Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D21-1236 _____________________________ C.F., Mother of M.F., M.F., L.F., Minor Children, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Mallory D. Cooper, Judge. January 11, 2022 JAY, J. C.F. appeals the final judgment terminating her parental rights to her three children: M.F., M.F., and L.F. In each of the three points raised, C.F.’s sole argument for reversal is predicated on the cited testimony of her witnesses and her medical documents submitted into evidence, and on the arguments made by her attorney during the multiple evidentiary hearings, all of which, she claims, demonstrate that the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are not based on competent, substantial evidence. But C.F. misunderstands the proper standard of review, which is crucial in resolving her appeal and which impels us to affirm. In an appeal of a final judgment terminating parental rights, it is not the function of this Court “‘to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.’” J.B. v. C.S., 186 So. 3d 1142, 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (quoting In the Interest of R.D.D., 518 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)). Rather, where the trial court has weighed the evidence and reached a conclusion, its judgment enjoys a presumption of correctness and “will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support.” Dep’t of Children & Families v. A.L., 307 So. 3d 978, 982 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (quoting N.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 843 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)). Our task “is not to conduct a de novo proceeding or reweigh the evidence by determining independently whether the evidence as a whole satisfies the clear and convincing standard.” Id. Instead, we determine only “whether the record contains competent substantial evidence to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard.” Id. at 982–83 (citation omitted). In short, our review of a final judgment terminating parental rights is “highly deferential.” Id. at 983 (quoting N.L., 843 So. 2d at 999); accord S.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 311 So. 3d 971, 972 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (citation omitted) (“Our standard of review in termination of parental rights cases is highly deferential. A trial court’s ‘finding that evidence is clear and convincing enjoys a presumption of correctness and will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support.’”). This highly deferential standard not only limits our review “to whether competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s final judgment,” it also restrains us from reversing the judgment in those cases where we “cannot say that no one could reasonably find such evidence to be clear and convincing.” J.P. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 183 So. 3d 1198, 1203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (quoting N.L. 843 So. 2d at 1000). Here, the trial court heard an immense amount of testimony and evidence of a highly technical nature over the course of multiple hearings, and all during the height of the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic. The judge was diligent in ensuring that C.F. was afforded due process throughout all of the proceedings and produced a masterful final judgment that assembled all of the medical facts in a coherent manner. Affording the final judgment its due deference—as we must—leads us to the inescapable 2 conclusion that competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision that several statutory grounds for termination of C.F.’s parental rights were proved by clear and convincing evidence, that its termination of C.F.’s parental rights promotes the children’s best interests, and that termination is the least restrictive means to protect the children from serious harm. Consequently, the final judgment is hereby AFFIRMED. RAY and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ C.F., pro se, Appellant. Ward L. Metzger of Children’s Legal Services, Tallahassee, for Appellee; Sara Goldfarb, Statewide Director of Appeals, Tallahassee, for Guardian ad Litem. 3