Deadmond v. Wildhaber
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket5-25-0769
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOTICE
2026 IL App (5th) 250769-U
NOTICE
Decision filed 11/20/26. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0769 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
TRACY DEADMOND, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Madison County.
)
v. ) No. 22-LA-545
)
JAMES E. WILDHABER, ) Honorable
) Sarah D. Smith,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HACKETT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Barberis and Boie concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for remittitur where the
jury’s punitive damages award did not violate defendant’s due process rights and
where the trial court’s finding that the award was not improperly based on passion
or prejudice was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant, James E. Wildhaber, was found liable of negligence and
willful and wanton conduct against plaintiff, Tracy Deadmond. The jury returned a verdict in
plaintiff’s favor with compensatory damages of $5.95 million and punitive damages of $29.5
million. On appeal, defendant asks this court to remand for entry of a remittitur where the jury’s
punitive damages award violated his constitutional due process rights and was improperly based
on passion or prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm.
1
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident which took place in Clinton County,
Illinois, on February 6, 2022. At around 7:30 p.m. on that date, defendant, who was intoxicated,
was driving on the wrong side of the road on U.S. Highway 50 when he struck the passenger side
of a Ford Taurus head-on. Inside the Ford, plaintiff’s mother was driving, plaintiff’s son was in
the backseat, and plaintiff was in the front passenger seat. After the collision with defendant’s
vehicle, the Ford became disabled in the middle of the eastbound lane. While plaintiff’s mother
and son were able to exit the vehicle, plaintiff remained stuck inside. Approximately one minute
after the collision with defendant’s vehicle, a second car struck the Ford in a T-bone-type collision.
This second vehicle was driven by codefendant Phillip Clutts.
¶5 On February 7, 2022, defendant was charged via information with one count of aggravated
driving under the influence of alcohol, one count of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident
involving personal injury, and one count of failure to give information and render aid. Thereafter,
defendant pled guilty to all three counts and the trial court sentenced him to four years in the
Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) on the aggravated DUI charge and one year in the
IDOC on the leaving the scene charge.
¶6 On April 28, 2022, plaintiff filed a civil complaint alleging one count of negligence against
defendant and another count of negligence against codefendant Clutts. On November 16, 2022,
plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint adding a punitive damages claim
against defendant. On January 5, 2023, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion. That same day,
plaintiff filed an amended complaint retaining the original counts of negligence against defendant
and Clutts and adding a claim of willful and wanton misconduct against defendant.
2
¶7 On December 10, 2024, plaintiff filed an unopposed motion to bifurcate the punitive
damages claim at trial, which the trial court granted on February 20, 2025. On April 3, 2025, the
parties stipulated that plaintiff’s hitherto incurred medical charges resulting from the accident
totaled $700,000.
¶8 The compensatory phase of the trial began on May 13, 2025. Plaintiff first played a video
deposition of defendant, taken on May 8, 2025, for the court. A transcript of that video was
provided to this court, and we will recount its contents here. In the video, defendant recalled that,
at around 5:30 p.m. on February 6, 2022, defendant’s girlfriend locked him out of the house, and
he began drinking vodka and several mixed drinks. Sometime between 6 p.m. and 6:30 p.m.,
defendant left the house in his vehicle to drive around and calm down. At some point, defendant
got onto U.S. Highway 50 and began driving on the wrong side of the roadway. At around 7:30
p.m., he hit a black Kia and struck the passenger side of a Ford Taurus, within which plaintiff was
a passenger. Defendant admitted that he failed to reduce his speed to avoid the crash, and that the
Ford’s driver, plaintiff’s mother, did not do anything to contribute to the accident. After the
collision, the Ford came to a halt in the middle of the eastbound lane. Defendant’s vehicle was also
disabled. Defendant went over and checked on plaintiff, who was still inside the Ford, and saw
that plaintiff was unconscious. He heard plaintiff making noises and knew that plaintiff was hurt.
Defendant then ran and hid in a field, where he called his girlfriend and mother on his cell phone.
Police then came and found defendant in the field.
¶9 Defendant admitted to telling police officers that the other vehicles had been in the
improper lane. However, defendant insisted that he had been sincerely mistaken at the time and
had not intended to mislead the officers. Defendant did not recall initially telling the officers that
he only had a few beers. Defendant admitted that Clutts was not responsible for the accident but
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declined to state that Clutts was similarly not responsible for plaintiff’s injuries. Defendant
acknowledged that he refused to provide blood and urine samples after the collision because he
knew he was intoxicated. Although defendant knew before getting into his vehicle that evening
that he was intoxicated, that driving in his condition was illegal, and that he could seriously hurt
someone, he decided to drive anyway. Defendant conceded that his conduct disregarded others’
safety. Defendant admitted that, nearly six hours after the accident, blood and urine samples
showed that he was at twice the legal intoxication limit. Defendant confirmed that, in connection
with this accident, he pled guilty to aggravated DUI, leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident
involving personal injury, and failure to give information and render aid charges.
¶ 10 Clutts, testifying for plaintiff, stated that, on the night of the accident, he was driving his
truck to a friend’s house. The road was dry, and the atmosphere was very dark and cold. As he
drove, he came up on a Kia that was parked on the side of the road. The Kia’s headlights were
shining in Clutts’s face, and as a result, Clutts could not see very well. Almost immediately after
driving past the Kia, Clutts saw another vehicle in front of him in the middle of the roadway. This
vehicle did not have any lights on. Clutts did not have time to hit the brakes on his truck before he
crashed into the other vehicle at around 60 miles an hour. Clutts crawled out of his truck’s window
and lay on the ground. When emergency services arrived, he stood up and told the emergency
personnel to take care of plaintiff instead of himself.
¶ 11 After Clutts testified, plaintiff played a video deposition of Illinois State Police Trooper
Ryne Brieseacher for the court. A transcript of the video was provided to this court, and we will
recount its contents here. In the video, Trooper Brieseacher testified that he was a traffic crash
reconstructionist and that he reconstructed the accident at issue in this case. The accident took
place on a straight, flat, two-lane road with a speed limit of 55 miles per hour. It was very dark
4
outside at the time, and there were no streetlamps in the area. The accident between defendant’s
and plaintiff’s vehicles was a head-on collision that took place in the road’s eastbound lane, the
lane of travel reserved for plaintiff’s vehicle. Due to the point of impact, Trooper Brieseacher
concluded that defendant was in the wrong lane of traffic. The second crash, between plaintiff’s
and Clutts’s vehicles, was a T-bone-type collision which took place approximately one minute
after the first collision. Trooper Brieseacher confirmed that the airbags in plaintiff’s car deployed
and that plaintiff had his seat belt on at the time of the collisions. Trooper Brieseacher testified that
although the legal alcohol limit in Illinois was 0.08%, toxicology testing indicated that defendant
had 0.182% present in his blood. Trooper Brieseacher was also able to conclude that,
approximately five seconds prior to the crash, defendant’s vehicle was travelling at a speed of
approximately 63.25 to 68.29 miles per hour. In contrast, plaintiff’s vehicle was travelling at a
speed of 54.7 to 59.2 miles per hour. Trooper Brieseacher concluded that the primary causes of
the collision were defendant’s intoxication and improper lane usage.
¶ 12 Plaintiff then played a video deposition of Dr. Valerie Rundle-Gonzalez for the court. A
transcript of the video was provided to this court, and we will recount its contents here. Dr. Rundle-
Gonzalez testified that she was a neurologist and medical injury patient specialist licensed to
practice in Texas and Florida since 2010. She and her husband, Dr. Hector Miranda-Grajales,
maintained an Austin, Texas, practice, from which she saw people from all over the United States.
Dr. Rundle-Gonzalez saw plaintiff on May 21, 2024. On that date, plaintiff’s chief complaints
were headaches, dizziness, vertigo, hearing loss, insomnia, fatigue, cognitive difficulties, and
mood changes. Plaintiff attributed these ailments to the motor vehicle accident at issue. Testing at
Dr. Rundle-Gonzalez’s facility revealed that plaintiff had several cognitive and executive function
issues which primarily affected his memory, organization, and problem-solving skills. Dr. Rundle-
5
Gonzalez confirmed that such issues were common in patients with severe brain injuries. Dr.
Rundle-Gonzalez concluded that the motor vehicle accident had caused a severe traumatic brain
injury that would most likely be permanent. She opined that plaintiff could not take care of himself
and would need help performing daily living activities. On cross-examination, Dr. Rundle-
Gonzalez admitted that she had only seen plaintiff once for 1½ hours, and that she had never
prescribed any medication for him. She also admitted that a previous report from her clinic
described plaintiff’s traumatic brain injury as moderate rather than severe.
¶ 13 Plaintiff then played a video deposition of Dr. Hector Miranda-Grajales. A transcript of the
video was provided to this court, and we will recount its contents here. Dr. Miranda-Grajales
testified that he was a brain injury medicine specialist physician. Dr. Miranda-Grajales first saw
plaintiff at his clinic on May 20, 2024. Plaintiff’s chief complaints at that time were severe
headaches, insomnia, dizziness, irritability, depression, fatigue, and problems with his attention,
concentration, and memory. Plaintiff also reported pain in his legs, low back, and neck, as well as
difficulty with his hearing. After conducting an examination, Dr. Miranda-Grajales diagnosed
plaintiff with chronic pain due to trauma, chronic posttraumatic headaches, neck and low back
pain, concussion, post-concussion syndrome, dizziness, occipital neuralgia, history of falling,
fatigue, attention and concentration deficit, and irritability. Dr. Miranda-Grajales concluded that
plaintiff had at least suffered a moderate traumatic brain injury and that plaintiff’s ailments were
caused by the motor vehicle accident at issue. Dr. Miranda-Grajales testified that plaintiff had
trouble with daily living activities, including dressing himself, brushing his teeth, feeding himself,
bathing himself, and doing routine housework. Dr. Miranda-Grajales opined that plaintiff could
not take care of himself or live independently and would need assistance for the rest of his life. Dr.
Miranda-Grajales described plaintiff’s situation as “one of the worst outcomes of a brain injury
6
case [he had] seen, again, of people that [could] walk and talk.” Dr. Miranda-Grajales opined that
the minimum total cost for plaintiff’s future care was over $8.5 million. On cross-examination, Dr.
Miranda-Grajales admitted that he had only spent about five hours with plaintiff in total and that
he had not seen plaintiff since May of 2024.
¶ 14 Plaintiff testified that he had been living in a nursing home for approximately three or four
years and had a hard time hearing, remembering things, reading, and getting around. Plaintiff
described his current living situation as “kind of a nightmare.” Plaintiff testified that he did not
“even feel like [he was] living.” He felt like he was trapped and in prison. The facility where he
lived was very dirty, the food was “simply survivable,” and there was “really no one to talk to.”
Plaintiff could no longer drive, which made it hard to go places. Before the accident, plaintiff lived
by himself, drove himself, skied, boated, tubed, hunted, and played baseball and basketball. Now,
plaintiff used a wheelchair a lot of the time but was working on getting better at walking. Plaintiff
had aggressive headaches about twice a week, which he did not suffer from prior to the accident.
Plaintiff’s mother lived close by, but his children lived elsewhere. Plaintiff testified that his family
did not come and see him very often because he was angry a lot of the time. Plaintiff acknowledged
that, prior to the accident, he was on disability for pancreatitis. Plaintiff also admitted that he
smoked about a pack of cigarettes a day.
¶ 15 On cross-examination, plaintiff confirmed that he made his own medical decisions and
could live at a different facility. Plaintiff insisted that he could go to the bathroom independently,
dress himself, feed himself, bathe himself, and brush his own teeth. However, he testified that he
had problems with his eyesight and memory which affected his daily living capabilities. Plaintiff
admitted that, about 16 months after the vehicle accident, he walked two blocks from the nursing
home facility to his mother’s house. There, a shed collapsed on him, he broke his legs, and he had
7
to be flown in a helicopter to the hospital. Plaintiff also admitted that, prior to the accident, he had
chronic kidney disease, lupus, anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder. Plaintiff had been on
disability for more than 10 years and did not remember when he last worked. Plaintiff greatly
desired to live on his own again.
¶ 16 Dr. Michael April testified that he was a physician specializing in physical medicine and
rehabilitation. Dr. April was licensed to practice in Florida and Maryland, and practiced in Florida,
where he oversaw rehabilitation and pain management at two nursing homes. On August 30, 2024,
Dr. April saw and evaluated plaintiff at plaintiff’s Illinois nursing home for a couple of hours. Dr.
April had no doubt that plaintiff had suffered a severe brain injury in the car accident at issue.
Plaintiff had also suffered multiple fractures to several bones in his body, traumatic respiratory
failure, a lacerated liver, and a collapsed lung. Plaintiff had lost a lot of his visual and hearing
abilities because of the crash. Dr. April therefore found it “extremely unlikely” that plaintiff had
ever been pain-free since February 2022. Dr. April believed that plaintiff’s brain injury would be
permanent and that plaintiff would need constant supervision for the rest of his life. Dr. April
estimated the minimum total cost of plaintiff’s future care would be almost $9 million. On cross-
examination, Dr. April confirmed that he was not licensed to practice in Illinois and was referred
to this case by Dr. Miranda-Grajales. Dr. April confirmed that he had last seen plaintiff in August
of 2024. Dr. April also confirmed that he had been retained and paid by plaintiff’s attorneys.
¶ 17 The plaintiff then played a video deposition of Abbie Siegwald. A transcript of the video
was provided to this court, and we will recount its contents here. Siegwald testified that she worked
as the social service director at plaintiff’s nursing care facility, Odin Health and Rehab Center, for
approximately 2½ years until August of 2024. She confirmed that plaintiff was admitted to Odin
in either late April or early May of 2022 and that she remembered plaintiff and saw him daily
8
during her time working there. Plaintiff was, to her recollection, one of the youngest residents of
the facility. She was aware that plaintiff had a traumatic brain injury. She did not recollect any
other residents at Odin at that time with traumatic brain injuries. Siegwald agreed that plaintiff’s
needs were unmet at Odin and that he needed care that could not be provided there. She testified
that, depending on the day, plaintiff had severe difficulty performing his daily living activities
while at Odin. She did not believe that plaintiff could take care of himself or live independently.
¶ 18 John McGowan testified that he was an accounting consultant and that plaintiff’s attorneys
had retained him. Adjusting for medical inflation, McGowan made calculations for plaintiff’s
future medical needs based on both Dr. Miranda-Grajales’s and Dr. April’s estimates. Based on
Dr. Miranda-Grajales’s $8.5 million estimate, McGowan calculated that plaintiff would need
between $9.7 million and $12.8 million dollars for his future medical needs. Based on Dr. April’s
$9 million estimate, McGowan calculated that plaintiff would need between $10.2 million and
$15.5 million. McGowan testified that his calculations used conservative numbers.
¶ 19 Plaintiff then played the video deposition of Dr. Andrea George. A transcript of the video
was provided to this court, and we will recount its contents here. Dr. George testified that she was
an endocrinologist licensed to practice in Illinois and Texas and currently practicing in Austin,
Texas. On May 24, 2024, she interpreted some testing on and recommended treatment for plaintiff.
Dr. George concluded that plaintiff had low levels of various hormones, including testosterone,
prolactin, and growth hormone. Dr. George recommended that plaintiff receive testosterone and
growth hormone replacement treatment. Dr. George testified that these treatments would improve
plaintiff’s muscle weakness, low mood, and fatigue. Dr. George opined that the cause of these
hormone issues was the traumatic brain injury plaintiff had suffered in the car accident at issue.
On cross-examination, Dr. George admitted that she worked alongside Dr. Miranda-Grajales and
9
Dr. Rundle-Gonzalez, that she did not prescribe or administer any treatment to plaintiff, and that
she had not reconsidered plaintiff’s case since May of 2024. 1
¶ 20 Linda Schweiger testified that she was a registered nurse, certified nurse life care planner,
and certified brain injury specialist retained by defendant to determine a life care plan for plaintiff.
To generate her opinion in this case, Schweiger reviewed several documents, including medical
records, depositions, and reports. Schweiger contended that Dr. April’s life care plan for plaintiff
had several discrepancies and inaccuracies and was not as thorough as it should have been.
Schweiger agreed with the doctors’ assessments that plaintiff needed 24/7 care of some sort, but
disagreed with their recommendation that plaintiff have a home health aide. Schweiger instead
recommended that plaintiff reside in an assisted living or group home, contending that such
placement would be better for plaintiff because there would be more reliable supervision.
Ultimately, Schweiger testified that she believed that the total cost of plaintiff’s future medical
care was $3.3 million.
¶ 21 On cross-examination, Schweiger agreed that plaintiff had sustained a serious brain injury
in the accident at issue, that plaintiff could not care for himself and would need 24/7 ongoing care
for the rest of his life, and that he would need life-long medical follow-ups for his injuries sustained
in the crash. Schweiger also admitted that she had never conducted testing on or even met plaintiff.
Upon being shown a prior report of hers which listed the future life care cost for plaintiff as $2
million, she corrected her former opinion and testified that the $2 million figure, not the $3.3
million figure, was the correct one, as the earlier $3.3 million figure was a typographical error.
1
After Dr. George’s deposition was played, the plaintiff rested his case. Clutts sought a directed
verdict, which the trial court granted.
10
¶ 22 Dr. Stan Smith testified that he was an economist at his company, Smith Economics, which
did economic analysis nationwide. Dr. Smith analyzed Dr. McGowan’s economic evaluations of
the life care plan costs for plaintiff and opined that Dr. McGowan had used economic growth rates
that were overly high, resulting in “an enormously unrealistically huge number.” Using what Dr.
Smith believed to be more appropriate economic growth rates, he recalculated costs for plaintiff’s
future medical needs based on both Schweiger’s and Dr. April’s life care plans. Based on
Schweiger’s plan, Dr. Smith calculated that plaintiff would need approximately $1.8 million for
his future medical needs. Based on Dr. April’s plan, Dr. Smith calculated that plaintiff would need
approximately $5.3 million. Kevin Puckett testified that he was the president and owner of KP
Underwriting, a medical underwriting company that estimated life expectancies and medical cost
projections for life care plans, settlements, and workers’ compensation companies. Based on what
he learned about plaintiff’s medical history from defendant’s attorneys, Puckett determined that
plaintiff’s life expectancy would be reduced by approximately seven to nine years. On cross-
examination, Puckett confirmed that he never reviewed plaintiff’s medical records from before the
accident, and that if he had the chance to review plaintiff’s medical records from the last two years,
it could significantly change his opinion.
¶ 23 At the close of the compensatory phase of the trial, the trial court read several instructions
to the jury, including that the “verdict must not be based on speculation, prejudice, or sympathy.”
The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff’s favor with compensatory damages of $5.95 million. The
jury also found that defendant’s conduct had been willful and wanton, requiring punitive damages.
The trial then proceeded to the punitive damages phase.
¶ 24 Plaintiff then played a video deposition of defendant for the court. A transcript of the video
was provided to this court, and we will recount its contents here. Defendant confirmed that he
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received his first DUI in November of 2007, when he was a minor with a suspended license. After
that incident, defendant received some supervision and treatment, but a little less than four years
later, in October of 2011, he received another DUI. After this incident, he received probation and
alcohol treatment, completed some community service, and paid some fines. Thus, at the time of
the vehicular accident at issue, defendant already had two DUIs. He received a DUI in the current
case and pled guilty. His driver’s license was also revoked. Defendant admitted that, in July of
2023, a little more than a year after the accident at issue, he received a driving with a revoked
license charge while speeding 25 miles over the speed limit. A month after that, in August of 2023,
he received his fourth DUI, an aggravated driving under the influence charge, to which he pled
guilty.
¶ 25 Defendant admitted that he was going 68 miles an hour on the wrong side of the road and
was intoxicated over twice the legal limit on the night of the vehicular accident in question. After
the crash, he fled and ran because he knew he had been driving drunk. Defendant acknowledged
initially blaming the other vehicles for the crash but insisted that he did not intend to deceive and
had truly been mistaken about the circumstances at the time. Defendant acknowledged that he
knew plaintiff had been seriously hurt and that he never reached out to apologize for his actions.
Defendant admitted liquidating his assets and selling his house after the lawsuit at issue had been
filed but testified that he did so because he knew he would be leaving soon for prison and wanted
to get his affairs in order. Defendant denied hiding any assets because of this lawsuit and testified
that he had not been able to work since he had gone to prison. Although he had between $10,000
to $15,000 in his checking account only a year prior, defendant testified that there “was probably
nothing in” his account now because, despite being in prison, he had used up the money to pay
credit card and medical bills. Although defendant intended to resume working as an ironworker
12
upon his release from prison, he anticipated having some difficulty getting hired because of his
criminal history. Defendant confirmed that he had two children under the age of 10 and that he
expected to care for and be financially responsible for them after his release from prison.
¶ 26 Defendant testified that he was sorry for any harm he had caused in the accident. Through
treatment, defendant realized that he was an alcoholic. Defendant knew of his problems with
alcohol prior to the accident. In the past, defendant had taken court-ordered classes and completed
court-ordered treatment for his prior DUIs, gone to Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings
“religiously,” and sought counseling and medicine for his condition.
¶ 27 During closing arguments, in response to plaintiff’s counsel’s request for $50 million in
punitive damages, defense counsel argued that it would not “take anywhere close to $50 million
to punish” defendant since he was “coming out of prison with no money and no job.” Defense
counsel reiterated that defendant had “nothing right now” and opined that “an award of $50,000
*** [was] going to make [defendant] sting for quite some time.” In rebuttal, plaintiff’s counsel
stated that if $50,000 was “anywhere near” the jury’s punitive damages verdict, it would be “an
insult.” The trial court instructed the jury that all the instructions it had read aloud after the
compensatory phase of the trial still applied. The trial court also read the following instructions
specifically regarding the jury’s consideration of punitive damages:
“If you believe that justice and the public good require it, you may award an
amount of money which will punish [defendant] and discourage him and others from
similar conduct. In arriving at your decision as to the amount of punitive damages, you
should consider the following three questions. The first question is the most important to
determine the amount of punitive damages.
One, how reprehensible was [defendant’s] conduct? On this subject, you should
consider the following: [t]he facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct, the
vulnerability of the plaintiff, the duration of the misconduct, the frequency of the
defendant’s misconduct, whether the harm was physical as opposed to economic, and
whether the defendant tried to conceal the misconduct; two, what actual and potential harm
did defendant’s conduct cause to the plaintiff in this case; and three, what amount of money
13
is necessary to punish the defendant and discourage the defendant and others from future
wrongful conduct.
The amount of punitive damages must be reasonable and in proportion to the
actual and potential harm suffered by the plaintiff.”
¶ 28 At the close of the punitive damages phase of the trial, the jury awarded plaintiff a punitive
damage award of $29.5 million. Based on the jury’s verdicts, the trial court then entered judgment
in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the amount of $35.45 million.
¶ 29 On June 16, 2025, defendant filed a motion for remittitur, arguing that the jury had
overlooked critical evidence on defendant’s financial status, resulting in a “brutally excessive”
punitive damages award improperly based on passion. On July 2, 2025, plaintiff filed a response
to defendant’s motion for remittitur, arguing that, as the jury’s punitive damages award was proper,
remittitur by the trial court would be unwarranted. On August 20, 2025, defendant filed a reply in
support of his motion for remittitur, additionally arguing that the jury’s punitive damages award
violated his due process rights under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
On August 21, 2025, the trial court took the matter under advisement.
¶ 30 On August 25, 2025, the trial court issued a written order denying defendant’s posttrial
motion for remittitur. In its order, the trial court denied that the jury’s award violated defendant’s
due process rights, asserting that defendant’s behavior reflected “extraordinary reprehensibility,”
which strongly supported “a significant punitive award.” The trial court also noted that the jury’s
punitive award was within a single-digit ratio of the compensatory award, “which [was] generally
presumed constitutionally sound.” Finally, the trial court commented that the “jury’s award was
based on the evidence and [did] not shock the judicial conscience,” that it “was neither the product
of passion nor prejudice,” and that it constituted “a measured response to [d]efendant’s reckless
disregard for human life.” Defendant appeals.
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¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 32 On appeal, defendant asks this court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of a
remittitur where the jury’s punitive damages award violated his due process rights and was
improperly based on passion or prejudice. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for remittitur
for an abuse of discretion. Mogensen v. SCF Lewis & Clark Fleeting LLC, 2025 IL App (5th)
230501, ¶ 76. An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s ruling was arbitrary, ignored
recognized principles of law, or if no reasonable person would take the position adopted by the
trial court. Estate of Oglesby v. Berg, 408 Ill. App. 3d 655, 661 (2011).
¶ 33 A. Due Process Argument
¶ 34 Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
remittitur where the jury’s punitive damages award violated his due process rights. We review
de novo whether a jury’s punitive damages award is constitutional. Turner v. Firstar Bank, N.A.,
363 Ill. App. 3d 1150, 1162 (2006). The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of “grossly excessive or arbitrary” punishments
on a tortfeasor. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416
(2003). To the extent an award is “grossly excessive,” it furthers no legitimate purpose and
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property. Id. at 417. Legitimate purposes of punitive
damages include the goals of punishment and deterrence. See International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local 150 v. Lowe Excavating Co., 225 Ill. 2d 456, 490 (2006). In BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996), the Supreme Court listed three guideposts to
assist courts in determining whether punitive damages awards against defendants were grossly
excessive: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s actions, (2) the disparity between
the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award, and (3) the
15
difference between the punitive damages award and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases. A reviewing court should not disturb an award of punitive damages as
unconstitutionally excessive unless it determines that the award falls outside these guideposts. See
Doe v. Parrillo, 2021 IL 126577, ¶ 59.
¶ 35 1. Reprehensibility
¶ 36 The Supreme Court has opined that “the most important indicium of the reasonableness of
a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.” Gore, 517
U.S. at 575. In determining the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, courts are required to
consider whether (1) the harm caused was physical rather than economic; (2) the conduct
demonstrated an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; (3) the
conduct’s target was financially vulnerable; (4) the conduct involved repeated actions or was an
isolated incident; and (5) the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere
accident. See Holland v. Schwan’s Home Service, Inc., 2013 IL App (5th) 110560, ¶ 258.
¶ 37 In this case, the harm done to plaintiff was clearly physical. Dr. Rundle-Gonzalez, Dr.
Miranda-Grajales, and Dr. April all testified that plaintiff had sustained at least a moderate
traumatic brain injury that would most likely be permanent. Schweiger, defendant’s expert, also
agreed that plaintiff had sustained a serious brain injury. All three doctors confirmed that, because
of his injury, plaintiff had several physical, cognitive, and executive function issues preventing
him from being able to care for himself or live independently. Siegwald also believed that plaintiff
was unable to care for himself or live independently, as, based on her observations, plaintiff often
had severe difficulty performing daily living activities. Schweiger also agreed that the plaintiff
could not care for himself or live independently. Plaintiff testified that, whereas before the
accident, he played sports and engaged in outdoor hobbies, he now used a wheelchair and was
16
working to improve his walking skills. Plaintiff testified to suffering from eyesight, hearing, and
memory problems, and having aggressive headaches twice a week, all of which he had not suffered
from before the accident.
¶ 38 Defendant’s conduct also clearly demonstrated an indifference to or a reckless disregard
for the health and safety of others. Defendant admitted that, before driving on the night of the
accident, he knew he was intoxicated and could seriously hurt someone but chose to drive anyway.
Defendant acknowledged driving 68 miles an hour on the wrong side of the road. Defendant
conceded that his conduct disregarded others’ safety. Defendant confirmed that after the accident,
and after seeing that plaintiff was hurt, he ran away and hid in a field, where police eventually
found him. Plaintiff was also clearly financially vulnerable at the time of the accident. Plaintiff
acknowledged that he had been on disability for more than 10 years prior to the accident and that
he did not remember when he last worked.
¶ 39 Next, the court is to consider whether defendant’s conduct involved repeated actions or
was an isolated incident. While defendant’s conduct here constituted a single incident of harm to
plaintiff, defendant’s actions on previous occasions amply warned him of the danger his
intoxicated behavior posed to himself and others. However, as his conduct here did not involve
repeated actions against plaintiff, this factor does not contribute to the greater body of
reprehensibility outlined herein.
¶ 40 Finally, although the harm caused was ultimately the result of an accident, defendant’s
actions in the commission of his conduct arguably included elements of intentional malice and
deceit. Defendant admitted that he drove on the night of the accident despite knowing that he was
intoxicated and could seriously hurt someone. Defendant acknowledged running away and hiding
in a field after seeing that plaintiff was hurt and in need of aid.
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¶ 41 2. Disparity Between the Award and Harm to Plaintiff
¶ 42 The Supreme Court has also commented that “[t]he second and perhaps most commonly
cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award is its ratio to the actual
harm inflicted on the plaintiff.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 580. The Court explained that “[i]n most cases,
the ratio will be within a constitutionally acceptable range, and remittitur will not be justified on
this basis.” Id. at 583. Specifically, single-digit ratios between punitive and compensatory damages
are more likely to comport with due process, especially “when the defendant’s conduct is
particularly egregious and the plaintiff’s harm arose from a physical assault or injury.” Parrillo,
2021 IL 126577, ¶ 55; also see Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425. However, as defendant points out, the
Court has stated that when compensatory damages are substantial, as in this case, a lesser ratio
“can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.
¶ 43 In this case, the jury awarded the plaintiff $29.5 million in punitive damages and $5.95
million in compensatory damages, representing a single-digit ratio of roughly 5 to 1. Defendant
argues that, despite this, the award furthers no legitimate purpose, constitutes an arbitrary
deprivation of property, and violates his due process rights because, at the time of trial, defendant
was incarcerated, unemployed, and without assets. Given the