Termination: S E v. Indiana Department of Child Services
CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
Date FiledOctober 13, 2026
Docket26A-JT-01264
JudgeJudge DeBoer
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any
action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified.
FILED
Oct 13 2026, 9:27 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
In re the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child
Relationship of B.E. (Minor Child) and S.E. (Father),
Appellant-Respondent
v.
Indiana Department of Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner
October 13, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-JT-1264
Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court
The Honorable T. Grey Chandler, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
48C02-2508-JT-192
Opinion by Judge DeBoer
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1264 | October 13, 2026 Page 1 of 11
Judges Foley and Felix concur.
DeBoer, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] S.E. (Father) appeals the termination of his parental rights to B.E. (Child),
arguing the Department of Child Services (DCS) failed to make reasonable
efforts toward reunification. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Father and C.B. (Mother) [collectively, Parents] are the parents of Child (born
August 2021). On August 10, 2024, Mother, Father, and Child were riding in
their car when Mother and Father began to argue. Mother threw her phone at
Father, and when he flung it back at her, it hit Child’s face instead and caused
“a small gash and bruising by his right eye.” Exhibits at 8. For this incident,
Father was charged with Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent and Level 5
felony domestic battery under cause 48C03-2408-F5-2511 (F5-2511).
[3] Then, on August 13, Father pulled Child by his arm from the back seat of a car
and through the car window and held him while he shoved Mother to the
ground. This altercation resulted in Father’s charge for Level 6 felony domestic
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1264 | October 13, 2026 Page 2 of 11
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battery in cause 48C03-2408-F6-2422 (F6-2422). Based on these events and
other allegations of neglect and repeated exposure to domestic violence, Child
was adjudicated a child in need of services (CHINS) on October 10. At that
time, Child was placed in the custody of DCS, and the permanency plan was
2
reunification. As part of his mediated agreement, Father agreed to do the
following:
a. Complete a Substance Use Disorder Assessment and follow all
recommendations from that assessment[;]
b. Random Drug Screens[;]
c. Successfully complete a program of Homebased Case Work
and comply with all reasonable recommendations[;]
d. Successfully complete domestic violence services and comply
with all reasonable recommendations[;]
e. Complete a parenting assessment and follow all
recommendations of that assessment[; and]
f. Consistently engage in parenting time with [Child] as permitted
by this Court and as allowed by any active no contact orders.
1
Father was incarcerated for a total of four days while both cases were pending: August 13-14 and October
14-15, 2024.
2
Mother also entered into a mediated agreement.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1264 | October 13, 2026 Page 3 of 11
Id. at 13. Five days later, the criminal court issued a no contact order (NCO) in
F5-2511 protecting Child.
[4] After a review hearing in January 2025, the trial court found that Parents failed
to comply with the case plan, take any steps towards reunification, cooperate
with DCS, or participate in court-ordered services. For Father specifically, the
court found he completed “some intakes for services but [was] not engag[ed] or
in compliance.” Id. at 26. The court scheduled the matter for a permanency
hearing in August.
[5] Meanwhile, on May 8, the trial court modified the NCO protecting Child to
allow Father to have contact with Child consistent with the CHINS case.
Then, on June 11, Father pled guilty to the F5-2511 and F6-2422 charges and
began serving his F5-2511 sentence through Madison County Community
Corrections (MCCC). When he failed to report to the center by June 27,
MCCC filed a notice of termination and the criminal court issued a warrant for
his arrest. Father was apprehended on August 6 and has since remained in
custody.
[6] At the August 19 permanency hearing, the trial court found, in relevant part,
“[Parents] have not complied with the Child’s case plan. [N]either parent has
fully complied with any recommended service. Father has recently been
arrested and has had multiple relapses with illicit substances. Mother has
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1264 | October 13, 2026 Page 4 of 11
3
similarly continued to use [illegal substances] and is now in rehab . . . .” Id. at
30. Accordingly, the court approved a new permanency plan of reunification
with a concurrent plan of adoption. In the meantime, on September 3, the
criminal court ordered Father to serve the balance of his F5-2511 and F6-2422
sentences in the Department of Correction (DOC) with a projected release date
of May 1, 2028.
[7] On September 12, DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights.
The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on December 8 and heard testimony
from the family case manager (FCM), Court Appointed Special Advocate
(CASA), Child’s foster placement (Foster Parent), and Father. Mother did not
appear.
[8] The FCM elaborated on Father’s noncompliance with his mediated agreement.
Specifically, Father only completed the substance use disorder assessment
(SUDA), the domestic violence services evaluation, and a few random drug
screens. First, the SUDA produced recommendations for Father to engage in
entitlement services, group psychotherapy, and skills coaching, which Father
participated in but did not complete. Second, the domestic violence
evaluation’s recommendation was for Father to complete a twenty-six-week
program, but Father only attended for a handful of sessions before he was
3
Mother had a suspended sentence in cause 48C05-2301-F6-107 since February 2, 2024. But on July 24,
2025, following multiple probation violations, she was ordered to serve the balance of her sentence in the
Department of Correction. However, the criminal court stayed its sentence pending completion of inpatient
treatment and six months of sober living.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1264 | October 13, 2026 Page 5 of 11
discharged due to lack of attendance. Third, between October 28, 2024 and
November 30, 2025, Father missed 185 random drug screen calls and 78
random drug screen tests. And two of the six drug screens Father completed
4
tested positive for buprenorphine or cocaine.
[9] Father also did not complete a homebased case work program or parenting
assessment, and he did not consistently engage in parenting time with Child.
The FCM acknowledged there was an NCO in place protecting Child but
explained that even “[w]hen it was modified, [Father] only saw [Child] twice
before no-showing to a couple of visits and then becoming incarcerated.”
Transcript at 28. The FCM also noted that since the opening of the CHINS
case, Father failed to maintain contact with DCS or show that he had stable
housing and employment to meet Child’s basic needs for food, shelter, and
clothing. The FCM and the CASA recommended the trial court terminate
Parents’ parental rights and allow Foster Parent to pursue adoption.
[10] Foster Parent testified that Child had lived with him, his wife, and their other
children since August 2024. There, Child had a schedule, attended school, and
maintained a relationship with his biological sisters, who were adopted by a
friend of Foster Parent. Foster Parent stated he and his wife intended to adopt
Child.
4
Buprenorphine is a prescription opioid. Father also tested positive for buprenorphine in two other tests but
had a prescription for it at those times.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1264 | October 13, 2026 Page 6 of 11
[11] Finally, with some variation, Father’s testimony was consistent with the facts
above. Specifically, he said he did not follow through with the SUDA
recommendations, the domestic violence program, or parenting time because he
was in a deep state of depression from not being able to see Child, which caused
him to relapse on methamphetamine. Father indicated the buprenorphine-
positive drug screens occurred at times when he had a valid prescription. He
also said he was enrolled in DOC’s recovery while incarcerated (RWI) program
and on a waitlist for mental health treatment, but parenting classes were
unavailable at the facility. Finally, he advised that he had established post-
release employment and housing. The trial court took the matter under
advisement.
[12] On March 24, 2026, the trial court entered an order with detailed findings of
fact and conclusions of law terminating Parents’ parental rights. Father now
5
appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[13] When DCS files a petition to terminate parental rights, it must prove the
allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2 (1998).
On appeal, we defer to the trial court’s judgment and neither assess witness
credibility nor reweigh the evidence. In re E.P., 267 N.E.3d 531, 535 (Ind. Ct.
5
Mother does not participate in this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1264 | October 13, 2026 Page 7 of 11
App. 2025), trans. denied. “We consider only the evidence and reasonable
inferences favorable to the court’s judgment.” Id.
[14] We review the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law under a two-
tiered standard of review. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App.
2019), trans denied. “First, we determine whether the evidence supports the
findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment.”
E.P., 267 N.E.3d at 535. We accept unchallenged findings as true and will
affirm the court’s judgment unless it was clearly erroneous. Id. “Findings are
clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either
directly or by inference.” Id. (quoting In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied).
[15] Here, Father claims DCS failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification
under Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.5(b)(2) by failing to provide him with
6
services. Under the statute, “DCS is generally required to make reasonable
efforts to preserve and reunify families during CHINS proceedings.” In re H.L.,
915 N.E.2d 145, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). But this Court has long held the
obligation “is not a requisite element of our parental rights termination statute.”
In re E.E., 736 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Notably, “a failure to
6
To the extent Father’s argument raises a potential due process violation, the State contends, and we agree,
that Father waived the issue because he did not raise it with the trial court, nor did he develop it in his
opening brief on appeal. It is well established that a party may waive a due process claim “by raising it for
the first time on appeal.” In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016). Waiver notwithstanding, in light of
our conclusion that DCS provided reasonable efforts, we find no due process violation.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1264 | October 13, 2026 Page 8 of 11
provide services does not serve as a basis on which to directly attack a
termination order as contrary to law.” In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1048 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2025) (quoting In re J.W., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015),
trans. denied), trans. denied.
[16] Nevertheless, Father makes several arguments in support of his contention.
First, Father claims he “was incarcerated for a significant amount of time[] while
the CHINS case was pending” and DCS failed to provide him with services
during his incarceration. Appellant’s Brief at 8 (emphasis added). We
recognize Father was arrested in August 2025 and remained in custody for the
balance of the CHINS case and the entire duration of the termination
proceedings, which concluded in March 2026. However, a close review of the
record reveals he was incarcerated for only two days between Child’s CHINS
adjudication in October 2024 and his arrest in August 2025. Stated another
way, Father had nearly ten months of non-incarcerated time to complete each of
the services in his mediated agreement. During that time, Father failed to fully
complete any of the services that were offered to him. And “[t]he time for
parents to rehabilitate themselves ‘is during the CHINS process, prior to the
filing of the petition for termination.” In re B.M., 913 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Prince v. Dep’t of Child Servs, 861 N.E.2d 1223, 1230
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). Father had ample time pre-incarceration to participate in
the services that were offered to him, and he chose not to do so.
[17] Second, Father argues DCS did not provide him with adequate time to
complete a parenting assessment between the NCO modification and the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1264 | October 13, 2026 Page 9 of 11
petition for termination. Yet the evidence shows that after the NCO was
modified on May 8, 2025, Father visited with Child twice. Then, he failed to
appear for several scheduled visitations and stopped participating altogether
before the termination petition was filed on September 12. While we
acknowledge Father was in custody beginning on August 6, he had adequate
time to complete the assessment before his arrest.
[18] Third, Father contends DCS failed to notify him of the SUDA recommendation
for group psychotherapy. On the contrary, the record shows Father was aware
of the recommendation and that he worked with a therapy provider to establish
services, but he did not follow through with completion.
[19] In sum, Father’s arguments are merely requests to reweigh the evidence, which
we will not do. The record supports the trial court’s decision to terminate
7
Father’s parental rights, and we find no error in its judgment.
Conclusion
[20] Finding the trial court did not err in terminating Father’s parental rights, we
affirm.
[21] Affirmed.
7
Father also argues that “although [he] provided the FCM with his home address, the FCM never visited the
home.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. He says nothing more and does not cite any legal authority indicating this fact
constitutes error, let alone reversible error. Therefore, we find he has waived this argument for appellate
review. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a); see also A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1156 n.4 (failure to present a cogent
argument waives the issue on appeal).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1264 | October 13, 2026 Page 10 of 11
Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Lisa Johnson
Brownsburg, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Katherine A. Cornelius
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
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