Keegan Lee v. Kierstin Matsuda
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledOctober 7, 2020
Docket3D20-0439
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed October 7, 2020.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D20-439
Lower Tribunal No. 18-10545
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Keegan Lee,
Appellant,
vs.
Kierstin Matsuda,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Raul Cuervo,
Judge.
Arguez Hirsch, and Yenys Hirsch and Michael Arguez (Davie), for appellant.
No appearance, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, LOGUE, and HENDON, JJ.
HENDON, J.
In August, 2018, the circuit court entered a final judgment of permanent
injunction for protection against stalking against the appellant. In January 2020, the
appellant moved to vacate, modify, or dissolve the injunction; he alleged changed
circumstances and contended that the injunction had served its purpose. The circuit
court summarily denied the motion without a hearing and without providing reasons
for denying the motion. We reverse and remand for a hearing on appellant's motion,
to provide him with a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Lotridge v. Lobasso,
101 So. 3d 402, 403 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (reversing and remanding for a hearing on
appellant’s motion, where he shall have “a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”);
Barfield v. Kay, 140 So. 3d 703 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (summary denial of a motion
to vacate or modify an injunction without a hearing is a violation of respondent’s
due process rights); McCormick v. Shannon, 32 So. 3d 787, 788 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)
(“Due process requires a trial court to give a person moving to vacate an injunction
a meaningful opportunity to be heard”); Colarusso v. Lupetin, 28 So. 3d 238, 239
(Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (holding that as appellant's motion was legally sufficient, the
trial court should have afforded appellant a meaningful opportunity to be heard
rather than summarily denying his motion); Reed v. Reed, 816 So. 2d 1246, 1247
(Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (“Due process requires that [the movant] be given [an]
opportunity to be heard on his request and that his motion should not be summarily
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disposed of . . . .” ). We express no opinion on the merits of the motion to dissolve
or modify the injunction.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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