Full Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed October 14, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D25-1852 Lower Tribunal No. 22-15693-CA-01 ________________ Christopher Ruwe a/k/a Christopher Nicholas Ruwe, Appellant, vs. Itria Ventures LLC, Appellee. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Peter R. Lopez, Judge. Andrew M. Kassier, P.A., and Andrew M. Kassier, for appellant. Law Offices of Paul A. Humbert, P.L., and Paul A. Humbert, for appellee. Before SCALES, C.J., and BOKOR and GOODEN, JJ. SCALES, C.J. In this post-judgment collection proceeding, appellant Christopher Ruwe, the impleaded defendant below, appeals an August 29, 2025 final summary judgment in favor of the judgment creditor below, appellee Itria Ventures, LLC (“Itria”). The trial court determined that the $50,000 given to Ruwe by the judgment debtor below, Carjavi 2, LLC (“Carjavi”), was a constructively fraudulent transfer pursuant to section 726.106(1) of the Florida Statutes (2023),1 part of Florida’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“FUFTA”). We affirm. Under FUFTA’s section 726.106(1), a judgment debtor’s transfer is fraudulent as to a creditor if “(a) the creditor’s claim arose before the transfer, (b) the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer or became insolvent because of the transfer, and (c) the debtor made the transfer without receiving reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer.” RREF SNV-FL SSL, LLC v. Shamrock Storage, LLC, 250 So. 3d 788, 789-90 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). In this appeal, as below, Ruwe does not dispute that the first two elements of section 726.106(1) were satisfied. Hence, the only issue for this 1 Because proof of the debtor’s intent to hinder, delay or defraud the creditor is not required under the statute, see Levin v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 823 So. 2d 132, 136 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), section 726.106(1) is commonly referred to as a “constructive fraud” statute. Wurtzebach v. Flooring Depot FTL, Inc., 384 So. 3d 251, 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). 2 Court’s de novo consideration2 is whether the summary judgment record reveals a genuine factual dispute as to whether Carjavi received a reasonably equivalent value when it gave Ruwe the $50,000. The summary judgment record conclusively established that Carjavi received no reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the funds.3 Indeed, the parties agree that Carjavi gave Ruwe the money to pay the security deposit and six-months rent for a residential home leased to a family member of Carjavi’s owner. Because Itria presented unrebutted evidence below that Carjavi derived no benefit (economic or otherwise) from paying the lease obligations for its principal’s family member, the trial court properly found that Carjavi did not receive a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the $50,000 transfer.4 2 We review de novo the trial court’s order granting final summary judgment. See Arbor Grove Dev., LLC v. ECS1, Inc., 425 So. 3d 699, 700 n.4 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025). Similarly, we review de novo the trial court’s application of FUFTA. Id. 3 Ruwe suggests that the trial court erred by not considering his “good faith” defense asserted pursuant to FUFTA section 726.109(1). But, pursuant to its express terms, FUFTA section 726.109(1)’s “good faith” defense for innocent transferees applies only to a creditor’s claim of actual fraud brought under section 726.105(1)(a), and does not apply to constructive fraud claims, such as Itria’s, brought under section 726.106(1). See § 726.109(1), Fla. Stat. (2023). 4 For the first time on appeal, citing a case from a federal bankruptcy court for the Middle District of Florida that applied FUFTA’s “reasonably equivalent 3 Affirmed. value” element, Ruwe’s reply brief claims that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Carjavi received an indirect benefit from paying the lease obligations for its principal’s family member. It is well settled, though, that issues raised for the first time in the reply brief are precluded from our consideration. See Raffay v. Longwood House Condo. Ass’n, 389 So. 3d 589, 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023). Moreover, even if Ruwe had preserved this “indirect benefit” claim for our review, we would be compelled to affirm because Ruwe failed to meet his summary judgment burden of producing evidence that Carjavi had received an indirect benefit in exchange for Carjavi paying Ruwe $50,000 for the lease obligations of Carjavi’s owner’s family member. In fact, Ruwe did not raise the “indirect benefit” issue in his response to Itria’s summary judgment motion. See In re: Mongelluzzi, 587 B.R. 392, 404 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2018) (“Courts consider two types of benefits when analyzing reasonably equivalent value: direct benefits (benefits that the debtor receives directly) and indirect benefits (benefits that the debtor receives indirectly). If a plaintiff proves that the debtor did not receive direct benefits reasonably equivalent to the value it gave up, the burden is on the defendant to produce evidence that the debtor indirectly received sufficient, concrete value.”). 4