United States v. Nazeer Vick

USCA4 Appeal: 25-4275 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/13/2026 Pg: 1 of 14 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25-4275 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. NAZEER VICK, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Dever, III, District Judge. (7:23-cr-00101-D-RJ-2) Argued: September 16, 2026 Decided: October 13, 2026 Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Diaz and Judge Benjamin joined. ARGUED: Margaret McCall Reece, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jonathan Silberman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Annie Barouh, Seattle, Washington, Matthew Nis Leerberg, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. W. Ellis Boyle, United States Attorney, Lucy Partain Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 25-4275 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/13/2026 Pg: 2 of 14 NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge: After Nazeer Vick pleaded guilty to bribery of prison guards and conspiracy to distribute drugs while he was in prison on federal charges, the district court sentenced him to 102 months of consecutive imprisonment, enhancing the sentence under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(2) (Official Victim) because Vick assaulted a prison official and, in doing so, created “a substantial risk of serious bodily injury.” The court found that, during the investigation of whether Vick had indeed committed bribery and smuggled drugs into prison, law enforcement officers searched his cell, leading to his attacking an officer. During the tussle, Vick lifted the officer off his feet, threw him against the wall, and ultimately pushed him to the concrete floor. Vick objected to the application of the enhancement, arguing that he only “grabbed the pant leg” of the officer while struggling to get the officers to stop grabbing him and that the correction officer simply fell to the floor and required no medical attention. He asserted that “the facts [were] insufficient to support that six-level guideline increase.” The district court, however, overruled his objection and applied the enhancement, finding that Vick had assaulted the officer in a manner that created a “substantial risk of serious injury.” On appeal, Vick contends that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in overruling his objection to the § 3A1.2(c)(2) enhancement and that the facts, in any event, were not sufficient to satisfy it. As he argues, “[F]or this six-level sentencing enhancement to apply, the circumstances must be ‘tantamount to aggravated assault’ and ‘sufficiently serious to create at least a substantial risk of serious bodily injury.’” (Quoting U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2 cmt. n.4(A)). He maintains that his conduct “does not meet this high bar,” as “[i]t 2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4275 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/13/2026 Pg: 3 of 14 was neither the equivalent of an aggravated assault nor did it create substantial risk of serious bodily injury.” Vick also challenges the district court’s 102-month sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. I While Vick was being held in federal custody in the Bladen County Detention Center in North Carolina on federal charges, he allegedly “ran” the “C-Pod unit” of the prison and was a primary source of contraband in the prison. During the course of his operations, he paid correctional officers to help smuggle in drugs and other contraband that his wife brought to the prison in resealed bags of potato chips. During the investigation of this operation, law enforcement officers searched Vick’s cell in April 2023, uncovering a potato chip bag, drugs, a shank, tobacco, razor blades, and other contraband. As officers attempted to move Vick from his cell, he attacked Officer Tyler Cook by — as the surveillance video showed — lifting him up off the ground, throwing him against the nearby wall, and slamming him to the concrete floor. The officer hit his head on the wall and his back on the concrete floor but suffered no lasting injury that required medical treatment. After assaulting Officer Cook, Vick told another officer, “I just had to prove a point.” Vick thereafter pleaded guilty to bribery of a public official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A) and (C), and to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance (marijuana), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. 3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4275 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/13/2026 Pg: 4 of 14 At sentencing, the district court calculated Vick’s advisory sentencing range to be 92 to 115 months’ imprisonment. But before reaching that conclusion, the court took evidence on whether to apply a six-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(2) (Official Victim). After receiving the evidence, the court concluded, over Vick’s objection, that the enhancement applied, finding that Vick’s conduct created a “substantial risk of serious injury” to Officer Cook. Then, after addressing Vick’s personal circumstances and the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court sentenced Vick to 102 months’ imprisonment, in the middle of the Guidelines sentencing range. From the district court’s judgment, Vick filed this appeal, challenging his sentence in various respects. II Vick contends first that the district court erroneously lightened the government’s legal burden when it concluded that the government had satisfied U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(2) without considering the Guidelines commentary and other Guidelines provisions, which, he maintains, require a showing of more serious conduct than the district court recognized. Relying first on the commentary to § 3A1.2, he argues that the government had to prove that the conduct amounted to “aggravated assault,” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2 cmt. n.4(A), which is more serious than mere assault, as required by the guideline itself. And based on this, he argues that the court should have then referred to the guideline for “aggravated assault” in U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, because that guideline includes commentary defining “aggravated assault.” Specifically, that commentary defines “aggravated assault” as “a felonious 4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4275 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/13/2026 Pg: 5 of 14 assault that involved (A) a dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily injury (i.e., not merely to frighten) with that weapon; (B) serious bodily injury; (C) strangling, suffocating, or attempting to strangle or suffocate; or (D) an intent to commit another felony.” Id. § 2A2.2 cmt. n.1. Vick then adds that “serious bodily injury” is defined in the commentary to § 1B1.1 to mean “injury involving extreme physical pain or the protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation.” Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(L). Assembling these various provisions, Vick concludes that conduct significantly more aggravated than that at issue here was required to satisfy § 3A1.2(c), a proposition that he claims the district court did not recognize. The government contends that Vick’s multi-step application of § 3A1.2(c)(2) was unnecessary and indeed inappropriate, as this case is governed by our decision in United States v. Hampton, 628 F.3d 654 (4th Cir. 2010). In that case, we applied § 3A1.2(c) to a defendant who had shoved a police officer in the chest, struggled with another officer, and attempted to reach into his own pocket where he had a gun. Id. at 657, 661. The Hampton court concluded that the conduct there constituted an assault, noting that the common meaning of assault included a “reasonable apprehension of harm” and “a threat or attempt to inflict offensive physical contact creating . . . apprehension of such harm.” Id. at 660 (cleaned up). Vick retorts that Hampton’s holding is of doubtful application because “assault” as used in the guideline is ambiguous and that we should, under more recent law, consult the commentary, which requires an “aggravated assault.” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2 cmt. n.4(A); see 5 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4275 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/13/2026 Pg: 6 of 14 also Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019); United States v. Boler, 115 F.4th 316, 322–23 (4th Cir. 2024). * The record shows that in applying the § 3A1.2(c)(2) enhancement, the district court determined that it should apply if Vick “assaulted” Officer Cook in a manner that created “a substantial risk of serious bodily injury.” The court recognized that commentary to § 3A1.2(c) explained that the enhancement applies in “circumstances tantamount to aggravated assault” but that “actual serious injury” is not required; the enhancement applies, it concluded, if there was “merely a substantial risk of serious injury.” Finally, the court recognized that the “serious injury” that was risked must involve “extreme physical pain or the protracted impairment of a function of a bodily organ, member, or mental faculty or requiring medical intervention, such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation.” We conclude that the district court did not err in its recitation of the legal standard that it applied. To begin, the guideline itself requires only that the government prove, as relevant to the issue here, that the defendant “assaulted” a prison official “in a manner creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury.” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(2). And if the commentary is to be considered — which Vick argues should be done — it adds that the enhancement * While we do not need to address the issue here, we note that the Supreme Court is set to resolve whether Kisor applies to the Sentencing Guidelines or whether Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993), “still correctly states the rule for the deference that courts must give the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines.” Beaird v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 2553 (2026). 6 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4275 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/13/2026 Pg: 7 of 14 “applies in circumstances tantamount to aggravated assault.” Id. § 3A1.2(c)(2) cmt. n.4(A) (emphasis added). The commentary further makes clear that the enhancement “is limited to assaultive conduct against such official victims that is sufficiently serious to create at least a ‘substantial risk of serious bodily injury.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)). And the serious bodily injury placed at risk by the assaulting conduct must involve “extreme physical pain or the protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation.” Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(L). Thus, while § 3A1.2(c)(2) requires the defendant to have assaulted a prison official, the commentary explains that, because assaults can involve a mere offensive touching, a qualifying assault must be “tantamount” to “aggravated assault,” which it defines to be assaultive conduct that creates a “substantial risk of serious bodily injury.” Id. § 3A1.2 cmt. n.4(A). While Vick would have us cross reference the guideline for aggravated assault, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, and its commentary, that guideline is applicable to crimes charging aggravated assault, and there is nothing in § 3A1.2(c)(2) to suggest that the aggravated assault guideline should apply. Indeed, the § 3A1.2(c)(2) commentary states that the conduct need only be “tantamount to aggravated assault,” and it then “limited” any notion of aggravated assault to “assaultive conduct . . . that is sufficiently serious to create at least a ‘substantial risk of serious bodily injury’” — the very language used in the text of the guideline itself. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2 cmt. n.4(A) (emphases added). In addition, the general instructions for applying the Guidelines caution against applying definitions in one section to those in another section, providing, “Definitions of 7 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4275 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/13/2026 Pg: 8 of 14 terms also may appear in other sections. Such definitions are not designed for general applicability . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.2. Thus, any definition of aggravated assault that is contained in § 2A2.2 and its commentary does not necessarily apply to § 3A1.2(c)(2), especially when § 3A1.2(c)(2) and its commentary give a definition of assaultive conduct that is to be used in applying that guideline. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the district court explicitly recognized and applied each of the appropriate requirements for a § 3A1.2(c)(2) enhancement, even accepting the allegedly heavier burden imposed by the commentary. Indeed, we cannot determine what portion of the court’s announced legal standard was, according to Vick, in error. Accordingly, we reject Vick’s challenge to the legal standard applied by the district court. Vick contends nonetheless that his conduct did not satisfy the legal standard that the court applied. He argues: Mr. Vick’s conduct is far from an aggravated assault. Mr. Vick had a confrontation with detention officers following a triggering event, and ultimately, during the brief tussle, he grabbed an officer’s pants leg. He did not punch or kick the officer. By the officer’s own testimony, Mr. Vick did nothing else — he just grabbed the officer’s pants leg. The officer ended up on the floor, but ultimately, suffered only a jammed finger. There was no weapon involved, nor was the incident a part of Mr. Vick’s attempt to commit a felony. Mr. Vick’s conduct is a far cry from aggravated assault. What Vick omits, however, is the demonstrated fact that he lifted Officer Cook off the ground and then threw him against the wall and onto the concrete floor. This was testified to by Officer Cook and is clearly shown in the surveillance video in the record, which we have reviewed. Officer Cook also testified that “[i]n my five years, I have had 8 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4275 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/13/2026 Pg: 9 of 14 quite a few [inmates or personnel] having to go to the hospital from having . . . hit the [concrete] floor.” He acknowledged, however, that “on this occasion,” he did not have to go to the hospital. Based on Officer Cook’s testimony and the video, the district court found: Here, having viewed the video and credited Mr. Cook’s testimony, Mr. Vick was sitting in a wheelchair upset after the cell search. He’s conversing in some way with Mr. Cook. He is upset. He . . . is a larger man than Mr. Cook, and he . . . stands up. And even though he was handcuffed in the front, [he] was able to essentially . . . grab Mr. Cook’s legs, and lift him up, both feet off the ground as reflected in the video and . . . slammed him back into a wall and then down to the floor. It is a concrete floor. Officers then came to assist Officer Cook. Officer Cook did have a jammed finger, but the issue, again, is the substantial risk of serious injury. We conclude that the court did not clearly err in making these factual findings. And the finding that Vick created a substantial risk of serious injury in particular is supported by the fact that similar conduct had earlier resulted in victims having to go to the hospital. As already noted, “serious bodily injury” is defined, as relevant here, to include “injury . . . requiring medical intervention such as . . . hospitalization.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(L). Accordingly, we reject Vick’s challenge to the district court’s application of the six- level enhancement in § 3A1.2(c)(2). III Vick next contends that his sentence was “procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately explain its consideration of [his] mitigation arguments and the corresponding application.” He points to his youth at the time of his offending conduct; the tragedy of his childhood experiences, including being sent to prison at the age 9 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4275 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/13/2026 Pg: 10 of 14 of 16 and suffering child abuse; his efforts at self-improvement since entering prison, including his training, classwork, and good conduct in prison; and the length of his combined sentences. He contends that “[i]t is entirely unclear on the record how [his] arguments factored into his sentence or if the district court simply rejected [his] arguments.” In short, he maintains that the district court did not sufficiently address or consider his nonfrivolous arguments. Of course, even though sentencing involves a district court’s exercise of discretion, the court must nonetheless, as Vick rightly contends, sufficiently explain “‘the reasons for [the] imposition of [a] particular sentence’ ‘to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.’” United States v. Gaspar, 123 F.4th 178, 182 (4th Cir. 2024) (first quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); and then quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). And in providing its explanation, the court must “address or consider all non-frivolous reasons presented for imposing a different sentence and explain why [it] has rejected those arguments.” United States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740, 744 (4th Cir. 2019). But this requirement must be understood in the context of affording meaningful appellate review and fairness in sentencing. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356–59 (2007); United States v. Powers, 40 F.4th 129, 137 (4th Cir. 2022). Thus, when addressing the defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments, the court need not “address every argument a defendant makes” so long as it “focuses on the whole of a defendant’s argument.” United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 2020); see also Powers, 40 F.4th at 137. And on review, “we do not evaluate a court’s sentencing statements in a 10 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4275 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/13/2026 Pg: 11 of 14 vacuum but may discern the court’s rationale from the context surrounding its explanation.” Gaspar, 123 F.4th at 183 (cleaned up). In this case, the district court amply satisfied these requirements. The court explained, over the course of many pages of the sentencing transcript, Vick’s personal circumstances, both good and bad, and with unusual detail. The court began — and indeed ended — by noting that it had considered “all arguments” that Vick’s counsel had made, both at sentencing and in his sentencing memorandum. The court then described in detail the nature of Vick’s childhood difficulties, including his absent father, his mother’s drug abuse, his time in foster care, and his experience of abuse by an authority figure. The court noted that it had considered the challenges with Vick’s substance abuse as a young man, his age at the time of his first criminal offense (voluntary manslaughter), and “the totality of [his] criminal history.” It also noted that Vick had apparently had a “respite” from criminality for the 20-month period since he had been incarcerated at FCI Williamsburg. It recognized that Vick had earned a GED, that he was intelligent, that he had no infractions during that period, and that he had used his time at FCI Williamsburg productively. On the other hand, the court also explained that it was “really shameful” how Vick had failed his son by engaging in the criminal conduct before the court. The court recognized further that Vick was 34 years old and that he would be serving a long sentence for another conviction. Finally, the court proceeded to explain how it balanced Vick’s arguments with his “unrelenting” history of criminality and his involvement of his family in the drug- dealing scheme. In short, the court meaningfully and expressly considered virtually every nonfrivolous argument that Vick had presented to the court, explaining to him how it had 11 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4275 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/13/2026 Pg: 12 of 14 balanced the good factors with the bad. Put simply, there was essentially no more that the court could have said to Vick about his arguments, and it is somewhat perplexing that he now claims on appeal that the court was “entirely unclear.” Based on the district court’s fulsome explanation to Vick at sentencing, we conclude that any claim that the court failed to take account of Vick’s personal circumstances and his arguments for a lower sentence is baseless, and we reject his challenge. IV Finally, Vick contends that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court “did not properly balance the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors.” As he argues more specifically, [T]he district court failed to adequately consider that: (1) for a period of eight years during his childhood, Mr. Vick was repeatedly sexually assaulted by a law enforcement officer; (2) Mr. Vick has already demonstrated an increased respect for the law since his August 2023 sentence on unrelated federal charges; (3) a long sentence will not provide opportunities [or] protection to the community nor serve as any kind of deterrent. He adds that his previous federal sentence was “already sufficient to promote . . . respect [for the law], as demonstrated by Mr. Vick[’s] showing dramatic improvement while at FCI Williamsburg.” He thus concludes that his “sentence is greater than necessary to achieve” the goals of § 3553(a). After properly calculating Vick’s Guidelines range to be 92 to 115 months’ imprisonment, the district court, upon reviewing and applying the § 3553(a) factors, imposed a sentence of 102 months’ imprisonment, in the middle of the recommended sentencing range. 12 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4275 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/13/2026 Pg: 13 of 14 A sentence falling within the range recommended by the Sentencing Commission is “presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006). This standard is deferential, and a “defendant can only rebut the presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. (cleaned up). Section 3553(a) requires district courts to impose a sentence that is “‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes’ of the statute,” United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 176 (4th Cir. 2014), and in doing so, “district courts have extremely broad discretion when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a) factors,” United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011). Under such a deferential standard, we do not “substitute our judgment in weighing the relevant factors.” Id. (quoting United States v. Langston, 590 F.3d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009)). In short, Vick faces a high hurdle when attempting to rebut the presumption of reasonableness. The record in this case shows that the district court considered all of the § 3553(a) factors, as well as all of Vick’s arguments with respect to them, and exercising its discretion, the court balanced them to reach the sentence that it imposed. The court considered the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need to promote respect for law, provide just punishment, and afford adequate deterrence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). As we have noted, the court explained that it had considered arguments for both sides but emphasized that Vick had engaged in the “really serious criminal conduct” of distributing and conspiring to distribute drugs while already in jail on other pending charges. And it specifically noted that, in doing so, Vick 13 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4275 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/13/2026 Pg: 14 of 14 had brought his wife into the scheme and put his young son’s future in jeopardy, a factor that the court found to be “really shameful.” The court recognized Vick’s more recent 20- month period of good behavior, but found that it paled in comparison to the “totality of [Vick’s] criminal history,” which the court described as an “unrelenting period of criminality.” The court also considered Vick’s age and his other sentences, but it concluded that the within-Guidelines sentence was necessary given the “great need” for “just punishment, . . . incapacitation, and general deterrence.” We conclude that the district court thoroughly addressed the § 3553(a) factors and explained how it weighed them against Vick’s arguments in determining Vick’s sentence. In light of these circumstances, we conclude that Vick failed to clear the high hurdle of rebutting the presumption of reasonableness that applies to his within-Guidelines sentence. See Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d at 379; see also Rita, 551 U.S. at 350–51 (“[T]he courts of appeals’ ‘reasonableness’ presumption . . . simply recognizes the real-world circumstance that when the judge’s discretionary decision accords with the Commission’s view of the appropriate application of § 3553(a) in the mine run of cases, it is probable that the sentence is reasonable”). Accordingly, we reject Vick’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. * * * For the reasons given, we affirm the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED 14