George McCarty v. Stephen Lister and Traci Lister
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket4D2025-1761
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
GEORGE MCCARTY, CARRIE MCCARTY, KELCEE MCCARTY,
JESSICA MCCARTY, and GEORGE MCCARTY,
as Parent and Natural Guardian of T.M., a Minor,
Appellants,
v.
STEPHEN LISTER and TRACI LISTER,
Appellees.
No. 4D2025-1761
[November 18, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
Martin County; Elizabeth Ann Metzger, Judge; L.T. Case No.
432020CA001116CAAXMX.
Andrew A. Harris and Grace Mackey Streicher of Harris Appeals, P.A.,
Palm Beach Gardens, and Timothy C. Felice of Felice Trial Attorneys, West
Palm Beach, for appellants.
Andrew A. Labbe of Salmon, Salmon, Labbe & Dehne, Tampa, for
appellees.
CIKLIN, J.
George McCarty and his family appeal from a final judgment entered
after a jury returned a verdict for their landlords, Stephen and Traci Lister,
in this premises liability action. The McCarty family contends: the
landlord’s counsel’s improper references to McCarty’s consultation with an
attorney required a mistrial or new trial; the trial court inadequately
instructed the jury concerning the landlords’ maintenance duties; and the
cumulative effect of the asserted errors requires reversal.
We affirm. We write to explain why counsel’s repeated suggestion that
McCarty changed his account after consulting an attorney was improper,
and why the trial court properly acted within its discretion in denying a
mistrial or new trial. We affirm the instructional issue without discussion.
McCarty suffered serious injuries after falling over a seawall at the
home which his family had rented from the landlords. McCarty testified
that the ground beside the seawall had opened beneath him, trapping his
foot, and his effort to free himself propelled him over the seawall. The
McCartys attributed the accident to defective seawall construction and
resulting erosion.
The landlords disputed that account, and relied on McCarty’s medical
records containing his differing descriptions of the accident, including that
McCarty had slipped while fishing or lost his balance. McCarty attributed
those discrepancies to his concussion and medication.
During opening statement, the landlords’ counsel discussed an
account which McCarty reportedly had given to emergency medical
personnel, to which the landlords’ counsel added: “No lawyers, no
consultations.” The trial court sustained the McCartys’ objection, and
instructed the jury to disregard the statement concerning when McCarty
had first spoken with counsel.
Later, during the landlords’ cross-examination of McCarty, the
landlords’ counsel identified a medical record containing McCarty’s
account that the ground had given way, followed by McCarty being asked
whether he had seen a lawyer. The trial court sustained the McCartys’
objection before McCarty could answer. Following discussion outside the
jury’s presence, the court trial denied the McCartys’ motion for mistrial,
and instructed the jury, “[T]he last question posed by [the landlords’]
counsel before we took a break was improper. I am instructing you to
disregard that question. It is not to be considered by you in any manner.”
The trial court also reminded the jury that the lawyers’ statements were
not evidence.
After a seven-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for the landlords,
answering “no” to both liability questions. The trial court entered final
judgment for the landlords, and denied the McCartys’ motion for new trial.
We review the denial of a motion for mistrial or new trial for abuse of
discretion. Howard v. Palmer, 123 So. 3d 1171, 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rindner, 996 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2008). In assessing preserved claims of improper comments, we
consider whether the comments were “so highly prejudicial and
inflammatory that [the comments] denied the opposing party its right to a
fair trial.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Medina, 300 So. 3d 177, 181
(Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (quoting Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246,
1271 (Fla. 2006)). In making that assessment, we recognize the trial
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court’s superior position to evaluate how the challenged comments may
have impacted the jury. Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Malpica, 419 So. 3d 1198,
1202 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025). The fact that a trial court gives a curative
instruction does not insulate the ruling from appellate scrutiny. Instead,
we collectively consider the challenged conduct and the curative
instruction’s adequacy.
The parties do not dispute that counsel’s references were improper.
However, the impropriety of counsel’s conduct, and the necessity of a new
trial, remain distinct inquiries, and we turn to why the impropriety here
did not require a new trial.
We recognize that McCarty’s credibility was central to the landlords’
defense, and their counsel’s insinuation that McCarty, after contacting an
attorney, had fabricated his story, targeted the jury’s assessment of his
differing accounts. The existence of admissible impeachment evidence
therefore does not, by itself, resolve the question of prejudice. The jury
still had to evaluate McCarty’s differing accounts, without necessarily
considering whether McCarty’s consultation with an attorney was evidence
of fabrication.
The trial court sustained the McCartys’ objections to both of counsel’s
questions and, following the later question, expressly instructed the jury
that the later question was improper and could not be considered “in any
manner.” The trial court also reminded the jury that counsel’s statements
were not evidence. Considering the two references together, the trial
court’s express corrective instructions, and the evidentiary context in
which the references had occurred, we conclude that the trial court acted
within its discretion in denying a mistrial or new trial.
The McCartys cite Howard as a comparable case requiring reversal, but
there, we reversed based on the combined effect of an improperly
suggestive question that had violated a pretrial order and additional
prejudicial statements. 123 So. 3d at 1173-74. Howard demonstrates
that a curative instruction does not invariably remedy the sort of
suggestion at issue here. Rather, our conclusion rests on our assessment
of these references together, and the trial court’s express corrective
instructions, in the context of this record.
We have considered the McCartys’ arguments collectively, including
their claim of cumulative error, and conclude that reversal is not
warranted.
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Our affirmance rests on our determination that the improper
comments, considered in conjunction with the trial court’s adequate
response thereto, were not so highly inflammatory and prejudicial as to
deny the McCartys the right to a fair trial.
Affirmed.
LOTT, J., and CARBUCCIA, ELAINE A., Associate Judge, concur.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.
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