Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D2025-1130 _____________________________ MICHAEL A. SMITH, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. _____________________________ Petition for Writ of Prohibition—Original Jurisdiction. October 7, 2026 PER CURIAM. DENIED. Raulerson v. State, 409 So. 3d 713, 716–17 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025) (noting that a writ of prohibition is “not an appeal from a nonfinal order in which this Court reviews the circuit court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion or for legal error” and that a petitioner seeking a writ of prohibition to assert a claim of self- defense immunity under section 776.032, Florida Statutes, must “show clearly and conclusively, without a good faith dispute,” that he was justified in the use of force). RAY and BILBREY, JJ., concur. WINOKUR, J., concurs with opinion. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ WINOKUR, J., concurring. Our supreme court has confirmed that a defendant “who believes legal error was committed” at a pretrial self-defense immunity hearing pursuant to section 776.032(1), Florida Statutes, may “seek relief by filing a petition for a writ of prohibition[.]” Boston v. State, 326 So. 3d 673, 677 (Fla. 2021). This position was recently emphasized when our supreme court rejected a proposal to authorize a nonfinal appeal to challenge an order denying self-defense immunity to a criminal charge. In re Amends. to Fla. Rules of App. Proc., 405 So. 3d 332 (Fla. 2025). In doing so, the court noted that, pursuant to Boston, a defendant still may seek relief following a denial of self-defense immunity by petition for writ of prohibition. Id. at 333–34. Accordingly, as we recently asserted in Raulerson v. State, when a defendant seeks relief following a denial of self-defense immunity, it is “not an appeal from a nonfinal order in which this Court reviews the circuit court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion or for legal error[;]” instead, the defendant “seeks to invoke the writ authority of this Court[.]” 409 So. 3d 713, 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025). A defendant seeking a writ of prohibition to assert a claim of self-defense immunity must “show clearly and conclusively, without a good faith dispute,” that he was justified in the use of force. Id. at 717. It is on this basis that the majority denies the petition sought in this case. Judge Tanenbaum provided a detailed concurrence in Raulerson analyzing several important ramifications arising from the consideration of self-defense immunity by writ of prohibition instead of by interlocutory appeal. First, we may not treat a petition for writ of prohibition as an (unauthorized) appeal of a nonfinal order. Raulerson, 409 So. 3d at 721 (noting, in the wake 2 of our supreme court’s refusal to authorize an interlocutory appeal of an order denying self-defense immunity, that “[t]he district courts of appeal, then, still lack the constitutional authority to directly review a denial of self-defense immunity as if the order is on appeal—by writ or otherwise”) (Tanenbaum, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Second, to secure relief, a petitioner seeking self-defense immunity by writ of prohibition must establish that the face of the record shows that the trial court “clearly and indisputably is acting or proposing to act beyond its jurisdiction.” Id. at 723. And third, “the trial court’s resolution of [an] evidentiary conflict is conclusive and not reviewable.” Id. at 724. Under these standards, I agree that a writ of prohibition is not justified here. In reaching this conclusion, I note that my resolution may have been different if we were reviewing the trial court’s order denying immunity as an interlocutory appeal, but, as stated above, this avenue is not open to us. * _____________________________ David S. Katz of Katz & Phillips, P.A., Orlando, for Petitioner. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Amanda Bosman, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent. * Our supreme court noted that the Florida Public Defender Association opposed the proposed amendment to authorize interlocutory appeal for review of orders denying self-defense immunity, “express[ing] concern” that interlocutory appeal would present “unique problems[.]” In re Amends., 405 So. 3d at 333. This “concern” was one of the reasons for the rejection of the proposal. As Judge Tanenbaum noted in his Raulerson opinion, this opposition does not account for the “more favorable review parameters that accompany direct appellate review—instead of an extraordinary, prerogative writ’s more stringent parameters.” Raulerson, 409 So. 3d at 721 n.2 (Tanenbaum, J., concurring). 3