In re Commitment of Hughes

2026 IL App (1st) 240578 No. 1-24-0578 First Division October 13, 2026 ____________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________ In re COMMITMENT OF ) MICHAEL HUGHES ) ) Appeal from the (The People of the State of Illinois ) Circuit Court of Petitioner-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) ) No. 10 CR 80013 Michael Hughes, ) Respondent-Appellant). ) Honorable ) Michael Clancy and ) Nicholas Kantas, ) Judges, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Ellis and Justice Howse concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION ¶1 Following a bench trial, respondent Michael Hughes was found to be a sexually violent person (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (SVP Act or Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2020)). After a dispositional hearing, respondent was committed to the Department of Human Services (DHS) for secure treatment. Respondent now appeals, raising several claims of error. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. No. 1-24-0578 ¶2 I. BACKGROUND ¶3 In 1997, respondent pled guilty in various cases to a total of one count of predatory criminal sexual assault, six counts of criminal sexual assault, and nine counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse in connection with the sexual abuse of at least eight boys. Respondent was also charged with two additional counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and criminal sexual assault but was never prosecuted because the alleged victim died in an accident while the case was pending. The victims ranged from 10 to 14 years old and were players on youth baseball or football teams coached by respondent. The offenses occurred either at respondent’s home or office, often after respondent supplied the victims with alcohol or marijuana and showed them pornography. Respondent was sentenced to 24 years in prison for these offenses. ¶4 A. The State’s SVP Petitions ¶5 On July 29, 2010, the State filed a petition to civilly commit respondent as an SVP based on an evaluation by Dr. John Arroyo. Dr. Arroyo diagnosed respondent with “Paraphilia, Not Otherwise Specified, Non-consent” (PNOS-Nonconsent), a congenital or acquired mental disorder involving persistent sexual attraction to nonconsenting partners. The State’s petition asserted that Dr. Arroyo’s evaluation showed that respondent’s condition affected his emotional or volitional capacity and made him substantially probable to commit future acts of sexual violence. ¶6 On September 3, 2019, the State filed an amended SVP petition adding an evaluation from Dr. David Suire, who diagnosed respondent with “Pedophilic Disorder, Sexually Attracted to Boys, Nonexclusive Type; Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder (OSPD), Sexually Attracted to Adolescent Males, Nonexclusive Type and Other Specified Personality Disorder with Antisocial and Narcissistic Features.” Like the State’s initial petition, the amended petition asserted that -2- No. 1-24-0578 respondent’s mental disorders affected his emotional or volitional capacity and made it substantially probable that he would commit further sexually violent acts. ¶7 B. Respondent’s First Motion Exclude a Hebephilia Diagnosis ¶8 On December 19, 2014, respondent filed a “Motion to Bar Testimony of Evidence Related to an Alleged Hebephilia Diagnosis Pursuant to Frye” (see Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)). The motion cited In re Detention of New, 2014 IL 116306, ¶ 3, where the respondent had been convicted of sexually abusing a 12-year-old boy and a 14-year-old boy. Based in part on these convictions, the State’s evaluator in New diagnosed the respondent with a paraphilia based on “sexual attraction to early adolescent males,” a condition our supreme court described as “otherwise known as hebephilia.” Id. ¶¶ 3, 33. The respondent filed a pretrial motion to bar testimony about this diagnosis on the grounds that it was not generally accepted within the psychiatric and psychological communities. Id. ¶ 4. The circuit court denied the motion and proceeded to trial without first holding a hearing pursuant to Frye. Id. ¶ 5. On appeal, our supreme court held that the diagnosis of hebephilia was subject to the admissibility standards set forth in Frye and thus remanded for the circuit court to hold a hearing to determine whether the diagnosis was generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. Id. ¶ 53. ¶9 In the present case, respondent’s motion asserted that, despite using different terminology, Dr. Suire essentially diagnosed him with hebephilia. Similarly, respondent contended that Dr. Arroyo’s diagnosis of a paraphilic attraction to nonconsenting partners was “actually [a] hebephilia diagnos[i]s in disguise” because Dr. Arroyo reported that respondent’s victims were unable to give legal consent because they were underage. Accordingly, respondent argued that the circuit court should bar Dr. Suire and Dr. Arroyo’s diagnoses “unless the State meets its burden of proving general acceptance following a Frye hearing.” -3- No. 1-24-0578 ¶ 10 The State initially responded that New had “no impact” on this case because respondent was “not diagnosed with hebephilia.” The State argued that Dr. Arroyo diagnosed PNOS- Nonconsent because respondent was “not simply attracted to children who have started to enter puberty,” but was instead “aroused by force and manipulation,” which he happened to use against minor victims. Because Illinois courts had already deemed PNOS-Nonconsent to be generally accepted, the State contended that a Frye hearing was unnecessary. ¶ 11 The circuit court denied respondent’s motion, reasoning that New did not affect established precedent that PNOS-Nonconsent was a generally accepted diagnosis. Thus, the court did not rule on whether a hebephilia diagnosis was generally accepted. ¶ 12 C. Respondent’s Second Motion to Exclude a Hebephilia Diagnosis ¶ 13 Several years later, in September 2019, respondent filed a renewed motion “to preclude any testimony regarding any paraphilia or paraphilic disorder involving sexual attraction to adolescents also known as ‘hebephilia.’ ” Citing aspects of Dr. Arroyo and Dr. Suire’s depositions, respondent again contended that, despite using different labels, the State’s experts effectively diagnosed him with hebephilia. ¶ 14 In response, the State acknowledged that since respondent’s original request for a Frye hearing, “sexual attraction to adolescent males, which is the same thing as pedophilia had come to light during the deposition.” The State also confirmed that at least one of its experts diagnosed respondent with hebephilia. In light of the State’s change in position, the circuit court set the matter for a Frye hearing on hebephilia. ¶ 15 D. The Frye Hearing ¶ 16 At the Frye hearing, Dr. David Thornton testified for the State as an expert in the evaluation and risk assessment of sex offenders. Dr. Thornton completed a report on the acceptance of a -4- No. 1-24-0578 hebephilia diagnosis, which he defined as a “preferential sexual interest in children who are in the early stages of puberty.” He distinguished hebephilia from pedophilia, which is a sexual preference for “prepubescent” children. Dr. Thornton explained that pedophiles are attracted to children in Tanner stage 1 of physical development, which researchers generally consider ages 10 and under. Hebephiles, on the other hand, are attracted to children in Tanner stages 2 and 3, “which children normally go through the period from when they are about 11 to 14” years old. Minors 15 years of age and older are likely to be more developed and in Tanner stages 4 and 5, which are not associated with a mental disorder. However, Dr. Thornton cautioned that different children develop at different ages and rates. Additionally, evaluators “[a]lmost never” know what Tanner stage a victim is in and thus usually make diagnoses based on general guidelines and the available facts of each case. ¶ 17 Regarding the general acceptance of hebephilia, Dr. Thornton examined numerous published studies, including research from the Kurt Freund Laboratory (Freund Laboratory) in Toronto, Canada. The Freund Laboratory was renowned for demonstrating hebephilia in some men using a penile plethysmograph (PPG), a diagnostic device that detects sexual arousal by measuring involuntary changes in penile volume and blood flow. Dr. Thornton also relied on his own clinical experience, particularly field studies measuring the reliability with which experts can diagnose hebephilia from the same set of facts. Dr. Thornton testified that these field studies yielded “very good” reliability scores for hebephilia, showing that it can be diagnosed “a bit better” than many other recognized conditions like schizophrenia or bipolar disorder. ¶ 18 Ultimately, Dr. Thornton opined that a hebephilia diagnosis was “definitely” generally accepted under Frye. He explained that researchers who study hebephilia are “strongly pro” in accepting the diagnosis and “pretty well invariably acknowledge the existence of hebephilia and -5- No. 1-24-0578 will accept it as a mental disorder.” Experts who are often hired by prosecutors also “pretty much all” accept hebephilia whereas “most” defense experts do not. The remaining experts are “mixed” and “split 50/50” in accepting hebephilia. Thus, according to Dr. Thornton, “it’s clear that overall there is a majority opinion in favor” of accepting hebephilia as a valid diagnosis. ¶ 19 On cross-examination, respondent’s counsel questioned Dr. Thornton on hebephilia’s exclusion from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Dr. Thornton acknowledged that the DSM did not adopt a proposal to enumerate hebephilia as a recognized paraphilia, but testified that he gave no weight to that decision because the DSM only enumerates a few of the many paraphilias known to exist. Dr. Thornton reiterated that hebephilia is properly diagnosed using the DSM’s general framework for other, nonspecified paraphilias. ¶ 20 Dr. Thornton further recognized that, at least for purposes of a pedophilia diagnosis, the DSM states that prepubescent children are “generally age 13 and under.” He explained that this language had been criticized by many experts in the field who believe that it was more accurate to say that prepubescent children are generally ages 10 and under. Thus, Dr. Thornton opined that the DSM’s definition can be “a little bit misleading” and cause hebephilia to be “misdiagnose[d]” as pedophilia in some cases. Upon questioning by the circuit court, Dr. Thornton testified that most researchers have come to define hebephilia as “a sexual interest in Tanner stages 2 and 3, children generally aged between 11 and 14.” ¶ 21 Dr. James Cantor also testified as an expert for the State. Like Dr. Thornton, Dr. Cantor explained that hebephilia is defined by a sexual preference for “pubescent children” in Tanner stages 2 and 3, which is generally from ages 11 to 14. In contrast, pedophilia is a preference for prepubescent children in Tanner stage 1, which is typically ages 10 and under. However, also like -6- No. 1-24-0578 Dr. Thornton, Dr. Cantor cautioned that “the age of puberty differs a little bit between kids” and can depend on various factors such as gender and nutrition. ¶ 22 Further in line with Dr. Thornton, Dr. Cantor opined that PPG research from the Freund Laboratory and others have shown a “very, very reliable finding” that hebephilia exists. Dr. Cantor also discussed his own research that showed physiological differences among pedophiles, hebephiles, and those with a sexual preference for adults. ¶ 23 Finally, Dr. Cantor testified that hebephilia was more researched than any of the paraphilias listed in the DSM other than pedophilia. He surveyed 50 different studies on hebephilia, all but two of which suggested that hebephilia was a distinct mental condition. Dr. Cantor explained that the two outlier studies used small sample sizes and defined hebephilia to include an interest in 15- and-16-year-olds, which is broader than the definition typically used by researchers. According to Dr. Cantor, scientists and researchers in the field were “virtually unanimous” in accepting hebephilia as an identifiable mental disorder. ¶ 24 Dr. Thomas Zander testified for respondent as an expert in forensic psychology and the assessment of sex offenders. He was a “semiretired” forensic psychologist who primarily evaluated sex offenders for civil commitment proceedings. Dr. Zander opined that a hebephilia diagnosis is not generally accepted among mental health professionals. In particular, Dr. Zander stated that sexual attraction to minors in Tanner stages 1 through 3 is associated with pedophilia. According to Dr. Zander, there is not a “separate legitimate diagnosis called hebephilia,” and if anything, what some call hebephilia is mostly a “redundant subset” of pedophilia. ¶ 25 Dr. Zander rejected Dr. Thornton and Dr. Cantor’s definition of hebephilia as referring generally to 11-to-14-year-olds, instead endorsing the DSM’s definition that pedophilia includes attraction to children 13 and under. Dr. Zander criticized the State’s experts for “fail[ing] to -7- No. 1-24-0578 recognize the practical reality of how these research based proposals will play out in [ ] everyday life and *** in the courtroom.” Instead, Dr. Zander claimed that most experts would not consider an attraction to 14-year-olds to be a disorder because 14-year-olds are typically in Tanner stages 4 or 5. According to Dr. Zander, proposals to add hebephilia to the DSM were rejected because the inclusion of 14-year-olds would allow those with normal sexual interests to be diagnosed with a mental disorder. ¶ 26 After hearing arguments from the parties, the circuit court issued an oral ruling that the State had met its burden in showing that a hebephilia diagnosis was generally accepted in the psychological and psychiatric communities. Thus, the court allowed the State to introduce evidence of the diagnosis at trial. ¶ 27 E. Respondent’s Motion to Exclude a Pedophilia Diagnosis ¶ 28 On November 2, 2021, respondent filed a new motion in limine to exclude testimony regarding “diagnoses that have not been proven to be generally accepted.” More specifically, respondent argued that although the circuit court ruled that hebephilia was generally accepted, Dr. Suire did not diagnose with him hebephilia. Instead, Dr. Suire diagnosed pedophilia based on the DSM’s guidance that children under 13 are generally prepubescent. Respondent argued that the court “necessarily” rejected this definition of pedophilia because it “directly contradict[ed]” the ages that the State’s witnesses testified to at the Frye hearing. The court denied respondent’s motion. ¶ 29 F. Bench Trial ¶ 30 The matter proceeded to a bench trial beginning on August 22, 2023. At trial, Dr. Suire testified as the State’s expert in the evaluation and risk assessment of sex offenders. Dr. Suire completed a clinical evaluation to determine whether respondent met the criteria for an SVP. As -8- No. 1-24-0578 part of his evaluation, Dr. Suire reviewed records and conducted a videotaped interview with respondent. Dr. Suire completed his initial evaluation in January 2011 and updated the evaluation four times, most recently in September 2022. ¶ 31 Dr. Suire summarized respondent’s criminal history as follows. In 1983, respondent was sentenced to four years of probation for “indecent liberties with a child and assault.” The charges arose from an incident in which respondent, then 17, forced a 15-year-old boy to perform oral sex on him. Respondent threatened to kill the victim if he told anybody what had happened. In 1984, respondent was charged with battery after drinking Southern Comfort and attempting to unbutton a male victim’s pants. The victim was able to fight respondent off, and respondent was not ultimately convicted of any charges. ¶ 32 Defendant received 24 years in prison after pleading guilty to numerous counts of predatory criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse for offenses occurring between 1994 and 1997. The victims, eight boys ranging from 10 to 14 years old, were players on youth sports teams coached by respondent. Generally, the offense involved respondent luring the victims to his home or office, where he would provide them with liquor mixed with Mountain Dew and sometimes marijuana. Respondent would often put on a pornographic movie and proceed to fondle and perform oral sex on the victims. Respondent admitted in interviews to victimizing six of the boys but claimed that he falsely plead guilty to abusing the other two. He explained that he gave the victims alcohol and marijuana because he believed it made them less likely to tell their parents about the abuse. ¶ 33 After the convictions in the 1997 cases, another man also came forward with similar accusations against respondent. The man alleged that in the mid-1980s, when he was between 12 and 14 years old, he awoke one night on a baseball trip to find respondent, then an assistant coach -9- No. 1-24-0578 of the team, performing oral sex on him. The man alleged that respondent threatened to kill him and his family if he reported the incident. Sometime later, the man was at respondent’s home when respondent offered the man alcohol, touched the man’s penis over his pants, and attempted to kiss him on the mouth. Respondent admitted to Dr. Suire that he had had “sexual contact” with the man. ¶ 34 Dr. Suire also testified that respondent had an “above average” disciplinary record in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), with only 1 “major” violation and 11 “minor” violations. However, IDOC at one point classified respondent as a “predator” because he was “grooming” a “much younger” inmate. Respondent admitted that he was “deep in his cycle” during that time. Respondent participated in sex offender treatment for two years but left the program against his therapist’s recommendation. While in IDOC custody, respondent had completed some “treatment-type activities,” such as group discussions, but had consistently refused specific treatment for sex offenders. Respondent told Dr. Suire that he did not need to participate in sex offender treatment at DHS because he “felt he had done the work he needed to do.” ¶ 35 Ultimately, Dr. Suire diagnosed respondent with three mental disorders using the DSM: (1) pedophilic disorder, sexually attracted to boys, nonexclusive type; (2) other specified paraphilic disorder (OSPD)-sexually attracted to adolescents, nonexclusive type; and (3) OSPD with antisocial and narcissistic features. Dr. Suire testified that the criteria for pedophilic disorder included sustained sexual interest in prepubescent children, which the DSM defined as children 13 years of age and under. Dr. Suire opined that respondent met these criteria due to repeated sexual contact with children 13 and under which caused harm to the victims and placed respondent’s career, reputation, and freedom at great risk. - 10 - No. 1-24-0578 ¶ 36 Dr. Suire diagnosed respondent with OSPD-sexually attracted to adolescents under the general paraphilia framework outlined in the DSM. Dr. Suire defined “adolescents” as those who are “pubescent,” meaning that they have “gone through some aspect of puberty” but are not yet fully developed. Generally, “adolescents” were likely to be 14 or 15 years old. Dr. Suire acknowledged that he did not know the exact Tanner stages of respondent’s victims but diagnosed him based on a pattern of repeated offenses involving victims in the general age range. ¶ 37 Finally, Dr. Suire explained that he diagnosed respondent with a personality disorder due to a “combination of antisocial and narcissistic traits” that Dr. Suire opined raised his risk of sexual recidivism. In particular, Dr. Suire identified factors such as respondent’s repeated offending, recklessness, and lack of remorse. Dr. Suire also testified that respondent was “pretty entitled” and had a “very high view of himself” consistent with a narcissistic personality disorder. Indeed, respondent acknowledged that he had “kind of a narcissistic personality” during his interview. Dr. Suire stated that these diagnoses are acquired or congenital disorders that affected respondent’s emotional or volitional capacity and predisposed him to commit future acts of sexual violence. ¶ 38 To evaluate respondent’s risk of recidivism, Dr. Suire used two reputable actuarial instruments called the Static-99 Revised (Static-99R) and Static-2002 Revised (Static-2002R). Respondent scored a four on the Static-99R, placing him in the “above average” risk range. His “relative risk” score was 1.96, meaning he was nearly twice as likely to reoffend as the typical offender in the sample. Respondent scored a six on the Static-2002R, again placing him in the “above average risk” category. The relative risk for that score was 2.63, meaning respondent was more than two-and-a-half times more likely to reoffend than the typical sex offender. Dr. Suire opined that these instruments tend to underestimate the true risk of recidivism because they only - 11 - No. 1-24-0578 consider offenses that resulted in criminal charges. Thus, the instruments do not capture offenses that are not detected or do not result in formal charges for some other reason. ¶ 39 Aside from the static actuarial instruments, Dr. Suire also considered various factors known to increase or decrease an offender’s risk of recidivism. Dr. Suire identified respondent’s deviant sexual interests, “offense supported attitude,” and “prudent hostility” as dynamic factors that increased his risk of reoffending beyond what was captured by the actuarial instruments. Dr. Suire explained that he identified these factors due to respondent’s stated sexual interest in minors, his claims that the victims instigated several of the offenses, and his persistent complaints of unfair treatment while in custody. Dr. Suire also considered that “older research” suggested respondent’s personality disorder, substance abuse, and history of being physically abused elevated his chance of reoffending. ¶ 40 Lastly, Dr. Suire opined that there were no additional “protective factors” that decreased respondent’s risk of recidivism. Dr. Suire testified that respondent’s participation in treatment was not a protective factor because respondent stopped treatment in 2002 against his therapist’s advice. Dr. Suire also concluded that respondent had learned some treatment-related concepts but did not demonstrate an ability to change his behavior. For example, Dr. Suire noted that respondent was unable to refrain from “grooming” a much younger inmate despite recognizing that he was in his “cycle” at the time. Dr. Suire also explained that respondent’s age, which was 57 at the time of trial, was not a protective factor because it was already considered by the actuarial instruments. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Dr. Suire determined that respondent was substantially probable to reoffend, meaning that he was “[m]uch more likely than not” to commit further acts of sexual violence. - 12 - No. 1-24-0578 ¶ 41 On cross-examination, Dr. Suire clarified that he “[e]ssentially” diagnosed respondent with hebephilia, stating that “the combination of the pedophilic disorder and [OSPD-sexually attracted to adolescents] probably captures hebephilia in it.” He explained respondent’s “primary sexual interest is 12-to-14-year-old boys,” which would indicate both pedophilia and hebephilia depending on how developed the particular victims were. Dr. Suire generally considered children 13 and under to be prepubescent under the DSM’s definition but acknowledged that some 13-year- olds would be in the developmental stages associated with hebephilia. Dr. Suire also recognized that it was “not uncommon” for some experts to define hebephilia as a sexual interest 11-to-14- year-olds. ¶ 42 Regarding respondent’s risk of reoffending, Dr. Suire testified that he used an “unstructured” approach of adjusting respondent’s static actuarial instrument scores. This approach involved identifying the presence of dynamic and protective factors and then using research and his own clinical judgment to determine how each factor affected the probability that respondent would reoffend. Dr. Suire did not modify the static scores with a “structured” adjustment method such as the STABLE-2007 or VRS-SO because he believed that respondent’s lack of treatment and unwillingness to be interviewed prevented reliable scoring on those instruments. ¶ 43 Following Dr. Suire’s testimony, the State entered into evidence certified copies of respondent’s convictions. The parties stipulated that these convictions qualified as sexually violent offenses under the Act. ¶ 44 After the State rested, respondent moved to strike Dr. Suire’s testimony on the basis that the State had not proven that his diagnoses were generally accepted. Specifically, respondent again contended that Dr. Suire was contradicted by the State’s Frye hearing witnesses because they - 13 - No. 1-24-0578 testified that pedophilia was associated with attraction to children aged 10 and under and hebephilia was associated with attraction to children aged 11 to 14. Respondent also moved for a directed finding, alleging that the State failed to prove that respondent had a mental disorder as defined by the SVP Act. The circuit court denied both of respondent’s motions. ¶ 45 Respondent then called Dr. Arroyo as his expert witness in forensic psychology and sex offender risk assessment. Dr. Arroyo issued his initial report in July 2010, which was followed by a series of updated reports ending in August 2023. Respondent repeatedly declined to be interviewed, so Dr. Arroyo completed all of his reports based solely on the documentary evidence in respondent’s file. ¶ 46 Like Dr. Suire, Dr. Arroyo began his risk evaluation with the Static-99R and the Static- 2002R. Dr. Arroyo scored respondent as a four on the Static-99R, placing him in the “above average” risk category. This score correlated to an “absolute risk” of 17% for the routine sample of sex offenders and approximately 32% for the “high risk” group of offenders. Respondent scored a five on the Static-2002R, which translated to an absolute risk score of approximately 25%. ¶ 47 Dr. Arroyo further testified that he used different means of adjusting these static scores in his various reports. Prior to the 2023 updates, Dr. Arroyo modified respondent’s scores using the STABLE-2007. Based on this methodology, Dr. Arroyo initially concluded that respondent met the criteria to be considered an SVP. However, Dr. Arroyo changed his opinion in 2023 because he began using the VRS-SO to modify static actuarial scores. According to Dr. Arroyo, the VRS- SO was the more accurate method in cases where the subject refused to be interviewed. ¶ 48 Ultimately, respondent scored a 34 on the VRS-SO, placing him in the “average” risk category. Factoring this score into the static instruments, Dr. Arroyo calculated that respondent’s absolute risk of recidivism was 7.7% for 5 years and approximately 12.5% for 10 years. Dr. Arroyo - 14 - No. 1-24-0578 opined that he no longer believed that respondent was an SVP because these scores did not suggest he was substantially probable to reoffend. ¶ 49 On cross-examination, Dr. Arroyo clarified that he diagnosed respondent with OSPD- nonconsent and other specified personality disorder with antisocial and narcissistic traits. Dr. Arroyo stated that these diagnoses were mental disorders under the Act and were chronic in that “[t]hey don’t go away by themselves” but could be managed through treatment. Dr. Arroyo also testified that respondent’s conditions were congenital or acquired and affected his emotional or volitional capacity. When asked whether respondent’s disorders predisposed him to engage in acts of sexual violence, Dr. Arroyo replied that, “They may, but it’s my opinion that they don’t in Mr. Hughes’ case.” Upon questioning by the circuit court, Dr. Arroyo reiterated that he changed his opinion on whether respondent was an SVP in June 2023 because he began using the VRS-SO to adjust actuarial risks scores. ¶ 50 Respondent also called Dr. Brian Abbott as an expert witness. Dr. Abbot testified that he was contacted by respondent’s counsel to determine whether he agreed with the reports from the State’s evaluators. Dr. Abbott reviewed the documents in the case and interviewed respondent in May 2016. Dr. Abbott then issued an initial report in July 2017 in which he found that respondent was not an SVP. Dr. Abbott interviewed respondent again in July 2023 and issued an updated report thereafter. Like the initial report, Dr. Abbott’s updated reports also concluded that respondent did not meet the criteria to be considered an SVP. ¶ 51 More specifically, Dr. Abbot concluded that respondent suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from being sexually abused as a child, but that the condition did not affect his emotional or volitional capacity or predispose him to commit acts of sexual violence. Dr. Abbott explained that respondent’s offending was a “maladaptive way of coping” with his trauma by - 15 - No. 1-24-0578 seeking the “power and control” he lacked as a child. However, Dr. Abbot found “no evidence” that respondent’s PTSD gave him difficulty controlling his sexually violent behavior. For example, Dr. Abbott found that respondent’s minimal disciplinary history while in custody indicated that he could control whatever sexual urges he may have. ¶ 52 Dr. Abbott further testified that he did not diagnose respondent with pedophilic disorder because although some of his victims were “likely” prepubescent, others were too old to assume so without more evidence. Dr. Abbott explained that not all who sexually offend against children have pedophilic disorder. Instead, the DSM identifies five factors that tend to separate offenders with pedophilic disorder from those without: (1) an expressed sexual interest in prepubescent children, (2) use of child pornography, (3) boy victims, (4) multiple child victims, and (5) victims unrelated to them. Dr. Abbott opined that respondent met only three of the five criteria because he had not expressed an interest in prepubescent children or been known to use child pornography. To the contrary, Dr. Abbott recalled that respondent told one evaluator in 2012 that his ideal sexual partner was not a prepubescent child, but a six-foot-tall man with long hair and a “swimmer’s build.” Dr. Abbott also recalled respondent telling him about a “young, immature-looking” intellectually disabled man in DHS custody. Respondent stated that he might have been sexually attracted to such a person in the past, but that he was no longer interested. ¶ 53 Despite finding that respondent did not have a mental disorder under the Act, Dr. Abbott also evaluated respondent’s risk of recidivism with the Static-99R. Respondent scored a five, placing him in the “above average” risk category. That score was associated with a 12.8% chance of reoffending within five years among the routine sample group. Dr. Abbott did not report respondent’s likelihood to reoffend within 10 years because he felt it was irrelevant to whether respondent was currently a danger to reoffend. - 16 - No. 1-24-0578 ¶ 54 Dr. Abbott also supplemented his Static-99R results with the VRS-SO. He opined that a “structured” adjustment method like the VRS-SO was more reliable than Dr. Suire’s unstructured analysis because the unstructured method tends to introduce subjectivity and overestimate the risk of recidivism. Dr. Abbot explained that the VRS-SO was designed to evaluate how treatment affects an offender’s risk of recidivism. In this case, Dr. Abbott compared respondent at the time he entered IDOC custody in 2000 to the time of trial in 2023 by assigning him a numerical score in various categories. According to Dr. Abbott, respondent showed an 11-point improvement since entering custody, which placed him in the “lower third” in terms of risk to reoffend. In particular, Dr. Abbott credited respondent with improvement in sexual deviance and sexual compulsivity because he was now comfortable with his homosexuality and did not engage in inappropriate sexual activity while in custody. Respondent also reported that he no longer fantasized about sex with minors or masturbated to his previous victims. After factoring in the VRS-SO results, respondent’s 5-year risk of reoffending dropped to 5.8%, which Dr. Abbott testified would not qualify as a substantial probability of recidivism under the Act. ¶ 55 G. Respondent’s Motion to Admit Frye Hearing Evidence ¶ 56 Following Dr. Abbott’s testimony, respondent made an oral motion to admit into evidence the testimony and reports from the State’s experts at the Frye hearing. The State responded that such evidence was “irrelevant” to the issues at hand because “the State’s witnesses did not diagnose the respondent with hebephilia.” The court denied respondent’s motion. ¶ 57 H. Closing Arguments and the Court’s Ruling ¶ 58 During closing arguments, respondent argued that the State failed to prove that he had a mental disorder under the Act, alleging that Dr. Suire “made up” the diagnosis of OSPD-sexually attracted to adolescents and incorrectly diagnosed him with pedophilia where there was no - 17 - No. 1-24-0578 evidence that any of his victims were prepubescent. Respondent also maintained that the State did not prove that he was substantially probable to commit future acts of sexual violence because Dr. Suire was biased, “inexplicably failed” to use a structured adjustment method like the VRS-SO, and engaged in “statistical gymnastics” by relying on subjective and unquantifiable dynamic factors. ¶ 59 The State countered that Dr. Suire credibly diagnosed respondent with mental disorders involving sexual attraction to underage boys, as evidenced by respondent’s statements and numerous offenses involving boys between the ages of 12 and 14. The State also contended that respondent had a substantial probability of recidivism based on his “above average” scores on the actuarial instruments, the presence of several dynamic factors, and the absence of any significant protective factors. ¶ 60 After taking the matter under advisement, the circuit court issued the following ruling on December 13, 2023. First, as the parties stipulated, the court noted that respondent had been convicted of multiple sexually violent offenses. The court also found that respondent had a mental disorder within the meaning of the Act, observing that both Dr. Suire and Dr. Arroyo reached that conclusion based on respondent’s records and the DSM. Finally, the court credited Dr. Suire’s testimony that respondent was substantially likely to reoffend. The court stated that Dr. Suire’s evaluation was the most “comprehensive” and considered both actuarial instruments and other empirical factors specific to respondent’s case. The court further noted that Dr. Arroyo agreed that respondent was substantially probable to reoffend for many years until changing his opinion in 2023. Although the court acknowledged that both of respondent’s experts now thought respondent was not substantially probable to reoffend, the court assigned greater weight to Dr. Suire’s - 18 - No. 1-24-0578 testimony because it was “more credible” and “more convincing.” Accordingly, the court found that respondent was an SVP. ¶ 61 Respondent filed a timely posttrial motion, which he then amended on February 2, 2024. The amended motion argued that the State failed to prove that respondent was an SVP beyond a reasonable doubt and that the circuit court erred by allowing the State to elicit testimony about diagnoses that were not generally accepted. The court denied the motion and, after a subsequent dispositional hearing, committed respondent to a secure DHS facility. ¶ 62 This appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS ¶ 63 A. Hebephilia and the Frye Hearing ¶ 64 Respondent raises numerous claims of error on appeal. We begin by addressing several related arguments concerning the diagnosis of hebephilia and the circuit court’s handling of the Frye hearing. Respondent generally contends that the court erred in ruling that hebephilia was a generally accepted diagnosis at the Frye hearing and in allowing Dr. Suire to testify at trial about a paraphilic disorder related to pubescent boys that the State did not first prove was generally accepted. ¶ 65 In Illinois, the admission of scientific evidence is governed by the Frye standard. In re Commitment of Adams, 2021 IL App (1st) 182049, ¶ 40. Under Frye, new or novel scientific evidence is admissible at trial only if the methodology or scientific principle upon which it is based is “ ‘sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.’ ” In re Commitment of Simons, 213 Ill. 2d 523, 529-30 (2004) (quoting Frye, 293 F. at 1014). “ ‘[G]eneral acceptance’ ” does not requi