Idaho State Bar v. Jeffrey J. Hepworth

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No. 53451 IDAHO STATE BAR, ) ) Petitioner-Appellant-Cross Respondent, ) Boise, June 2026 Term ) v. ) Opinion filed: October 2, 2026 ) JEFFREY J. HEPWORTH, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk ) Respondent-Respondent on Appeal-Cross ) Appellant. ) Appeal from the Professional Conduct Board Hearing Committee of the Idaho State Bar. The decision of the Professional Conduct Board Hearing Committee finding a violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct is affirmed, the recommended sanction is vacated, and Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for 18 months, with the first 6 months enforced and the next 12 months conditionally withheld. Joseph N. Pirtle, Idaho State Bar Counsel, Boise, for Appellant-Cross Respondent. Joseph N. Pirtle argued. Law Offices of Comstock & Bush, Boise, for Respondent on Appeal-Cross Appellant. John A. Bush argued. ___________________________________ MOELLER, Justice. The Idaho State Bar (“ISB”) appeals from the withheld, one-year suspension recommended by the Hearing Committee of the Professional Conduct Board of the Idaho State Bar (“Committee”) in this attorney discipline case. On May 31, 2023, the ISB filed an amended complaint against Jeffrey J. Hepworth, an attorney licensed by the Idaho State Bar, alleging he violated six provisions of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (“Professional Conduct Rules”): 3.3(a)(1), 3.3(a)(3), 4.1(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.1(a). After an evidentiary hearing, the Committee determined by clear and convincing evidence that Hepworth had violated all six rules. The Committee’s recommended sanction was a withheld, one-year suspension. 1  5 8.4(d) It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. 6 8.1(a) An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact. A. Hepworth’s conduct at the employment discrimination trial. The conduct at issue in the ISB’s amended complaint concerns the testimony of Hepworth’s non-retained expert witness, Justine Sweet, regarding the compensation she received for her testimony at trial. Hepworth called Sweet to testify about the results of the Global Appraisal of Individual Needs Assessment (“GAIN-1 Assessment”) she administered to Hilliard in 2017. The GAIN-1 Assessment is a series of psychological instruments used to assist with clinical diagnosis, placement, and treatment. On cross-examination, defendant’s counsel, Pamela Howland, asked Sweet, “[a]re you being paid for your testimony today?” Sweet responded, “$40.” Later, during his closing argument to the jury, Hepworth referred to Sweet’s statement that she was only paid $40, presumably to highlight the unbiased nature of her testimony: And [Hilliard] ended up with Justine Sweet, who he had never met before that. And Justine Sweet testified, and I was incredibly impressed with Justine Sweet. She just finished a 12-hour stint at her place of employment where she deals with drug addicts and very mentally disturbed people. She worked all night, 12 hours, and then showed up to court here for $40. She wasn’t -- wasn’t a high-paid hired gun. She was a nice lady. And she was qualified. She had had a lot of training. She almost had her Ph.D. She had her master’s. She was just a little bit away from her Ph.D. in counseling. And she had done a lot of substance abuse evaluations. And she was very familiar with the GAIN test. The GAIN test, which is a [sic] certified by the State of Idaho as a qualified substance abuse assessment tool. And she literally sat down next to [Hilliard] and asked him questions for two hours and put the information in herself on the computer and generated a report. And there’s nothing, nothing to suggest Brent Hilliard has a substance abuse problem. (Emphasis added). The jury issued a verdict in favor of Hilliard and awarded him $664,275.40. The federal district court entered judgment in that amount against the defendants. After the trial, Hepworth’s firm filed a bill of costs, a supplemental motion for taxation of costs, and a motion for attorney fees that itemized all the funds paid to witnesses. Upon reviewing these filings, Howland learned that (1) Hepworth’s firm had tendered a check to Sweet for $91.50 3 with a subpoena before her appearance at the trial; (2) Hepworth had personally signed and issued a check for $500 to Sweet the day after the trial; and (3) Hepworth had told Sweet before trial that she would be paid a “reasonable fee” for her time. On January 3, 2022, Howland filed a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment, a motion to set aside the judgment or amend findings or grant a new trial, and a motion for relief from the judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60. Howland also filed a grievance with the ISB against Hepworth on March 8, 2022, based in part on the revelations concerning Sweet’s compensation. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho scheduled a hearing on the motions and received briefing from the parties. Before the hearing, Hepworth filed an affidavit with the federal district court wherein he testified: During trial I met with Justine Sweet on two occasions to prepare for her testimony. I told her that we were paying the other expert fact witnesses for their time and we expected to pay her a reasonable fee. She did not tell me how much she intended to charge. I did not remember to follow up with her before she testified. On the witness stand she truthfully testified she had been paid $40.00 in response to Pam Howland’s question. I saw no reason to inquire further. . . . . . I felt bad for Justine when she testified she had only been paid $40.00. . . . In my opinion, Justine Sweet testified accurately and truthfully when she testified in [c]ourt she had only received $40.00 for the day she was in [c]ourt. I believe she had likely forgotten I promised to pay a reasonable fee for her time as we had the other expert fact witnesses. At trial, it did not occur to me to ask her more questions about her fee because I felt it was immaterial. . . . Pam Howland knew as much as I did about the fee arrangements for the expert fact witnesses. The federal district court conducted a hearing on the motions on August 29, 2022, and issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on September 14, 2022. See Hilliard v. Twin Falls Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., No. 1:18-CV-00550-CWD, 2022 WL 4235136 (D. Idaho Sept. 14, 2022). The court granted the TFCSO’s motion for a new trial and its motion for relief from the judgment. See id. at *1, *11. It found that “[t]he integrity of the judicial process and the legitimacy of the jury’s verdict were severely compromised by the circumstances surrounding payments made to Sweet[.]” Id. at *4. The court highlighted Hepworth’s (1) failure to fully disclose the $91.50 payment already made to Sweet before her testimony; (2) failure to clarify her testimony during the trial; and (3) reliance on her incorrect testimony in closing argument during which he “knowingly misrepresent[ed] the full extent of the compensation paid and promised to be paid to Sweet.” Id. at *4–5. The court also explained that it was 4  left with the inescapable conclusion that [Hepworth] knowingly presented to the jury an inaccurate and incomplete portrayal of the compensation paid to and promised to be paid to Sweet for her testimony. This fundamentally interfered with the jury’s ability to weigh the credibility of Sweet’s testimony, vis-à-vis the other witnesses and evidence, and with defense counsel’s ability to fully and fairly present their case. Id. at *5. The federal district court noted that “[w]hat is clear in the record is that [Hepworth] promised to pay Sweet a reasonable fee prior to trial and knew during her trial testimony that he owed Sweet a further payment[.]” Id. at *7. It also explained that Hepworth’s explanation that he “forgot” to pay Sweet until after trial was belied by the fact that he highlighted her testimony during closing argument and “unilaterally decided to pay Sweet an additional $500 . . . before receiving any invoice from Sweet.” Id. The federal district court also explained that Sweet’s testimony was important to Hilliard’s claims and effective against the defendant’s arguments. See id. at *5. It noted that her testimony describing the results of the GAIN-1 assessment, which Hepworth used to weaken the argument that Hilliard had an addiction problem, “was central to the liability finding.” Id. Hepworth’s firm “described Sweet as a ‘critical’ witness.” Id. Her testimony was used to rebut the defendant’s arguments addressing Hilliard’s truthfulness and his fitness to return to work. Id. The issue of Sweet’s compensation was relevant to any bias or credibility determinations by the jury and the false information “gravely compromised the integrity of the judicial process by interfering with the jury’s task of weighing the credibility of Sweet’s testimony and rendering a fair and impartial verdict.” Id. The federal district court rejected Hepworth’s argument that because Sweet’s testimony was both truthful and immaterial, there were no grounds for a new trial. Id. at *4. It reasoned that: [t]he truth or falsity of Sweet’s testimony about her witness fee is not determinative of the present motions. One interpretation of the record is that, when asked “[a]re you being paid for your testimony today,” Sweet’s response of “$40” was truthful, because she was entitled to an attendance fee of $40 for each day of her testimony. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b). Conversely, because Sweet had received a payment in the amount of $91.50 prior to trial, her response of “$40” could be viewed as untruthful. This discrepancy does not change the [c]ourt’s conclusion stated herein. The basis for granting a new trial is not any false testimony by Sweet but, rather, the misrepresentations and conduct of [Hepworth] discussed herein which substantially prejudiced the integrity and fairness of the trial process. Id. at *5 n.4 (italicized emphasis added). As the court phrased it, Hepworth “deliberately emphasized Sweet’s testimony and the context of the same, to [Hilliard]’s unfair advantage, during 5 closing argument to bolster and contrast Sweet’s credibility from the other ‘high-paid hired gun[s].’ ” Id. at *5. As to materiality, it identified that Hepworth specifically cited her testimony in his closing argument and that Sweet’s testimony was “extremely influential to the issues before the jury” in a “close case with both parties having strong arguments and evidence supporting their respective positions.” Id. at *6. Among its reasons for granting a new trial, the federal district court took issue with Hepworth’s conduct following Howland’s inquiry about Sweet’s compensation after Howland had reviewed the memorandum of costs. In short, Hepworth’s inconsistent statements about a purported “invoice” his firm received from Sweet after trial were “burdensome to reconcile and deeply troubling to the [c]ourt.” Id. at *7 n. 8. It described his explanations as “vacillating and incomplete.” Id. at *7. After providing various explanations to opposing counsel and the federal court, Hepworth’s firm “submitted a supplemental bill of costs reducing the amount sought for [the] post-trial payment to Sweet by one-half,” which Hepworth argued should make the defense “pleased.” Id. Following the federal district court’s order granting a new trial, the parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement and filed a stipulated dismissal of the case with prejudice. The federal district court granted the stipulation and dismissed the case with prejudice on February 27, 2023. B. Hepworth’s conduct following the Bar complaint. Acting on information supplied by Howland, the ISB filed a disciplinary complaint against Hepworth on April 12, 2023, alleging violations of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. The ISB later filed an amended complaint on May 31, 2023. While the Bar matter was pending, Hepworth filed a motion in the federal district court on September 28, 2023, seeking to set aside the judgment of dismissal and the settlement agreement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The motion was based on information Hepworth garnered from his deposition of Howland in the ISB disciplinary proceeding. Four days later, Hepworth filed a motion to vacate the evidentiary hearing with the Committee and stay actions in the disciplinary proceeding based on his motion to set aside the judgment in the federal case. Hepworth argued that, based on the information he obtained from Howland during the disciplinary proceedings, she committed fraud at the federal district court. The Committee granted the motion in part and stayed disciplinary proceedings until the federal case was resolved. 6  The federal district court denied the Rule 60(b) motion on January 24, 2024. On February 27, 2024, Howland filed a motion for attorney fees incurred defending against the motion. The federal district court granted that motion and found Hepworth acted “recklessly in filing the motion . . . thereby unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying the proceedings in [the] matter.” Hilliard, 2024 WL 1347168, at *3 (D. Idaho Mar. 29, 2024). It found that the motion was filed for the improper purpose of “avoid[ing] sanctions in the ISB proceeding.” Id. Not only was the motion not timely as to one claim for relief, but Hepworth’s alleged basis for the remaining motions was the “newly discovered evidence” that was available to Hepworth in 2022. See id. at *4. This “new evidence” was the allegation that Howland committed fraud by not “tender[ing] any compensation to Justine Sweet to account for the time she spent” for her deposition prior to trial. Id. The federal district court summarized its conclusions: [Hepworth] waited to explore the issue with Ms. Howland [her lack of compensation to Justine Sweet] until after a settlement agreement was reached, after his client began receiving payments pursuant to the agreement, and after he learned that Ms. Howland’s letter initiated an apparent investigation and eventually led to formal charges by the ISB. Such suspect timing cannot be ignored. Id. (footnote omitted). The district court granted Howland’s motion for fees and assessed the award against Hepworth personally. See id. at *5. Hepworth filed an appeal of the district court’s decision with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the federal district court on March 26, 2025. See Hilliard v. Twin Falls Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., Nos. 24-819, 24-2112, 2025 WL 914748 (9th Cir. Mar. 26, 2025). The panel’s memorandum order explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The Ninth Circuit panel, describing the federal district court’s findings of fact as “thoroughly supported by the record,” affirmed the federal district court’s conclusion that Hepworth “acted recklessly in filing the frivolous Rule 60(b) motion, thereby unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying the proceedings in this matter.” Id. at *1. It also upheld the federal district court’s conclusion that the motion “failed to raise any legitimate argument, tried to reopen a matter that had been closed for seven months due to the parties’ settlement, and appeared to have been brought by [Hepworth] for his own benefit.” Id. C. The ISB proceedings. Upon resolution of the pending federal case, the Committee lifted its stay of the disciplinary proceedings. The Committee issued its Order on Motions for Partial Summary Judgment in the disciplinary proceedings on September 30, 2025, concluding that Hepworth was “precluded from 7 relitigating the factual findings in the federal case based on issue preclusion.” Thus, the Committee took “judicial notice of the factual findings in the federal case” under Rule 525(m) of the Idaho Bar Commission Rules (“IBCR”), and Rule 201(b) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence (“IRE”). The Committee cited Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613, 618 (2007), and stated that issue preclusion “has been routinely applied in disciplinary proceedings in the majority of other jurisdictions.” It then discussed each of the five factors from Ticor Title. In evaluating Hepworth’s arguments against summary judgment, the Committee observed that he “appear[ed] to conflate issue preclusion[,] which deals with facts[,] and claim preclusion[,] which deals with the outcome of claims.” It then found that, based on the federal district court’s findings, Hepworth had committed the ethical violations contained in Counts 1 through 5 of the amended complaint as a matter of law. Count 6 of the ISB’s amended complaint alleged a violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 8.1(a) based on Hepworth’s conduct and interactions with the ISB during the disciplinary proceedings. Since this behavior was not part of the federal district court’s findings, the Committee held an evidentiary hearing before making findings of fact. The conduct at issue in this count of the amended complaint is summarized below. On September 29, 2022, after the federal district court entered its order granting a new trial, Hepworth sent Bar Counsel, Joe Pirtle, an email self-reporting “alleged misconduct.” At an evidentiary hearing with the Committee on October 22, 2025, Hepworth’s son and law partner, Grady Hepworth, explained that the decision to self-report stemmed from Grady’s attendance at an Inns of Court meeting where Bar Counsel made a CLE presentation that referenced the duty to self-report. Grady stated that neither he nor his father had knowledge of the Bar grievance filed by Howland at the time his father sent the email. In the email, Hepworth made the following statements, which the ISB alleged conflicted with his account of the events during a hearing on Howland’s motion for a new trial and his affidavit submitted to the federal district court:  “I have no specific memory of a discussion about paying [Sweet] for the time she spent with me preparing for trial and testifying.”  “Its [sic] possible I forgot to tell her we would pay her for her time.” 8 Specifically, the ISB alleged that these email statements conflicted with Hepworth’s earlier account of his fee discussions with Sweet at the hearing on the motion for a new trial at the federal district court:  “[W]e had forgotten that I told her we would pay her for the time and I’m kind of weird this way, Your Honor. When I tell somebody that I’m going to pay them for their time, I mean it.”  “I met with [Sweet] a number of times [before trial]. I knew I owed her money.” Likewise, in an affidavit previously filed with the federal district court, Hepworth gave a materially different version of events:  “We subpoenaed Ms. Sweet to testify at trial and paid the mandatory minimum travel and witness fees when she was subpoenaed.”  “During trial I met with Justine Sweet on two occasions to prepare her for testimony. I told her that we were paying the other expert fact witnesses for their time and we expected to pay her a reasonable fee.”  “I blamed myself for not remembering to follow up with her to charge us her normal rate for time. I felt responsible.”  “I believe [Sweet] had likely forgotten I promised to pay a reasonable fee for her time as we had the other expert fact witnesses.” The Committee found that Hepworth’s statements in the email claiming he had “no memory” of discussing compensation with Sweet or may have forgotten any discussion about compensation “directly contradict[ed] [Hepworth’s] prior statements to the [federal district] [c]ourt and the [c]ourt’s factual findings in the civil case.” It also found Hepworth’s testimony “not credible” after comparing it to his affidavit filed with the federal district court, which “unequivocally state[d] that he met with Sweet during the trial and he expected to pay her a reasonable fee.” The Committee concluded that the statements in the email “were made in connection with a disciplinary proceeding because he was self-reporting a potential violation of ethical rules.” It also concluded that, based on clear and convincing evidence, Hepworth had the intent required to find a violation of Rule 8.1(a) because he knew that the statements in the email were false based on his affidavit and statements at the federal district court. The Committee determined that Hepworth should be sanctioned for the six rule violations it had found he violated. It recommended a one-year withheld suspension from the practice of law during which time he was subject to a single condition: that he abide by the Professional Conduct Rules. The ISB appealed, arguing that the sanction was “too lenient.” Hepworth cross-appealed, 9 maintaining that the Committee erred in finding that he committed any of the alleged rule violations. II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW “When this Court reviews an attorney discipline case, we ‘independently examine[ ] the record developed before the Professional Conduct Board to determine whether the evidence supports the findings and recommendations of the Board’s hearing Committee.’ ” Idaho State Bar v. Oleson, 175 Idaho 541, 548, 568 P.3d 83, 90 (2025) (alteration in original) (quoting Idaho State Bar v. Warrick, 137 Idaho 86, 90, 44 P.3d 1141, 1145 (2002)). “We review the Committee’s decision to ‘determine if it is clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious.’ ” Id. (quoting Warrick, 137 Idaho at 90, 44 P.3d at 1145; and then citing I.B.C.R. 509(d)(9)). “Professional misconduct must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. (citing Wilhelm v. Idaho State Bar, 140 Idaho 30, 34, 89 P.3d 870, 874 (2004)). The burden of proof is on the attorney petitioner “to show the evidence does not support the Committee’s findings.” Idaho State Bar v. Frazier, 136 Idaho 22, 25, 28 P.3d 363, 366 (2001). If the evidence is substantial and competent, yet conflicting, it may still support a trial court’s findings of fact provided that those findings are not clearly erroneous. Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 857, 230 P.3d 743, 749 (2010). “Whether a party presented sufficient evidence to meet the clear and convincing standard is a finding of fact that this Court will uphold if substantial and competent evidence supports it.” Snider v. Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 644, 289 P.3d 43, 46 (2012). “In reviewing the Committee’s sanction recommendation, this Court considers: (1) the nature of the violations; (2) aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (3) the need to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession; and (4) the moral fitness of the lawyer.” Oleson, 175 Idaho at 549, 568 P.3d at 91 (first citing Idaho State Bar v. Souza, 142 Idaho 502, 506, 129 P.3d 1251, 1255 (2006); and then citing Idaho State Bar v. Clark, 153 Idaho 349, 359–60, 283 P.3d 96, 106–07 (2012)). “The ultimate responsibility for assessing the facts and determining the sanction to be imposed rests with this Court.” Id. (citing Clark, 153 Idaho at 355, 283 P.3d at 102). III. ANALYSIS A. The Committee did not err by applying issue preclusion to the federal district court’s findings of fact. Hepworth argues that the Committee’s decision to apply issue preclusion and adopt the federal district court’s findings of fact was clearly erroneous. He distinguishes a federal district court’s power to impose litigation sanctions from the ISB’s power to impose professional 10 disciplinary sanctions. He cites a case from the Arizona Supreme Court holding that, “under [Arizona’s] rules, issue preclusion is not applicable in attorney disciplinary proceedings; only criminal convictions and disciplinary orders from other jurisdictions may be given preclusive effect.” Hancock v. O’Neil, 515 P.3d 695, 701 (Ariz. 2022). The genesis of that appeal was a federal district court case in which an attorney was sanctioned due to discovery fraud. Id. at 697. Hepworth asserts that “[t]his case is no different.” In response, the ISB points to this Court’s analysis in Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613, 618 (2007), for the application of issue preclusion, which the Committee applied in its Order on Motions for Partial Summary Judgment on September 30, 2025. The Committee noted that issue preclusion “has been routinely applied in disciplinary proceedings in the majority of other jurisdictions.” Caselaw from other jurisdictions supports this view. See, e.g., In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); In re Jordan, 518 P.3d 1203, 1236– 37 (Kan. 2022). The Committee then discussed how each of the five factors identified in Ticor Title applied here. Those factors are: (1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. In evaluating Hepworth’s arguments opposing summary judgment, the Committee explained, as noted above, that he “appear[ed] to conflate issue preclusion[,] which deals with facts[,] and claim preclusion[,] which deals with the outcome of claims.” The Committee reiterated its adoption of this analysis in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation. On appeal, Hepworth does not address the Committee’s analysis applying Ticor Title in its order on partial summary judgment, which found issue preclusion applied to his proceedings. The Idaho Bar Commission Rules do not specifically address “issue preclusion,” but they grant broad powers to the Committee under Rule 525 (“Additional Rules of Procedure”). Yet, these powers are subject to a high standard of proof: “[a]ny issue of fact shall be proved by clear and convincing evidence.” I.B.C.R. 525(e). Important to this case, Rule 525(m) (“Judicial Notice”) states: 11  A Hearing Committee may take judicial notice of facts entitled to such notice; provided, however that the facts judicially noticed shall be specified by the Hearing Committee either at the time of the hearing or at the time of declaring its finding of facts, whichever it deems appropriate. I.B.C.R. 525(m). While “judicial notice of facts entitled to such notice” is not defined, this rule shows that the Committee’s taking of judicial notice and accepting the federal district court’s order was not facially improper, as Hepworth argues. Further, we held in 2022 that issue preclusion barred an attorney from challenging some factual bases underlying a complaint from the ISB in a disciplinary matter. Idaho State Bar v. Smith, 170 Idaho 534, 544, 513 P.3d 1154, 1164 (2022). In short, this Court’s precedents contradict Hepworth’s contention that issue preclusion cannot apply in attorney disciplinary proceedings. Hepworth contends that “the clear distinguishing factor of Smith . . . is that Smith was actually a party in two of the three cases underlying disciplinary action,” whereas Hepworth was not a party to the federal district court action at issue here. He also points out that Smith had an evidentiary hearing even though issue preclusion applied. This argument is unavailing because whether Hepworth was the real party in the Hilliard case did not affect his interest in defending Hilliard or himself in the Rule 59 and Rule 60 motion proceedings brought by TFCSO at the federal district court. His financial interests were aligned with Hilliard on the merits because he wanted to preserve the jury verdict and judgment in favor of his client. His interests were also aligned with Hilliard because defeating TFCSO’s motion for a new trial would require the federal district court to find he did not put forward misleading or false evidence to the jury or did not fail to correct false testimony. It is also telling that the federal district court imposed an award of attorney fees against Hepworth personally, which shows that it was his conduct at issue, not his client’s. Lastly, an evidentiary hearing was necessary in Smith because issue preclusion did not apply to all the factual bases underlying the ISB’s complaint. Smith, 170 Idaho at 544, 513 P.3d at 1164. That is comparable to the Committee’s actions below, where it held an evidentiary hearing on Count 6 because it concerned Hepworth’s email to Bar Counsel. That conduct was not before the federal district court and the Committee did not apply issue preclusion to that issue. Based on our recent affirmation of issue preclusion in Smith and Idaho Bar Commission Rule 525(m), we conclude that the Committee did not err in applying issue preclusion to the proceedings below. Like in Smith, “many of the facts . . . have been the subject of past litigation and appeals, all of which were decided against [Hepworth].” See Smith, 170 Idaho at 544, 513 P.3d 12 at 1164. Hepworth’s arguments before the federal district court, the Committee, and on appeal are the same, notwithstanding his differing recollection of the facts at times. The federal district court summarized his arguments: “[Hilliard]’s response maintains that: Sweet’s testimony was truthful and accurate; the comments made during closing argument did not misrepresent the compensation Sweet had received at that point in time; and, no deception by [Hepworth] occurred as evidenced by the post-trial disclosure of all payments made to Sweet.” In his summary judgment motion to the Committee, Hepworth argued that “Justine Sweet did not testify falsely” and that he did not know how much Sweet had been paid.1 The federal district court concluded that Hepworth “knowingly presented to the jury an inaccurate and incomplete portrayal of the compensation paid to and promised to be paid to Sweet for her testimony.” The Committee’s reliance on this conclusion comports with the guardrails of issue preclusion. Its analysis addressed each factor of issue preclusion and was supported by substantial and competent evidence: the trial record from the federal district court, the hearing transcript and evidence from the Rule 59 and Rule 60 hearing brought by TFCSO at the federal district court, and the federal district court’s order on the Rule 59 and Rule 60 motions. Beyond his argument that issue preclusion is facially improper, Hepworth makes various arguments asserting that issue preclusion was improper because the factual determinations of the federal district court did not sufficiently align with the professional rules to determine whether any violations occurred. Most of these points address whether Sweet’s testimony of “$40” was truthful or material, and whether Hepworth “knew” Sweet had already been paid more than $40. Hepworth did not raise these arguments in his opening brief as it pertains to issue preclusion; however, these arguments appear to repackage his points against the Committee’s findings and conclusions and whether they were clearly erroneous. Because they address the same issues, we will evaluate them in the remainder of our analysis. B. We affirm the Committee’s conclusion that Hepworth violated Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1), 3.3(a)(3), 4.1(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). Initially, we note that it can be confusing at times to apply two evidentiary standards in the same case that sound somewhat alike: “clear and convincing” and “substantial and competent.” It is important to recognize that, when we refer to these standards, we are applying distinct concepts. 1 Hepworth’s memorandum on summary judgment in the disciplinary proceedings did not address the materiality of Sweet’s testimony. 13 As used in this opinion, the “clear and convincing” standard refers to the quantum of proof the ISB had to present to establish a violation occurred, while the “substantial and competent” standard refers to the probative value and admissibility of the evidence the Committee relied upon in reaching its conclusions. Put simply, the former measures the sufficiency of the evidence while the latter determines whether it is credible and legally relevant proof that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” See Laundry v. Franciscan Health Care Ctr., 125 Idaho 279, 281, 869 P.2d 1374, 1376 (1994). In appealing the findings of the Committee, it is Hepworth’s burden to show the Committee’s findings are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Idaho State Bar v. Frazier, 136 Idaho 22, 25, 28 P.3d 363, 366 (2001). “Whether a party presented sufficient evidence to meet the clear and convincing standard is a finding of fact that this Court will uphold if substantial and competent evidence supports it.” Snider v. Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 644, 289 P.3d 43, 46 (2012). Hepworth identifies six issues on appeal under the overarching claim that the “Committee Committed Clear Error by Failing to Identify or Address the Individual Elements [of] Proof Required to Find Violations of the [Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct] set forth in Counts One – Five.” Hepworth argues that Sweet’s testimony was immaterial, yet it was truthful. He maintains that it was reasonable for Hepworth not to correct Sweet’s testimony, and that he did not know Sweet had been paid or would be paid more than $40. 1. The Committee did not err in concluding that Hepworth violated Rule 3.3(a)(1). Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1) states: “(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer[.]” I.R.P.C. 3.3(a)(1). Comment 2 to Rule 3.3 further explains that “the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.” I.R.P.C. 3.3 cmt. 2. Relevant to Hepworth’s arguments on appeal, comment 8 states that “[a] lawyer’s knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. . . . [T]he lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood.” I.R.P.C. 3.3 cmt. 8. Hepworth argues that Rule 3.3(a)(1) cannot apply because Sweet’s trial testimony was true and the rule requires proof of a false statement. He cites the federal district court’s statements acknowledging that, in isolation, Sweet’s testimony of “$40” could be truthful or that it was a plausible interpretation of Howland’s question asking if Sweet was compensated for her testimony 14 “today.” The federal district court stated at the hearing on the motions “I intend to give the benefit of the doubt to Ms. Sweet . . . . I don’t think she was misrepresenting anything at the time.” In its order, the court explained that: The truth or falsity of Sweet’s testimony about her witness fee is not determinative of the present motions. One interpretation of the record is that, when asked “[a]re you being paid for your testimony today,” Sweet’s response of “$40” was truthful, because she was entitled to an attendance fee of $40 for each day of her testimony. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b). (Alteration in original). Hepworth argues that the Committee’s statement in its order on partial summary judgment that deemed the veracity of Sweet’s testimony “not relevant” is clearly erroneous. Therefore, he maintains that he could not be found in violation of the applicable professional rules because the underlying statement at the tribunal was true. It is important to note that in referencing the Committee’s “not relevant” statement, Hepworth omits the reasoning following the Committee’s statement with an ellipsis. The excluded portion of the Committee’s statement reads in full, “this argument is not relevant because the [c]ourt’s factual findings that [Hepworth] provided misleading and deceitful statements were not based on Sweet’s testimony.” (Emphasis added). The Committee also emphasized that compliance with Rule 3.3(a)(1) required that any statement Hepworth made about Sweet’s compensation could not “omit[] essential information.” Based on the findings from the federal district court, which were appropriately considered by the Committee, we conclude that substantial and competent evidence supports the Committee’s conclusion that Hepworth violated Rule 3.3(a)(1) when he failed to correct a false statement of material fact he made to the jury during closing argument. The district court found that Hepworth “knowingly presented to the jury an inaccurate and incomplete portrayal of the compensation paid to and promised to be paid to Sweet for her testimony.” That is because he had “full knowledge that Sweet had been tendered more than $40 prior to trial, and . . . had promised and intended to pay Sweet an additional sum of money prior to trial.” (Emphasis omitted). Importantly, the earlier payment of $91.50 and Hepworth’s promise to pay Sweet a fee for her time testifying at trial occurred prior to his closing argument in the employment discrimination trial. The $500 payment Hepworth gave Sweet the day after trial also preceded receiving an invoice from Sweet. Thus, it can be inferred from the circumstances that Hepworth knew his statement that Sweet “showed up to court here for $40. She wasn’t -- w