Jacobs v. Cabral
CourtHawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals
Date FiledOctober 6, 2026
DocketCAAP-24-0000643
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
06-OCT-2026
08:04 AM
Dkt. 59 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I
ALEXA JACOBS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANDREW CABRAL, Defendant-Appellant, and
CLIFTON PERREIRA; JEREMY PALLONE-DE LA TORRE;
NOLAN WADA, Defendants-Appellees,
and
JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; and
DOE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 2CCV-XX-XXXXXXX)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, McCullen and Guidry, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Andrew Cabral (Cabral) appeals
from the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit's1 (circuit court)
July 15, 2024 "Order Denying [Cabral's] Motion to Dismiss
1 The Honorable Michelle L. Drewyer presided.
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Complaint, Filed July 6, 2023" (Order Denying the Motion to
Dismiss).2
On July 6, 2023, Plaintiff-Appellee Alexa Jacobs
(Jacobs) filed a Complaint against Cabral, and Defendants-
Appellees Clifton Perreira, Jeremy Pallone-De La Torre, and
Nolan Wada (collectively, Defendants-Appellees). Jacobs'
Complaint alleged that, on or about February 4, 2022, she had
suffered personal injuries as a new Maui Police Department (MPD)
recruit. The Complaint set forth claims of failure to render
aid and intentional infliction of emotional distress against
Cabral and Defendants-Appellees.
Pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of the Circuit Courts
of the State of Hawaiʻi (RCCH),3 Jacobs' deadline to serve the
Complaint was January 6, 2024. Each of the Defendants-Appellees
2 This is an interlocutory appeal. On April 15, 2025, this court
temporarily remanded the case to the circuit court to allow for the entry of
an appropriate amended order granting leave for an interlocutory appeal. On
April 23, 2025, the circuit court entered its "Amended Order Granting
[Cabral's] Motion for Leave to File Interlocutory Appeal from Order Denying
[Cabral's] Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Filed July 6, 2023, to Sever the
Claims, and Stay Proceedings with Respect to [Cabral], Filed July 25, 2024."
3 RCCH Rule 28, which governs dismissal for want of service,
provides,
A diligent effort to effect service shall be made in all
actions. An action or claim may be dismissed sua sponte
with written notice to the parties if no service is made
within 6 months after the action or claim has been filed.
Such dismissal may be set aside and the action or claim
reinstated by order of the court for good cause shown upon
motion duly filed not later than ten (10) days from the
date of the order of dismissal.
(Bolded emphasis added.)
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were timely served with the Complaint by August 8, 2023.
Cabral, who no longer resided in Hawaiʻi, was not served when
Defendants-Appellees were served, or by January 6, 2024.
On April 15, 2024, Jacobs filed an "Ex Parte Motion
for First Extension of Time to Serve Complaint" (Ex Parte
Motion) pursuant to Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP)
Rule 6(b),4 seeking additional time in which to serve Cabral.
The circuit court granted Jacobs' motion that same day,
extending the deadline to serve Cabral to July 6, 2024.
Defendants-Appellees filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the circuit court denied.
In April 2024, Jacobs located Cabral in Nixa, Missouri
and served him with the Complaint via certified mail, return
receipt requested. Jacobs received a return receipt showing
that Cabral received service of the Complaint on April 22, 2024.
On May 9, 2024, Cabral filed his Motion to Dismiss.
The circuit court heard the motion, and ordered the parties to
file supplemental memoranda on the matter of whether Jacobs'
4 HRCP Rule 6(b) states, in relevant part,
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by
order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at
or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may
at any time in its discretion . . . (2) upon motion made
after the expiration of the specified period permit the act
to be done where the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect[.]
(Emphasis added.)
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delayed service of Cabral was due to "excusable neglect." The
circuit court heard additional argument on July 11, 2024, and
entered its Order Denying the Motion to Dismiss on July 15,
2024.
Cabral sets forth four points of error on appeal,
contending that the circuit court erred when it: (1) "granted
[Jacobs'] ex parte motion for extension of time to serve process
to [Cabral]"; (2) "found good cause sufficient to extend the
time to serve [Cabral]"; (3) "tolled the statute of limitations
with respect to the claims against [Cabral] by granting the ex
parte motion"; and (4) "denied [Cabral's] motion to dismiss."
Upon careful review of the record, briefs, and
relevant legal authorities, and having given due consideration
to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties,
we consolidate and resolve Cabral's contentions of error as
follows.
In Cabral's Motion to Dismiss, he sought dismissal of
Jacobs' Complaint "due to expiration of the statute of
limitations set forth in [Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS)] § 657-7
[(2016)]." In addressing Cabral's motion, the circuit court
considered "matters outside the pleading," such as the
declarations of Jacobs' counsel Peter C. Hsieh (Hsieh). Under
such circumstances,
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If, on a motion asserting [an HRCP Rule 12(b)(6) defense]
to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in [HRCP] Rule 56, and all parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by [HRCP] Rule 56.
Andrade v. Cnty. of Hawaiʻi, 145 Hawaiʻi 265, 269, 451 P.3d 1, 5
(App. 2019) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we apply the de
novo standard of review applicable to an order denying a motion
for summary judgment under HRCP Rule 56. Id.
The record is clear that Jacobs did not serve Cabral
by January 6, 2024, as required by RCCH Rule 28. Upon
discovering this missed deadline, Jacobs moved, in April 2024
and pursuant to HRCP Rule 6(b), for an extension of time in
which to serve Cabral. Cabral contends on appeal that the
circuit court erroneously granted the extension, the statute of
limitations was not tolled, and that Jacobs' claims were time-
barred because Jacobs served Cabral after the two-year statute
of limitations had expired.
We first consider whether the circuit court abused its
discretion by extending the time in which to serve Cabral. See
Bank of Hawaiʻi v. Shaw, 83 Hawaiʻi 50, 56, 924 P.2d 544, 550
(App. 1996) (reviewing orders disposing of motions for extension
of time on the ground of excusable neglect, brought pursuant to
the analogous District Court Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
6(b)(2), under the abuse of discretion standard).
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"Fundamentally, the determination of whether a party
has shown excusable neglect is at bottom an equitable one,
taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the
party's omission." Eckard Brandes, Inc. v. Dep't of Lab. &
Indus. Rels., 146 Hawaiʻi 354, 360, 463 P.3d 1011, 1017 (2020)
(cleaned up). The following circumstances are relevant here.
In his declaration in support of the Ex Parte Motion, Hsieh
represented he had informed Deputy Corporation Counsel John J.
Gores (Gores)5 on October 3, 2023 that Jacobs had not been able
to locate and serve Cabral. Gores informed Hsieh that Cabral
had retired from the MPD and was living on the mainland. Gores
did not know Cabral's address, but offered to find and provide
Cabral's address to Hsieh.
Hsieh has also declared on the record that his legal
assistant resigned in November 2023, his office experienced "a
major disruption," and this had caused Hsieh to miss the January
2024 deadline to serve Cabral. Hsieh became aware of the missed
deadline, and contacted Cabral's new counsel, Anna Elento-Sneed
(Elento-Sneed), on April 4, 2024, to request Cabral's current
address. Elento-Sneed did not provide Cabral's address, and
Hsieh endeavored to locate Cabral through his own investigation.
5 Gores was counsel for Defendants-Appellees and Cabral until
January 2, 2024, when Anna Elento-Sneed (Elento-Sneed) was substituted as
counsel.
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On April 15, 2024, Hsieh filed the Ex Parte Motion, obtained
additional time in which to serve Cabral with process, located
Cabral in Missouri, and mailed the Complaint and Summons to
Cabral's residence by certified mail, return receipt requested.
The return receipt shows that Cabral received service on April
22, 2024.
On this record, we conclude that the circuit court did
not abuse its discretion by finding that Jacobs' failure to
serve Cabral within six months was due to Hsieh's "excusable
neglect."
We next address Cabral's contention that Jacobs'
claims against Cabral were time-barred because Jacobs served him
more than two years after her alleged injury occurred. Jacobs
alleges that her injury occurred on February 4, 2022. Pursuant
to HRS § 657-7, a tort claim alleging personal injury "shall be
instituted within two years" of this date. (Emphasis added.)
Jacobs sought to institute her action through her
filing of the Complaint on July 6, 2023, which was within the
two-year deadline for tort claims set forth by HRS § 657-7. See
HRCP Rule 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint
with the court."). Pursuant to HRS § 657-22 (2016), the filing
of a complaint "shall not be deemed the commencement of an
action" if taken "without any intent that [process] should be
served." The record reflects that Jacobs intended to serve
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Cabral with process when she filed the Complaint; among other
things, Jacobs' process server represented that he
unsuccessfully attempted to serve Cabral around the time he
served Defendants-Appellees.
The United States District Court for the District of
Hawaiʻi's analysis in Heiser v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Polo
Beach Club provides helpful guidance here. 848 F. Supp. 1482
(D. Haw. 1993). In Heiser, the district court concluded that
plaintiffs' claims were not time-barred because,
First, Plaintiffs have complied with the literal
requirements of the Hawaii statute of limitations and rules
of procedure. Plaintiffs filed a complaint with this Court
within two years after their tort action accrued. This
complies with [HRS] § 657-7 and [HRCP Rule] 3.
Second, [HRS] § 657-22 does not require a plaintiff to
actually serve the defendant or to exercise due diligence.
Instead, the threshold inquiry is a determination of the
plaintiff's intent at the time "any process was issued."
The legislature, by limiting the inquiry to the time of
issuance of process, apparently recognized the possibility
that the intent of a plaintiff to serve process may change
after process is issued but that under some circumstances
there may still be justification for tolling the statute of
limitations.
Id. at 1484-85 (emphasis added).
The record reflects that Jacobs timely filed the
Complaint within the two-year statute of limitations, intended
to promptly serve Cabral with the Complaint and Summons but was
unable to do so, ultimately moved for and obtained an extension
of time in which to serve Cabral, and served Cabral with the
Complaint and Summons prior to the new service deadline.
Jacobs' timely commencement of her claims against Cabral
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therefore tolled the statute of limitations pursuant to HRS
§ 657-7 and § 657-22, and HRCP Rule 3. Jacobs' claims are not
time-barred.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Order Denying
the Motion to Dismiss.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, October 6, 2026.
On the briefs: /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Presiding Judge
Anna Elento-Sneed,
for Defendant-Appellant. /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Associate Judge
Peter C. Hsieh,
for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Associate Judge
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