Klucker v. Zobrist
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket5-26-0250
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
NOTICE
2026 IL App (5th) 260250
Decision filed 11/19/26. The
text of this decision may be NO. 5-26-0250
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
GRAYSON KLUCKER, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Madison County.
)
v. ) No. 24-LA-686
)
ASHTON ZOBRIST, ) Honorable
) Patrick G. King,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BOLLINGER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Cates and Justice Clarke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiff Grayson Klucker was awarded compensatory and punitive damages by a jury in
connection with a negligence action brought against defendant Ashton Zobrist. On appeal,
defendant argues that the trial court erred by permitting plaintiff to plead willful and wanton
conduct and seek punitive damages and by excluding evidence of plaintiff’s use of marijuana for
self-medication. Defendant also argues that the compensatory and punitive damages awards were
excessive. We affirm the trial court’s order granting plaintiff leave to plead willful and wanton
conduct and seek punitive damages and order excluding evidence of plaintiff’s marijuana use. We
further affirm the jury’s award of punitive damages and compensatory damages for emotional
distress and pain and suffering. We reduce and remit the damages award with respect to
disfigurement and loss of normal life.
1
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On May 15, 2024, plaintiff Grayson Klucker filed a personal injury action against
defendant Ashton Zobrist arising from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on July 4, 2023, in
Madison County. In this original complaint, plaintiff alleged that he was traveling westbound on
Broadway approaching the Route 160 intersection while operating a 2022 Kawasaki KLX230. He
alleged that he approached the intersection in the left lane without a stop sign and possessed the
right of way to make a left turn onto Route 160 from Broadway. 1 Plaintiff further alleged that
defendant was proceeding northbound on Route 160 in a 2002 Ford Pickup and was required to
stop at a stop sign. He claimed that defendant did not have the right of way, failed to stop at the
stop sign, and struck plaintiff’s motorcycle, pushing it across the roadway into the front of another
vehicle stopped on Deal Street. Plaintiff reported being ejected from his vehicle and losing
consciousness. He claimed to have “suffered severe and life-threatening bodily injuries, including
but not limited to altered mental state, concussion, abrasions of multiple areas of the body, closed
fractures of left tibia and fibula, closed bicondylar fracture of left tibia, acute pain, left lower leg
and knee Morel lesions, psychological injury and emotional distress.” He alleged that his injuries
were evolving and that he continued to receive treatment. Plaintiff asserted claims based on
negligence and negligence per se, each seeking damages exceeding $50,000.
¶4 A. Pretrial
¶5 On September 30, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint to include
a claim for punitive damages. He contended that the developed evidence clearly demonstrated that
defendant “ignored a stop sign and gunned it through a major intersection, blindly.” He asserted
1
Plaintiff later filed an amended complaint changing this allegation to state that plaintiff approached
the intersection of Broadway and Route 160 in the right through lane (with no intention of turning left).
2
that such conduct was “as reckless of conduct as one can feasibly engage in when operating several
thousand pounds of motorized steel on the public roadways.”
¶6 In support of his motion, he included deposition testimony from defendant and several
witnesses. Defendant admitted that he was required to stop at the stop sign, that cross-traffic had
the right of way, and that he nonetheless proceeded into the intersection and struck plaintiff’s
motorcycle.
¶7 Deborah Workman testified that she was a passenger in her husband’s vehicle at the front
of the left-turn lane on Broadway. She testified that when her husband began to turn left onto Route
160, defendant pulled out in front of them, causing her husband to slam on his brakes to avoid a
collision. Defendant went through the intersection and collided with plaintiff.
¶8 Another eyewitness, Amanda Garcia, who was also a passenger in a vehicle driven by her
husband, stated that they were waiting in line in the left-turn lane. She observed a black pickup
attempting to cross Broadway and noted that it “lunged four times into the intersection, and after
the fourth lunge, he then ‘gunned it’ and drove through the intersection,” resulting in a collision
with plaintiff. She affirmed that plaintiff was not exceeding the speed limit and that he could not
have done anything to avoid the collision.
¶9 A third witness, Carlie Stroteheide, was positioned in the third vehicle in line, waiting to
make a left turn. She observed the motorcycle and heard honking at the same time. Suddenly, a
truck appeared, and she saw the motorcycle go beneath the truck before being propelled into the
air; she stated, “[H]e got launched.”
¶ 10 Plaintiff asserted in his motion to amend that there existed “a reasonable likelihood that
Plaintiff can prove facts at trial that are sufficient to support an award for punitive damages” given
defendant’s conduct. Plaintiff argued that defendant was aware of his duty to yield to plaintiff,
3
knew that he could not see if anyone was approaching the intersection, and yet entered the
intersection recklessly. Plaintiff requested leave to amend his complaint to include a claim for
punitive damages.
¶ 11 Defendant objected to the motion asserting that plaintiff was unable to demonstrate a
reasonable likelihood of establishing facts at trial sufficient to warrant an award of punitive
damages. He argued that he stopped at the stop sign for several minutes prior to entering the
intersection, yielded to cross-traffic, looked both ways, and proceeded through the intersection
only after believing it to be safe. Defendant did not observe any cross-traffic coming from
westbound Broadway, including plaintiff, because traffic from the left-turn lane was obstructing
traffic from the westbound through lane. Plaintiff would not have been able to travel straight
westbound on Broadway through the intersection without passing cars on the shoulder or
navigating around the backed-up traffic. He also cited the deposition testimony of Mary Roberts,
who stated that she first saw plaintiff when he was traveling on the shoulder of the westbound lane
“because that is what caught” her attention. She confirmed that plaintiff was passing vehicles
within the westbound lane.
¶ 12 A hearing was held on the motion. After hearing arguments of counsel, the trial court
granted the motion finding there were factual disputes for the jury’s consideration as to whether
the evidence rose to the level of willful and wanton conduct. Plaintiff thereafter filed an amended
complaint which included a willful and wanton conduct count and punitive damages claim.
Plaintiff removed the negligence per se count.
¶ 13 At a subsequent pretrial hearing, the parties argued their positions concerning the
admissibility of plaintiff’s marijuana use. Plaintiff contended that he would not receive a fair trial
if defendant were permitted to assert that he regularly used marijuana. He noted that no evidence
4
indicated that he was impaired on the day of the incident. Plaintiff referenced excerpts from the
testimony of Dr. Stachniak, defendant’s expert witness, in which he testified that the relevance of
plaintiff’s marijuana consumption was its role in managing his anxiety. Accordingly, plaintiff
withdrew his claim that his anxiety worsened following the incident. Plaintiff further stated that
the expert did not establish a connection between marijuana use and the exacerbation of depression
or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
¶ 14 In response, defendant acknowledged that he was not contending that plaintiff was
impaired at the time of the incident, but rather that marijuana use was relevant to plaintiff’s claim
for “mental disorders which worsened because of the accident” and to “show that he was self-
medicating prior to the accident.” Defendant further argued that his expert opined that plaintiff’s
self-medication was preexisting and “goes to all of the disorders, the PTSD, anxiety, etc.” He
pointed out that plaintiff intended to testify regarding other medications he was taking for his
mental conditions. Defendant agreed to exclude any opinions concerning cannabis use disorder.
Additionally, defendant asserted that his expert testified that plaintiff used marijuana for self-
medication of his anxiety symptoms, which were integral to a diagnosis of PTSD. Defendant
argued that it was probative “because it shows the existence of and severity of his preexisting
mental health conditions.”
¶ 15 After continued argument along those same lines, the trial court ruled as follows:
“The question is whether—there probably is some probative value. The question is
whether it’s substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice.
I’m concerned it will be prejudicial and probably to an extent unfairly. I’m not sure
how we would thread the needle. At this point—I will take it up later in trial if it comes up
5
or if a door opens that you think that has to be opened. I don’t want to close the door
completely.
I think based upon—some of it is going to be based upon testimony, and some is
going to be cross-examination and plaintiff’s testimony, but I’d say initially we’ll say that
any use of marijuana will be barred at this time, but we can take it up on a side bar and we
can definitely take it up if the door opens to where it could become a relevant factor.”
¶ 16 B. Trial
¶ 17 The jury trial commenced on November 3, 2025, and spanned four days. We summarize
only the witnesses and testimony relevant to the issues on appeal.
¶ 18 1. Carlie Stroteheide
¶ 19 The videotaped evidence deposition of Stroteheide was presented at trial. Although we
were not provided with the actual videotape shown to the jury, we were furnished with a transcript
of the deposition. Stroteheide testified that she was in the left turn on Route 160 at the time of the
collision. She was the last vehicle in line to turn left onto Broadway. As she entered the left-turn
lane, she observed plaintiff’s motorcycle through her rearview mirror slow down and continue
straight toward the intersection. Plaintiff passed her in the middle of the through lane at
approximately 30 miles per hour, within the speed limit, and was not engaging in any unsafe
maneuvers. Plaintiff stayed within his lane and did not cross over the curb. Although she did not
witness the collision, she heard screeching and saw the motorcycle propelled beneath a truck, with
plaintiff thrown into a pole. During cross-examination, she stated that she did not observe
defendant because the vehicles in front of her obstructed her view and therefore could not provide
any opinions regarding his actions before the incident.
6
¶ 20 2. Amanda Garcia
¶ 21 Garcia testified that at the time of the collision, she was in an elevated truck driven by her
husband located in the left-turn lane on Route 160. She observed plaintiff pass by them in the
through lane to her right. The speed limit was 35 miles per hour, and plaintiff appeared to be
traveling at the same pace as the surrounding traffic, with no indications of speeding. Two or three
vehicles were ahead of her in the turn lane, so they had to wait their turn. By the time plaintiff
overtook them on the right, they were already stopped. She observed a truck at the stop sign for
northbound Route 160 that appeared to “lunge forward” slightly three or four times. During the
fourth lunge, the truck was situated in the middle of the intersection. She witnessed the truck “gun
it through the rest of the intersection.” Plaintiff was not maneuvering around a stopped line of
vehicles on the shoulder. She contacted emergency services via 911 while her husband exited the
vehicle to assist.
¶ 22 On cross-examination, she acknowledged that she did not observe the collision. She
described what she meant by lunging forward by “[l]ike he stabbed the gas pedal and immediately
hit the brake again, kind of like lurching forward.” By the fourth lunge defendant was halfway into
the intersection. He then gunned it on the fourth lunge. During redirect examination, she stated
that plaintiff had been traveling in the middle of his lane.
¶ 23 3. Deborah Workman
¶ 24 The videotaped evidence deposition of Workman was played next. Her vehicle was
traveling westbound along Broadway in the left-turn lane. She was a passenger, with her husband
operating the vehicle. They were the first vehicle in line to turn left. They turned at the same time
defendant started to proceed into the intersection, and she exclaimed “stop.” She did not observe
the truck until it suddenly pulled in front of their vehicle. By the time she saw the truck, it was
7
already within the intersection. She observed the truck cross and then saw the motorcycle, after
which she screamed, anticipating the imminent event. She stated that the truck did not look like
“he was dashing in front of us, it just looked like he pulled in front of us.” She observed the truck
strike the motorcycle. She did not notice the motorcycle traveling around cars on the shoulder. She
witnessed plaintiff being propelled into the air.
¶ 25 Workman observed defendant run to the scene and he stated that he had not seen plaintiff.
He appeared shaken and concerned but did not attempt to flee. Plaintiff attempted to stand while
the individual assisting him repeatedly advised him to remain lying down. He moved his leg and
screamed. She had no opinions regarding the speed of the truck or the motorcycle. She took notes
immediately after the accident that indicated that defendant said he did not see plaintiff and that
the motorcycle rider was traveling at a high speed.
¶ 26 4. Bailey Mettler
¶ 27 Bailey Mettler testified that on the date of the incident, defendant was her boyfriend, and
she was a passenger in his truck. They had just departed from Dairy Queen and reached a two-way
stop. Because of heavy traffic, they came to a complete stop. The individual in the left-turn lane
signaled to defendant to proceed, prompting him to cautiously advance. Defendant had been
stopped at the intersection for several minutes prior to entering it. She did not observe plaintiff
until the moment of impact. Defendant did not gun or lunge through the intersection, nor did he
deliberately strike plaintiff.
¶ 28 5. Mary Roberts
¶ 29 Roberts observed the incident, stating that she was at the stop sign on Deal Street
attempting to merge into the eastbound lane when “a motorcycle came flying by,” and it
unexpectedly collided with the front of her bumper. She was unaware of the motorcycle’s exact
8
speed or whether it was exceeding the speed limit but described it as “a good amount of speed.”
The motorcycle caught her attention because it was on the shoulder to her left. She did not observe
the collision. She exited her vehicle to check on plaintiff, who was breathing and communicating
at the time. She stated that she had not seen defendant’s truck prior to the collision.
¶ 30 6. Defendant
¶ 31 Defendant testified that he was enrolled at Southern Illinois University Edwardsville
pursuing a degree in civil engineering. He was dating Bailey Mettler, who was a passenger in his
truck during the collision. He was operating his grandfather’s Ford F-150, which weighed
approximately 5,000 pounds. Defendant had raced at Highland Speedway for several years and
raced late-model cars since age 14. He acknowledged that, at a stop sign, he must come to a
complete stop and remain stationary until it is his turn to proceed, recognizing that cross-traffic
has the right of way. He also agreed that he must wait at a stop sign as long as necessary until all
traffic has cleared and it was safe to proceed. Furthermore, he concurred that it would violate traffic
laws and be potentially hazardous to pull out of a stop sign at an intersection in a manner that
would cut off cross-traffic with the right of way.
¶ 32 Defendant did not believe that his actions contributed to the incident and maintained that
he was not at fault. Upon arriving at the intersection, he intended to proceed straight across. He
stopped at the stop sign for two to three minutes and crept forward to improve his view of the road.
He acknowledged that he did not have the right of way at the intersection. He indicated that the
vehicle at the front of the left-turn lane signaled him to proceed. The left-turn lane was congested,
backing up into the through lane. He did not observe plaintiff until the moment of impact. From
his position, he could see the westbound through lane in front of Workman’s car. Additionally, he
could see through the gaps between vehicles in the left-turn lane as he crept forward slightly.
9
However, when he first approached the stop sign, he could not see beyond the left-turn lane. He
consciously decided to proceed through the intersection, aware of another lane and understanding
that both the left-turn lane and the westbound through lane had the right of way. He denied lunging
or gunning it into the intersection. Plaintiff sideswiped his truck, resulting in a collision. The dent
was situated on the front middle bumper of his vehicle. The impact occurred in plaintiff’s lane of
travel.
¶ 33 7. Plaintiff
¶ 34 Plaintiff testified that at the time of the collision, he had recently graduated from high
school and had been accepted into the University of Alabama, where he intended to pursue a degree
in business. He did not recall the accident. His last memory was watching fireworks earlier that
evening. His next recollection was waking up in a hospital bed, where he observed six or seven
rods inserted into his leg to stabilize it. He did not know how he had arrived there. Photographs
depicting the condition of his leg at that time were shown, including an image of a gash on his hip.
Initial treatment primarily involved pain management. He underwent four surgeries, with the first
three occurring within the first month. His leg sustained multiple breaks, and his tendons and
ligaments were torn. He was hospitalized for one month. The period between surgeries was
miserable, characterized by severe, indescribable pain. During this time, he was mostly confined
to bed and unable to move about on his own. He was only able to go outside on three occasions.
Upon discharge, he used a wheelchair for several months. When he commenced therapy, it was
highly painful and offered limited benefit.
¶ 35 In January 2024, he sought to attend the University of Alabama and stated that his
physicians had advised him to do so. He tried to walk to the bookstore, but upon experiencing
significant pain, he “kind of stopped and realized how much pain I was in, so I just down and I—
10
I just broke down.” He felt a sense of inadequacy and believed he had not progressed as far in his
recovery as expected. Subsequently, he decided to return home. He made another attempt to
resume studies in the fall of 2024. This was challenging due to the campus’s size, numerous hills,
and the fact that his class was 0.9 miles from his dormitory. He tried to use electric bikes; however,
they were often unavailable due to high student demand, so he mostly walked. He believed that
the University of Alabama was too large and that his academic performance was declining to C
and D grades. He decided to return home around Halloween 2024. Between his initial departure
from college and his return in the fall, he was employed at a roofing company, handling office
tasks and deliveries. As of the date of the trial, he was enrolled at Ranken Technical School and
was actively engaged in his studies and experiences.
¶ 36 His ankle mobility remains impaired. He has sensitive scars; some are completely numb,
while others tingle when pressure is applied. He continues to wear a brace daily beneath his
trousers. His leg is misaligned and angled, and he cannot straighten it as fully as his right leg. He
experiences persistent daily pain and applies ice when swelling occurs. He experiences pain while
walking and ascending stairs. He doubts that his leg will ever return to its previous normal
condition.
¶ 37 Plaintiff testified that his injuries included injuries to his left leg and mental health
conditions, including anxiety, depression, and PTSD. He stated that he experiences flashbacks that
cause him discomfort and make him feel shaky. Before the incident, he had experienced anxiety
since age 13 and depression beginning in high school, for which he was prescribed Wellbutrin and
Effexor. He also described experiencing family turmoil before the incident, particularly when his
mother attempted to take her own life in his presence. His oldest sister had previously attempted
suicide, and another sister attempted suicide after the incident. He worried about his family. Before
11
the incident, he had not been diagnosed with PTSD. He had received mental health services from
therapists and counselors, primarily to address family-related trauma. At the time of trial, he had
no medical restrictions.
¶ 38 A stipulation regarding plaintiff’s medical bills was entered into the record. The parties
agreed that $421,213.56 was a reasonable and customary value for the treatment plaintiff received.
¶ 39 8. Dr. Thomas Revak
¶ 40 The videotaped deposition of Dr. Thomas Revak was played for the jury. He is an
orthopedic trauma surgeon. He testified that plaintiff sustained multiple injuries to his left leg,
specifically a fracture of the tibial plateau, which is the upper part of the tibia, as well as a fracture
of the tibial shaft lower down on his shinbone. Additionally, the fibula was broken in multiple
locations. The injuries included multiple compound fractures of both the tibia and fibula. Plaintiff
also suffered injuries to the knee and ankle. He had open fractures, indicating that the bone
protruded through the soft tissue, resulting in an open wound exposed to the external environment.
Dr. Revak performed the second, third, and fourth surgical procedures on plaintiff’s leg. Between
the surgeries, there would have been significant pain and limitations in functionality.
¶ 41 The initial procedure was conducted by a different physician on July 5, 2023, involving the
application of an external fixation device. An erector set was secured to the bone with pins, helping
align the fractures and maintain stability. This device facilitated wound cleaning and irrigation.
The recovery period was approximately 10 to 14 days, allowing soft tissues to heal and swelling
to diminish, and plaintiff likely experienced considerable pain during this period.
¶ 42 Dr. Revak performed the next surgical procedure on July 19, 2023, intending to address all
issues at that time. However, upon commencing the operation, he realized that the underlying
injury was considerably more complex than initially anticipated. After completing a portion of the
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procedure, he elected to return on a subsequent day to address the tibia. Plaintiff has numerous
hardware components in his left leg, spanning from the knee to the ankle.
¶ 43 For several months, plaintiff was unable to bear weight and would have experienced
considerable pain according to Dr. Revak. Plaintiff reported ankle pain, prompting further
imaging. The results indicated some “eccentricity at the syndesmosis” and incomplete healing of
the fibula, necessitating further surgical intervention. Plaintiff remained non-weightbearing for a
period of four to six weeks thereafter.
¶ 44 Given his injuries, Dr. Revak anticipated that plaintiff will have certain functional
limitations, which were expected to persist permanently. He also anticipated that plaintiff would
experience chronic knee pain for the remainder of his life. He testified that patients were typically
advised that full recovery to preinjury normalcy was unlikely following such injuries and
procedures. Dr. Revak expected plaintiff to experience ongoing functional limitations and pain
related to his injuries, similar to his current condition, and this was expected to continue throughout
his life. A long-term complication he identified was early-onset knee arthritis. Although Dr. Revak
did not believe plaintiff would require additional surgery, a knee replacement may be necessary at
some point.
¶ 45 Plaintiff informed Dr. Revak that his ankle pain has significantly improved following the
most recent surgery and that he experienced only a “vague knee pain.” Ten days prior to the most
recent surgery, he allowed plaintiff to resume full work duties despite ankle pain, as it did not
impair plaintiff’s ability to perform his employment responsibilities. Following the last surgery,
plaintiff was absent from work for four to six weeks. He had no current intentions to place plaintiff
on indefinite work restrictions. As of the date of his deposition, no restrictions had been imposed
13
on plaintiff, and he had no upcoming medical appointments. He testified that plaintiff may not
require knee replacement surgery.
¶ 46 9. Dr. Eric Wittrock
¶ 47 Dr. Eric Wittrock was plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist. Plaintiff commenced treatment with
him following the incident on July 15, 2024, and remained under his care. He believed, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, that plaintiff sustained PTSD as a consequence of the
collision. He advised plaintiff to maintain ongoing treatment with him. Plaintiff continued to
exhibit symptoms associated with PTSD.
¶ 48 During cross-examination, Dr. Wittrock testified that prior to his initial visit with plaintiff,
he was unaware of any other trauma in plaintiff’s life. At the time of the initial visit, plaintiff was
already under medication for depression and anxiety. He was informed that plaintiff’s family had
a history of bipolar disorder and previous suicide attempts. One criterion for diagnosing PTSD was
that the individual must have experienced, witnessed, or learned about a traumatic event involving
actual or threatened death or serious injury. A suicide attempt by a close family member may be
classified as a traumatic event. He acknowledged that it was theoretically possible that plaintiff’s
PTSD may have existed prior to the accident. He did not impose any medical or mental health
restrictions on plaintiff prior to his attendance at college.
¶ 49 10. Sarah Klucker
¶ 50 Sarah Klucker, plaintiff’s mother, testified that since the incident, plaintiff had been unable
to engage in certain activities he previously enjoyed. He was unable to enter the duck blind for
hunting or navigate the rough terrain to place decoys. Additionally, he could not kneel on the
ground to play with his niece. She acknowledged that prior to the incident, plaintiff received
treatment from several mental health therapists. Three years before the incident, she attempted to
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commit suicide within the family residence, with plaintiff present. Subsequently, the family
participated in six or seven sessions of family therapy. Additionally, two of her daughters
attempted suicide. She acknowledged that plaintiff worried about her and that these preceding
events have had a traumatic impact on him.
¶ 51 11. Dr. Michael Stachniak
¶ 52 Dr. Michael Stachniak, a psychiatrist with dual certification in general adult psychiatry and
child and adolescent psychiatry, was called as an expert witness retained by defendant. He
conducted an independent medical and mental health examination of plaintiff and reviewed a
substantial number of his medical records. He indicated that he was hired by defendant to examine
plaintiff, whom he met virtually for two hours. His fee for an evaluation was $5,795, with
additional charges of $2,500 for medical review and telephone consultations and $3,000 for the
deposition. He also billed at least $3,795 for his trial testimony. Since the inception of this case,
his earnings have totaled approximately $15,000. He maintained his own practice and allocated
about 20% of his time to this work; however, it accounted for about 50% of his total income. Over
the past three years, he conducted more than 140 of these types of medical evaluations, earning
roughly $350,000 annually from these services. Since 2022, his earnings from litigation consulting
approached $1 million.
¶ 53 Dr. Stachniak testified that at the time of the incident, plaintiff was taking Wellbutrin at a
lower-than-usual dose and Effexor at the maximum dose. Prior to the incident, plaintiff met the
diagnostic criteria for both generalized anxiety disorder and depression. He also concluded that
plaintiff met the criteria for PTSD, which he believed preexisted the incident due to prior exposure
to “quite a number of traumatic incidents.” Some of the attempted suicides by his family
profoundly impacted him mentally and emotionally. He testified that plaintiff met the clinical
15
criteria for enuresis, a condition characterized by bedwetting that began in childhood and persisted
into young adulthood.
¶ 54 Dr. Stachniak testified that plaintiff’s prescribed dose of Wellbutrin was increased
following the incident. Although the dose escalation was consistent with the prescribed levels, the
timing of the increase subsequent to the incident served as an objective criterion indicating that
the symptoms were worse. Plaintiff was performing well for his age of 21, and there was no
evidence to suggest that his condition impeded his ability to work or maintain a typical lifestyle.
He participated in an internship and engaged in social activities.
¶ 55 During cross-examination, Dr. Stachniak indicated that the accident contributed to and
increased plaintiff’s PTSD, though it was not the sole cause. The most significant contributing
factors were his mother’s and sister’s suicide attempts. Plaintiff was more vulnerable than the
average person to sustaining mental health and psychological damage due to these past issues.
Plaintiff had never been diagnosed with or treated for PTSD prior to the incident. He had
previously been prescribed numerous psychiatric medications and therapies, which would have
been indicated for PTSD. Dr. Stachniak was the first to acknowledge that the PTSD was
preexisting. He stated that plaintiff confided in him that, over the past year, his pain has been
“essentially absent in terms of not treating” and that he occasionally used Tylenol.
¶ 56 On redirect examination, Dr. Stachniak testified that plaintiff was “functioning well
currently occupationally, socially, interpersonally. His medications have hardly changed at all, just
a slight increase in that very low dose of Wellbutrin following the accident. Biopsychosocially
he’s doing pretty all right.” He lacked objective evidence that plaintiff’s daily life was unbearable
in any manner.
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¶ 57 Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel made an offer of proof as to Dr.
Stachniak’s excluded testimony concerning plaintiff’s marijuana use. Dr. Stachniak testified that
plaintiff’s recent history of marijuana use involved daily or near-daily consumption, and he met
the objective criteria for cannabis use disorder. This was considered relevant because substance
use disorder was highly prevalent among individuals with PTSD. Dr. Stachniak opined that
plaintiff’s consistent and daily use was indicative of self-medicating behavior, which was highly
pertinent to his PTSD history. He further stated that the extent of marijuana use served as additional
evidence of PTSD predating the accident and suggested self-medication for PTSD. Additionally,
he noted that prior to the accident, plaintiff was prescribed medication but remained “very
symptomatic.” His medication doses increased significantly in early 2023 leading up to the
incident, which he believed was insufficient given the severity of his symptoms. As his medication
dosage escalated, so did his marijuana use, reaching a frequency of “every day, very heavy use.”
He believed plaintiff’s symptoms were not adequately controlled in the weeks and months before
the incident. Plaintiff’s marijuana use was clinically significant and could have substantial
implications for his future academic and occupational pursuits. He explained that PTSD was an
anxiety disorder and that anxiety was a symptom that could arise from a PTSD diagnosis.
¶ 58 12. Motion for Directed Verdict
¶ 59 Defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict on the count alleging willful and wanton
conduct. After considering the arguments presented by counsel, the trial court stated that, upon
examining all the testimony and demonstrative exhibits and viewing them in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, and upon applying the Pedrick test, 2 there “are issues of
2
“Trial courts apply what is known as the Pedrick standard when deciding a motion for directed
verdict or a motion for judgment n.o.v. Under that standard, a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. is properly
granted only where ‘all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so
overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.’ ”
17
credibility of witnesses and conflicting evidence which should be left for the jury’s determination.”
It also found that “the nonmoving party has established at least a prima facie evidence for every
element of their claim.” It denied the motion.
¶ 60 13. Closing Arguments
¶ 61 After a jury instruction conference, closing arguments were presented. Plaintiff’s counsel
argued that defendant “gunned it through the intersection after lunging past his stop sign four
times” and cut off traffic in the left-turn lane, ultimately striking plaintiff, who had the right of
way. He stated that Dr. Stachniak, “the guy who got paid $100 a minute for his testimony” and
had earned $1 million over the preceding three years by speaking with lawyers, testified that
plaintiff suffered from PTSD as a result of the incident. Plaintiff’s counsel further argued that he
had lost the ability to move his body freely without experiencing constant pain. Regarding
monetary compensation, he made statements such as that a suitcase containing $5 million “would
be a hell no” and that plaintiff would not accept it even if it contained three times that amount.
¶ 62 In closing, defendant’s counsel asked the jury to set sympathy aside. He argued that
defendant “creeped forward” at the stop sign and waited for several minutes. After looking through
the gaps between the cars in the left lane, he saw no vehicles moving and believed he had been
waved through the intersection. He maintained that the collision was an accident, not the result of
negligence. Defendant’s counsel further argued that, although plaintiff’s leg injury was painful
and gruesome, plaintiff made a full recovery and was not subject to any medical restrictions. He
asserted that, if the jury found fault and awarded damages, it should award $100,000 for
Hamilton v. Hastings, 2014 IL App (4th) 131021, ¶ 22 (quoting Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37
Ill. 2d 494, 510 (1967)).
18
disfigurement, $100,000 for loss of normal life, $100,000 for emotional distress, and $100,000 for
pain and suffering, for a total of $821,213.56. 3
¶ 63 In rebuttal, plaintiff’s counsel argued that it felt like there was no justice in the world and
that “[b]ullies and the powerful win while claiming to be the victims themselves.” It was stated,
“We know that, and we have an obligation to everyone else not to do something reckless for our
own convenience. This was like a version of Russian roulette with traffic. It’s like spinning around
blindfolded in a room, pointing a loaded gun, firing it knowing there’s people all around that you
might hit.” Regarding damages, he argued that the jury was not required to accept any figure
presented. However, if the total compensatory damages were even one penny or dollar below $10
million, defendant would consider it a victory. “If it’s $1 million less than that, I think they’re
going to be popping champagne bottles tonight. Don’t give them that celebration.”
¶ 64 14. Jury’s Verdict
¶ 65 The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the total sum of $27,496,213.56, itemized as
follows: disfigurement—$10 million, loss of normal life—$10 million, pain and suffering—$5
million, emotional distress—$2 million, medical expenses—$421,213.56, and punitive
damages—$75,000.
¶ 66 C. Posttrial
¶ 67 On November 12, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion seeking judgment to recover costs,
prejudgment interest, and postjudgment interest. On December 5, 2025, defen