Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D2025-2729 _____________________________ CITY OF MAITLAND and DAVIES CLAIMS NORTH AMERICA, INC., Appellants, v. WILLIAM MCGOVERN and SANFORD AIRPORT AUTHORITY/PREFERRED GOVERNMENTAL CLAIMS SOLUTIONS/PGCS, Appellees. _____________________________ On appeal from the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims. Wilbur W. Anderson, Judge. Date of Accident: June 25, 2012. October 7, 2026 PER CURIAM. This appeal involves a firefighter’s workers’ compensation claim filed under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, which creates a rebuttable presumption of occupational causation for disabling heart disease suffered by firefighters, among other professions, who meet certain prerequisites. Appellants, the City of Maitland (“Maitland”) and Davies Claims North America, Inc. (collectively, “E/SA 1”), appeal a compensation order in which the judge of compensation claims (“JCC”) determined that Claimant’s heart disease was compensable as to E/SA 1, directed E/SA 1 to authorize a physician to treat Claimant’s condition and to pay him impairment benefits, and denied E/SA 1’s claim for contribution against Appellees, Sanford Airport Authority (“SAA”) and Preferred Governmental Claims Solutions/PGCS (collectively, “E/SA 2”). E/SA 1 raise several arguments on appeal, only one of which merits discussion. They contend that, contrary to the JCC’s determination, E/SA 2 is responsible for Claimant’s workers’ compensation claim under the last injurious exposure rule applicable to occupational disease claims. For the following reasons, we reject E/SA 1’s argument and affirm as to all issues raised on appeal. Claimant began working as a firefighter for Maitland in 1988. As found by the JCC, Claimant passed a preemployment physical with no evidence of heart disease. In June 2012, Claimant had a cardiac stenting procedure performed after a heart catheterization revealed a seventy to eighty percent occlusion of his left anterior descending artery. Rather than returning to work after the procedure, Claimant used his accrued sick leave and Family Medical Leave Act time before retiring from Maitland in August 2012. Claimant did not report his heart condition as a workers’ compensation injury at that time, and Maitland did not report the incident to its servicing agent. Shortly after retiring, Claimant began working as a firefighter for SAA. Not surprisingly, Claimant’s preemployment physical with SAA showed evidence of heart disease. After working for SAA for about twelve years, Claimant experienced further heart complications in 2024, underwent additional stent procedures and a double bypass surgery, and was placed on a heart transplant list. Thereafter, Claimant filed a petition for benefits against E/SA 1, claiming compensability of his heart condition and seeking authorization for medical care along with temporary disability and impairment benefits. The alleged date of accident was June 25, 2012. E/SA 1 defended against the claim and filed a notice of controversy under section 440.42(4), Florida Statutes, seeking a determination that E/SA 2 were responsible for providing workers’ compensation benefits to Claimant under the last injurious 2 exposure rule. The JCC rejected E/SA 1’s assertion, concluding that there can be no injurious exposure in heart disease cases where the presumption provided for in section 112.18(1) does not apply, absent a concession or finding that an employee’s heart disease is compensable without the benefit of the presumption. The JCC determined that because Claimant’s preemployment physical with SAA showed evidence of heart disease, the presumption did not apply against E/SA 2. He noted as well that Claimant did not file a workers’ compensation claim against E/SA 2, and E/SA 1 did not attempt to prove that Claimant’s heart disease was independently compensable as to E/SA 2. The JCC found Claimant’s heart condition compensable as to E/SA 1 and awarded him medical care and impairment benefits but denied his claim for temporary disability benefits. This appeal followed. Section 440.151, Florida Statutes (2011), which applies to “Occupational diseases,” provides in part: (1)(a) Where the employer and employee are subject to the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law, the disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease as hereinafter defined shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident, notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, and the employee or, in case of death, the employee’s dependents shall be entitled to compensation as provided by this chapter . . . . .... (5) Where compensation is payable for an occupational disease, the employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease, and the insurance carrier, if any, on the risk when such employee was last so exposed under such employer, shall alone be liable therefor, without right to contribution from any prior employer or insurance carrier; . . . . 3 (Emphasis added). The parties agree that heart disease may constitute an occupational disease. This Court has explained that “[c]oronary artery disease is an occupational illness when suffered by a firefighter meeting the requirements of section 112.18(1).” City of Mary Esther v. McArtor, 902 So. 2d 942, 943 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) ∗; see also N. Collier Fire Control & Rescue Dist. v. Harlem, 371 So. 3d 368, 369 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (noting that the claimant “leaned exclusively on the occupational-causation presumption found in section 112.18, Florida Statutes”); Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Davis, 26 So. 3d 13, 14 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (citing McArtor and explaining that when a firefighter suffers a condition caused by heart disease, the firefighter’s heart disease is deemed a compensable occupational disease unless the employer is able to rebut the statutory presumption of compensability); Sledge v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 497 So. 2d 1231, 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (“[C]laimant’s claim for heart disease is a claim for an occupational disease rather than an accident by injury.”). E/SA 1 argue that under the plain language of section 440.151(5), SAA is responsible for Claimant’s heart condition because he was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of firefighting while working there. Like the JCC did, we reject this contention. As the JCC correctly recognized, and as E/SA 1 acknowledge, because Claimant’s preemployment physical with SAA showed evidence of heart disease, the presumption created by section 112.18 did not apply to his employment there. See § 112.18(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011) (providing in part that so long as a firefighter successfully passes a physical examination before employment, any heart disease suffered by him or her is presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary is shown by competent evidence). Cf. City of Jacksonville v. Ratliff, 217 So. 3d 183, 185 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (“The claimant qualified for the ‘heart-lung’ presumption under ∗ In Friesen v. State of Florida Highway Patrol/Division of Risk Management, 364 So. 3d 1051, 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023), this Court explained that McArtor was implicitly overturned in City of Port Orange v. Sedacca, 953 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), due to its reliance on the definition of “disability” in section 440.02(13), Florida Statutes. 4 section 112.18(1), having no evidence of heart disease on his pre- employment physical, among other prerequisites.”). Moreover, E/SA 1 presented no evidence demonstrating any connection between Claimant’s heart condition and his employment with SAA. Nor did E/SA 2 concede that Claimant’s heart condition was compensable as a result of his employment with SAA. Under these circumstances, E/SA 1 failed to support its claim that Claimant was last “injuriously exposed” while working for SAA. § 440.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2011). Thus, the JCC did not err in denying E/SA 1’s claim for contribution from E/SA 2. Accordingly, we affirm the compensation order. AFFIRMED. LEWIS, M.K. THOMAS, and TREADWELL, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Karen J. Cullen of Broussard, Cullen & Eldridge, Orlando, for Appellants. James Robert Spears of Law Office of James R. Spears, PLLC, Orlando; George W. Boring, III, and George W. Helm, III, of Public Entity Legal Solutions, Lake Mary, for Appellees. 5