Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT ELIYAHU AZULAY, Appellant, v. KIMBERLY AZULAY, Appellee. No. 4D2025-2197 [October 7, 2026] Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Cheryl Caracuzzo, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502022DR008363XXXXNB. Lane Weinbaum of Weinbaum P.A., Coral Springs, for appellant. Deanna V. Shuler of Deanna V. Shuler P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, and Robyn R. Weiss of Robyn R. Weiss, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for appellee. PER CURIAM. In this post-dissolution of marriage case, the husband appeals an order finding him in contempt. Because this court subsequently reversed the portion of the underlying final judgment that formed the basis for the contempt finding, the contempt order cannot stand. We therefore reverse the contempt order but affirm the reservation of attorney’s fees. The trial court entered a final judgment of dissolution of marriage requiring the sale of the parties’ marital home upon expiration of the lease and prohibiting the parties from living in the marital home. The husband appealed the final judgment. While that appeal was pending, the wife moved for contempt and enforcement. The trial court granted the motion, finding the husband in civil contempt for living in the marital home and “actively sabotaging the sale” of the home. The trial court appointed a real estate attorney as “agent/ad litem” to stand in the husband’s place in selling the home and ordered the husband to be responsible for the agent/ad litem’s fees. The trial court reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of attorney’s fees and costs. The husband appeals the contempt order. During the pendency of this appeal, this court reversed the portion of the final judgment mandating the sale of the marital home. Azulay v. Azulay, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1181 (Fla. 4th DCA June 10, 2026). In that decision, this court explained that the husband had requested to keep the home and make an equalizing payment to the wife, while the wife had requested that the home be sold. Id. The trial court accepted the wife’s proposal without explaining why it rejected the husband’s proposed buyout. Id. This court reversed and remanded for the trial court to “reconsider its decision to mandate the sale of the home either by providing for a reasonable alternative or explaining why the sale is necessary.” Id. The contempt finding was based on the husband’s alleged violation of the obligations imposed by the final judgment concerning the marital home. The obligations concerning the marital home were interrelated, as the prohibition against living in the marital home was tied to the requirement that the home be sold. Because the portion of the judgment forming the basis for the contempt finding has been reversed, the contempt order cannot stand. See Bellville v. Bellville, 758 So. 2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that where the obligation forming the basis of contempt is vacated on appeal, the contempt order “simply cannot stand,” even though those obligations “may be reinstated in the future”); Joannou v. Corsini, 543 So. 2d 308, 310-11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (finding a contempt order was rendered moot by the reversal of the underlying judgment); Wiesenthal v. Wiesenthal, 154 So. 3d 488, 489 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“[W]here an award is improper and requires reversal, a finding of contempt based upon such award must also be reversed.”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we reverse the contempt order. 1 We do not, however, disturb the portion of the order reserving jurisdiction to determine attorney’s fees. See Joannou, 543 So. 2d at 312 (holding that an award of attorney’s fees as a contempt sanction was not rendered moot by the subsequent reversal of the underlying final judgment). 2 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 1 Our reversal includes the portion of the order requiring the husband to pay the fees of the agent/ad litem. 2 Our opinion should not be interpreted as condoning the husband’s alleged obstructive behavior. If, upon reconsideration, the trial court again orders the sale of the marital home, nothing in this opinion precludes the trial court from imposing contempt sanctions for any future obstructive conduct. 2 LEVINE, KLINGENSMITH and LOTT, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing. 3