Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Christopher Payton, Oct 15 2026, 9:03 am Appellant-Plaintiff CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court v. Derek Fell, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Vigo County, Appellee-Defendant October 15, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-CT-118 Appeal from the Vigo Superior Court The Honorable Robert A. Pell, Special Judge Trial Court Cause No. 84D06-2409-CT-6418 Opinion by Judge Pyle Judges May and Scheele concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-118 | October 15, 2026 Page 1 of 14 Pyle, Judge. Statement of the Case [1] Christopher Payton (“Payton”) appeals the trial court’s order granting a motion to set aside a default judgment filed by Derek Fell in his official capacity as the Vigo County Sheriff (“Sheriff Fell”). Payton argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Sheriff Fell’s motion to set aside the default judgment. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. [2] We affirm. Issue Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Sheriff Fell’s motion to set aside the default judgment. Facts1 1 At the outset, we note that both the Appellant’s Statement of Facts and the Appellee’s Statement of Facts are numbered and are not in narrative form as required by Indiana Appellate Rules 46(A)(6)(c) and 46(B). We caution both parties’ attorneys to comply with the appellate rules in future appeals. Failure to follow the appellate rules may result in waiver of an issue on appeal. See Vandenburgh v. Vandenburgh, 916 N.E.2d 723, 729 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (explaining that “[a]lthough the failure to comply with the appellate rules does not necessarily result in waiver of an issue, it is appropriate where noncompliance impedes our review.”). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-118 | October 15, 2026 Page 2 of 14 [3] In March 2023, John Plasse was the Vigo County Sheriff (“Sheriff Plasse”), and Sheriff Fell was the chief of operations for the Vigo County Sheriff’s Department. On March 18, 2023, law enforcement officers arrested Payton and transported him to the Vigo County Jail. While he was being placed in a cell, Payton was involved in an incident with several correctional officers (“the March 2023 incident”). During this incident, one of the correctional officers used a Conducted Energy Device (“a CED”) on Payton. [4] Sixteen months later, in July 2024, Sheriff Plasse died from cancer. Although Sheriff Plasse had been ill for several months, he had continued to work and had just been in the office less than a week before his death. Sheriff Plasse’s death was “traumatic” for the sheriff’s department employees because he had passed away so quickly. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 39). In August 2024, three weeks after Sheriff Plasse had died, Sheriff Fell was appointed as the Vigo County Sheriff. [5] During the months following Sheriff Plasse’s death, the sheriff’s department office was “chaotic[,]” and its employees experienced a “very difficult transition period[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 20, 39). Although Sheriff Fell allowed Sheriff Plasse’s family members to go through Sheriff Plasse’s office several times to gather his personal belongings, Sheriff Fell did not allow anyone else to enter Sheriff Plasse’s office for a period of time. In addition, Sheriff Fell did not initially feel comfortable moving into Sheriff Plasse’s office. When it eventually came time for Sheriff Fell to move into Sheriff Plasse’s office in late September or early October 2024, it was emotionally difficult for him to do so because of the close Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-118 | October 15, 2026 Page 3 of 14 relationship that he had shared with Sheriff Plasse. To ease his transition into Sheriff Plasse’s office, Sheriff Fell had the office painted and moved the desk. [6] It was during this chaotic time, in September 2024, that Payton filed a complaint for damages against Sheriff Plasse, in his official capacity as the Vigo County Sheriff, and unnamed correctional officers. Realizing his mistake in identifying the Vigo County Sheriff, three days later, Payton filed an amended complaint against Sheriff Fell, in his official capacity as the Vigo County Sheriff, and unnamed correctional officers. [7] In the complaint, Payton alleged that, during the March 2023 incident, his “federal and state constitutional rights as well as his rights pursuant to Indiana state [had been] violated when [he] [had been] subjected to battery and use of excessive force.” (App. Vol. 2 at 13). Specifically, Payton alleged that he had told the correctional officers “that he was actively experiencing a mental health situation.” (App. Vol. 2 at 14). However, according to Payton, the correctional officers had not provided him with any mental health assistance. Rather, Payton alleged that the correctional officers had placed him in an isolated jail cell, attempted to restrain him with handcuffs, “slammed” him to the ground with such force that it caused him to suffer serious injuries, and “tasered . . . [him] several times while [he was] restrained in handcuffs.” (App. Vol. 2 at 15). Payton further alleged that Sheriff Fell had “permitted a practice and/or custom of the use of unnecessary and excessive force by jail officers against jail inmates.” (App. Vol. 2 at 16). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-118 | October 15, 2026 Page 4 of 14 [8] Payton sent the amended complaint via certified mail to Sheriff Fell at the sheriff’s department. Administrative Assistant Melissa Scott (“AA Scott”) received and signed for the amended complaint on September 30, 2024. However, Sheriff Fell did not file a responsive pleading, and, in October 2024, Payton filed a motion for a default judgment. [9] In February 2025, following the recusal of the original trial court judge and the appointment of a special judge, Payton filed a renewed motion for a default judgment. Two weeks later, the trial court granted Payton’s motion and entered a default judgment against Sheriff Fell. The trial court also scheduled a May 2025 pretrial conference for a June 2025 jury trial to determine Payton’s damages. [10] The first time that Sheriff Fell, who had worked at the sheriff’s department in various roles for twenty-three years, learned about the case was when he received the default judgment order in March 2025. Typically, when Sheriff Fell receives a complaint in which he is named as a defendant, he scans the complaint to his computer and emails it to the sheriff’s department’s attorney, the county attorney, and the county’s insurance agent. Sheriff Fell searched his computer and did not find Payton’s amended complaint. Thereafter, Sheriff Fell spoke to the administrative assistants, the business manager, the jail commander, the jail matron, two sheriff’s department chiefs, and other sheriff’s department employees to determine if they had seen Payton’s amended complaint or if they knew anything about the case. However, none of the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-118 | October 15, 2026 Page 5 of 14 employees had “information, or documentation or knowledge about what may have happened with” it. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 15). [11] In March 2025, Sheriff Fell’s counsel entered an appearance and filed a motion to continue the May 2025 pretrial conference. In May 2025, Sheriff Fell filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. [12] The trial court heard the facts as set forth above during an October 2025 hearing. In addition, AA Scott testified and acknowledged that she had signed the certified mail receipt for the amended complaint. She explained that administrative assistants are typically especially careful with certified mail and that they do not open mail addressed to Sheriff Fell. In addition, AA Scott testified that if the sheriff’s door was closed, she would put the sheriff’s mail in his mailbox and that if the sheriff’s door was open, she would put his mail on his desk. AA Scott further testified that she did not know what had happened to Payton’s amended complaint. [13] In addition, Sheriff Fell testified that no one in the sheriff’s department knew what had happened to Payton’s amended complaint. When asked what he believed had happened to the amended complaint, Sheriff Fell responded as follows: I don’t question the fact that it was received by, our Administrative Assistant Ms. Scott, I mean she signed for it, I don’t question that at all. . . . But I think during the transition, I’m not making excuses just reasoning. I think during the transition somehow it got lost in the shuffle, whether it was placed, in Sheriff Plasse’s office or, mailboxes or, got sent to the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-118 | October 15, 2026 Page 6 of 14 jail or wrong location or whatever it might have been, I . . . can’t, I’d love to be able to sit here and say I know what happened to that, to . . . the mail. I . . . can’t say that cause I don’t know. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 22). [14] Lastly, Vigo County Jail Commander and Sheriff’s Department Deputy Charles Funk (“Deputy Funk”) testified that he had not received Payton’s amended complaint. He further testified about the events that had transpired during the March 2023 incident and provided the facts in support of Sheriff Fell’s alleged meritorious defense. Specifically, Deputy Funk testified that before Payton had arrived at the jail, correctional officers had received a dispatch that Payton was being combative and that the arresting officer needed additional help. According to Deputy Funk, when Payton had arrived at the jail, Payton had been referred to the medical department because he had been acting erratically and had told law enforcement officers that he had ingested methamphetamine and K2. According to Deputy Funk, during the booking process, Payton had stated that he wanted to kill himself and that he wanted “to swallow his tongue and die.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 51). In addition, Deputy Funk testified that based upon Payton’s drug use, erratic behavior, and suicidal statements, correctional officers had placed him in restraints and taken him to a padded cell for his own safety. According to Deputy Funk, Payton was “basically resisting officers the entire time.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 52). [15] Deputy Funk further testified that while in the padded cell with Payton, correctional officers had removed Payton’s restraints to give him medicine. In Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-118 | October 15, 2026 Page 7 of 14 addition, Deputy Funk testified that when the officers had attempted to put the restraints back on Payton, he had “started fighting with officers again” and kicking them. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 52). According to Deputy Funk, one of the officers had given Payton “a drive-stun” with a CED. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 52). Deputy Funk explained that the CED that the correctional officer had used was not “what people see when they see someone being tased. Where you . . . deploy probes and . . . it makes them immobile.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 53). Rather, according to Deputy Funk, the CED that the officer had used was “like a pain compliance thing that, you . . . put . . . on their skin. Deliver . . . a brief shock to them . . . but they can . . . still move and do it, it’s just kind of a pain compliance.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 53). Deputy Funk further testified that Payton had subsequently complied with the officers and had been evaluated and cleared by a medical professional. [16] During closing argument, Sheriff Fell argued, in relevant part, as follows: . . . I think that, you know in a situation like this, you know Sheriff Plasse who’d, been the, Chief of Police for the Terre Haute Police Department for over a decade. Who’d served two (2) terms in Afghanistan, and was now the Vigo County Sheriff in his second term. Was extremely well[-]liked and was well[-] respected within the community, not only profession[ally] but personally. I think after this particular situation is that, you know, someone like that dies unexpectedly, even though they had, a . . . significant illness and had been dealing with it for quite some time. I think it had an impact upon this particular Sheriff’s Department[.] (Tr. Vol. 2 at 58). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-118 | October 15, 2026 Page 8 of 14 [17] In December 2025, the trial court issued an order granting Sheriff Fell’s motion to set aside the default judgment. The order specifically provides, in relevant part, as follows: The Court finds that the breakdown in the mail delivery system was due to Sheriff Plasse’s death and constitutes excusable neglect. Further, said death and transition to [Sheriff] Fell constitutes exceptional circumstances justifying relief from the default judgment. [Sheriff] Fell has a substantial interest in the matter, especially because [Payton] alleged that [Sheriff] Fell, as Sheriff, had a practice, custom or policy of using excessive force in the jail. It is true that [Sheriff] Fell’s actions to set aside the judgment were not especially quick. However, [Sheriff] Fell will suffer significant loss if the default judgment is not set aside. Whereas [Payton] will suffer much less of a loss if the case is reinstated. In short, it is the Court’s opinion that the allegations of excessive force should be supported by evidence and not presumed by default[.] The Court finds that [Sheriff] Fell has asserted a meritorious defense. (App. Vol. 2 at 10-11) (internal case citation omitted). [18] Payton now appeals. Decision [19] Payton argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Sheriff Fell’s motion to set aside the default judgment. We disagree. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-118 | October 15, 2026 Page 9 of 14 [20] The decision whether to set aside a default judgment is given substantial deference on appeal. Huntington National Bank v. Car-X Associates Corporation, 39 N.E.3d 652, 655 (Ind. 2015). Our standard of review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion may occur if the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Id. When reviewing the trial court’s decision, we will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Id. [21] “A default judgment is not generally favored, and any doubt of its propriety must be resolved in favor of the defaulted party.” KWD Industrias SA DE CV v. IPM LLC, 129 N.E.3d 276, 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (cleaned up). “Indiana law strongly prefers disposition of cases on their merits.” Coslett v. Weddle Brothers Construction Company, Inc., 798 N.E.2d 859, 861 (Ind. 2003), reh’g denied. [22] “This court has considered the amount of money involved, the material issues of fact accompanying the allegations, the length of the delay, and lack of prejudice in concluding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a case to be heard on the merits.” KWD, 129 N.E.3d at 281. See also Kmart Corporation v. Englebright, 719 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that “[a] cautious approach to the grant of motions for default judgment is warranted in cases involving material issues of fact, substantial amounts of money, or weighty policy determinations”) (cleaned up), trans. denied. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-118 | October 15, 2026 Page 10 of 14 [23] Here, Payton argues that “the Trial Court abused its discretion by granting Derek Fell’s Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(1) when Derek Fell, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Vigo County, failed to make a showing of excusable neglect[.]” (Payton’s Br. 6). [24] “Under subsection (B)(1) [of Trial Rule 60], a trial court may relieve a party from a default judgment for ‘mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect’ if the party files a motion within one year of the judgment and alleges a meritorious claim or defense.” Huntington, 39 N.E.3d at 655. “Addressed to the trial court’s equitable discretion, a Trial Rule 60(B)(1) motion does not attack the substantive, legal merits of a judgment, but rather addresses the procedural, equitable grounds justifying the relief from the finality of a judgment.” Id. (cleaned up). “Because there is no general rule as to what constitutes excusable neglect under Trial Rule 60(B)(1), each case must be determined on its own particular facts.” Id. (cleaned up). “The controlling question is whether there exists even slight evidence of excusable neglect.” Wamsley v. Tree City Village, 108 N.E.3d 334, 336 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). [25] For example, in the Wamsley case, Matthew Joseph accidentally discharged a firearm while cleaning it. The bullet passed through the wall of his apartment and struck Wamsley, who lived in the adjacent apartment. Wamsley retained counsel, who communicated for several months with the apartment complex’s insurer and its management company. The insurer denied Wamsley’s claim, and Wamsley filed a suit against the apartment complex and the management company (collectively “the landlords”) and Joseph. The president of the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-118 | October 15, 2026 Page 11 of 14 management company contacted Wamsley’s counsel, acknowledged receipt of the complaint, and pointed out a factual error in it. The president then placed the complaint in a file cabinet and did nothing further. Neither Wamsley’s counsel nor the management company notified the insurer of the complaint. [26] None of the defendants timely answered the complaint, and Wamsley moved for and was granted a default judgment. The landlords retained counsel and filed motions to set aside the default judgment on the grounds of excusable neglect. The trial court granted the landlords’ motions following a hearing. On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court. See Wamsley v. Tree City Village, 95 N.E.3d 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. granted. Specifically, we concluded that, although we were aware of the high level of deference accorded to trial court in these decisions and the preference in Indiana for resolving cases on the merits, “the [l]andlords’ inattention to the complaint and summons and their failure to consult with or discuss the suit with the Insurer may constitute neglect, but it does not constitute excusable neglect under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(1).” Id. at 542. [27] However, our Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacated this Court’s opinion, and, in a two-page per curiam opinion, explained and concluded as follows: “The controlling question is whether there exists even slight evidence of excusable neglect. Our deferential standard of review compels us to affirm the trial court. There exists evidence of excusable neglect in this case – although that evidence is indeed exceedingly slight – and Landlords have made Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-118 | October 15, 2026 Page 12 of 14 the requisite showing under Trial Rule 60(B)(1) of a meritorious defense.” 2 Wamsley, 108 N.E.3d at 336 (cleaned up). See also Riddle v. Cress, 153 N.E.3d 1112, 1114 (Ind. 2020) (per curiam) (granting transfer, vacating this Court’s memorandum decision that had reversed the trial court’s order granting the Riddles’ motion to set aside a default judgment, and concluding that under the deferential standard of appellate review, the trial court’s assessments of the parties’ credibility and demeanor were sufficient “to establish at least ‘slight evidence’ of excusable neglect”), reh’g denied. [28] Here, our review of the record reveals that there exists evidence of excusable neglect. See Wamsley, 108 N.E.3d at 336. Specifically, during the months following Sheriff Plasse’s sudden death in July 2024, the sheriff’s department was in chaos, and its employees experienced an extremely difficult transition. We further note that this case involves material issues of fact regarding what happened during the March 2023 incident. In addition, as noted by the trial court, Sheriff Fell will suffer a significant loss if the default judgment is not set aside. On the other hand, Payton will suffer much less of a loss if the case is reinstated. [29] In sum, based on these facts and circumstances, the deference accorded to trial courts in similar cases, and the preference in Indiana for resolving cases on the merits, we conclude that Sheriff Fell demonstrated excusable neglect. See 2 The per curiam opinion does not set forth the specific facts that constituted the slight evidence of excusable neglect. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-118 | October 15, 2026 Page 13 of 14 KWD, 129 N.E.3d at 282 (concluding that based upon the record and in light of the issues of fact accompanying the claims raised in the complaint and the absence of evidence of prejudice to KWD, the appellees demonstrated excusable neglect). Accordingly, we further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Sheriff Fell’s motion to set aside the default judgment. See id. at 283.3 [30] Affirmed. May, J., and Scheele, J., concur. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Rachel O. Webster Bradley C. Lohmeier Saeed & Little, LLP Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE David P. Friedrich Wilkinson, Goeller, Modesitt, Wilkinson & Drummy Terre Haute, Indiana 3 We further note that Sheriff Fell has made the requisite showing under Trial Rule 60(B)(1) of a meritorious defense. See Wamsley, 108 N.E.3d at 336. Payton does not argue otherwise. We also note that because we have found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the breakdown in the mail delivery system was due to Sheriff Plasse’s death and constituted excusable neglect, we need not determine whether such a breakdown also constituted exceptional circumstances pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(8). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-118 | October 15, 2026 Page 14 of 14