Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and JAMES DOUGLAS CASTELLANO, Appellants, v. KEVIN ANTONIO and NIKKI ZEMBAL, individually, and ZOE ANTONIO, a minor, by and through her parents, next friends and natural guardians, KEVIN ANTONIO and NIKKI ZEMBAL, Appellees. Nos. 4D2025-1236 and 4D2025-1276 [November 18, 2026] Consolidated appeals from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Jeffrey R. Levenson, Judge; L.T. Case No. 062021CA010608AXXXCE. Kevin D. Franz of Boyd & Jenerette, P.A., Boca Raton, and Jennifer L. Aybar of Boyd & Jenerette, P.A., Maitland, for appellant Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company. John P. Joy of Walton Lantaff Schroeder & Carson LLP, Fort Lauderdale, and Sara Sandler Cromer of Walton Lantaff Schroeder & Carson LLP, Port St. Lucie, for appellant James Douglas Castellano. Daniel A. Bushell of Bushell Law, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellees. MAY, J. The defendant and his insurer appeal an adverse judgment in an automobile accident case. They argue the trial court erred in denying their motion for remittitur and in entering the amended final judgment against the insurer. We agree with the defendant and his insurer on the first issue and reverse. We affirm on the second issue. • The Facts The plaintiff was involved in two automobile accidents within months of each other. This case involves the first accident that occurred in February 2018. The plaintiff was a passenger in the back seat of her father’s car when the car collided with the defendant’s truck. The plaintiff was ten years old at the time. 1 At trial, the plaintiff introduced videotaped testimony from her treating physicians, her mother and father, and herself. Dr. Ellowitz testified that he saw the plaintiff soon after the first accident. He ordered an MRI and recommended physical therapy, a home exercise program, and occasional anti-inflammatories. In July 2018, he determined the plaintiff had reached “maximum medical improvement.” He did not think she needed aggressive or invasive treatment. The plaintiff returned to Dr. Ellowitz after the second accident. Dr. Ellowitz testified that the plaintiff’s shoulder issues were “more due to radiation to the shoulder area from the cervical spine.” He opined those issues would worsen with age and require treatment. Dr. Coats, a neurosurgeon, recommended continuing non-surgical treatment (therapy, exercises, anti-inflammatory medicines, applying heat and ice, and using topical agents). He was still treating the plaintiff at the time of trial. He testified that the plaintiff’s injuries could negatively impact her as she aged. Regarding future medical expenses, Dr. Coats testified the plaintiff might need a discectomy in the future. The hospitalization would cost between $90,000 and $100,000. And the procedure would cost between $25,000 and $30,000. Dr. Suite testified that he first saw the plaintiff in June 2023, after the second accident. The plaintiff reported “headaches, dizziness, difficulty with memory and concentration, difficulty with sleep, irritability, neck pain, lower back pain, left shoulder pain, as well as numbness and tingling in the upper extremities.” He diagnosed the plaintiff “with mild traumatic brain injury, post concussive syndrome, cervical herniated disc, [and] cervical radiculopathy.” He “recorded muscle or myofacial [sic] pain syndrome, muscle spasms, a problem with her left shoulder which she mentioned as well, headaches and dizziness.” 1 The plaintiff’s claims from the second accident were resolved prior to trial. 2 The defense provided videotaped testimony of Dr. Geoffrey Negin. He explained that an X-ray of the plaintiff’s spine taken after the February 2018 accident looked “normal” and “appropriate for [her] age.” In closing arguments, the plaintiff quantified past medical expenses at $47,573.88, future medical expenses at $106,500, and did not quantify other future treatment expenses, such as therapies and consultations. The plaintiff asked for $24,000 a year for pain and suffering and multiplied that figure by 70 years. The plaintiff asked for $1,834,073.88 in total. In the closing, defense counsel disputed the defendant’s negligence and whether the plaintiff suffered any permanent injury. Defense counsel suggested a $10,000 award in non-economic damages should the jury find the defendant negligent. The jury found the defendant driver and the plaintiff’s father were both negligent in causing the February 2018 accident. The jury allocated thirty percent fault to the defendant and seventy percent fault to the plaintiff’s father. The jury found the plaintiff sustained a permanent injury. The jury then awarded the plaintiff $700,000 in past and future medical expenses and $10,000 for pain and suffering, for a total of $710,000. The plaintiff moved for an additur, arguing that the non-economic damages awarded were inexplicably low compared to the medical expenses award. The defendant moved for a remittitur because the medical expenses award exceeded the proof at trial. The trial court denied both motions. The plaintiff then moved to enter final judgment and to join the nonparty insurer to the judgment. The plaintiff attached a proposed final judgment. The insurer responded that the proposed judgment’s wording was improper. The trial court signed the plaintiff’s proposed final judgment and then entered an amended final judgment, reducing the total award by the father’s percentage of fault, entitling the plaintiff to $193,125.99 against the defendant driver. The amended final judgment included the following paragraphs: 4. The amount of this Final Judgment against Defendant, Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, is being limited to Defendant, JAMES DOUGLAS CASTELLANO’S liability insurance policy disclosed during discovery with limits of $25,000.00, with Defendant, Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company. However, this limitations 3 [sic] shall not prejudice, in any manner whatsoever, the Plaintiff’s ability to seek and recover against Defendant, Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, the entire Final Judgment, plus interest, costs, and/or any other amount recoverable, the Plaintiff has or shall recover in this action against Defendant, JAMES DOUGLAS CASTELLANO, and any other damages, attorney’s fees or costs allowable under Florida law, by pursuing all of his rights, remedies, and causes of action against Defendant, Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, allowable under Florida law, including, but not limited to a claim for insurance bad-faith brought by Plaintiff or assignees against Defendant, Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company. …. 7. This court retains jurisdiction over all matters, including, but not limited to, the amounts of costs by Plaintiff against Defendant, any motion for attorney’s fees and costs by Plaintiff against Defendant, any timely served motions pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530, and execution and enforcement actions on this Amended Final Judgment and any and all attorney fees, costs or relief that the Plaintiff may be entitled to. (emphasis added). The defendant driver and his insurer now appeal from the amended final judgment. • The Analysis o The Remittitur Issue In their first issue, the defendants argue the evidence failed to support the jury’s $700,000 award for past and future medical expenses. They suggest the amount should not have exceeded $134,240.55, and a remittitur should have been entered. The defendants argue the record failed to show the plaintiff sustained a head or shoulder injury from the first accident and that medical treatment or expenses related to those injuries could be attributed only to the second accident. The plaintiff’s past medical expenses should be 4 limited to $9,095.83 for expenses incurred between February and July 2018. The defendants argue the plaintiff could recover no more than $47,573.88 for total past medical expenses. The defendants suggest the jury’s award for past and future medical expenses was unsupported by the record. Dr. Coats testified that the cost for future medical treatment was between $76,666.67 and $86,666.67. Thus, the jury’s award could not exceed $95,762.50 ($9,095.83 plus $86,666.67) or $134,240.55 ($47,573.88 for all past expenses and $86,666.67 for future medical expenses). The plaintiff responds that the total award was not excessive given the plaintiff’s young age, the long-lasting effects of her injuries, and treatment for them. The plaintiff points out that while the jury awarded $700,000 in past and future medical expenses, the defendant was responsible for only thirty percent, limiting his financial responsibility to $193,125.99. The plaintiff further argues that her monthly psychotherapy appointments could amount to $250,000 if extrapolated at the same rate for the rest of her expected lifespan. Similarly, her weekly “peak performance” visits could amount to $650,000 over her lifetime. Thus, the jury’s award did not require a remittitur. We review a trial court’s ruling on the motion for remittitur for an abuse of discretion. Odom v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 254 So. 3d 268, 275 (Fla. 2018). However, the decision to modify a jury’s verdict turns on statutory standards and case law. See § 768.043, Fla. Stat. (2018). A trial court may enter an order reducing the amount of damages a jury awarded if the verdict is “clearly excessive.” See § 768.043(1), Fla. Stat. Section 768.043(2) lays out the factors a court considers. A jury “might properly award damages equal to or in excess of those requested by counsel in closing argument.” Lopez v. Cohen, 406 So. 2d 1253, 1256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). But a jury cannot award damages greater than is reasonably supported by the evidence. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Diaz-Torres, 422 So. 3d 212, 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025). The plaintiff has the burden to establish “through competent, substantial evidence, that [her] future medical expenses will more probably than not be incurred.” Hitchcock v. Mahaffey, 243 So. 3d 459, 460 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (citation modified). “Florida law restricts recovery of future medical expenses to those expenses reasonably certain to be incurred.” Id. (citation modified) (emphasis added). 5 “[T]he amount of past medical expenses incurred does not—at least by itself—provide a reasonable basis for a jury to compute future medical expenses.” Auto Club Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Babin, 204 So. 3d 561, 563 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). Therefore, some direct evidence of anticipated future medical expenses must exist. Id. “Testimony or evidence that certain treatments might possibly be obtained in the future cannot merit an award of future medical expenses.” Gen. Emps. Ins. Co. v. Isaacs, 206 So. 3d 62, 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). Here, the evidence does not support the jury’s award. See GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 209 So. 3d 77, 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (holding insufficient evidence supported future medical expenses for drug detoxification because no one testified how long plaintiff would have to take the drug); see also DeAlmeida v. Graham, 524 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (“While we find evidence […] from which the jury could infer the need for future medical treatment, we do not find evidence in the record from which the jury could, with reasonable certainty, determine the amount of medical expense appellee would be likely to incur in the future.”). At best, the evidence supported past medical expenses of $47,573.88 and the possibility of neck surgery costing $86,000 in the future. The future therapy appointments were not testified to in any detail at trial. The plaintiff focused on pain and suffering and non-economic damages. We reverse and remand this case for the trial court to order a remittitur. If the plaintiff disagrees with the remittitur, the trial court can limit a retrial to past and future medical expenses. Nieves v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248 So. 3d 240, 242 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (citation modified). o The Non-Joinder Statute Issue In the second issue, the insurer argues the wording in the amended final judgment violates the nonjoinder statute. Specifically, the insurer claims that Paragraph 4 reaches beyond the trial court’s jurisdiction under the nonjoinder statute and authorizes an unpled bad faith claim. The insurer requests that we direct the trial court to: (1) remove the insurer as a defendant, (2) delete Paragraph 4, and (3) remove the bold language in Paragraph 7. The insurer cites Illinois Union Insurance Company v. McGinley, 401 So. 3d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025). The plaintiff responds that McGinley is distinguishable. The plaintiff suggests “there was no jurisdictional deficiency because the insurer was 6 joined at the time of judgment and its joinder was for the purpose of entry and enforcement of the judgment.” We agree with the plaintiff. “Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Mandelko v. Lopresti, 345 So. 3d 314, 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (citation modified). Section 627.4136(4), Florida Statutes (2025), states: “At the time a judgment is entered or a settlement is reached during the pendency of litigation, a liability insurer may be joined as a party defendant for the purposes of entering final judgment or enforcing the settlement by the motion of any party[.]” McGinley is distinguishable. There, the trial court’s final judgment referenced “continuing litigation” against the insurer within the same case. McGinley, 401 So. 3d at 573. The insurer was not a party in the underlying cases, had no claims asserted against it, and no party moved for leave to assert claims or add parties to the current litigation. Id. The day after the trial court’s pronouncement, the parties filed amended complaints and added multiple new claims against the insurer. Id. Here, however, the trial court merely added the insurer in the final judgment and the subsequent amended final judgment. The plaintiff did not file a new complaint or claim against the insurer as occurred in McGinley. The judgment merely clarified that the plaintiff was not precluded from pursuing future claims against the insurer. We therefore affirm this issue. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. SHEPHERD and SHAW, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing. 7