The State of Florida v. Alicia Garcia
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledMay 20, 2020
Docket3D18-1984
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed May 20, 2020.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D18-1984
Lower Tribunal Nos. 13-23196,12-12412,12-124, & 12-12413
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The State of Florida,
Petitioner,
vs.
Alicia Garcia,
Respondent.
A Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Eric Wm.
Hendon, Judge.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Brian H. Zack, Assistant Attorney
General, for petitioner.
Elio Vazquez, for respondent.
Before SALTER, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner, the State of Florida, seeks a writ of certiorari to quash an order
mitigating the sentence imposed against respondent, Alicia Garcia. The motion
upon which relief was premised was filed more than sixty days after Garcia was
sentenced to a negotiated term of incarceration pursuant to a plea agreement.
Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800, “[a]fter the passage of
[sixty] days from imposition of the sentence, the trial court [loses] jurisdiction to
modify the [legal] sentence.” State v. Sutton, 371 So. 2d 717, 718 (Fla. 2d DCA
1979) (citations omitted); see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(c) (“A court may reduce or
modify to include any of the provisions of chapter 948, Florida Statutes, a legal
sentence imposed by it, sua sponte, or upon motion filed, within [sixty] days after
the imposition.”). 1 Although here, the State failed to duly apprise the lower tribunal
of the untimeliness of the mitigation motion, instead raising the issue for the first
time in the instant petition, “it is well settled that a [party] cannot confer jurisdiction
on the trial court by waiver, acquiescence, estoppel, or consent since jurisdiction is
established solely by general law.” White v. State, 404 So. 2d 804, 805 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1981) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we are constrained to grant relief and
quash the order under review. See State v. Sotto, 348 So. 2d 1222, 1223 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1977) (granting certiorari relief because “[t]he sixty day time periods under
1
In 1996, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure was amended to add a new subdivision
(b), the “existing subdivision (b) was renumbered as subdivision (c).” Fla. R. Crim.
P. 3.800, committee note (1996).
2
Fl[orida] R[ule of] Crim[inal] P[rocedure] 3.800(b) had elapsed at the time the
mitigation orders were entered”); see also Kiriazes v. State, 798 So. 2d 789, 794
(Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (“More than sixty days had passed since the original sentence
was imposed and thus, under rule 3.800(c), the trial court had no jurisdiction to
correct the error.”); State v. Baca, 707 So. 2d 766, 767 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“The
motion for reconsideration was filed over thirty days after the denial of the motion
and outside of the sixty-day limit provided in rule 3.800(c). Accordingly, the trial
court did not have jurisdiction on October 30, 1996, to reduce [the defendant’s]
sentence.”) (citation omitted).
Certiorari granted. Order quashed.
3