Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT GEORGE MCCARTY, CARRIE MCCARTY, KELCEE MCCARTY, JESSICA MCCARTY, and GEORGE MCCARTY, as Parent and Natural Guardian of T.M., a Minor, Appellants, v. STEPHEN LISTER and TRACI LISTER, Appellees. No. 4D2025-1761 [November 18, 2026] Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Martin County; Elizabeth Ann Metzger, Judge; L.T. Case No. 432020CA001116CAAXMX. Andrew A. Harris and Grace Mackey Streicher of Harris Appeals, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, and Timothy C. Felice of Felice Trial Attorneys, West Palm Beach, for appellants. Andrew A. Labbe of Salmon, Salmon, Labbe & Dehne, Tampa, for appellees. CIKLIN, J. George McCarty and his family appeal from a final judgment entered after a jury returned a verdict for their landlords, Stephen and Traci Lister, in this premises liability action. The McCarty family contends: the landlord’s counsel’s improper references to McCarty’s consultation with an attorney required a mistrial or new trial; the trial court inadequately instructed the jury concerning the landlords’ maintenance duties; and the cumulative effect of the asserted errors requires reversal. We affirm. We write to explain why counsel’s repeated suggestion that McCarty changed his account after consulting an attorney was improper, and why the trial court properly acted within its discretion in denying a mistrial or new trial. We affirm the instructional issue without discussion. McCarty suffered serious injuries after falling over a seawall at the home which his family had rented from the landlords. McCarty testified that the ground beside the seawall had opened beneath him, trapping his foot, and his effort to free himself propelled him over the seawall. The McCartys attributed the accident to defective seawall construction and resulting erosion. The landlords disputed that account, and relied on McCarty’s medical records containing his differing descriptions of the accident, including that McCarty had slipped while fishing or lost his balance. McCarty attributed those discrepancies to his concussion and medication. During opening statement, the landlords’ counsel discussed an account which McCarty reportedly had given to emergency medical personnel, to which the landlords’ counsel added: “No lawyers, no consultations.” The trial court sustained the McCartys’ objection, and instructed the jury to disregard the statement concerning when McCarty had first spoken with counsel. Later, during the landlords’ cross-examination of McCarty, the landlords’ counsel identified a medical record containing McCarty’s account that the ground had given way, followed by McCarty being asked whether he had seen a lawyer. The trial court sustained the McCartys’ objection before McCarty could answer. Following discussion outside the jury’s presence, the court trial denied the McCartys’ motion for mistrial, and instructed the jury, “[T]he last question posed by [the landlords’] counsel before we took a break was improper. I am instructing you to disregard that question. It is not to be considered by you in any manner.” The trial court also reminded the jury that the lawyers’ statements were not evidence. After a seven-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for the landlords, answering “no” to both liability questions. The trial court entered final judgment for the landlords, and denied the McCartys’ motion for new trial. We review the denial of a motion for mistrial or new trial for abuse of discretion. Howard v. Palmer, 123 So. 3d 1171, 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rindner, 996 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). In assessing preserved claims of improper comments, we consider whether the comments were “so highly prejudicial and inflammatory that [the comments] denied the opposing party its right to a fair trial.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Medina, 300 So. 3d 177, 181 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (quoting Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1271 (Fla. 2006)). In making that assessment, we recognize the trial 2 court’s superior position to evaluate how the challenged comments may have impacted the jury. Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Malpica, 419 So. 3d 1198, 1202 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025). The fact that a trial court gives a curative instruction does not insulate the ruling from appellate scrutiny. Instead, we collectively consider the challenged conduct and the curative instruction’s adequacy. The parties do not dispute that counsel’s references were improper. However, the impropriety of counsel’s conduct, and the necessity of a new trial, remain distinct inquiries, and we turn to why the impropriety here did not require a new trial. We recognize that McCarty’s credibility was central to the landlords’ defense, and their counsel’s insinuation that McCarty, after contacting an attorney, had fabricated his story, targeted the jury’s assessment of his differing accounts. The existence of admissible impeachment evidence therefore does not, by itself, resolve the question of prejudice. The jury still had to evaluate McCarty’s differing accounts, without necessarily considering whether McCarty’s consultation with an attorney was evidence of fabrication. The trial court sustained the McCartys’ objections to both of counsel’s questions and, following the later question, expressly instructed the jury that the later question was improper and could not be considered “in any manner.” The trial court also reminded the jury that counsel’s statements were not evidence. Considering the two references together, the trial court’s express corrective instructions, and the evidentiary context in which the references had occurred, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying a mistrial or new trial. The McCartys cite Howard as a comparable case requiring reversal, but there, we reversed based on the combined effect of an improperly suggestive question that had violated a pretrial order and additional prejudicial statements. 123 So. 3d at 1173-74. Howard demonstrates that a curative instruction does not invariably remedy the sort of suggestion at issue here. Rather, our conclusion rests on our assessment of these references together, and the trial court’s express corrective instructions, in the context of this record. We have considered the McCartys’ arguments collectively, including their claim of cumulative error, and conclude that reversal is not warranted. 3 Our affirmance rests on our determination that the improper comments, considered in conjunction with the trial court’s adequate response thereto, were not so highly inflammatory and prejudicial as to deny the McCartys the right to a fair trial. Affirmed. LOTT, J., and CARBUCCIA, ELAINE A., Associate Judge, concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing. 4