Full Opinion

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA ________________________________ Case No. 5D2025-1404 LT Case No. 18-2022-DR-1041 ________________________________ TODD M. JANOSKY, Appellant, v. JILLIAN E. JANOSKY, Appellee. _______________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Flagler County. Christopher A. France, Judge. Andrew T. Windle, of The Windle Family Law Firm P.A., Orlando, for Appellant. David P. Krupski, of Ivy Law, Ponte Vedra, for Appellee. October 9, 2026 MACIVER, J. Former Husband, Todd Janosky, raises three issues on appeal in which he claims the trial court erred in entering its Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage in the highly contentious divorce proceedings between him and Former Wife, Jillian Janosky. Because only a partial trial transcript was provided in the appellate record, and the answer brief raises the omission, our review “is limited to the pleadings, judgment dissolving the marriage and other matters contained in the record.” Mayfield v. Mayfield, 929 So. 2d 671, 672 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); see also Lane v. Lane, 107 So. 3d 1251, 1252 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“In the absence of a trial transcript, we are obligated to affirm the trial court unless clear error appears on the face of the final judgment.”). On our limited review, two of Former Husband’s claims have merit. I. First, Former Husband claims that the trial court entered inconsistent timesharing, exchange schedule, and communication provisions in the Final Judgment. In the Final Judgment, the trial court awarded timesharing with the minor children to Former Wife every Wednesday and Thursday, to Former Husband every Monday and Tuesday, and rotated the weekends. Non-school exchanges were to be at the Flagler County Library. The trial court designated the parties as “equal timesharing parents” of the minor children, with their duties, responsibilities, and other related matters set out in the separate Parenting Plan attached as Exhibit “A”. But the Parenting Plan arguably awards care of the children to Former Wife on Monday and Tuesday and to Former Husband on Wednesday and Thursday—opposite to that ordered in the Final Judgment. The Parenting Plan also references a timesharing schedule that was previously in existence but is not attached. The Final Judgment also ordered that communication between the parents was limited to an online co-parenting app and that they “shall thereafter not e-mail, text, or telephone, but shall post all communication exclusively on the website with the exception that the parties may communicate by telephone or text messaging regarding matters of an emergency nature regarding the children that must be acted upon in less than forty-eight (48) hours.” But the Parenting Plan provides that the “parents shall communicate with each other by telephone, text, e-mail or other electronic means as long as both parties agree to the type of electronic communication.” 2 In Murnane v. Murnane, 411 So. 3d 543 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025), this Court remanded a summer break timesharing schedule for clarification because the trial court’s instructions “can be interpreted in multiple ways, thus leading to confusion,” where the plan simultaneously allowed two consecutive vacation weeks while permitting those weeks to be scheduled consecutively or separately—a conflict that could result in one parent obtaining up to five consecutive weeks of timesharing. Id. at 545; see also Justice v. Justice, 80 So. 3d 405, 407 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (reversing and remanding final judgment that awarded former husband timesharing pursuant to a temporary order, but then stated that timesharing was controlled by an attached exhibit with different schedule, making it “unclear from this order whether appellant is entitled to timesharing every other Monday”). Similarly, in Dowers v. Johnson, 392 So. 3d 140, 142–43 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024), the Fourth District reversed and remanded where the final judgment, among other things, required the parents to communicate solely by one method, yet the incorporated parenting plan allowed for multiple means of communication—a direct internal inconsistency that rendered the final judgment ambiguous and unenforceable as written. Here, the trial court erred in entering an ambiguous or inconsistent judgment regarding timesharing and communication. II. Next, the Final Judgment provided that Former Wife could purchase Former Husband’s interest in the marital home within ninety days, or the home would be listed for sale. It outlined certain offsets to which Former Wife was entitled, valued the home, and found the sum due to Former Husband for his equity to be $31,571.00. It ordered Former Wife to pay that sum to Former Husband within ninety days from the date of the Final Judgment, or to list the home immediately for sale, with extensive directions governing the sale of the marital home. In Patel v. Patel, 162 So. 3d 165 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015), this Court reversed the portion of a final judgment that awarded the marital home to the husband and directed the wife to execute a 3 quitclaim deed but made no provision to relieve the wife of mortgage liability. This Court remanded with instructions that the husband attempt to refinance the home to place the mortgage solely in his name within a reasonable time, and that the amended judgment include a hold harmless provision if refinancing could not be obtained. Id. at 166; see also Jones v. Jones, 184 So. 3d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (reversing and remanding where “the trial court’s final judgment should have specifically addressed each party’s financial responsibilities prior to sale of the home and the consequences should Former Wife fail to sell or refinance the home within the allotted time frame”). Here, the Final Judgment that permits Former Wife to purchase the marital home but is silent about Former Husband’s mortgage liability is legally deficient. The Final Judgment is otherwise affirmed. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. JAY, C.J., and EISNAUGLE, J., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ 4