Full Opinion

Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this opinion until it is certified. IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana De’Mario Streeter, FILED Oct 02 2026, 9:49 am Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals v. and Tax Court State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff October 2, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-CR-509 Appeal from the Porter Superior Court The Honorable Michael A. Fish, Judge Trial Court Cause Nos. 64D01-2309-F5-8182 64D01-2402-F6-1823 64D01-2410-F5-10769 Opinion by Judge Bradford Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 1 of 23 Judge Felix concurs. Chief Judge Tavitas concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion. Bradford, Judge. Case Summary [1] De’Mario Streeter pled guilty to Level 5 felony domestic battery, Level 5 felony stalking, and Level 6 felony intimidation. The trial court accepted Streeter’s guilty plea and sentenced him to an aggregate thirteen-and-one-half-year executed sentence. The trial court also ordered Streeter to pay court costs and $80.00 in fees. Streeter contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him and in ordering him to pay court costs and fees. We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in sentencing Streeter and in ordering him to pay court costs. However, because we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay $80.00 in fees, we affirm in part and reverse in part. Facts and Procedural History [2] On August 28, 2023, Streeter committed a domestic battery against his girlfriend, S.D. During this battery, Streeter fractured S.D.’s jaw and caused bruising and swelling to her face, neck, arms, and torso. As a result of the battery, S.D. had to have her jaw wired shut and required reconstructive surgery. On September 8, 2023, the State charged Streeter with Level 5 felony Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 2 of 23 domestic battery resulting in serious bodily injury in Cause No. 64D01-2309- F5-8182 (“Cause No. F5-8182”). The State later amended the charging information to include a charge of Level 5 felony attempted obstruction of justice. [3] In February of 2024, Streeter communicated threats to Portage Police Detective N.H. “because of her occupation as a law enforcement officer” with the intent that she “be placed in fear that the threat would be carried out[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 15. On February 7, 2024, Streeter sent a message to Detective N.H. that said You a smart pretty b[***]h lol I wonder if u gone look even more cute in a … lmao u think its a game too. See, its pretty easy for me to get what I want. Especially someone’s whole life, address, cell phone number, location, car they drive. U name it, anything. Literally anything! And you my friend have earned yo self a spot....and your little friend you was with. This was fun too you. Its gunna be even more fun to me, because its all gunna all be unexpected surprises. Dead people are more fun[.] Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 147 (bracketed material added). Streeter sent a second message that said “[n]o expiration date on revenge <3333 NONE! And I don’t forget s[**]t.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 147. On February 8, 2024, Streeter sent two more messages. In the first of these messages, Streeter referenced a handgun and stated that it “[h]as your name written all over it ;)[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 146. In the second, Streeter said “[y]our little friend, he’s not that smart. He’ll be dead before the new year is here. Lmao Being dead sounds like it sucks. But these are the decisions we make when we deal with people and play games. Goodmorning Tho ;) I love how pretty you Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 3 of 23 are <3333[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 146. On February 23, 2024, the State charged Streeter with three counts of Level 6 felony intimidation in Cause No. 64D01-2402-F6-1823 (“Cause No. F6-1823”). [4] Streeter also stalked Detective N.H. “[a]nd made explicit or implicit threats with the intent to place her in unreasonable fear of sexual battery, serious bodily injury, or death[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. On August 5, 2024, in violation of a no contact order, Streeter sent a letter to Detective N.H. He also sent messages referencing Detective N.H. on October 7, and October 8, 2024. On October 10, 2024, Streeter sent additional messages referencing Detective N.H., in which he threatened to sexually batter her or cause her serious bodily harm or death. On October 17, 2024, the State charged Streeter with two counts of Level 5 felony stalking, five counts of Level 6 felony intimidation, and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy in Cause No. 64D01-2410-F5-10769 (“Cause No. F5- 10769”). [5] On December 1, 2025, Streeter and the State entered into a stipulated plea agreement, by the terms of which Streeter agreed to plead guilty to Level 5 felony domestic battery in Cause No. F5-8182; Level 6 felony intimidation in Cause No. F6-1823; and Level 5 felony stalking in Cause No. F5-10769. In exchange for Streeter’s guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss “the remaining Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 4 of 23 counts and charges captioned.”1 Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 90. The trial court accepted Streeter’s guilty plea. [6] After Streeter requested that the trial court appoint counsel for the sentencing hearing, the trial court conducted an indigency hearing. Streeter affirmed that his financial situation had not changed, he had not sold any property or inherited property, he had not come into possession of any lottery winnings, and he did not have any money saved. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found Streeter “indigent” and that he qualified “for the services of the public defender.” Tr. Vol. II p. 18. [7] The trial court held a sentencing hearing on January 30, 2026. In the presentence investigation report (“PSI”), Streeter indicated that, due to his incarceration, he had no current source of income but that prior to his incarceration, he had earned approximately $6000.00 per month. Streeter’s monthly expenses did not exceed his monthly income, and he indicated that his financial situation had been “good[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 120. Streeter further indicated that he would return to work once released from incarceration. [8] Detective N.H. testified that she had initially been assigned to investigate Streeter’s domestic battery against S.D. but she eventually became involved in approximately ten cases against Streeter. As part of her law-enforcement 1 In addition to Cause Nos. F5-8182, F6-1823, and F5-10769, the caption included numerous charges that had been brought under ten other cause numbers. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 5 of 23 duties, Detective N.H. had monitored Streeter’s communications while he was incarcerated. She noted that Streeter had violated a no-contact order protecting S.D. “[h]undreds and hundreds of times.” Tr. Vol. II p. 28. Streeter had also telephoned Detective N.H., sent her letters, sent her messages through the jail communication system, and given her messages indirectly through his conversations and messages with other associates because he knew that she was listening to and reading his jail communications. Detective N.H. gave a lengthy victim-impact statement in which she detailed Streeter’s actions and indicated that she had experienced “on-going fear, stress, and emotional strain” as a result of Streeter’s actions. Tr. Vol. II p. 36. [9] In sentencing Streeter, the trial court found the following aggravating factors: 1. The Defendant has a prolific history of criminal or delinquent behavior as set forth in the pre-sentence report. 2. Defendant has violated no-contact order(s) issued against him. 3. The Defendant has recently violated the conditions of probation, parole, and/or pre-trial release. 4. The harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by the victim was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 130. The trial court “reject[ed] all mitigating factors.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 130. The trial court then sentenced Streeter to the following consecutive sentences: (1) five years for domestic battery; (2) two and one-half years for intimidation; and (3) six years for stalking, for an aggregate sentence of thirteen and one-half years. The trial Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 6 of 23 court also dismissed “all remaining counts in all causes” pursuant to the plea agreement. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 131. The trial court also imposed “judgment liens entered for three (3) sets of court costs [2] and the $80.00 jail booking and death benefit fee.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 131. [10] When Streeter indicated that he would like to have counsel appointed for the purpose of appeal, the trial court engaged him in the following exchange: [Trial Court]: You’ve been incarcerated for some time, I’m aware of your financial situation. I had previously appointed pauper counsel for you and had made a finding that you’re an indigent person. Have any circumstances changed that would allow you to hire an attorney with your own funds at this time? [Streeter]: No. [Trial Court]: Does anybody owe you money that you know of? [Streeter]: No. [Trial Court]: Are you an heir in anybody’s estate? Anybody passed away and you would get money from their estate, anything of that nature? [Streeter]: No, your Honor. [Trial Court]: Okay. Anybody sold any property or anything of yours where they owe you the money from that property sale? [Streeter]: No. [Trial Court]: Do you have any personal property that is worth anything significant? I heard some folks say that you may have played some instruments or something of that nature? [Streeter]: No. [Trial Court]: Anything value that could be sold? [Streeter]: No. 2 The record indicates that the court costs imposed in each of the three actions were $189.00. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 7 of 23 [Trial Court]: Okay. [Trial Court]: Sir, I’ll find you’re indigent and you qualify for the services of the public defender. I’ll maintain the appointment of the public defender service for the appeal period[.] Tr. Vol. II pp. 54–56. Discussion and Decision [11] Streeter contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him, in ordering him to pay court costs, and in ordering him to pay $80.00 in fines. I. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Sentencing Streeter. [12] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (quotation omitted). We review for an abuse of discretion the court’s finding of aggravators and mitigators to justify a sentence, but we cannot review the relative weight assigned to those factors. When reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances identified by the trial court in its sentencing statement, we will remand only if the record does not support the reasons, or the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 8 of 23 sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record, and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law. Baumholser v. State, 62 N.E.3d 411, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citation and quotation omitted), trans. denied. [13] The trial court sentenced Streeter to five years for Level 5 felony domestic battery resulting in serious bodily injury, six years for Level 5 felony stalking, and two and one-half years for Level 6 felony intimidation. “A person who commits a Level 5 felony … shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between one (1) and six (6) years, with the advisory sentence being three (3) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). “A person who commits a Level 6 felony … shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) months and two and one-half (2½) years, with the advisory sentence being one (1) year.” Ind. Code § 35-50- 2-7(b). Thus, the trial court imposed an enhanced sentence for the domestic- battery count and maximum sentences for the stalking and intimidation counts. A. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Failing to Find Streeter’s Guilty Plea to be a Mitigating Circumstance [14] Streeter argues the trial court improperly failed to consider his guilty plea as a mitigating circumstance. The trial court “is not obligated to accept the defendant’s contentions as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance or to give the proffered mitigating circumstances the same weight the defendant does.” Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 9 (Ind. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 9 of 23 “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. Streeter has failed to do so. [15] “A guilty plea is not necessarily a mitigating factor where the defendant receives substantial benefit from the plea or where evidence against the defendant is so strong that the decision to plead guilty is merely pragmatic.” Norris v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1245, 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied. Streeter received a significant benefit from his guilty plea. With regards to the three cause numbers at issue in the instant appeal, the State dismissed nine felony charges and one misdemeanor charge in exchange for Streeter’s guilty plea. In addition to these charges, numerous other cases were also dismissed as part of the plea agreement. Our review of the record indicates that, in total, nineteen felony charges and nine misdemeanor charges were dismissed. Given the significant benefit Streeter received, he has failed to demonstrate that his guilty plea was a significant mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found no mitigating circumstances. B. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Finding the Significant Harm Suffered by the Victims to be an Aggravating Circumstance [16] Initially, we note that the trial court found three unchallenged aggravating circumstances: (1) Streeter’s “prolific” history of criminal or delinquent Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 10 of 23 behavior; (2) Streeter violated the no-contact orders issued against him; and (3) Streeter recently violated the conditions of probation, parole, and/or pre-trial release. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 130. A single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to enhance a sentence. When a trial court improperly applies an aggravator but other valid aggravating circumstances exist, a sentence enhancement may still be upheld. The question we must decide is whether we are confident the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even if it had not found the improper aggravator. Baumholser, 62 N.E.3d at 417 (internal quotation and citation omitted). [17] Streeter argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found the significant harm suffered by the victims to be an aggravating circumstance. Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1(a), however, provides that “[i]n determining what sentence to impose for a crime, the court may consider the following aggravating circumstances: (1) The harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by the victim of an offense was: (A) significant; and (B) greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense.” We have held that “in order for this factor to be a valid aggravator, the trial court must explain why the impact suffered by the victims exceeded that which is normally associated with the crime.” Walden v. State, 216 N.E.3d 1165, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. The trial court did so here. [18] The State argues that “the harm was greater than just stalking or just placing the victim in reasonable fear as the endless contacts and threats led to a state of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 11 of 23 constant hyper-vigilance and fear for her life, as well as her family’s safety, wholly disrupting Detective [N.H.’s] life[.]” Appellee’s Br. p. 15. Given the severity of Streeter’s conduct and numerous threats to Detective N.H., we agree. However, even if the trial court had abused its discretion in finding this aggravating circumstance, under these circumstances of this case, we can say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even without consideration of the harm to Detective N.H. II. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Ordering Streeter to Pay Court Costs [19] An abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to a trial court’s sentencing decisions and to the imposition of costs and fees. This standard allows reversal only when a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law. But a statute’s meaning and scope are legal questions we review de novo. Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 771 (Ind. 2024) (internal citation and quotations omitted). [20] Streeter contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay court costs, given its finding that he was indigent with regard to appointment of counsel. Initially, we note that while Streeter argues that the trial court did not conduct an indigency hearing with regard to court costs, the trial court conducted an indigency hearing with regard to appointment of counsel and entered court costs as a civil judgment, meaning that Streeter could not be Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 12 of 23 imprisoned for non-payment. The indigency hearing conducted by the court was sufficient to cover both appointment of counsel and the imposition of costs and fees. See generally Wooden v. State, 757 N.E.2d 212, 218–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (providing that a trial court does not need to conduct a separate indigency hearing if the trial court’s order imposing fines and/or court costs includes language indicating that the defendant cannot be imprisonment for nonpayment), trans. denied. [21] We have previously concluded that “[a] defendant’s indigency does not shield him from all costs or fees related to his conviction. An indigency determination merely prevents the defendant from being imprisoned for his inability to pay.” Meunier-Short v. State, 52 N.E.3d 927, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citation and quotation omitted). The Indiana Supreme Court appeared to recognize this in Spells, stating, “a defendant may be deemed unable to pay one cost, yet able to pay another.” 225 N.E.3d at 778. Furthermore, the Indiana General Assembly has codified the fact that “[i]f the court finds that the person is able to pay some of the fines, fees, and court costs, the court may prorate the person’s fine, fee, and court costs, and require the person to pay an amount that the person can reasonably afford.” Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6.5(e). [22] In this case, the trial court questioned Streeter about his financial situation during the guilty-plea hearing. The trial court found Streeter to be “indigent” and that he qualified “for the services of the public defender” at the sentencing hearing. Tr. Vol. II p. 18. At sentencing, the trial court questioned Streeter about whether his financial situation had changed. The trial court again found Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 13 of 23 Streeter to be “indigent” and that he qualified “for the services of the public defender” on appeal. Tr. Vol. II p. 55. In sentencing Streeter, the trial court “order[ed] judgment liens entered for three (3) sets of court costs and the $80.00 jail booking and death benefit fee. There is no restitution.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 131. The trial court’s order did not include a specific indigency finding as it relates to costs or fees. [23] The PSI includes additional information relating to Streeter’s financial situation, indicating that while Streeter did not have a source of income while incarcerated, prior to his incarceration, he had earned approximately $6000.00 per month. Streeter’s monthly expenses had not exceeded his monthly income, and he indicated that his financial situation had been “good[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 120. Streeter further indicated that he would return to work once released from incarceration. [24] Indiana Code section 33-37-2-3(a)(2) provides that if a trial court finds that a person is not indigent with regard to payment of court costs, it can order “the person [to] pay … the entire amount of the costs at some later date[.]” In this case, the trial court effectively ordered Streeter to pay the court costs at some later date. Given Streeter’s admitted earning potential post-incarceration, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard. [25] It is clear from the record that the trial court considered Streeter’s indigency but nonetheless ordered him to pay court costs. Streeter did not face the possibility of imprisonment as the trial court entered a civil judgment against Streeter for Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 14 of 23 the court costs. One can reasonably infer from the trial court’s order that, in finding him indigent, the trial court determined that Streeter could pay some costs, but not others. It was within the trial court’s discretion to reach this conclusion. See Spells, 225 N.E.3d at 779. III. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Imposing $80.00 in Fees [26] Again, we review a trial court’s imposition of costs and fees for an abuse of discretion. Spells, 225 N.E.3d at 771. This standard allows reversal only when a decision “is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). We review a “statute’s meaning and scope,” which are legal questions, de novo. Id. A. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Imposing the Jail-Booking Fee [27] Indiana Code section 36-2-13-17.4 provides that “[a] sheriff or an employee of a jail may not charge an individual a fee for the individual to be incarcerated or held in a jail unless the individual has been convicted of a crime for which the individual was incarcerated or held in the jail.” In accordance with this statute and pursuant to Porter County Local Criminal Rule 4940 (“LR 4940”), following Streeter’s conviction, the trial court imposed a $75.00 jail-booking fee. LR 4940 provides: Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 15 of 23 Pursuant to Porter County Ordinance 15-01 (February 18, 2015), Every defendant who has been arrested, incarcerated in the Porter County Jail, and who has been convicted of a misdemeanor or felony offense in Porter County arising from such arrest are liable for an Inmate Processing Fee in the sum of $75.00. In the event an individual is incarcerated on multiple criminal cases simultaneously, only one Inmate Processing Fee shall apply to that period of incarceration. In the event an individual is incarcerated at different times on separate cases, the fee shall apply to each case and each incarceration. Collection of the fee shall be as follows: (a) CASH BONDS: The Clerk of Court shall deduct $80.00 from the cash bond ($75.00 Inmate Processing Fee and $5 Death Benefit Fee) of all defendants designated above, and this deduction shall take precedence over all other deductions from cash bonds, unless a court shall specifically order to the contrary, or shall waive the Inmate Processing Fee. The Sheriff shall promptly notify the Clerk of Court of the posting of such bond. (b) SURETY BONDS: For every case in which a surety bond is posted, whether posted individually, or as a dual bond required by a court, an added cash bond of $80 must be posted. The Sheriff shall promptly notify the Clerk of Court of the posting of such bonds. (c) RECOGNIZANCE PROMISE TO APPEAR RELEASE: The arrested individual is responsible for payment of the fee upon conviction directly to the Porter County Sheriff’s Department who shall issue a receipt and promptly notify the Clerk of Court the fee has been paid and the cause number for which it has been paid. The Clerk of Court shall note said payment on the chronological case summary. (d) PAYMENT AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION: An individual who has been placed Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 16 of 23 on probation and who has not paid the Inmate Processing Fee shall pay the same as a condition of probation in a manner consistent with their financial ability to do so. The payment shall be made to the Porter County Sheriff’s Department who shall issue a receipt with the appropriate cause number and notify the Clerk of Court of the payment. The Clerk of Court shall note the payment on the chronological case summary. (e) INMATE COMMISSARY ACCOUNT: An inmate released after conviction who has not other[wise] paid the Inmate Processing Fee shall have deducted from the inmate’s commissary fund at the Porter County Jail an amount up to the full amount of the Inmate Processing Fee. The Death Benefit Fee is excluded from this collection method. The Porter County Sheriff shall issue a receipt with the appropriate cause number and notify the Clerk of Court of the payment. The Clerk of Court shall note the payment on the chronological case summary. (f) INDIGENCY: Any Defendant found to be indigent and unable to pay the Inmate Processing Fee may apply to the Court for an Order waiving collection of the fee. https://www.portercountyin.gov/DocumentCenter/View/3978/2017-Local- Rules-of-Court-for-the-Porter-County-Courts?bidId= (bold omitted, last visited September 2, 2026). [28] “If the trial court imposes fees within statutory limits, there is no abuse of discretion.” Jackson v. State, 968 N.E.2d 328, 333 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The $75.00 inmate processing fee was within the limits set by both Indiana Code section 36-2-13-17.4 and LR 4940. However, the manner of collection ordered Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 17 of 23 by the trial court, i.e., including the fee as part of the judgment lien, is not one of the collection options listed in the ordinance. Because the trial court’s order did not comply with any of the collection options listed in LR 4940, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the fee. We, therefore, reverse the imposition of the $75.00 jail-booking fee. B. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Imposing the $5.00 Death-Benefit Fee [29] Streeter also challenges the trial court’s imposition of a $5.00 death-benefit fee. The statutory authority for collecting a $5.00 death-benefit fee is found in the chapter on bail bonds and is established by Indiana Code Section 35-33-8- 3.2(d), which provides: “the clerk of the court shall: (1) collect a fee of five dollars ($5) from each bond or deposit required under subsection (a)(1); and (2) retain a fee of five dollars ($5) from each deposit under subsection (a)(2).” This fee is, thus, retained from a bail bond or deposit. The trial court did not order that this fee be retained from either a bail bond or deposit but rather included the fee as part of the judgment lien. The fee was therefore not imposed pursuant to the statutory authority for collection of the fee. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the fee, and we reverse the imposition of the $5.00 death-benefit fee. [30] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Felix, J., concurs. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 18 of 23 Tavitas, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT James Harper3 Harper & Harper, LLC Valparaiso, Indiana Kenneth B. Elwood Rhame Elwood & McClure Portage, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Kelly A. Loy Section Chief for Criminal Appeals Alexa R. Rojas Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana 3 Attorney Harper represented Streeter during the majority of the instant appeal and filed both Appellant’s Brief and Appellant’s Reply Brief before the Court. However, effective August 20, 2026, Attorney Harper withdrew his representation, leaving Attorney Elwood as the only counsel of record for Streeter. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 19 of 23 Tavitas, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. [31] I concur with the majority’s decision that: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (2) the trial court’s indigency hearing was sufficient to cover both the appointment of counsel and the imposition of costs and fees; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the jail booking fee; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the death benefit fee. I disagree, however, with the majority’s decision regarding the court costs. Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part. [32] Given the trial court’s determination that Streeter is indigent, I conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the court costs. Indiana Code Section 33-37-2-3 provides, in relevant part: (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), when the court imposes costs, it shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the convicted person is indigent. If the person is not indigent, the court shall order the person to pay: (1) the entire amount of the costs at the time sentence is pronounced; (2) the entire amount of the costs at some later date; (3) specified parts of the costs at designated intervals; or Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 20 of 23 (4) the entire amount of the costs at some later date, less any amount credited under subsections (g) through (i) for the performance of: (A) allowable community service work ordered by the court as part of the person’s sentence or as part of the person’s probation; or (B) uncompensated volunteer work approved by the court at a nonprofit or municipal corporation that benefits the community, even if the volunteer work is not ordered by the court. (b) A court may impose costs and suspend payment of all or part of the costs until the convicted person has completed all or part of the sentence. If the court suspends payment of the costs, the court shall conduct a hearing at the time the costs are due to determine whether the convicted person is indigent. If the convicted person is not indigent, the court shall order the convicted person to pay the costs: (1) at the time the costs are due; or (2) in a manner set forth in subsection (a)(2) through (a)(4). (c) If a court suspends payment of costs under subsection (b), the court retains jurisdiction over the convicted person until the convicted person has paid the entire amount of the costs. [33] In Spells, our Supreme Court noted: By statute, “whenever the court imposes a fine, it shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the convicted person is indigent” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-509 | October 2, 2026 Page 21 of 23 and it may order the payment of a fine only “[i]f the person is not indigent.” I.C. § 35-38-1-18(a) (2007). When costs are imposed, too, the court “shall conduct a hearing” into the person’s indigency and order the costs paid only “[i]f the person is not indigent.” I.C. § 33-37-2-3(a). Spells, 225 N.E.3d at 775. The Court also noted that “an indigent defendant may not be ordered to pay unaffordable fines, costs, or fees.” Id. at 777. Further, this Court held in Howard v. State, 236 N.E.3d 735, 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024): “If, however, the trial court determines that the defendant is indigent or fails to hold an indigency hearing at all, the trial court may not assess fines, costs, and most fees.” [34] Despite our Supreme Court’s holding in Spells, the State claims that an indigency finding does not prohibit the trial court from imposing a fine and costs. Appellee’s Br. p. 18 (citing McRoy v. State, 794 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), clarified on reh’g, 798 N.E.2d 521). The State contends that the trial court