Full Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed January 29, 2020. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D18-2491 Lower Tribunal No. 18-552 ________________ C.S., a Juvenile, Appellant, vs. The State of Florida, Appellee. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Dawn Denaro, Judge. Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Shannon Hemmendinger, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kayla Heather McNab, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before SALTER, SCALES, and MILLER, JJ. MILLER, J. Appellant, C.S., challenges an order withholding adjudication of delinquency for committing the offense of grand theft in the third-degree, in violation of section 812.014(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2017). On appeal, C.S. contends the lower tribunal erred in denying his motion for dismissal, as the evidence adduced by the State to demonstrate the value of the purloined items was insufficient to support a finding of delinquency. For the reasons articulated below, we discern no error and affirm. BACKGROUND On the morning of March 22, 2017, Domingo Gonzalez, a junior at G. Holmes Braddock Senior High School, unwittingly left his encased cellular telephone atop a school desk, while turning in a class assignment. The device vanished, and, despite an exhaustive search of the classroom, was not recovered. During the lunch hour, a classmate, Carla Lugones, received information that C.S. was in possession of the telephone. Lugones approached C.S. and expended vigorous efforts to negotiate the return of the device in exchange for a sum of $50.00. The parties met later, at C.S.’s urging, far from the prying eyes of the school surveillance cameras. The telephone was reunited with its owner, but the case and the subscriber identity module (“SIM card”) were not. The agreed-upon monies were not furnished at that time. Thus, after returning the cellular phone, C.S. threatened to kill Gonzalez in the absence of prompt payment. 2 The incident was reported to school authorities, and C.S. was arrested and charged by petition with one count of grand theft in the third-degree. The case eventually proceeded to an adjudicatory hearing. At the hearing, Gonzalez described the telephone as a pristine, newly purchased, black Apple iPhone 7 Plus. He acquired the device approximately one month prior to the theft for $700.00, from a wireless communications retailer. The case and SIM card, neither of which were ever recovered, cost $50.00 and $25.00, respectively, and were procured simultaneously. At the time of the theft, the telephone was unmarred and functioned perfectly. At the conclusion of the evidence, C.S. sought dismissal. The trial court denied the motion, found C.S. delinquent, withheld adjudication, and imposed a term of supervision. The instant appeal ensued. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The standard of review that applies to a motion for judgment of dismissal in a juvenile case is the same standard that applies to a motion for judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.” A.P.R. v. State, 894 So. 2d 282, 284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (footnote omitted) (citing J.P. v. State, 855 So. 2d 1262, 1264 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)) (“Though referred to as a judgment of acquittal, under the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, the proper title of the motion should have been a Motion for Judgment of Dismissal. Notwithstanding, this court uses the same standard on review as for a 3 judgment of acquittal.”); see E.A.B. v. State, 851 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); W.E.P. v. State, 790 So. 2d 1166, 1170-71 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); see also J.L.F. v. State, 887 So. 2d 432, 433 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); M.N. v. State, 821 So. 2d 1205, 1025-06 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (applying standard of review for motions for judgment of acquittal in a juvenile case). Accordingly, “[o]ur review of the denial of a motion for judgment of dismissal is de novo.” J.W.J. v. State, 994 So. 2d 1223, 1224 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing E.A.B., 851 So. 2d at 310). “A motion for judgment of dismissal should not be granted unless there is no legally sufficient evidence on which to base a guilty verdict.” Id. (citing G.D. v. State, 497 So. 2d 1318, 1319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)). “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the State.” Id. (citation omitted). LEGAL ANALYSIS In a third-degree grand theft prosecution, the State bears the burden of establishing the property at issue was “[v]alued at $300 or more, but less than $5,000.” § 812.014(2)(c)(1), Fla. Stat. (2017).1 “Value means the market value of the property at the time and place of the offense or, if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time after 1 Grades of larceny hold historical significance, as “in ancient times, the higher grade of this offense was punishable capitally, and that grade was reached at what now would seem an extremely low figure as to value . . . [G]rand larceny . . . consist[ed] of feloniously stealing the personal property of another, ‘above the value of 12 pence.’” State v. Hibberd, 262 P. 950, 953 (Or. 1928) (citation omitted). 4 the offense.” § 812.012(10)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (2017); see Bloodsaw v. State, 994 So. 2d 378, 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“The general rule under the theft statute is that value means fair market value at the time of the theft.”) (citation omitted). Testimony as to the purchase price of an item, absent additional evidence as to “the manner in which the [item was] used, the condition and quality of the item[], and the percentage of depreciation of the item[] since [its] purchase,” is insufficient to establish the value of the stolen property. Davis v. State, 48 So. 3d 176, 180 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (quoting D.H. v. State, 864 So. 2d 588, 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)). Further, “[t]he insufficiency of such evidence of the purchase price is not remedied by the addition of bare evidence that the item was in working order when stolen.” K.W. v. State, 983 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citation omitted). Finally, Florida courts have determined that “[e]lectrical components . . . are subject to accelerated obsolescence because manufacturers are constantly releasing new, improved technology at lower prices. For this reason, purchase price alone is generally insufficient to establish the value of such property in theft cases.” Y.R. v. State, 226 So. 3d 1008, 1009 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (quoting Lucky v. State, 25 So. 3d 691, 692 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)). Nonetheless, “[v]alue may be established by direct testimony of fair market value or through evidence of the original market cost of the property, the manner in which the items were used, the condition and quality of the items, and the percentage 5 of depreciation of the items since their purchase.” Pickett v. State, 839 So. 2d 860, 861-62 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (citation omitted). In austere terms, the purchase price of the stolen item, combined with evidence of condition at the time of theft, is sufficient to establish value. See Smith v. State, 305 So. 2d 868, 870 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (“[T]he purchase price in this case was sufficient to prove that the property exceeded $100 in value in light of the fact that the state adduced testimony that the [item] was recently stolen and was still in good condition (‘almost brand new’) at the time of the theft.”). Here, the uncontroverted testimony established the purchase price of the telephone was $700.00, the SIM card, $25.00, and the case, $50.00. All three items were acquired a mere month before the theft. Moreover, at the time of the theft, the device was unsullied, fully operating, and in its originally-purchased condition. Consequently, the “evidence established more than just the purchase price and that the phone was in working order.” K.W., 983 So. 2d at 715. Thus, “[i]n viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt” that the aggregate value of the three items at the time of the theft was $300.00 or more. Id. at 716; see also Sylvester v. State, 766 So. 2d 1223, 1224 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“However, the aggregate value of the items stolen was at least $300 based on the number of items stolen, their newness, and their individual purchase prices.”). Indeed, here, given 6 “the evidence that the [items were] purchased only [one month] before” for a total of $775.00, and all were in perfect condition when stolen, “‘the minimum value’ of the [items] was ‘so obvious as to defy contradiction’ and ‘reasonable persons could not doubt that the value of the’” items was at least $300.00. K.W., 983 So. 2d at 716 (quoting Jackson v. State, 413 So. 2d 112, 114-15 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)). Accordingly, we conclude the evidence amply supports the judicial finding under review and decline to embrace the assertion of error. Thus, we affirm. Affirmed. 7