Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellant, v. WAYNE CARLTON MATHIS, Appellee. No. 2D2025-2309 October 9, 2026 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Manatee County; Frederick P. Mercurio, Judge. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Analise V. Walker, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant. Blair Allen, Public Defender, and Maura J. Kiefer, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee. ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge. A jury found Wayne Carlton Mathis guilty of selling or delivering cocaine within 1,000 feet of a place of worship. At sentencing, the trial court departed downward from Mathis's lowest permissible sentence of 69.75 months' imprisonment and instead imposed one year of community control followed by two years of drug offender probation. On this appeal of the sentence, the State argues that the court erred in departing downward because it failed to articulate a valid legal basis for doing so. We agree and reverse and remand for resentencing. In April 2023, detectives with the Manatee County Sheriff's Office engaged in an undercover operation to purchase drugs in the parking lot of a Bradenton convenience store. Mathis approached the detectives, who were sitting in an unmarked car, asked if they needed anything, and then requested a ride to another store. One of the detectives asked for drugs and proposed that Mathis provide drugs in exchange for the ride. Mathis put up his hands and walked away from the car to the other side of the parking lot. After a bit, the detectives moved the car closer to the area where Mathis was standing. At some point, Mathis reapproached the car and agreed to obtain drugs for the detectives in exchange for a ride. He got into the undercover vehicle and gave the deputy directions to a certain location. Once there, the deputy gave Mathis $60. Mathis took the money, got out of the car, and walked out of visual range. He then returned with 0.8 grams of crack cocaine and gave it to the deputy. The sale took place within 1,000 feet of a church. According to his criminal punishment scoresheet, Mathis—who was sixty-four years old at the time of sentencing—had eighteen prior felony convictions, including convictions for robbery, possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, resisting an officer with violence, grand theft, and escape. Of his multiple drug-related convictions, five were for sale or delivery. His lowest permissible sentence was 69.75 months' imprisonment. At sentencing, Mathis presented evidence in mitigation. A Manatee County Sheriff's lieutenant testified that during his two years of incarceration on the instant offense, Mathis had been an excellent inmate and had been serving as a trustee in the jail kitchen. Mathis's sister testified that Mathis was a kind and loving person who made poor 2 decisions. Mathis testified that he served as head cook for the jail staff and had worked 5,776 hours in the kitchen, often volunteering for extra shifts. He presented a certificate confirming those hours. In response to the court's inquiry, he stated that he had not received any payment, gain time, or other benefit for that work.1 He also testified that he routinely spoke to young people in Teen Court, and he presented a "letter of appreciation" that he had received from the Teen Court supervisor. The State recommended a sentence of seven years' imprisonment. Mathis's counsel did not move for a downward departure, conceding that he had no basis for doing so. Notwithstanding the concession—or its own observation that Mathis's prior record was "horrific" and that his robbery conviction qualified him as a violent felony offender of special concern—the trial court departed sua sponte. Acknowledging that there were no statutory grounds to depart, the court asserted three nonstatutory grounds instead: (1) the relatively small amount of cocaine involved; (2) Mathis's volunteer hours in the kitchen; and (3) Mathis's volunteer hours with Teen Court.2 As to the first ground, the court stated: [T]he weight of the cocaine is less than one gram. It is 8 tenths of a gram. Now, there may have been some consumed in the testing, which may have made it more, but I don't believe that the drugs were significantly more in weight. And what's in this bag is five little pieces of rock cocaine. And to me, it's abhorrent to send somebody to prison for almost 70 months for this quantity of cocaine. 1 The court then acknowledged, "[W]ell, you haven't been sentenced yet so they haven't calculated any of your gain time." 2 The court discussed these grounds at the sentencing hearing and, consistent with sections 921.002(f) and 921.00265(2), Florida Statutes (2024), identified them in writing as the bases for its departure. 3 I don't really personally fundamentally believe that sending someone to prison for that length of time for these — this quantity of drugs is an appropriate use of our prison system and prison space. I think it's much more important that the prison spaces reserved for violent offenders that harm people physically or commit burglaries to dwellings and other what I consider violent crimes. I just have a hard time doing it, but unfortunately, it's my job. And I took an oath to uphold the law. The court stated further, "[I]f I'm wrong about [the small quantity of drugs being a nonstatutory mitigating factor], I would still depart based upon the two other nonstatutory mitigating factors that I would have and have departed based upon the evidence presented here in court." As to those two factors, the court stated: I can state that prior to becoming a judge, I participated as a voluntary judge in Teen Court. And since I've been a judge, I regularly served as a judge in the Teen Court programs in both Sarasota and Manatee counties. And it's a very meaningful program, and I think it provides eye-opening experiences for teens in our community. And the fact that Mr. Mathis was willing to share his experiences with those youths on more than one occasion. And the fact that he received this letter of appreciation demonstrates to the Court that he's a credit to the community and efforts to show that he has learned from his mistakes in trying to educate those that are still educable and willing to avoid those pitfalls that he's experienced in his life. I'll further find, based upon his testimony and the lieutenant's testimony, that the defendant has volunteered extensively at the Manatee County Jail for over 5,776 hours as a cook in the Food Services Division, including time served as a cook and the staff, meaning employees of the Sheriff's Department, services at the jail for which he is not compensated financially nor is he compensated or awarded any additional gain time or received any other benefits. So I find that his volunteering at the jail as a food services cook, and because they allow him to serve as the cook for the staff, that demonstrates to the Court a certain 4 level of trust that the Sheriff's Department employees themselves put in Mr. Mathis, that it's a credit to his character, despite his flaws and criminal history and substance abuse and everything else regarding his criminal history, they've seen fit to give him that opportunity both prior to and after his conviction [i]n this case. So I'll find both of those to be nonstatutory mitigating circumstances which would allow the Court to depart from the Criminal Punishment Code Scoresheet. After the trial court concluded, the State stated, "[F]or purposes of any record, Your Honor, I would like to say that the State would object to the departure and reserves the right to appeal." And on appeal, the State argues that none of these reasons justified a downward departure sentence. We agree. Preliminarily, we address whether the State's general objection preserved the issue for appeal. As a general rule, "[a]n issue is preserved for appeal if the attorney's articulated concern is sufficiently specific to inform the court of the alleged error." State v. Paulk, 813 So. 2d 152, 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (citing Williams v. State, 414 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1982)). A general objection can be sufficient, however, "when the basis for that objection clearly appears from the context," State v. Roberts, 963 So. 2d 747, 748 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), or when "it is clear from the hearing transcript that the trial court was aware of the legal errors associated with its ruling" and therefore "had the opportunity to correct it," State v. Walker, 923 So. 2d 1262, 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). In addition, we have repeatedly held that to preserve a challenge to the validity of a departure, "[t]he State does not have to advise the trial court specifically that the reason for the departure is invalid." State v. Barnes, 753 So. 2d 605, 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); see also State v. Caulkins, 390 So. 3d 255, 259 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024); State v. Ayers, 901 So. 2d 942, 944 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). But see State v. Clark, 770 So. 2d 237, 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 5 2000) (disagreeing with Barnes "to the extent it states that a general objection to the imposition of a downward departure sentence is sufficient to preserve an appellate argument challenging the validity of the departure reason and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the departure reason"). Here, Mathis did not move for a downward departure, expressly conceding that there was no statutory basis for departure; instead, he presented evidence that he hoped might "neutralize[]" any aggravating effect of his prior record. Despite noting his "horrific" prior record, the trial court relied on that evidence not merely to sentence him to the lowest permissible sentence but to sua sponte depart below it. In doing so, the court agreed that there was no statutory basis for departure but concluded that nonstatutory bases existed, namely, the relatively small quantity of drugs involved in Mathis's most recent offense and Mathis's volunteer work while incarcerated and awaiting trial. Then, the court preemptively stated that if departing based on drug quantity was impermissible, it would still depart based on Mathis's volunteer work. Given Mathis's concession that there was no statutory basis for departure, the trial court's agreement that there was no statutory basis, and the court's decision to depart nonetheless based on three asserted nonstatutory bases—one of which it acknowledged was on shaky ground—we conclude that the State's general objection was sufficient to preserve for appellate review its argument that the bases for departure were invalid. A trial court's determination to depart downward presents a mixed question of law and fact, and we will sustain the determination "if the trial court applied the correct rule of law and competent, substantial evidence supports it." State v. Cosby, 313 So. 3d 903, 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 6 2021) (first citing Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065, 1067 (Fla. 1999); and then citing State v. Diaz, 290 So. 3d 611, 613 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)). "The trial court may not impose a sentence below the lowest permissible sentence on a defendant's scoresheet unless there is a valid mitigating circumstance to justify the downward departure." State v. Saunders, 322 So. 3d 763, 765 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (citing § 921.0026(1), Fla. Stat. (2020)). "Because the statutory list of mitigating circumstances is not exclusive, Florida courts have held that a basis for downward departure will be upheld . . . so long as the purported basis for departure is consistent with legislative sentencing policies and is not otherwise prohibited." State v. Jones, 337 So. 3d 841, 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (first citing State v. Hodges, 151 So. 3d 531 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); and then citing State v. Bowman, 123 So. 3d 107 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)). As "the first purpose of sentencing is to punish," legislative sentencing policy discourages downward departures absent mitigating factors that concern "the nature of the crime, the conduct of the defendant or the mental capacity, condition, or attitude of the defendant," primarily vis-à-vis the offense conduct. State v. Chestnut, 718 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (citing § 921.0026(1), Fla. Stat.); see also § 921.0026(2). "Generally, mitigating circumstances supporting a downward departure ameliorate the level of the defendant's culpability." Rafferty v. State, 799 So. 2d 243, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing State v. D'Alexander, 496 So. 2d 1007, 1008 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)). Unsurprisingly, departing based on the quantity of drugs involved in the offense is not consistent with legislative sentencing policy. Atwaters v. State, 519 So. 2d 611, 612 (Fla. 1988) ("[S]ince the legislature has used the quantity of drugs involved in the offense as a basis for establishing varying penalties, it is clearly not consistent with the 7 purpose of the guidelines to also use the quantity of drugs as a reason for departure."). Relatedly, neither is departing based on the sentencing judge's personal belief that the lowest permissible sentence under the guidelines overstates the seriousness of the offense. See Caulkins, 390 So. 3d at 261 ("[A] trial court may not impose a departure sentence simply because it perceives that the minimum sentence established by the sentencing guidelines is not commensurate with the seriousness of the crime." (quoting State v. Thompkins, 113 So. 3d 95, 100 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013))); see also Brooks v. State, 378 So. 3d 666, 668 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024) ("[T]he trial judge's dissatisfaction with the recommended guideline range is insufficient to support a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines." (quoting State v. Nolasco, 542 So. 2d 1052, 1052 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989))). We are constrained to conclude that the trial court's additional and alternative bases for departure fare no better. Mathis's volunteer work while incarcerated and awaiting trial, although undeniably laudable, does not relate to the nature of the crime itself or to Mathis's offense conduct or level of culpability; consequently, a departure on that basis does not appear to be consistent with legislative sentencing policy. And, like the Third District in Paulk, 813 So. 2d at 154 n.1, we could find no "case law that suggests that good work in the community is a valid basis for departure."3 3 Although we understand the trial court's desire to see Mathis rewarded for his volunteer work, we also cannot ignore that the discretion to reduce a defendant's prison sentence based on good works and good behavior while incarcerated is vested in the Department of Corrections through an award of gain time credit. See § 944.275(1), (4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2025); see also Moore v. Pearson, 789 So. 2d 316, 319 (Fla. 2001) ("The authority to regulate gain time resides exclusively within the Department of Corrections pursuant to chapter 944, Florida 8 Because we conclude that the trial court's stated bases for departure are invalid, we reverse and remand for resentencing. Consistent with Jackson v. State, 64 So. 3d 90, 93 (Fla. 2011), however, we note that on remand the court is not precluded from departing downward on other grounds as long as the departure "comports with the principles and criteria" of the Criminal Punishment Code. Sentence reversed; remanded for resentencing. SLEET and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. Statutes."); cf. DelToro v. State, 584 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (suggesting that an award of gain time credit based on a prisoner's good conduct during pretrial detention in county jail "would be at best discretionary" with the Department). The court's decision to depart below the lowest permissible sentence on that basis thus constituted an impermissible end run around the Department. 9