Full Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 260250 Decision filed 11/19/26. The text of this decision may be NO. 5-26-0250 changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ GRAYSON KLUCKER, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Madison County. ) v. ) No. 24-LA-686 ) ASHTON ZOBRIST, ) Honorable ) Patrick G. King, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE BOLLINGER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Cates and Justice Clarke concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION ¶1 Plaintiff Grayson Klucker was awarded compensatory and punitive damages by a jury in connection with a negligence action brought against defendant Ashton Zobrist. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by permitting plaintiff to plead willful and wanton conduct and seek punitive damages and by excluding evidence of plaintiff’s use of marijuana for self-medication. Defendant also argues that the compensatory and punitive damages awards were excessive. We affirm the trial court’s order granting plaintiff leave to plead willful and wanton conduct and seek punitive damages and order excluding evidence of plaintiff’s marijuana use. We further affirm the jury’s award of punitive damages and compensatory damages for emotional distress and pain and suffering. We reduce and remit the damages award with respect to disfigurement and loss of normal life. 1 ¶2 I. BACKGROUND ¶3 On May 15, 2024, plaintiff Grayson Klucker filed a personal injury action against defendant Ashton Zobrist arising from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on July 4, 2023, in Madison County. In this original complaint, plaintiff alleged that he was traveling westbound on Broadway approaching the Route 160 intersection while operating a 2022 Kawasaki KLX230. He alleged that he approached the intersection in the left lane without a stop sign and possessed the right of way to make a left turn onto Route 160 from Broadway. 1 Plaintiff further alleged that defendant was proceeding northbound on Route 160 in a 2002 Ford Pickup and was required to stop at a stop sign. He claimed that defendant did not have the right of way, failed to stop at the stop sign, and struck plaintiff’s motorcycle, pushing it across the roadway into the front of another vehicle stopped on Deal Street. Plaintiff reported being ejected from his vehicle and losing consciousness. He claimed to have “suffered severe and life-threatening bodily injuries, including but not limited to altered mental state, concussion, abrasions of multiple areas of the body, closed fractures of left tibia and fibula, closed bicondylar fracture of left tibia, acute pain, left lower leg and knee Morel lesions, psychological injury and emotional distress.” He alleged that his injuries were evolving and that he continued to receive treatment. Plaintiff asserted claims based on negligence and negligence per se, each seeking damages exceeding $50,000. ¶4 A. Pretrial ¶5 On September 30, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint to include a claim for punitive damages. He contended that the developed evidence clearly demonstrated that defendant “ignored a stop sign and gunned it through a major intersection, blindly.” He asserted 1 Plaintiff later filed an amended complaint changing this allegation to state that plaintiff approached the intersection of Broadway and Route 160 in the right through lane (with no intention of turning left). 2 that such conduct was “as reckless of conduct as one can feasibly engage in when operating several thousand pounds of motorized steel on the public roadways.” ¶6 In support of his motion, he included deposition testimony from defendant and several witnesses. Defendant admitted that he was required to stop at the stop sign, that cross-traffic had the right of way, and that he nonetheless proceeded into the intersection and struck plaintiff’s motorcycle. ¶7 Deborah Workman testified that she was a passenger in her husband’s vehicle at the front of the left-turn lane on Broadway. She testified that when her husband began to turn left onto Route 160, defendant pulled out in front of them, causing her husband to slam on his brakes to avoid a collision. Defendant went through the intersection and collided with plaintiff. ¶8 Another eyewitness, Amanda Garcia, who was also a passenger in a vehicle driven by her husband, stated that they were waiting in line in the left-turn lane. She observed a black pickup attempting to cross Broadway and noted that it “lunged four times into the intersection, and after the fourth lunge, he then ‘gunned it’ and drove through the intersection,” resulting in a collision with plaintiff. She affirmed that plaintiff was not exceeding the speed limit and that he could not have done anything to avoid the collision. ¶9 A third witness, Carlie Stroteheide, was positioned in the third vehicle in line, waiting to make a left turn. She observed the motorcycle and heard honking at the same time. Suddenly, a truck appeared, and she saw the motorcycle go beneath the truck before being propelled into the air; she stated, “[H]e got launched.” ¶ 10 Plaintiff asserted in his motion to amend that there existed “a reasonable likelihood that Plaintiff can prove facts at trial that are sufficient to support an award for punitive damages” given defendant’s conduct. Plaintiff argued that defendant was aware of his duty to yield to plaintiff, 3 knew that he could not see if anyone was approaching the intersection, and yet entered the intersection recklessly. Plaintiff requested leave to amend his complaint to include a claim for punitive damages. ¶ 11 Defendant objected to the motion asserting that plaintiff was unable to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of establishing facts at trial sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. He argued that he stopped at the stop sign for several minutes prior to entering the intersection, yielded to cross-traffic, looked both ways, and proceeded through the intersection only after believing it to be safe. Defendant did not observe any cross-traffic coming from westbound Broadway, including plaintiff, because traffic from the left-turn lane was obstructing traffic from the westbound through lane. Plaintiff would not have been able to travel straight westbound on Broadway through the intersection without passing cars on the shoulder or navigating around the backed-up traffic. He also cited the deposition testimony of Mary Roberts, who stated that she first saw plaintiff when he was traveling on the shoulder of the westbound lane “because that is what caught” her attention. She confirmed that plaintiff was passing vehicles within the westbound lane. ¶ 12 A hearing was held on the motion. After hearing arguments of counsel, the trial court granted the motion finding there were factual disputes for the jury’s consideration as to whether the evidence rose to the level of willful and wanton conduct. Plaintiff thereafter filed an amended complaint which included a willful and wanton conduct count and punitive damages claim. Plaintiff removed the negligence per se count. ¶ 13 At a subsequent pretrial hearing, the parties argued their positions concerning the admissibility of plaintiff’s marijuana use. Plaintiff contended that he would not receive a fair trial if defendant were permitted to assert that he regularly used marijuana. He noted that no evidence 4 indicated that he was impaired on the day of the incident. Plaintiff referenced excerpts from the testimony of Dr. Stachniak, defendant’s expert witness, in which he testified that the relevance of plaintiff’s marijuana consumption was its role in managing his anxiety. Accordingly, plaintiff withdrew his claim that his anxiety worsened following the incident. Plaintiff further stated that the expert did not establish a connection between marijuana use and the exacerbation of depression or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). ¶ 14 In response, defendant acknowledged that he was not contending that plaintiff was impaired at the time of the incident, but rather that marijuana use was relevant to plaintiff’s claim for “mental disorders which worsened because of the accident” and to “show that he was self- medicating prior to the accident.” Defendant further argued that his expert opined that plaintiff’s self-medication was preexisting and “goes to all of the disorders, the PTSD, anxiety, etc.” He pointed out that plaintiff intended to testify regarding other medications he was taking for his mental conditions. Defendant agreed to exclude any opinions concerning cannabis use disorder. Additionally, defendant asserted that his expert testified that plaintiff used marijuana for self- medication of his anxiety symptoms, which were integral to a diagnosis of PTSD. Defendant argued that it was probative “because it shows the existence of and severity of his preexisting mental health conditions.” ¶ 15 After continued argument along those same lines, the trial court ruled as follows: “The question is whether—there probably is some probative value. The question is whether it’s substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice. I’m concerned it will be prejudicial and probably to an extent unfairly. I’m not sure how we would thread the needle. At this point—I will take it up later in trial if it comes up 5 or if a door opens that you think that has to be opened. I don’t want to close the door completely. I think based upon—some of it is going to be based upon testimony, and some is going to be cross-examination and plaintiff’s testimony, but I’d say initially we’ll say that any use of marijuana will be barred at this time, but we can take it up on a side bar and we can definitely take it up if the door opens to where it could become a relevant factor.” ¶ 16 B. Trial ¶ 17 The jury trial commenced on November 3, 2025, and spanned four days. We summarize only the witnesses and testimony relevant to the issues on appeal. ¶ 18 1. Carlie Stroteheide ¶ 19 The videotaped evidence deposition of Stroteheide was presented at trial. Although we were not provided with the actual videotape shown to the jury, we were furnished with a transcript of the deposition. Stroteheide testified that she was in the left turn on Route 160 at the time of the collision. She was the last vehicle in line to turn left onto Broadway. As she entered the left-turn lane, she observed plaintiff’s motorcycle through her rearview mirror slow down and continue straight toward the intersection. Plaintiff passed her in the middle of the through lane at approximately 30 miles per hour, within the speed limit, and was not engaging in any unsafe maneuvers. Plaintiff stayed within his lane and did not cross over the curb. Although she did not witness the collision, she heard screeching and saw the motorcycle propelled beneath a truck, with plaintiff thrown into a pole. During cross-examination, she stated that she did not observe defendant because the vehicles in front of her obstructed her view and therefore could not provide any opinions regarding his actions before the incident. 6 ¶ 20 2. Amanda Garcia ¶ 21 Garcia testified that at the time of the collision, she was in an elevated truck driven by her husband located in the left-turn lane on Route 160. She observed plaintiff pass by them in the through lane to her right. The speed limit was 35 miles per hour, and plaintiff appeared to be traveling at the same pace as the surrounding traffic, with no indications of speeding. Two or three vehicles were ahead of her in the turn lane, so they had to wait their turn. By the time plaintiff overtook them on the right, they were already stopped. She observed a truck at the stop sign for northbound Route 160 that appeared to “lunge forward” slightly three or four times. During the fourth lunge, the truck was situated in the middle of the intersection. She witnessed the truck “gun it through the rest of the intersection.” Plaintiff was not maneuvering around a stopped line of vehicles on the shoulder. She contacted emergency services via 911 while her husband exited the vehicle to assist. ¶ 22 On cross-examination, she acknowledged that she did not observe the collision. She described what she meant by lunging forward by “[l]ike he stabbed the gas pedal and immediately hit the brake again, kind of like lurching forward.” By the fourth lunge defendant was halfway into the intersection. He then gunned it on the fourth lunge. During redirect examination, she stated that plaintiff had been traveling in the middle of his lane. ¶ 23 3. Deborah Workman ¶ 24 The videotaped evidence deposition of Workman was played next. Her vehicle was traveling westbound along Broadway in the left-turn lane. She was a passenger, with her husband operating the vehicle. They were the first vehicle in line to turn left. They turned at the same time defendant started to proceed into the intersection, and she exclaimed “stop.” She did not observe the truck until it suddenly pulled in front of their vehicle. By the time she saw the truck, it was 7 already within the intersection. She observed the truck cross and then saw the motorcycle, after which she screamed, anticipating the imminent event. She stated that the truck did not look like “he was dashing in front of us, it just looked like he pulled in front of us.” She observed the truck strike the motorcycle. She did not notice the motorcycle traveling around cars on the shoulder. She witnessed plaintiff being propelled into the air. ¶ 25 Workman observed defendant run to the scene and he stated that he had not seen plaintiff. He appeared shaken and concerned but did not attempt to flee. Plaintiff attempted to stand while the individual assisting him repeatedly advised him to remain lying down. He moved his leg and screamed. She had no opinions regarding the speed of the truck or the motorcycle. She took notes immediately after the accident that indicated that defendant said he did not see plaintiff and that the motorcycle rider was traveling at a high speed. ¶ 26 4. Bailey Mettler ¶ 27 Bailey Mettler testified that on the date of the incident, defendant was her boyfriend, and she was a passenger in his truck. They had just departed from Dairy Queen and reached a two-way stop. Because of heavy traffic, they came to a complete stop. The individual in the left-turn lane signaled to defendant to proceed, prompting him to cautiously advance. Defendant had been stopped at the intersection for several minutes prior to entering it. She did not observe plaintiff until the moment of impact. Defendant did not gun or lunge through the intersection, nor did he deliberately strike plaintiff. ¶ 28 5. Mary Roberts ¶ 29 Roberts observed the incident, stating that she was at the stop sign on Deal Street attempting to merge into the eastbound lane when “a motorcycle came flying by,” and it unexpectedly collided with the front of her bumper. She was unaware of the motorcycle’s exact 8 speed or whether it was exceeding the speed limit but described it as “a good amount of speed.” The motorcycle caught her attention because it was on the shoulder to her left. She did not observe the collision. She exited her vehicle to check on plaintiff, who was breathing and communicating at the time. She stated that she had not seen defendant’s truck prior to the collision. ¶ 30 6. Defendant ¶ 31 Defendant testified that he was enrolled at Southern Illinois University Edwardsville pursuing a degree in civil engineering. He was dating Bailey Mettler, who was a passenger in his truck during the collision. He was operating his grandfather’s Ford F-150, which weighed approximately 5,000 pounds. Defendant had raced at Highland Speedway for several years and raced late-model cars since age 14. He acknowledged that, at a stop sign, he must come to a complete stop and remain stationary until it is his turn to proceed, recognizing that cross-traffic has the right of way. He also agreed that he must wait at a stop sign as long as necessary until all traffic has cleared and it was safe to proceed. Furthermore, he concurred that it would violate traffic laws and be potentially hazardous to pull out of a stop sign at an intersection in a manner that would cut off cross-traffic with the right of way. ¶ 32 Defendant did not believe that his actions contributed to the incident and maintained that he was not at fault. Upon arriving at the intersection, he intended to proceed straight across. He stopped at the stop sign for two to three minutes and crept forward to improve his view of the road. He acknowledged that he did not have the right of way at the intersection. He indicated that the vehicle at the front of the left-turn lane signaled him to proceed. The left-turn lane was congested, backing up into the through lane. He did not observe plaintiff until the moment of impact. From his position, he could see the westbound through lane in front of Workman’s car. Additionally, he could see through the gaps between vehicles in the left-turn lane as he crept forward slightly. 9 However, when he first approached the stop sign, he could not see beyond the left-turn lane. He consciously decided to proceed through the intersection, aware of another lane and understanding that both the left-turn lane and the westbound through lane had the right of way. He denied lunging or gunning it into the intersection. Plaintiff sideswiped his truck, resulting in a collision. The dent was situated on the front middle bumper of his vehicle. The impact occurred in plaintiff’s lane of travel. ¶ 33 7. Plaintiff ¶ 34 Plaintiff testified that at the time of the collision, he had recently graduated from high school and had been accepted into the University of Alabama, where he intended to pursue a degree in business. He did not recall the accident. His last memory was watching fireworks earlier that evening. His next recollection was waking up in a hospital bed, where he observed six or seven rods inserted into his leg to stabilize it. He did not know how he had arrived there. Photographs depicting the condition of his leg at that time were shown, including an image of a gash on his hip. Initial treatment primarily involved pain management. He underwent four surgeries, with the first three occurring within the first month. His leg sustained multiple breaks, and his tendons and ligaments were torn. He was hospitalized for one month. The period between surgeries was miserable, characterized by severe, indescribable pain. During this time, he was mostly confined to bed and unable to move about on his own. He was only able to go outside on three occasions. Upon discharge, he used a wheelchair for several months. When he commenced therapy, it was highly painful and offered limited benefit. ¶ 35 In January 2024, he sought to attend the University of Alabama and stated that his physicians had advised him to do so. He tried to walk to the bookstore, but upon experiencing significant pain, he “kind of stopped and realized how much pain I was in, so I just down and I— 10 I just broke down.” He felt a sense of inadequacy and believed he had not progressed as far in his recovery as expected. Subsequently, he decided to return home. He made another attempt to resume studies in the fall of 2024. This was challenging due to the campus’s size, numerous hills, and the fact that his class was 0.9 miles from his dormitory. He tried to use electric bikes; however, they were often unavailable due to high student demand, so he mostly walked. He believed that the University of Alabama was too large and that his academic performance was declining to C and D grades. He decided to return home around Halloween 2024. Between his initial departure from college and his return in the fall, he was employed at a roofing company, handling office tasks and deliveries. As of the date of the trial, he was enrolled at Ranken Technical School and was actively engaged in his studies and experiences. ¶ 36 His ankle mobility remains impaired. He has sensitive scars; some are completely numb, while others tingle when pressure is applied. He continues to wear a brace daily beneath his trousers. His leg is misaligned and angled, and he cannot straighten it as fully as his right leg. He experiences persistent daily pain and applies ice when swelling occurs. He experiences pain while walking and ascending stairs. He doubts that his leg will ever return to its previous normal condition. ¶ 37 Plaintiff testified that his injuries included injuries to his left leg and mental health conditions, including anxiety, depression, and PTSD. He stated that he experiences flashbacks that cause him discomfort and make him feel shaky. Before the incident, he had experienced anxiety since age 13 and depression beginning in high school, for which he was prescribed Wellbutrin and Effexor. He also described experiencing family turmoil before the incident, particularly when his mother attempted to take her own life in his presence. His oldest sister had previously attempted suicide, and another sister attempted suicide after the incident. He worried about his family. Before 11 the incident, he had not been diagnosed with PTSD. He had received mental health services from therapists and counselors, primarily to address family-related trauma. At the time of trial, he had no medical restrictions. ¶ 38 A stipulation regarding plaintiff’s medical bills was entered into the record. The parties agreed that $421,213.56 was a reasonable and customary value for the treatment plaintiff received. ¶ 39 8. Dr. Thomas Revak ¶ 40 The videotaped deposition of Dr. Thomas Revak was played for the jury. He is an orthopedic trauma surgeon. He testified that plaintiff sustained multiple injuries to his left leg, specifically a fracture of the tibial plateau, which is the upper part of the tibia, as well as a fracture of the tibial shaft lower down on his shinbone. Additionally, the fibula was broken in multiple locations. The injuries included multiple compound fractures of both the tibia and fibula. Plaintiff also suffered injuries to the knee and ankle. He had open fractures, indicating that the bone protruded through the soft tissue, resulting in an open wound exposed to the external environment. Dr. Revak performed the second, third, and fourth surgical procedures on plaintiff’s leg. Between the surgeries, there would have been significant pain and limitations in functionality. ¶ 41 The initial procedure was conducted by a different physician on July 5, 2023, involving the application of an external fixation device. An erector set was secured to the bone with pins, helping align the fractures and maintain stability. This device facilitated wound cleaning and irrigation. The recovery period was approximately 10 to 14 days, allowing soft tissues to heal and swelling to diminish, and plaintiff likely experienced considerable pain during this period. ¶ 42 Dr. Revak performed the next surgical procedure on July 19, 2023, intending to address all issues at that time. However, upon commencing the operation, he realized that the underlying injury was considerably more complex than initially anticipated. After completing a portion of the 12 procedure, he elected to return on a subsequent day to address the tibia. Plaintiff has numerous hardware components in his left leg, spanning from the knee to the ankle. ¶ 43 For several months, plaintiff was unable to bear weight and would have experienced considerable pain according to Dr. Revak. Plaintiff reported ankle pain, prompting further imaging. The results indicated some “eccentricity at the syndesmosis” and incomplete healing of the fibula, necessitating further surgical intervention. Plaintiff remained non-weightbearing for a period of four to six weeks thereafter. ¶ 44 Given his injuries, Dr. Revak anticipated that plaintiff will have certain functional limitations, which were expected to persist permanently. He also anticipated that plaintiff would experience chronic knee pain for the remainder of his life. He testified that patients were typically advised that full recovery to preinjury normalcy was unlikely following such injuries and procedures. Dr. Revak expected plaintiff to experience ongoing functional limitations and pain related to his injuries, similar to his current condition, and this was expected to continue throughout his life. A long-term complication he identified was early-onset knee arthritis. Although Dr. Revak did not believe plaintiff would require additional surgery, a knee replacement may be necessary at some point. ¶ 45 Plaintiff informed Dr. Revak that his ankle pain has significantly improved following the most recent surgery and that he experienced only a “vague knee pain.” Ten days prior to the most recent surgery, he allowed plaintiff to resume full work duties despite ankle pain, as it did not impair plaintiff’s ability to perform his employment responsibilities. Following the last surgery, plaintiff was absent from work for four to six weeks. He had no current intentions to place plaintiff on indefinite work restrictions. As of the date of his deposition, no restrictions had been imposed 13 on plaintiff, and he had no upcoming medical appointments. He testified that plaintiff may not require knee replacement surgery. ¶ 46 9. Dr. Eric Wittrock ¶ 47 Dr. Eric Wittrock was plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist. Plaintiff commenced treatment with him following the incident on July 15, 2024, and remained under his care. He believed, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that plaintiff sustained PTSD as a consequence of the collision. He advised plaintiff to maintain ongoing treatment with him. Plaintiff continued to exhibit symptoms associated with PTSD. ¶ 48 During cross-examination, Dr. Wittrock testified that prior to his initial visit with plaintiff, he was unaware of any other trauma in plaintiff’s life. At the time of the initial visit, plaintiff was already under medication for depression and anxiety. He was informed that plaintiff’s family had a history of bipolar disorder and previous suicide attempts. One criterion for diagnosing PTSD was that the individual must have experienced, witnessed, or learned about a traumatic event involving actual or threatened death or serious injury. A suicide attempt by a close family member may be classified as a traumatic event. He acknowledged that it was theoretically possible that plaintiff’s PTSD may have existed prior to the accident. He did not impose any medical or mental health restrictions on plaintiff prior to his attendance at college. ¶ 49 10. Sarah Klucker ¶ 50 Sarah Klucker, plaintiff’s mother, testified that since the incident, plaintiff had been unable to engage in certain activities he previously enjoyed. He was unable to enter the duck blind for hunting or navigate the rough terrain to place decoys. Additionally, he could not kneel on the ground to play with his niece. She acknowledged that prior to the incident, plaintiff received treatment from several mental health therapists. Three years before the incident, she attempted to 14 commit suicide within the family residence, with plaintiff present. Subsequently, the family participated in six or seven sessions of family therapy. Additionally, two of her daughters attempted suicide. She acknowledged that plaintiff worried about her and that these preceding events have had a traumatic impact on him. ¶ 51 11. Dr. Michael Stachniak ¶ 52 Dr. Michael Stachniak, a psychiatrist with dual certification in general adult psychiatry and child and adolescent psychiatry, was called as an expert witness retained by defendant. He conducted an independent medical and mental health examination of plaintiff and reviewed a substantial number of his medical records. He indicated that he was hired by defendant to examine plaintiff, whom he met virtually for two hours. His fee for an evaluation was $5,795, with additional charges of $2,500 for medical review and telephone consultations and $3,000 for the deposition. He also billed at least $3,795 for his trial testimony. Since the inception of this case, his earnings have totaled approximately $15,000. He maintained his own practice and allocated about 20% of his time to this work; however, it accounted for about 50% of his total income. Over the past three years, he conducted more than 140 of these types of medical evaluations, earning roughly $350,000 annually from these services. Since 2022, his earnings from litigation consulting approached $1 million. ¶ 53 Dr. Stachniak testified that at the time of the incident, plaintiff was taking Wellbutrin at a lower-than-usual dose and Effexor at the maximum dose. Prior to the incident, plaintiff met the diagnostic criteria for both generalized anxiety disorder and depression. He also concluded that plaintiff met the criteria for PTSD, which he believed preexisted the incident due to prior exposure to “quite a number of traumatic incidents.” Some of the attempted suicides by his family profoundly impacted him mentally and emotionally. He testified that plaintiff met the clinical 15 criteria for enuresis, a condition characterized by bedwetting that began in childhood and persisted into young adulthood. ¶ 54 Dr. Stachniak testified that plaintiff’s prescribed dose of Wellbutrin was increased following the incident. Although the dose escalation was consistent with the prescribed levels, the timing of the increase subsequent to the incident served as an objective criterion indicating that the symptoms were worse. Plaintiff was performing well for his age of 21, and there was no evidence to suggest that his condition impeded his ability to work or maintain a typical lifestyle. He participated in an internship and engaged in social activities. ¶ 55 During cross-examination, Dr. Stachniak indicated that the accident contributed to and increased plaintiff’s PTSD, though it was not the sole cause. The most significant contributing factors were his mother’s and sister’s suicide attempts. Plaintiff was more vulnerable than the average person to sustaining mental health and psychological damage due to these past issues. Plaintiff had never been diagnosed with or treated for PTSD prior to the incident. He had previously been prescribed numerous psychiatric medications and therapies, which would have been indicated for PTSD. Dr. Stachniak was the first to acknowledge that the PTSD was preexisting. He stated that plaintiff confided in him that, over the past year, his pain has been “essentially absent in terms of not treating” and that he occasionally used Tylenol. ¶ 56 On redirect examination, Dr. Stachniak testified that plaintiff was “functioning well currently occupationally, socially, interpersonally. His medications have hardly changed at all, just a slight increase in that very low dose of Wellbutrin following the accident. Biopsychosocially he’s doing pretty all right.” He lacked objective evidence that plaintiff’s daily life was unbearable in any manner. 16 ¶ 57 Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel made an offer of proof as to Dr. Stachniak’s excluded testimony concerning plaintiff’s marijuana use. Dr. Stachniak testified that plaintiff’s recent history of marijuana use involved daily or near-daily consumption, and he met the objective criteria for cannabis use disorder. This was considered relevant because substance use disorder was highly prevalent among individuals with PTSD. Dr. Stachniak opined that plaintiff’s consistent and daily use was indicative of self-medicating behavior, which was highly pertinent to his PTSD history. He further stated that the extent of marijuana use served as additional evidence of PTSD predating the accident and suggested self-medication for PTSD. Additionally, he noted that prior to the accident, plaintiff was prescribed medication but remained “very symptomatic.” His medication doses increased significantly in early 2023 leading up to the incident, which he believed was insufficient given the severity of his symptoms. As his medication dosage escalated, so did his marijuana use, reaching a frequency of “every day, very heavy use.” He believed plaintiff’s symptoms were not adequately controlled in the weeks and months before the incident. Plaintiff’s marijuana use was clinically significant and could have substantial implications for his future academic and occupational pursuits. He explained that PTSD was an anxiety disorder and that anxiety was a symptom that could arise from a PTSD diagnosis. ¶ 58 12. Motion for Directed Verdict ¶ 59 Defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict on the count alleging willful and wanton conduct. After considering the arguments presented by counsel, the trial court stated that, upon examining all the testimony and demonstrative exhibits and viewing them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and upon applying the Pedrick test, 2 there “are issues of 2 “Trial courts apply what is known as the Pedrick standard when deciding a motion for directed verdict or a motion for judgment n.o.v. Under that standard, a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. is properly granted only where ‘all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.’ ” 17 credibility of witnesses and conflicting evidence which should be left for the jury’s determination.” It also found that “the nonmoving party has established at least a prima facie evidence for every element of their claim.” It denied the motion. ¶ 60 13. Closing Arguments ¶ 61 After a jury instruction conference, closing arguments were presented. Plaintiff’s counsel argued that defendant “gunned it through the intersection after lunging past his stop sign four times” and cut off traffic in the left-turn lane, ultimately striking plaintiff, who had the right of way. He stated that Dr. Stachniak, “the guy who got paid $100 a minute for his testimony” and had earned $1 million over the preceding three years by speaking with lawyers, testified that plaintiff suffered from PTSD as a result of the incident. Plaintiff’s counsel further argued that he had lost the ability to move his body freely without experiencing constant pain. Regarding monetary compensation, he made statements such as that a suitcase containing $5 million “would be a hell no” and that plaintiff would not accept it even if it contained three times that amount. ¶ 62 In closing, defendant’s counsel asked the jury to set sympathy aside. He argued that defendant “creeped forward” at the stop sign and waited for several minutes. After looking through the gaps between the cars in the left lane, he saw no vehicles moving and believed he had been waved through the intersection. He maintained that the collision was an accident, not the result of negligence. Defendant’s counsel further argued that, although plaintiff’s leg injury was painful and gruesome, plaintiff made a full recovery and was not subject to any medical restrictions. He asserted that, if the jury found fault and awarded damages, it should award $100,000 for Hamilton v. Hastings, 2014 IL App (4th) 131021, ¶ 22 (quoting Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 (1967)). 18 disfigurement, $100,000 for loss of normal life, $100,000 for emotional distress, and $100,000 for pain and suffering, for a total of $821,213.56. 3 ¶ 63 In rebuttal, plaintiff’s counsel argued that it felt like there was no justice in the world and that “[b]ullies and the powerful win while claiming to be the victims themselves.” It was stated, “We know that, and we have an obligation to everyone else not to do something reckless for our own convenience. This was like a version of Russian roulette with traffic. It’s like spinning around blindfolded in a room, pointing a loaded gun, firing it knowing there’s people all around that you might hit.” Regarding damages, he argued that the jury was not required to accept any figure presented. However, if the total compensatory damages were even one penny or dollar below $10 million, defendant would consider it a victory. “If it’s $1 million less than that, I think they’re going to be popping champagne bottles tonight. Don’t give them that celebration.” ¶ 64 14. Jury’s Verdict ¶ 65 The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the total sum of $27,496,213.56, itemized as follows: disfigurement—$10 million, loss of normal life—$10 million, pain and suffering—$5 million, emotional distress—$2 million, medical expenses—$421,213.56, and punitive damages—$75,000. ¶ 66 C. Posttrial ¶ 67 On November 12, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion seeking judgment to recover costs, prejudgment interest, and postjudgment interest. On December 5, 2025, defen