Full Opinion

Supreme Court of Florida ____________ No. SC2024-1318 ____________ SAMUEL JASON DERRICK, Appellant, vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. October 8, 2026 PER CURIAM. Samuel Jason Derrick, a prisoner sentenced to death, appeals the postconviction court’s denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 motions. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.; see also State v. Fourth Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 697 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla. 1997) (holding “that in addition to our appellate jurisdiction over sentences of death, we have exclusive jurisdiction to review all types of collateral proceedings in death penalty cases”). We affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief. I A On June 25, 1987, Rama Sharma’s body was found near the general store Sharma owned in Moon Lake. Derrick v. State (Derrick I), 581 So. 2d 31, 33 (Fla. 1991). Derrick was identified as the culprit by the testimony of his friend, David Lowry. Derrick, after initially denying involvement, confessed to police that he stabbed and robbed Sharma. Derrick then confessed again when his wife was brought into the room: “He had sobbed to her that he did not know why he killed Sharma and that he could not believe that he stabbed him over thirty times.” Id. The jury recommended sentencing Derrick to death by an eight-to-four vote. Id. at 34. The judge imposed the death penalty finding several aggravators and little mitigation. Id. 1 Derrick appealed his conviction of first-degree murder and 1. The aggravators were “1) the murder was committed in the course of a robbery; 2) the murder was committed to avoid arrest; 3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel [HAC]; and 4) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner. In mitigation the judge found that Derrick was only twenty years old at the time of the murder. He found no other mitigation.” Derrick I, 581 So. 2d at 34 (footnote omitted). -2- death sentence by raising nine issues. Id. at 34-37. 2 This Court affirmed the conviction but found error with penalty phase testimony. 3 Derrick I, 581 So. 2d at 36. So this Court vacated Derrick’s sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase. Id. A jury again recommended the death penalty. Derrick v. State (Derrick II), 641 So. 2d 378, 379 (Fla. 1994). The trial court then 2. “Derrick argued that: (1) the trial court did not make an adequate inquiry under Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971), into the prosecution’s discovery violation; (2) the jury received highly prejudicial, irrelevant testimony which tainted the penalty recommendation; (3) he was denied a fair trial by being shackled throughout the proceedings; (4) he was denied a fair trial because the court did not inquire about jurors’ exposure to prejudicial media coverage; (5) the trial court erred in limiting the defense’s cross-examination of several State witnesses; (6) the trial court erred in overruling defense objections to the State’s improper closing arguments; (7) he was denied the right to a fair penalty recommendation when the court rejected his proposed jury instructions; (8) the court’s instructions on HAC were unconstitutionally vague; and (9) the imposed death sentence was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution because the court applied improper aggravating circumstances and excluded existing mitigating circumstances.” Derrick v. State (Derrick III), 983 So. 2d 443, 448 n.2 (Fla. 2008). 3. This “Court reversed Derrick’s death sentence based on its conclusion that the testimony offered by the State during the penalty phase from Randall James, a jailhouse informant, was impermissible and prejudicial because it suggested Derrick would kill again.” Derrick III, 983 So. 2d at 448. -3- found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced Derrick to death. Id. Derrick appealed his death sentence to this Court. This Court denied all of Derrick’s claims and upheld his sentence of death. Id. at 381.4 Derrick’s petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Derrick v. Florida, 513 U.S. 1130 (1995). B Derrick began the postconviction process by filing a shell Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion in 1997, which he later amended twice. Derrick v. State (Derrick III), 983 So. 2d 443, 449 (Fla. 2008). Derrick raised six claims in his initial motion. Id. 4. Derrick raised seven claims, all of which targeted the penalty phase. “This Court addressed four issues in detail: (1) whether the trial court erred in responding to a jury inquiry regarding a tie vote; (2) whether the court erred in instructing the jury on the aggravating factors that the killing occurred during the course of a robbery and was committed for pecuniary gain; (3) whether the court erred in finding that the killing was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest; and (4) whether the court erred in finding that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The remaining claims were: (1) the trial court erred in failing to consider all nonstatutory mitigating factors; (2) the court erred in finding that the killing was committed in perpetration of a felony; and (3) the death penalty was disproportionate to the crime. The Court found these claims meritless.” Derrick III, 983 So. 2d at 449 n.4 (citations omitted). -4- Derrick argued and received an evidentiary hearing on a sub-claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present available witnesses to testify that another man, Michael Keesling, made inculpatory statements about murdering Sharma. Derrick ended up abandoning this claim and presented no evidence. 5 All Derrick’s claims were ultimately denied by the postconviction court. Id. Derrick appealed that denial to this Court and filed a habeas petition. Id. at 447.6 This Court universally denied relief. Id. at 464. Derrick then filed his first successive motion for postconviction relief and argued that Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), applied to his prior adjudications. Derrick v. State, 236 So. 3d 231, 232 (Fla. 2018). This Court rejected that contention and affirmed 5. The postconviction court noted: “The defendant abandoned his remaining point concerning the guilt phase of the trial and no evidence was taken on that point.” 6. Along with the appeal of the six issues raised in the motion for postconviction relief, Derrick’s habeas petition argued two claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel: (1) appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to appeal the inaccuracies in the record, and (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the State’s improper closing argument. Id. at 463. -5- the denial of his motion. Id. Derrick filed three more successive postconviction motions, which together are at the heart of this appeal. The three motions rely on a theory of newly discovered evidence, describing allegedly relevant testimony that a now-deceased third party, Keesling (a/k/a Craze), is the real murderer of Sharma. Keesling died in 2009. We describe these latter three successive motions in turn. On July 14, 2022, Derrick filed his second successive motion in reliance on sworn statements provided by Claude Parker and Dawn Fayne. 7 According to Parker’s affidavit, Keesling stated: “******* dot head. I know right where that knife is. I stabbed that ****** ******. I stabbed him a bunch of times.” Keesling supposedly also said he hid the knife in Derrick’s gutter. Fayne, Keesling’s ex-girlfriend, said under oath that that she heard Keesling say, “I killed the dot head who owned this store. I stabbed him.” The affidavits of Fayne and Parker were obtained by Heather Barrow, Derrick’s investigator. Barrow found Parker and Fayne by conducting a general investigation of Moon Lake on Facebook in an 7. “Fayne” is also spelled as “Fain” several times throughout the record. -6- effort to find fresh leads on Derrick’s case. Barrow interviewed Parker and Fayne and had them sign affidavits that accompanied the second successive motion. Parker and Fayne distrusted police, so they, at the time of the original investigation, were not comfortable reporting what they had heard. But both their affidavits stipulated they would have revealed what Keesling told them if Derrick’s investigators had contacted them. On November 14, 2022, the court held an evidentiary hearing solely to determine whether Derrick’s claim based on the Parker and Fayne affidavits was timely. The court heard testimony from Parker, Fayne, and Barrow. The next day, the court entered an order finding Derrick’s claim was timely. The court then turned to whether the statements about what Keesling supposedly had said would have been admissible at Derrick’s trial. The court adjudicated that question in a final order that would cover all three successive postconviction motions being addressed in this appeal. On June 28, 2023, Derrick filed his third successive postconviction motion, this one based on statements provided by Kevin Melady. Melady was discovered by defense investigator Colin Kelly. Kelly was assigned to Derrick’s case on August 23, 2022— -7- after the discovery of Parker and Fayne. Kelly’s affidavit explained that he continued Barrow’s search for information relating to Keesling and found Melady by combing Pasco County Sheriff’s Office records and contacting Keesling’s ex-girlfriend. Melady claimed to hear Keesling state that “[Derrick] didn’t kill that Indian, I did” and “[Derrick is] on death row for a crime he didn’t commit.” Melady, like Parker and Fayne, allegedly did not trust the police so he did not report what Keesling had said. The court heard testimony from the defense investigator, entered an order finding the third successive motion timely, and consolidated that motion with the earlier second successive one. On March 11, 2024, Derrick filed his fourth successive motion, this final one based on statements provided by Thomas Kavanaugh. Kavanaugh’s affidavit stated Keesling had confessed that he “killed [Sharma] down by the Boondocks, the one that had the store” and that he “stabbed the **** out of him.” Keesling then supposedly threatened to kill Kavanaugh if he ever spoke to anyone about the murder. Kelly, the subsequent investigator who had found Melady after following up on Barrow’s work, also learned of Kavanaugh through Derrick’s brother. Kelly had not been able to -8- locate and meet with Kavanaugh until January 29, 2024. Kavanaugh, like the other supposed witnesses, failed to report Keesling’s alleged confession earlier because of his distrust of police. The postconviction court heard from witnesses over the course of several different days, between February 2023 and June 2024. Barbara Snapp, Claude Parker, and Cecile Huff testified they all heard Keesling discuss Sharma’s murder and make various statements that either directly took responsibility for the murder, or at least suggested it. Peer Starr was Derrick’s original postconviction investigator, who interviewed Billie Vernon. Vernon supposedly explained to Starr that she saw Lowry and Keesling throwing away bloody clothes in the dumpster in front of her trailer. Cherie Forness, while married to Derrick, had an “unsettling” conversation with Keesling about the investigation. On August 19, 2024, the postconviction court denied relief. The court applied the standard we set out in Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991), for reviewing newly discovered evidence. Under that standard, a defendant must prove the evidence would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. Id. at 915-16. Derrick argued to -9- the postconviction court that the hearsay statements would be admissible at a new trial either under the statement-against- interest exception to the hearsay rule or as a third-party admission of guilt under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). The postconviction court agreed with the State and denied admissibility under both the hearsay exception and Chambers. The court concluded the hearsay statements either did not inculpate Keesling or were not relevant because they did not exculpate Derrick. It also determined that none of the statements were sufficiently corroborated. After finding that the statements would be inadmissible at a new trial, the court found a cumulative analysis unnecessary and denied relief on all three motions. II On appeal, Derrick argues the postconviction court erred in denying his postconviction motions on the grounds that Keesling’s statements would be inadmissible statements, neither satisfying the statement-against-interest exception to the hearsay rule nor constituting a third-party admission of guilt under Chambers. Postconviction claims in capital cases must generally be filed within one year after the judgment and sentence become final. Fla. - 10 - R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1). And rule 3.851 prohibits, with certain exceptions, both untimely and repetitive claims. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2) (providing that “[a] claim raised in a successive motion must be dismissed . . . if the trial court finds the claim fails to meet the time limitation exceptions set forth in subdivision (d)(2)(A), (d)(2)(B), or (d)(2)(C)”). One such exception is for postconviction motions based on newly discovered evidence. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A). However, if a defendant seeks to pursue a postconviction claim based on newly discovered evidence, he must establish (1) that the newly discovered evidence was unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial and it could not have been discovered through due diligence, and (2) that the evidence is of such a nature that it would probably . . . yield a less severe sentence on retrial. Dailey v. State, 329 So. 3d 1280, 1285 (Fla. 2021). Because the postconviction court denied relief following an evidentiary hearing, we apply a mixed standard of review. Swafford v. State, 125 So. 3d 760, 767-68 (Fla. 2013). We review findings of fact and credibility determinations for competent, substantial evidence and the application of law to the facts de novo. Id. - 11 - A The parties’ dispute centers on the second prong of the Jones standard—whether the evidence is of such a nature that it would probably yield a less severe sentence on retrial. Primarily, the parties dispute the admissibility of the alleged newly discovered evidence that Derrick sets forth. Again, to constitute newly discovered evidence under Swafford, 125 So. 3d at 768, to meet the time-bar exception, the evidence would have to be admissible at a retrial. Robinson v. State, 707 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1998) (finding that affidavit, in which codefendant recanted testimony favorable to the State, failed to qualify as newly discovered evidence to support postconviction relief because the hearsay statements lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to qualify for the inadmissibility exception for a statement against interest). Derrick claims his newly discovered evidence is the testimony of new witnesses as detailed above. Through affidavits and at the evidentiary hearing, they testified that Keesling confessed to committing the murder for which Derrick was convicted. Each witness statement is a variation of the same story: that Keesling murdered Sharma, hid the knife, and allowed Derrick to take the - 12 - blame. Their pertinent statements also are quintessential hearsay—every new witness merely relaying what Keesling, now deceased, had told them. See § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2022) (defining hearsay as an out-of-court “statement . . . offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted”). So, the question is whether an exception to the hearsay rule applies. Derrick primarily relies on a hearsay exception found in section 90.804(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2022). That provision, setting out an exception for a statement against penal interest, requires that the party seeking to admit the evidence show (1) the declarant is unavailable, (2) the statement is relevant, (3) the statement tends to inculpate the declarant and exculpate the defendant, and (4) the statement is corroborated. Here, finding the first two requirements satisfied, the postconviction court denied Derrick’s claim based on the third and fourth requirements, a decision with which we do not disagree. 1 As to the third requirement—that a statement tend to inculpate the declarant and exculpate the defendant—the postconviction court did not err in concluding Keesling’s statements - 13 - were not clearly against his interests. The statement had to have been “so far contrary” to his interests that “a person in [Keesling’s] position would not have made the statement unless he . . . believed it to be true.” § 90.804(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Statements made in an egotistical, bragging, or boasting manner are of negligible probative value. See Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 994 (Fla. 2009) (finding a declarant’s purpose for the hearsay statements was likely “braggadocio” and “tough talk,” which obviated the probative value of evidence); Jones, 709 So. 2d at 525- 26 (explaining that an environment where a declarant socially benefits from bragging about murder lessens any serious penal interest at play); see also Larry v. State, 241 So. 3d 246, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (“We recognize that bragging about criminal activity may lessen the reliability somewhat.”). The postconviction court’s finding that Keesling’s statements were used to his reputational advantage is reinforced by the evidence of Moon Lake’s culture. Specifically, the postconviction court observed that the testimony throughout these proceedings demonstrate[s] that Moon Lake is an unusual, somewhat lawless area, where residents live by a different set of - 14 - rules and where “outlaws” and gangs reign and snitches are reprimanded. Here, two of the statements were made in situations where Keesling appeared to be boasting. Parker clearly testified that Keesling was “bragging” and “conniving” when he made the statements. Likewise, [Fayne] indicated that Keesling was “forceful and proud” when he made the alleged statements to her. Further, the testimony indicated that Keesling called himself “The Mayor of Moon Lake,” and made statements to Kavanaugh at a party of 20-22 people. A third-party confession made in the context of a declarant bragging to friends must be viewed cautiously. (Citations and footnote omitted). The affidavits also support the postconviction court’s determination that Keesling, whose street name was Craze, had a reputation in the community for violence—a reputation that he advanced. For example, when asked about a human skull on his cabinet, Keesling responded: “Hell yeah, I've killed people. I was in the service. . . . I stabbed the **** out of [Sharma]. . . . If you ever tell anyone, your skull will be on the shelf too.” Taking the culture of Moon Lake together with Keesling’s efforts to maintain a violent reputation, we find no error with the postconviction court’s conclusion that the statements were unreliable. 2 Even if the statements met the third requirement, the - 15 - postconviction court did not err in concluding the statements were uncorroborated—an independent basis supporting the court’s decision denying postconviction relief. Statements against penal interest are inadmissible as an exception “unless corroborating circumstances show the trustworthiness of the statement.” § 90.804(2)(c), Fla. Stat. In assessing “corroborating circumstances,” courts examine evidence presented at trial, the setting of the statements, and any other relevant circumstances that show the reliability of the statement. See Carpenter v. State, 785 So. 2d 1182, 1202-03 (Fla. 2001); Franqui v. State, 699 So. 2d 1312, 1318-19 (Fla. 1997); Bearden v. State, 161 So. 3d 1257, 1266 (Fla. 2015); Payton v. State, 239 So. 3d 129, 133 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). “The question for the trial court [is] whether [Keesling’s] statements were sufficiently corroborated to be reliable evidence— not whether [Keesling’s] statements were so credible as to prove [Derrick’s] defense.” Masaka v. State, 4 So. 3d 1274, 1283 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). To begin, Derrick’s strongest evidence for corroboration are Keesling’s multiple independent confessions and statements from a Moon Lake resident named Vernon who allegedly saw Keesling and - 16 - Lowry dumping bloody clothes out the day after the murder. Yet Vernon is deceased, so Starr’s testimony about what Vernon said she saw Lowry and Keesling do would also be hearsay, with no relevant exceptions. Starr’s testimony, then, is not competent corroborating evidence. Next, Keesling’s statements do not account for Lowry’s testimony at trial. Lowry testified that Derrick admitted to him in private to murdering Sharma and showed up at Lowry’s house at 1:30 a.m. the morning after the murder missing a shirt. Derrick I, 581 So. 2d at 33. Also, Derrick confessed in front of police and then confessed again when police brought in his wife. Id. Derrick did not challenge this confession on direct appeal or the appeal after being resentenced to death. Derrick’s first challenge to his confessions came on his third appeal to this Court, in which Derrick argued that trial counsel was ineffective for not attacking the detective’s inconsistent testimony, not attacking the investigative techniques, and not hiring a confession expert. Derrick III, 983 So. 2d at 451-52. This Court rejected challenges to the sufficiency of Derrick’s confession based on the record, as follows: - 17 - In [denying a suppression of confession claim], we also deem it important that Derrick does not allege that his confession to Detective Vaughn was actually false. .... . . . [N]one of the identified inconsistencies [in the detective’s testimony] would have led to the suppression of the confession as either coerced or involuntary. . . . . . . There is nothing about the circumstances of Derrick’s confession that suggest it was coerced, involuntary or otherwise inadmissible . . . based on the record in this case, and nothing that Derrick has alleged would alter the conclusion that the confession was voluntary and admissible. Accordingly, this claim is conclusively refuted by the record. Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). Third, both FBI Special Agent David Attenberger and Detective Vaughn testified at trial that Derrick’s tennis shoes were consistent with the shoeprints at the crime scene. There was testimony “that the FBI report indicated that [Derrick’s] shoes were similar in size, wear, make, and design to the imprints from the crime scene.” Fourth, the postconviction court found that the setting in which the statements were allegedly made cut against corroboration, explaining as follows: Without considering credibility, this Court has limited its analysis to determining the reliability of Keesling’s statements. In doing so, the Court has considered the circumstances and context in which Keesling’s statements were made, Keesling’s state of intoxication at the time the various statements were - 18 - made to the witnesses presented by the defense, Keesling’s constant consumption of alcohol and/or drugs when the statements were uttered, the details (or lack thereof) contained in Keesling’s statements, the substantial delay in reporting, inconsistencies in statements, and the corroboration of Keesling’s statement. As such, based on the Court’s evaluation of the foregoing factors, this Court finds that there remains a question about the reliability of the [sic] Keesling’s out- of-court statements. (Footnote omitted.) This conclusion—that almost all of Keesling’s alleged statements were made while the declarant and the listener, or both, were under the influence—further supports the postconviction court’s holding. See Payton, 239 So. 3d at 133 (finding lower court did not abuse its discretion by not admitting statements where the declarant was “under the influence of narcotics and alcohol” and there was no evidence further linking the third party to the murder). B Finally, we note that the parties’ briefing to this Court presents argument based on Chambers v. Mississippi, an argument which the postconviction court resolved against Derrick. But Chambers is inapplicable to Keesling’s statements because he is unavailable to testify and Florida recognizes a hearsay exception for - 19 - statements against penal interests. See generally McWatters v. State, 36 So. 3d 613, 639 n.8 (Fla. 2010) (explaining that Chambers does not apply to procedurally or factually different cases); Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128, 1144-45 (Fla. 2006); Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 661 n.6 (Fla. 2000) (“In Jones, this Court recognized that Chambers has since been limited to the specific facts and circumstances in that case because Mississippi evidence law did not permit an exception to the hearsay rules for statements against penal interest.” (citing Jones, 709 So. 2d at 524-25)). III In sum, the postconviction court did not err in concluding that the evidence submitted by Derrick through his postconviction motions failed to satisfy the Jones standard for newly discovered evidence. As the postconviction court correctly concluded, the evidence would have been inadmissible at retrial. We affirm the denial of postconviction relief. It is so ordered. COURIEL, C.J., and GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, BARRIOS, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. MUÑIZ, J., concurs in result with an opinion, in which LABARGA, J., concurs. - 20 - NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. MUÑIZ, J., concurring in result. I would affirm on the basis that Derrick did not establish the timeliness of the newly discovered evidence claims disposed of in the final order on appeal. LABARGA, J., concurs. An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pasco County, Stanley Mills, Judge Case No. 511987CF001775CFAXWS Serbo C. Simeoni, Clearwater, Florida, for Appellant James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Rick A. Buchwalter, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee - 21 -