Wayland Braxton Willis v. Haley Crowe
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
Date FiledOctober 9, 2026
DocketA27D0164
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Court of Appeals
of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA,____________________
October 09, 2026
The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:
A27D0164. WAYLAND BRAXTON WILLIS v. HALEY CROWE.
In this action for modification of child support and visitation, the trial court
entered its fifth temporary order awarding Haley Crowe sole physical custody of the
child, suspending Wayland Braxton Willis’s visitation until he submits to a drug
screen, prohibiting Willis from posting pleadings or other information about the child
custody proceedings online, and ordering Willis to pay attorney fees and undergo a
psychological evaluation. The trial court reserved all other matters pending further
order of the court. Willis has filed an application for discretionary appeal, challenging
the award of attorney fees.
As Willis notes, OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2) ordinarily requires an application for
discretionary review in domestic relations cases, such as this one. The trial court’s
fifth temporary order, however, is interlocutory because the court explicitly reserved
ruling on other matters.1 For this reason, Willis was required to follow the
1
We note that OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(11) authorizes direct appeals from judgments
or orders “in child custody cases awarding, refusing to change, or modifying child
custody.” And custody rulings are directly appealable, even if interlocutory. Brabant
v. Patton, 315 Ga. App. 711, 712–13 (728 SE2d 244) (2012). However, this Court looks
to the specific issue raised on appeal to determine whether a party is entitled to a
direct appeal under this provision. See Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44, 47 (799 SE2d 160)
(2017). Here, although the trial court’s fifth temporary order addresses custody, Willis
attacks only the entry of attorney fees against him. “Because custody is therefore not
an issue on appeal in this domestic relations case under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2), it is not
subject to a direct appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(11).” Barnes v. Barnes, 361
interlocutory appeal procedure of OCGA § 5-6-34(b) in order to appeal. See Bailey v.
Bailey, 266 Ga. 832, 833 (471 SE2d 213) (1996) (“The discretionary appeal statute
does not excuse a party seeking appellate review of an interlocutory order from
complying with the additional requirements of OCGA § 5-6-34(b).”). Accord Scruggs
v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 261 Ga. 587, 588–89(1) (408 SE2d 103) (1991). Because
Willis did not do so, we lack jurisdiction to consider this application, which is hereby
DISMISSED. See, e.g., Eidson v. Croutch, 337 Ga. App. 542, 543 (788 SE2d 129)
(2016) (dismissing appeal from attorney fees order issued prior to final judgment
because appellant failed to follow the interlocutory application procedure).
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________
10/09/2026
I certify that the above is a true extract from
the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Witness my signature and the seal of said court
hereto affixed the day and year last above written.
, Clerk.
Ga. App. 279, 281 (864 SE2d 119) (2021) (quotation marks omitted).