or appreciation of investments following the date the dissolution petition was filed, which is divisible as marital property, and an increase due to contributions from a party’s wages, which is not included in the marital estate to be divided. See Thompson v. Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 918 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“The difficulty encountered with the valuation at bar is that the increase in the retirement benefit’s post-filing value derives from two sources: (1) wages withheld from the beneficiary’s post-filing income, and (2) the increases attributable to the interest accumulated from the benefit’s value at the time of separation. The former increase is the result of the beneficiary’s contribution from non-marital property and may not be divided as a marital asset. The latter increase is the result of the benefit’s mere existence and is divisible as marital property.”) (citations omitted), reh’g denied, trans. denied; Niccum v. Niccum, 734 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“Myra is entitled and subject to any gains, losses and expenses related to and permitted by the investment plan on her 50% share. However, after the valuation date she is not entitled to any growth that results solely from deposits made by John.”). As for the brokerage account, the increase attributable to the accumulated interest or appreciated value of the assets constituted marital property to be divided between the parties. We decline to find that Husband’s management of the investments or trading—selecting funds Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 18 of 29 or stocks to purchase and deciding when to sell them—rendered the growth of the funds to be akin to wages or to comprise contributions of non-marital property. As for the rental properties, the court found the rental income funded the mortgage payments which increased the parties’ equity in the investments. Husband does not claim that he contributed funds to the brokerage account or the rental properties from his separate post-petition earned income. We find no abuse of discretion. 5. Division [28] Husband argues the trial court’s “purported 55/45 division in [Wife’s] favor is not supported by the statutory factors.” Appellant’s Brief at 37. A party may rebut the presumption that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. To the extent Husband does not challenge the court’s findings of fact, the unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver of the argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied. The court found the factors regarding the parties’ contribution to the acquisition of the marital property and the extent to which the property was acquired through inheritance or gift to be neutral, and it found the factors of the parties’ economic circumstances, conduct during the marriage, and earnings or earning ability to favor Wife. The court found that Wife had rebutted the presumption of an equal division of the marital property and that an award of fifty-five percent of the marital estate to Wife was just and reasonable. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 19 of 29 [29] With respect to the parties’ contributions to the acquisition of their property, during the marriage Wife worked as a paralegal in Indianapolis until 2009 and as an advocate in the prosecutor’s office in Oklahoma from 2009 through 2011, at which point she left the workforce by agreement of the parties. Husband was employed at Simon Property Group, working as a paralegal and then mall manager in Indiana, Oklahoma, and Illinois, before returning to Indianapolis and joining Keter, where he worked until 2024. A private equity firm purchased Keter in November 2021, and Husband’s ownership interest yielded him approximately $3.6 million, of which he “roll[ed] forward” $1.0 million back into the company. Transcript Volume III at 8. Husband’s annual salary when his employment with Keter ended was approximately $244,000 plus bonuses. The parties owned the marital residence with no mortgage, held funds in investment and retirement accounts, and accumulated five rental properties. The court found that Husband worked long hours outside the home, worked an average of 50 to 55 hours per week and 70 hours some weeks, traveled 15 to 25 nights per year, and was “on call 24/7” at Simon Property Group and Keter. Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 19. It found that Wife provided for all of the children’s needs, helped them with homework, scheduled and attended all of their appointments, attended parent-teacher conferences, drove them to extracurricular activities such as swimming, gymnastics, soccer, dance, and voice lessons, did the majority of the cooking for the children, and handled most of the upkeep of the residence. Wife indicated that she “put [her] career on hold for over 12 years to support him and the house so he could move up the corporate ladder.” Transcript Volume II at 161. Given that both parties Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-221 | October 16, 2026 Page 20 of 29 contributed through their individual efforts, we cannot say this factor weighs heavily in favor of either party. [30] The parties agree that they did not receive inheritances or significant gifts. As for dissipation, dissipation of marital assets refers to “the frivolous, unjustified spending of marital assets,” and the test for dissipation “is whether the assets were actually wasted or misused.” Goodman v. Goodman, 754 N.E.2d 595, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted), reh’g denied. We cannot say the record reveals frivolous, unjustified spending by either party. As for their economic circumstances, Wife lived in the marital residence with no mortgage payment, and the marital estate to be divided was valued at over $6.0 million. The marital property included funds in brokerage or deposit accounts totaling over $3.0 million, of which the court awarded nearly $2.2 million to Wife, and retirement funds totaling over $730,000, of which it awarded about $340,000 to Wife. The court awar