People's Trust Insurance Company v. Rosa N. Bravo
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledFebruary 19, 2020
Docket3D18-2160
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed February 19, 2020.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D18-2160
Lower Tribunal No. 18-7751
________________
People's Trust Insurance Company,
Appellant,
vs.
Rosa N. Bravo,
Appellee.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Barbara Areces,
Judge.
Brett Frankel and Jonathan Sabghir (Deerfield Beach); Cole Scott & Kissane,
P.A., and Kathryn L. Ender, David C. Borucke, and Mark D. Tinker (Tampa), for
appellant.
Mintz Truppman, P.A., and Timothy H. Crutchfield and Adrian N. Arkin, for
appellee.
Before EMAS, C.J., and LOGUE and SCALES, JJ.
LOGUE, J.
People’s Trust Insurance Company (the “Insurer”) seeks review of an order
directing its agent Rapid Response Team, LLC, to repair the property of Rosa N.
Bravo (the “Insured”). We treat this matter as an appeal of an interlocutory order
granting a temporary injunction, and reverse because the required formalities were
not followed.
The Insured made a claim for hurricane damage under its policy. The policy
at issue included a preferred contractor endorsement which gave the Insurer the right
to repair damage to the Insured’s dwelling in lieu of making a cash payment. The
Insurer advised it planned to exercise the option to repair, and requested the Insured
to submit a sworn proof of loss and sign a work authorization. After the Insured
declined to submit a sworn proof of loss containing the amount of its final claim
(indicating that determination of this amount was “pending”) and declined to sign
the work authorization in the form requested by the Insurer, the Insurer sued for
declaratory relief (count I) and breach of contract (count II). Without filing an
answer or counterclaim, the Insured filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to compel
repairs. The trial court entered an order dismissing count II and granting the motion
to compel to the extent of Insurer’s own estimate of repair.
We first decide that the trial court’s order meets the definition of an injunction.
The Order compels the Insurer to take affirmative action – i.e., to physically repair
the property. It is therefore an “in personam order, directing the defendant to act or
2
refrain from acting in a specified way.” Lopez v. Paredes, 653 So. 2d 472, 473 (Fla.
3d DCA 1995). Because the order under review is an injunction, we treat this matter
as an appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(B), although it
was filed as a petition for certiorari. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(c) (“If a party seeks
an improper remedy, the cause shall be treated as if the proper remedy had been
sought; provided that it shall not be the responsibility of the court to seek the proper
remedy.”).
While the order under review has some of the characteristics of a permanent
injunction that resolves the final dispute between the parties because it orders the
Insurer to make repairs when the complaint contends the Insurer has no
responsibility to do so, we nevertheless believe the trial court intended to enter only
a temporary injunction, because the order requires the Insurer to repair only to the
extent of its own estimate, which suggests to us, the judge intended further labor in
this case. Treating the order as a temporary injunction, it must be reversed as the
required formalities were not followed. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610; City of Miami v.
Santos, 278 So. 3d 822, 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (reversing a temporary injunction
because the record contained no evidentiary basis and no indication that the court
had considered the four necessary elements for a temporary injunction).
Reversed and remanded.
3