Full Opinion

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ Case No. 5D2026-0508 LT Case No. 05-2024-DP-1525 _____________________________ A.C., Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County. Charles G. Crawford, Judge. Matthew Metz, Public Defender, and Brian Hyer, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Deborah Chance, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. October 2, 2026 PER CURIAM. A.C. appeals the trial court’s final order finding her guilty of indirect criminal contempt following a non-jury trial. She raises two arguments for reversal, the first of which we find to be dispositive. A.C. asserts that the trial court reversibly erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal because there was not a clear and precise order issued by the court prohibiting any of the three actions for which she was found to be in contempt. We agree. 1 I A.C. is the mother of three minor children. In 2019, her marriage to the father of these children was dissolved in California. It is undisputed that both A.C. and her ex-husband were each awarded some custodial rights or timesharing with their children, albeit the specifics are not clear from our record. Not long after the divorce, A.C. moved to Connecticut with the three minor children; and her ex-husband moved to Florida where he remarried. The children lived with A.C. in Connecticut until early 2023. Litigation ensued there that resulted in the minor children coming to live with their father and stepmother in Florida. II In August 2024, the children’s father, joined by their stepmother, filed a petition in the Florida circuit court to terminate A.C.’s parental rights to the three children and for the stepmother to adopt the children. During the course of this litigation, A.C. committed three separate acts outside the presence of the trial court that led to the instant indirect criminal contempt proceeding being filed against A.C. for allegedly violating court orders prohibiting her from having direct or indirect contact with the children. The actions for which A.C. was charged and would later be found guilty at trial of indirect criminal contempt occurred on April 14, 2025; in May of 2025; and on September 25, 2025. Specifically, on April 14, 2025, A.C. appeared at the children’s home in Florida to take them out to dinner. Next, in May 2025, A.C., through an entity named New Worlds Reading, sent two packages of books to 1 Based on this disposition, we decline to address A.C.’s second argument on appeal. 2 the elementary school where her two eldest children attended. These books, which were intended to assist children reading below grade level, were to be delivered to the children. Lastly, on September 25, 2025, A.C. filed a pro se petition with the California court to enforce her custodial or timesharing rights with the children previously awarded by that court. Our record does not show that the California court took action on the petition or that A.C.’s minor children were contacted about this filing. III The State called several witnesses at A.C.’s indirect criminal contempt trial to prove that A.C. committed these above-described acts in violation of court orders. At the close of the State’s evidence, A.C., who did not dispute having taken these actions, moved for judgment of acquittal arguing that she could not be found guilty of indirect criminal conduct because there was no clear and precise order emanating from the Florida court that prohibited her from doing these acts. The trial court denied the motion and, at the conclusion of trial, found her guilty of indirect criminal contempt. This appeal ensued. IV Section 38.23, Florida Statutes (2024), defines “contempt” as follows: “[a] refusal to obey any legal order, mandate or decree, made or given by any judge relative to any of the business of the court, after due notice thereof, is a contempt, punishable accordingly.” When, as here, such conduct is committed outside the presence of the court, it is considered indirect criminal contempt. Plank v. State, 190 So. 3d 594, 606 (Fla. 2016) (citation omitted). As previously mentioned, A.C.’s first argument here is that the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal. Our standard of review is de novo; and, in so doing, we must consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to the State. Wallace v. State, 240 So. 3d 872, 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (citing Perez v. State, 138 So. 3d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)). A.C. has no quarrel with 3 this principle as she does not dispute that she did the acts in question that led to the instant contempt charges. A.C. more precisely asserts that the trial court committed legal error in finding that her behavior constituted contempt of court because none of the three actions that she did was clearly prohibited by any order of the trial court below. See Ford v. Ford, 153 So. 3d 315, 318 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“[W]here the trial court bases contempt upon noncompliance with something an order does not say, ‘the standard of review is legal error, not abuse of discretion.’” (quoting Harris v. Hampton, 70 So. 3d 747, 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011))); Sanger v. Asher, 385 So. 3d 1093, 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (providing that an appellate court reviews issues of legal error in a non-jury trial under the de novo standard) (citation omitted). V “For a person to be held in contempt of a court order, the language of the order must be clear and precise, and the behavior of the person must clearly violate the order.” Paul v. Johnson, 604 So. 2d 883, 884 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). Additionally, and pertinent here, “[a]s a general rule, the power to punish for contempt rests with the court contemned, and one court cannot punish a contempt against another court.” Guntner v. Jennings, 980 So. 2d 1185, 1188 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (alteration in original) (first quoting Graham v. State, 144 So. 2d 97, 98 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962); and then citing 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 69 (2002) (“The court which renders the order . . . is alone vested with the right to determine, on a rule for contempt for failure to comply with the order, whether the order has been complied with or a sufficient reason given for failure to comply therewith.”)). As to the first two acts of A.C. arriving at the children’s home on April 14, 2025, and then, in May 2025, causing school books to be sent through a third party to the children’s school, no order had been rendered by the trial court in this case that specifically prohibited A.C. from having any contact with the children. At best, there had been an order entered by the Connecticut court in its now-dismissed 2023 proceeding that had prohibited A.C. in that 4 case from having contact with the children. That order, however, was never domesticated as a Florida court order. Resultingly, we hold that the trial court committed legal error in finding A.C. to be in indirect criminal contempt for her actions of April 14, 2025, and May of 2025. VI However, and in contrast, by the time A.C. filed her petition in the California court on September 25, 2025, seeking enforcement of her custodial or timesharing rights with the children granted by that court, the trial court here, at a hearing held two weeks prior, orally ordered A.C. to have no direct or indirect contact with the children. That directive was subsequently reduced to a written order containing this verbiage. Admittedly, A.C.’s action of September 25, 2025, in filing her petition asking the California court to enforce her timesharing with the children likely violated the spirit of the Florida court’s order. Nevertheless, “a finding of contempt requires the violation of the letter of an order—not its spirit.” Reder v. Miller, 102 So. 3d 742, 744 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Stated slightly differently, “implied or inherent provisions of an injunction cannot serve as the basis for a contempt order.” Ogden v. Mindrebo, 316 So. 3d 379, 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (citations omitted). A.C.’s petition did not result in her having direct or indirect contact with the children, and the Florida court order did not precisely prohibit A.C. from filing a petition. We therefore hold that the trial court erred in finding A.C. guilty of indirect criminal contempt regarding her actions of September 25, 2025. 2 Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order finding A.C. guilty of indirect criminal contempt and remand with directions to the trial court that it enter a final order finding A.C. not guilty of indirect criminal contempt. 2 The State’s answer brief did not substantively challenge the merits of A.C.’s argument here. Instead, the State submitted that this appeal should be dismissed as moot. We disagree. See Hagan v. State, 853 So. 2d 595, 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). 5 ORDER VACATED; REMANDED for entry of order finding A.C. not guilty of indirect criminal contempt. WALLIS, LAMBERT, and HARRIS, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ 6