The State of Florida v. Aristides Quero
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledMay 20, 2020
Docket3D18-1820
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed May 20, 2020.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D18-1820
Lower Tribunal No. 17-18856
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The State of Florida,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
vs.
Aristides Quero,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Marisa Tinkler
Mendez, Judge.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kayla Heather McNab, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan S. Lerner, Assistant Public
Defender, for appellee/cross-appellant.
Before FERNANDEZ, HENDON and LOBREE, JJ.
HENDON, J.
The State of Florida appeals from a downward departure sentence imposed on
Aristides Quero after his conviction for felony battery with great bodily harm with
a weapon. We affirm.
The Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated battery with great
bodily harm with a weapon. A jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of
felony battery. § 784.041, Fla. Stat. (2016). The trial court denied the Defendant’s
motion for judgment of acquittal. The guideline sentence indicated a minimum of
31.2 months in state prison as a habitual felony offender. Prior to sentencing, the
defense counsel filed a motion for a downward departure sentence arguing that the
victim provoked the incident, and was a willing participant in the escalation of the
offense. After considering the arguments for and against departure, the trial court
granted the defense motion, downwardly departed, and sentenced the Defendant to
sixteen months in state prison, followed by two years of community control,
followed by three years of reporting probation, a mental health evaluation and
treatment, and a probation requirement of 100 hours of community service. The
State appeals from the downward departure sentence.
The trial court departed from the sentencing guidelines based on section
921.0026(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2012). 1 Competent, substantial evidence must
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§ 921.0026. Mitigating circumstances
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exist to support a sentencing departure. Hardie v. State, 162 So. 3d 297, 301 (Fla.
2d DCA 2015) (citing Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065, 1067 (Fla. 1999)). As
explained in Banks,
A trial court's decision whether to depart from the guidelines is a two-
part process. First, the court must determine whether it can depart, i.e.,
whether there is a valid legal ground and adequate factual support for
that ground in the case pending before it (step 1). Legal grounds are set
forth in case law and statute, and facts supporting the ground must be
proved at trial by “a preponderance of the evidence.” This aspect of the
court's decision to depart is a mixed question of law and fact and will
be sustained on review if the court applied the right rule of law and if
competent substantial evidence supports its ruling. Competent
substantial evidence is tantamount to legally sufficient evidence, and
the appellate court will assess the record evidence for its sufficiency
only, not its weight.
Second, where the step 1 requirements are met, the trial court
further must determine whether it should depart, i.e., whether departure
is indeed the best sentencing option for the defendant in the pending
case. In making this determination (step 2), the court must weigh the
totality of the circumstances in the case, including aggravating and
mitigating factors. This second aspect of the decision to depart is a
judgment call within the sound discretion of the court and will be
sustained on review absent an abuse of discretion. Discretion is abused
only where no reasonable person would agree with the trial court's
decision.
(1) A downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence, as calculated
according to the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024, is prohibited unless
there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure.
Mitigating factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, those listed in
subsection (2). The imposition of a sentence below the lowest permissible sentence
is subject to appellate review under chapter 924, but the extent of downward
departure is not subject to appellate review.
(2) Mitigating circumstances under which a departure from the lowest permissible
sentence is reasonably justified include, but are not limited to: . . .
(f) The victim was an initiator, willing participant, aggressor, or
provoker of the incident.
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Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065, 1067–68 (Fla. 1999) (footnotes omitted).
In deciding whether to depart from the guidelines, the record shows that the
court took into consideration the history of hostility between the parties and the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the offense. After questioning the parties
at length, the trial court concluded that there was some evidence of provocation by
the victim and thus there existed a valid legal ground to depart from the
recommended sentencing guidelines. Id. at 1068. Having articulated on the record
sufficient evidence in support of the legal ground for a departure sentence, the trial
court’s decision to grant the Defendant’s motion at that point was discretionary. Id.
On this record we find no error or abuse of discretion, and affirm the downward
departure sentence imposed on the Defendant.2 We decline to reach the issues on
cross-appeal.
Affirmed.
2
We note that the Defendant has finished the prison portion of his sentence (his
expected release date was 10/5/2019 followed by two years of community control
and five years of probation). As he has completed the incarceration portion of his
sentence prior to resolution of this appeal, he cannot be resentenced to additional
prison time on these facts. See Regueiro v. State, 619 So. 2d 463, 464 (Fla. 4th DCA
1993) (holding that once a person begins serving a lawfully imposed sentence, he
cannot be resentenced for an increased term of incarceration on the same facts).
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