Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Reindeer Logistics, LLC, FILED Appellant-Defendant Oct 13 2026, 8:44 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals v. and Tax Court Model 1 Commercial Vehicles, Inc., Appellee-Plaintiff October 13, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CE-2496 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Christina R. Klineman, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D01-2508-CE-37782 Opinion by Judge Kenworthy Judges Bradford and Pyle concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CE-2496 | October 13, 2026 Page 1 of 12 Kenworthy, Judge. Case Summary [1] This interlocutory appeal concerns eleven passenger vans owned by Model 1 Commercial Vehicles, Inc. (“Model 1”) currently in the possession of Reindeer Logistics, LLC (“Reindeer”) and held in storage facilities outside of Indiana. Model 1 brought an action to replevy the vans, which Reindeer claimed to be holding as security for a debt. The trial court granted Model 1 a preliminary order for immediate possession under the Indiana replevin statute, contingent on Model 1 posting a $1.1 million bond. [2] Reindeer appealed, and Model 1 moved to dismiss, arguing the interlocutory order is not appealable as of right. We hold we do not have jurisdiction to review the trial court’s preliminary possession order under the facts and circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. Facts and Procedural History [3] Model 1 sells, leases, and finances the purchase of commercial vehicles such as vans, buses, and work trucks. Los Angeles-based Zeeba Automotive Group, Inc. (“Zeeba”) rents commercial vehicles to customers across the United States. To carry out its rental business, Zeeba sometimes contracts with companies like Reindeer, which provides vehicle moving and storage services throughout the country. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CE-2496 | October 13, 2026 Page 2 of 12 [4] In 2024, under several separate agreements, Model 1 leased Zeeba a total of sixty-eight Ford passenger vans for use in Zeeba’s rental business. Zeeba intended to purchase the vans from Model 1, but after Zeeba’s financing fell through, the parties renegotiated the contracts and entered into a single, superseding master lease agreement for sixty-two of the vans (the “master lease”). Under the master lease terms, Model 1 retained ownership of the vans, and Zeeba had a possessory right to use and operate them. [5] Soon after executing the master lease, Zeeba defaulted on its payment obligations. After some negotiation and attempts to resolve the matter, Model 1 sent Zeeba a letter on May 9, 2025, terminating the master lease for nonpayment. Model 1 also demanded return of all the vans. [6] Not all vans, however, were in Zeeba’s possession and available to be returned. Some were leased to Zeeba’s customers, others were stored by vehicle transportation companies like Reindeer, and some were even unaccounted for. Relevant to this appeal, Zeeba informed Model 1 that eleven vans were in Reindeer’s possession and stored in Reindeer facilities in California, Massachusetts, and Tennessee. Zeeba advised Model 1 to work directly with Reindeer to “get those vehicles released,” essentially because Zeeba did not have the revenue to pay Reindeer for services rendered. Ex. Vol. 1 at 24. Model 1 contacted Reindeer, but Reindeer refused to turn over the vans; Reindeer was retaining possession due to Zeeba’s outstanding debt. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CE-2496 | October 13, 2026 Page 3 of 12 [7] On August 8, 2025, Model 1 brought a complaint for replevin, breach of lease, and damages against Zeeba. It also named as defendants Reindeer and another vehicle transportation company called Total Auto Movers, Inc. (“TAM”). 1 Model 1 contemporaneously moved for a preliminary order for immediate possession of all vans the defendants held. The trial court issued an order to show cause and scheduled a hearing for August 25, 2025. [8] Reindeer filed a response in opposition to Model 1’s motion. Reindeer did not dispute Model 1 owned the eleven vans Reindeer currently held. But Reindeer argued it came into possession of the vans legally pursuant to a contract with Zeeba and asserted a “valid possessory lien” for $62,604 in unpaid storage, transport, and other charges incurred by Zeeba related to those eleven vehicles. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 63. Reindeer claimed it was lawfully entitled to detain the vans until its charges were paid or adequate security was posted. 2 In support of its response, Reindeer attached an affidavit of its corporate executive, a copy of its agreement with Zeeba, and a list of unpaid charges related to the eleven vans. [9] The trial court held a hearing, after which Zeeba began working with Model 1 to return some of the vans to which it had access. Reindeer did not return the 1 Like Reindeer, TAM transports motor vehicles and possesses Model 1 vans via a contract with Zeeba. Neither Zeeba nor TAM is party to this appeal. 2 Reindeer also argued the trial court did not have in rem jurisdiction over vans located outside Indiana and therefore had no authority to order the county sheriff or officials in out-of-state jurisdictions to seize them. See id. at 64–65. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CE-2496 | October 13, 2026 Page 4 of 12 eleven vans it held. On September 24, 2025, the trial court entered findings and granted Model 1 a preliminary order for immediate possession of the unreturned vans, effective once Model 1 posted a written undertaking of $1.1 million (representing the estimated value of all the unreturned vans). It further ordered that upon Model 1’s posting of the written undertaking, “Reindeer is directed to immediately deliver the Model 1 Vans to Model 1 unless Reindeer files with the Court a written undertaking in the amount of $605,000 [the estimated value of the eleven vans in Reindeer’s possession].” Id. at 16. Two days later, Model 1 posted the replevin bond; Reindeer did not file a written undertaking to stay delivery of the vans. [10] Reindeer moved the trial court to certify the order for discretionary interlocutory appeal and to stay its execution. At the same time, Reindeer filed its notice of appeal with this Court, designating the appeal as one taken from an interlocutory order as of right. The trial court denied Reindeer’s motion to certify and stay the order. In this Court, Model 1 moved to dismiss Reindeer’s appeal, arguing the order for possession does not fall into any category which would entitle Reindeer to an interlocutory appeal. After Reindeer responded, this Court’s motions panel issued an order holding the motion to dismiss in abeyance for the writing panel to address. Reindeer is not entitled to an interlocutory appeal. [11] We review appellate jurisdictional questions de novo. Ball State Univ. v. Irons, 27 N.E.3d 717, 720 (Ind. 2015). The appellate authority of this Court is generally limited to appeals from final judgments. Id. A preliminary order for immediate Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CE-2496 | October 13, 2026 Page 5 of 12 possession, such as the one issued in this case, is not a final judgment. See Ind. Code § 32-35-2-15 (2002) (authorizing a prejudgment order for possession under replevin statute); I.C. § 32-35-2-20 (differentiating an order for possession and other preliminary orders in a replevin action from a final judgment). [12] But our Rules of Appellate Procedure also confer appellate jurisdiction over certain non-final orders under Indiana Appellate Rule 14. Irons, 27 N.E.3d at 720. “There are three ways a case may proceed as an interlocutory appeal: an interlocutory appeal of right (Rule 14(A)); a discretionary interlocutory appeal (Rule 14(B)); or an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certification (Rule 14(C)).” Id. The trial court did not certify the immediate possession order for discretionary interlocutory appeal and the class- action rule does not apply, so Reindeer’s only avenue for appeal at this stage is if the order qualifies as at least one of the nine order types which entitle a party to an interlocutory appeal of right. See Ind. Appellate Rule 14(A)(1)–(9). [13] Reindeer contends its appeal is proper under Rule 14(A)(3), which entitles a party to appeal an interlocutory order to “compel the delivery or assignment of any securities, evidence of debt, documents or things in action[.]” App. R. 14(A)(3). The list is non-exclusive; as the Indiana Supreme Court has explained, Rule 14(A)(3) encompasses court orders “which carry financial and legal consequences akin to those more typically found in final judgments: payment of money, issuance of a debt, delivery of securities, and so on.” Irons, 27 N.E.3d at 721 (quoting State v. Hogan, 582 N.E.2d 824, 825 (Ind. 1991)). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CE-2496 | October 13, 2026 Page 6 of 12 The rule is not, however, “designed to create an appeal as of right from every order to produce documents during discovery.” Hogan, 582 N.E.2d at 825. [14] In support of its argument that it is entitled to an interlocutory appeal, Reindeer relies on Ball State University v. Irons, 27 N.E.3d 717 (Ind. 2015). That case arose out of a post-dissolution action in which the parties were litigating responsibility for their child’s post-secondary education expenses. The student initially attended Ball State University but wanted to transfer to another school. The university, however, refused to release her transcript due to an outstanding tuition balance. The trial court joined the university as a party to the dissolution action and ordered it to release the student’s transcript, over which the university asserted a common law lien to secure the debt. The university attempted to appeal the trial court’s order to relinquish possession, arguing it met the criteria for an interlocutory appeal of right under Rule 14(A)(3). [15] Our Supreme Court began by reviewing the substantive law of common law liens, which require debt and possession to create and, in that way, “are much like securities.” Id. at 722. The Court determined the university satisfied the two elements to establish a common law lien. Id. Further, the Court held the trial court’s order directing the university to release the transcript—and thereby forfeit its lien—carried “financial and legal consequences akin to those more typically found in final judgments.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court concluded the trial court’s order was appealable as of right under Rule 14(A)(3). Id. Proceeding to the merits of the appeal, the Court then reversed the order Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CE-2496 | October 13, 2026 Page 7 of 12 joining the university as a necessary party to the post-dissolution action and ordering it to turn over the transcript. [16] Based on this authority, Reindeer argues it is entitled to an interlocutory appeal under Rule 14(A)(3). Reindeer notes it came into possession of the vans legally under its contract with Zeeba and claims a right to detain the vans to secure payment for the debt Zeeba owes it for storage and transport services. In other words, Reindeer contends “possessory liens arose” in the vans under the laws of the states in which the vans are located, as well as under the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted by those jurisdictions. Appellant’s Response to Motion to Dismiss at 3, 5 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 3068(a) (service lien); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 255, § 25 (garage keeper’s lien); and Tenn. Code § 66-19-103 (garage keeper’s or towing firm’s lien)). Essentially, Reindeer argues the eleven vans act as security for Zeeba’s unpaid storage fees in the same way the transcript in Irons was functionally security for the unpaid tuition balance. [17] Reindeer’s point is well taken, but the similarities between the cases stop there. The Irons Court did not hold the trial court’s order was appealable as of right merely because it involved a lien. Nor did the decision rely solely on the text of Rule 14(A)(3), which authorizes an interlocutory appeal of right from an order to “compel the delivery or assignment of any securities[.]” The crux of the Irons decision is that in addition to the security-like nature of the transcript, the university would have forfeited its lien if the trial court’s order to deliver the transcript were carried out. Irons, 27 N.E.3d at 722. Therefore, the order was Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CE-2496 | October 13, 2026 Page 8 of 12 one which carried “financial and legal consequences akin to those more typically found in final judgments.” Id. [18] Since the Irons decision, this Court has similarly focused on the financial and legal consequences an interlocutory order imposes on the parties when determining whether we have authority to hear an appeal under Rule 14(A)(3). In Steingart v. Musgrave, 221 N.E.3d 725, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), the trial court in a receivership action entered orders authorizing the receiver to compromise and settle two separate causes of action pending between one of the defendants and third-party accounting firms. This Court noted that although the orders were “technically interlocutory,” the defendant would “most certainly lose its right to pursue its claims against the accounting firms” if the receiver were to carry out the orders. Id. Accordingly, the Court reviewed the orders under Rule 14(A)(3) due to “the nature of the orders producing financial and legal consequences akin to those more typically found in final judgments[.]” Id. 3 [19] The question presented here is whether the trial court’s preliminary order of immediate possession produces similar consequences. It does not. [20] First, in a replevin action, a preliminary order for immediate possession is only a determination based on the probable validity of the plaintiff’s claim for 3 The Steingart case involved another, undisputably appealable order. See id. at 729. And so in holding the interlocutory orders to settle and compromise were appealable as of right, the Court noted it would promote judicial economy to address them in the same opinion. Id. at 732. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CE-2496 | October 13, 2026 Page 9 of 12 possession against the defendant. See I.C. § 32-35-2-14 (“Upon the hearing on the preliminary order . . . , the court shall: (1) consider the showing made by the parties appearing; and (2) make a preliminary determination which party, with reasonable probability, is entitled to possession, use, and disposition of the property, pending final adjudication of the claims of the parties.”) (emphases added). The trial court’s ruling at this stage has no bearing on the parties’ rights when the matter is eventually tried on the merits, nor does it bind the court at the final hearing or preclude a subsequent final adjudication. [21] Second, unlike the trial court order in Irons, the preliminary order in this case was contingent on Model 1 posting a $1.1 million written undertaking. This is a statutory requirement in a replevin action. See I.C. § 32-35-2-21 (providing the trial court “may not issue an order of possession” in the plaintiff’s favor until the plaintiff has filed with the court a written undertaking executed by a surety “to the effect that the plaintiff and the surety are bound to the defendant for the value of the property . . . along with other damages the defendant may suffer if the property has been wrongfully taken from the defendant”). The purpose of the bond “is primarily for the protection of the defendant in the event that the plaintiff does not prevail.” 66 Am. Jur. 2d Replevin § 45. 4 Any financial interest Reindeer has in the vans is protected by the written 4 While the action is pending, a defendant may also require the return of the property upon filing with the court a written undertaking executed by a surety. See I.C. § 32-35-2-22. Although the possession order specified Reindeer could require return of the vans by posting a bond in the amount of $605,000, Reindeer chose not to exercise this option. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CE-2496 | October 13, 2026 Page 10 of 12 undertaking, which at $1.1 million far exceeds the $62,604 in unpaid storage and transport fees Reindeer claims it is owed. And Reindeer recognized as much when it repeatedly asserted to the trial court that it opposed Model 1’s motion for immediate possession “absent payment [of Zeeba’s debt] or posting of a bond sufficient to protect Reindeer’s lien rights.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 64 (emphasis added); see also id. at 63, 66–67. [22] In sum, although Reindeer asserts possessory liens in the vans, the preliminary order for immediate possession, secured by a bond, is not one which carries financial and legal consequences akin to those found in a final order. Therefore, the interlocutory order is not one reviewable as of right under Indiana Appellate Rule 14(A)(3). Conclusion [23] Reindeer is not entitled to an interlocutory appeal. [24] Dismissed. Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT R. Eric Sanders Adam Lenkowsky Rolfes Henry Co., LPA Indianapolis, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CE-2496 | October 13, 2026 Page 11 of 12 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Tracy N. Betz Sydney L. Darnall Vivek R. Hadley Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP Indianapolis, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CE-2496 | October 13, 2026 Page 12 of 12