Full Opinion

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT ERIC PARRAVANI, DOC #F20101, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D19-569 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed July 8, 2020. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Nancy Moate Ley, Judge. Rachael E. Reese of O'Brien Hatfield, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Peter Koclanes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. CASE, JAMES R., Associate Senior Judge. Mr. Parravani was convicted of twenty counts of possession of child pornography and sentenced to concurrent fifteen-year prison terms on ten of the counts and, consecutive to those sentences, to concurrent twelve-year prison sentences followed by three years of probation on each of the remaining ten counts. In this appeal from his judgment and sentences, Mr. Parravani has raised issues related to both his convictions and his sentences. We affirm his judgment and sentences and, with the exceptions noted below, do so without further comment. Because Mr. Parravani has argued issues related to the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal under the circumstantial evidence standard, we recognize that to any extent that the recent opinion issued in Bush v. State, SC18-227, 2020 WL 2479140 (Fla. May 14, 2020), which issued while his appeal was pending, altered that standard for the purposes of our review of this case, our affirmance of Mr. Parravani's judgment under the facts of this case remains unchanged under either standard. Regarding the statutory- maximum sentences for second-degree felonies imposed in this case, on which we likewise find no reversible error on the issue raised and therefore affirm his sentences, we do recognize, however, that an issue regarding collective or individual application of the lowest permissible sentence (LPS) when that number exceeds the individual statutory maximums for the primary and additional offenses, as is the case here, remains pending in the Florida Supreme Court. See generally Champagne v. State, 269 So. 3d 629, 633, 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) ("The LPS is a minimum sentence; the question is whether it is an individual minimum sentence, required to be imposed on each offense at sentencing for which it exceeds that offense's statutory maximum, or a collective minimum sentence. . . . But as is apparent, the language of section 921.0024(2) is not consistent; both singular and plural terms are used, and the terms statutory maximum and statutory maximum sentence are used without explanation or definition."). But see Fruehwirth v. State, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D831 (Fla. 5th DCA Apr. 9, 2020) (certifying conflict with Champagne but also certifying its same question); Gabriel v. State, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2913 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 6, 2019), review granted, SC19-2155, 2020 WL 1888656 (Fla. Apr. 16, 2020). -2- Affirmed. NORTHCUTT and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur. -3-