James Douglas Castellano and Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Kevin Antonio
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket4D2025-1276
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and
JAMES DOUGLAS CASTELLANO,
Appellants,
v.
KEVIN ANTONIO and NIKKI ZEMBAL, individually, and ZOE ANTONIO,
a minor, by and through her parents, next friends and
natural guardians, KEVIN ANTONIO and NIKKI ZEMBAL,
Appellees.
Nos. 4D2025-1236 and 4D2025-1276
[November 18, 2026]
Consolidated appeals from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Jeffrey R. Levenson, Judge; L.T. Case
No. 062021CA010608AXXXCE.
Kevin D. Franz of Boyd & Jenerette, P.A., Boca Raton, and Jennifer L.
Aybar of Boyd & Jenerette, P.A., Maitland, for appellant Allstate Property
and Casualty Insurance Company.
John P. Joy of Walton Lantaff Schroeder & Carson LLP, Fort
Lauderdale, and Sara Sandler Cromer of Walton Lantaff Schroeder &
Carson LLP, Port St. Lucie, for appellant James Douglas Castellano.
Daniel A. Bushell of Bushell Law, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.
MAY, J.
The defendant and his insurer appeal an adverse judgment in an
automobile accident case. They argue the trial court erred in denying their
motion for remittitur and in entering the amended final judgment against
the insurer. We agree with the defendant and his insurer on the first issue
and reverse. We affirm on the second issue.
• The Facts
The plaintiff was involved in two automobile accidents within months
of each other. This case involves the first accident that occurred in
February 2018. The plaintiff was a passenger in the back seat of her
father’s car when the car collided with the defendant’s truck. The plaintiff
was ten years old at the time. 1
At trial, the plaintiff introduced videotaped testimony from her treating
physicians, her mother and father, and herself. Dr. Ellowitz testified that
he saw the plaintiff soon after the first accident. He ordered an MRI and
recommended physical therapy, a home exercise program, and occasional
anti-inflammatories. In July 2018, he determined the plaintiff had
reached “maximum medical improvement.” He did not think she needed
aggressive or invasive treatment.
The plaintiff returned to Dr. Ellowitz after the second accident. Dr.
Ellowitz testified that the plaintiff’s shoulder issues were “more due to
radiation to the shoulder area from the cervical spine.” He opined those
issues would worsen with age and require treatment.
Dr. Coats, a neurosurgeon, recommended continuing non-surgical
treatment (therapy, exercises, anti-inflammatory medicines, applying heat
and ice, and using topical agents). He was still treating the plaintiff at the
time of trial. He testified that the plaintiff’s injuries could negatively
impact her as she aged. Regarding future medical expenses, Dr. Coats
testified the plaintiff might need a discectomy in the future. The
hospitalization would cost between $90,000 and $100,000. And the
procedure would cost between $25,000 and $30,000.
Dr. Suite testified that he first saw the plaintiff in June 2023, after the
second accident. The plaintiff reported “headaches, dizziness, difficulty
with memory and concentration, difficulty with sleep, irritability, neck
pain, lower back pain, left shoulder pain, as well as numbness and tingling
in the upper extremities.” He diagnosed the plaintiff “with mild traumatic
brain injury, post concussive syndrome, cervical herniated disc, [and]
cervical radiculopathy.” He “recorded muscle or myofacial [sic] pain
syndrome, muscle spasms, a problem with her left shoulder which she
mentioned as well, headaches and dizziness.”
1 The plaintiff’s claims from the second accident were resolved prior to trial.
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The defense provided videotaped testimony of Dr. Geoffrey Negin. He
explained that an X-ray of the plaintiff’s spine taken after the February
2018 accident looked “normal” and “appropriate for [her] age.”
In closing arguments, the plaintiff quantified past medical expenses at
$47,573.88, future medical expenses at $106,500, and did not quantify
other future treatment expenses, such as therapies and consultations.
The plaintiff asked for $24,000 a year for pain and suffering and multiplied
that figure by 70 years. The plaintiff asked for $1,834,073.88 in total.
In the closing, defense counsel disputed the defendant’s negligence and
whether the plaintiff suffered any permanent injury. Defense counsel
suggested a $10,000 award in non-economic damages should the jury find
the defendant negligent.
The jury found the defendant driver and the plaintiff’s father were both
negligent in causing the February 2018 accident. The jury allocated thirty
percent fault to the defendant and seventy percent fault to the plaintiff’s
father. The jury found the plaintiff sustained a permanent injury. The
jury then awarded the plaintiff $700,000 in past and future medical
expenses and $10,000 for pain and suffering, for a total of $710,000.
The plaintiff moved for an additur, arguing that the non-economic
damages awarded were inexplicably low compared to the medical expenses
award. The defendant moved for a remittitur because the medical
expenses award exceeded the proof at trial. The trial court denied both
motions.
The plaintiff then moved to enter final judgment and to join the
nonparty insurer to the judgment. The plaintiff attached a proposed final
judgment. The insurer responded that the proposed judgment’s wording
was improper. The trial court signed the plaintiff’s proposed final
judgment and then entered an amended final judgment, reducing the total
award by the father’s percentage of fault, entitling the plaintiff to
$193,125.99 against the defendant driver.
The amended final judgment included the following paragraphs:
4. The amount of this Final Judgment against Defendant,
Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, is being
limited to Defendant, JAMES DOUGLAS CASTELLANO’S
liability insurance policy disclosed during discovery with
limits of $25,000.00, with Defendant, Allstate Fire and
Casualty Insurance Company. However, this limitations
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[sic] shall not prejudice, in any manner whatsoever, the
Plaintiff’s ability to seek and recover against Defendant,
Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, the entire
Final Judgment, plus interest, costs, and/or any other
amount recoverable, the Plaintiff has or shall recover in
this action against Defendant, JAMES DOUGLAS
CASTELLANO, and any other damages, attorney’s fees or
costs allowable under Florida law, by pursuing all of his
rights, remedies, and causes of action against Defendant,
Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, allowable
under Florida law, including, but not limited to a claim for
insurance bad-faith brought by Plaintiff or assignees
against Defendant, Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance
Company.
….
7. This court retains jurisdiction over all matters,
including, but not limited to, the amounts of costs by
Plaintiff against Defendant, any motion for attorney’s fees and
costs by Plaintiff against Defendant, any timely served
motions pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530, and execution and
enforcement actions on this Amended Final Judgment and
any and all attorney fees, costs or relief that the Plaintiff
may be entitled to.
(emphasis added).
The defendant driver and his insurer now appeal from the amended
final judgment.
• The Analysis
o The Remittitur Issue
In their first issue, the defendants argue the evidence failed to support
the jury’s $700,000 award for past and future medical expenses. They
suggest the amount should not have exceeded $134,240.55, and a
remittitur should have been entered.
The defendants argue the record failed to show the plaintiff sustained
a head or shoulder injury from the first accident and that medical
treatment or expenses related to those injuries could be attributed only to
the second accident. The plaintiff’s past medical expenses should be
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limited to $9,095.83 for expenses incurred between February and July
2018. The defendants argue the plaintiff could recover no more than
$47,573.88 for total past medical expenses.
The defendants suggest the jury’s award for past and future medical
expenses was unsupported by the record. Dr. Coats testified that the cost
for future medical treatment was between $76,666.67 and $86,666.67.
Thus, the jury’s award could not exceed $95,762.50 ($9,095.83 plus
$86,666.67) or $134,240.55 ($47,573.88 for all past expenses and
$86,666.67 for future medical expenses).
The plaintiff responds that the total award was not excessive given the
plaintiff’s young age, the long-lasting effects of her injuries, and treatment
for them. The plaintiff points out that while the jury awarded $700,000 in
past and future medical expenses, the defendant was responsible for only
thirty percent, limiting his financial responsibility to $193,125.99.
The plaintiff further argues that her monthly psychotherapy
appointments could amount to $250,000 if extrapolated at the same rate
for the rest of her expected lifespan. Similarly, her weekly “peak
performance” visits could amount to $650,000 over her lifetime. Thus, the
jury’s award did not require a remittitur.
We review a trial court’s ruling on the motion for remittitur for an abuse
of discretion. Odom v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 254 So. 3d 268, 275
(Fla. 2018). However, the decision to modify a jury’s verdict turns on
statutory standards and case law. See § 768.043, Fla. Stat. (2018).
A trial court may enter an order reducing the amount of damages a jury
awarded if the verdict is “clearly excessive.” See § 768.043(1), Fla. Stat.
Section 768.043(2) lays out the factors a court considers.
A jury “might properly award damages equal to or in excess of those
requested by counsel in closing argument.” Lopez v. Cohen, 406 So. 2d
1253, 1256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). But a jury cannot award damages greater
than is reasonably supported by the evidence. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Diaz-Torres, 422 So. 3d 212, 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025).
The plaintiff has the burden to establish “through competent,
substantial evidence, that [her] future medical expenses will more
probably than not be incurred.” Hitchcock v. Mahaffey, 243 So. 3d 459,
460 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (citation modified). “Florida law restricts recovery
of future medical expenses to those expenses reasonably certain to be
incurred.” Id. (citation modified) (emphasis added).
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“[T]he amount of past medical expenses incurred does not—at least by
itself—provide a reasonable basis for a jury to compute future medical
expenses.” Auto Club Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Babin, 204 So. 3d 561, 563 (Fla.
5th DCA 2016). Therefore, some direct evidence of anticipated future
medical expenses must exist. Id. “Testimony or evidence that certain
treatments might possibly be obtained in the future cannot merit an award
of future medical expenses.” Gen. Emps. Ins. Co. v. Isaacs, 206 So. 3d 62,
63 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
Here, the evidence does not support the jury’s award. See GEICO Gen.
Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 209 So. 3d 77, 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (holding insufficient
evidence supported future medical expenses for drug detoxification
because no one testified how long plaintiff would have to take the drug);
see also DeAlmeida v. Graham, 524 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
(“While we find evidence […] from which the jury could infer the need for
future medical treatment, we do not find evidence in the record from which
the jury could, with reasonable certainty, determine the amount of medical
expense appellee would be likely to incur in the future.”).
At best, the evidence supported past medical expenses of $47,573.88
and the possibility of neck surgery costing $86,000 in the future. The
future therapy appointments were not testified to in any detail at trial. The
plaintiff focused on pain and suffering and non-economic damages.
We reverse and remand this case for the trial court to order a remittitur.
If the plaintiff disagrees with the remittitur, the trial court can limit a
retrial to past and future medical expenses. Nieves v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 248 So. 3d 240, 242 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (citation modified).
o The Non-Joinder Statute Issue
In the second issue, the insurer argues the wording in the amended
final judgment violates the nonjoinder statute. Specifically, the insurer
claims that Paragraph 4 reaches beyond the trial court’s jurisdiction under
the nonjoinder statute and authorizes an unpled bad faith claim. The
insurer requests that we direct the trial court to: (1) remove the insurer
as a defendant, (2) delete Paragraph 4, and (3) remove the bold language
in Paragraph 7. The insurer cites Illinois Union Insurance Company v.
McGinley, 401 So. 3d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025).
The plaintiff responds that McGinley is distinguishable. The plaintiff
suggests “there was no jurisdictional deficiency because the insurer was
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joined at the time of judgment and its joinder was for the purpose of entry
and enforcement of the judgment.” We agree with the plaintiff.
“Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law
reviewed de novo.” Mandelko v. Lopresti, 345 So. 3d 314, 317 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2022) (citation modified).
Section 627.4136(4), Florida Statutes (2025), states: “At the time a
judgment is entered or a settlement is reached during the pendency of
litigation, a liability insurer may be joined as a party defendant for the
purposes of entering final judgment or enforcing the settlement by the
motion of any party[.]”
McGinley is distinguishable. There, the trial court’s final judgment
referenced “continuing litigation” against the insurer within the same case.
McGinley, 401 So. 3d at 573. The insurer was not a party in the underlying
cases, had no claims asserted against it, and no party moved for leave to
assert claims or add parties to the current litigation. Id. The day after the
trial court’s pronouncement, the parties filed amended complaints and
added multiple new claims against the insurer. Id.
Here, however, the trial court merely added the insurer in the final
judgment and the subsequent amended final judgment. The plaintiff did
not file a new complaint or claim against the insurer as occurred in
McGinley. The judgment merely clarified that the plaintiff was not
precluded from pursuing future claims against the insurer. We therefore
affirm this issue.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
SHEPHERD and SHAW, JJ., concur.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.
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