Cannon v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE ALTON CANNON, § § No. 425, 2025 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID Nos. 1704012804, STATE OF DELAWARE, § 2111008670 (N) § Appellee. § Submitted: July 15, 2026 Decided: October 9, 2026 Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices; and DANBERG, Chief Judge,1 constituting the Court en Banc. Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED. Alton Cannon, pro se, Wilmington, Delaware. Jordan A. Braunsberg, Esquire, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee State of Delaware. Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, COLLINS PRICE WARNER WOLOSHIN, Wilmington, Delaware, Amicus Curiae in support of Appellant Alton Cannon. 1 Sitting by designation under Del. Const. art. IV, § 12 and Supreme Court Rules 2(a) and 4(a) to complete the quorum. SEITZ, Chief Justice: After a bench trial, the Superior Court convicted Alton Cannon, a previously adjudicated Tier III sex offender, for two failures to report as a registered sex offender. While on probation for the failure-to-report offenses, the Department of Correction required Cannon to wear a GPS-enabled ankle bracelet. The Superior Court denied Cannon’s motion for sentence modification, which included a request to remove the GPS-enabled ankle bracelet. Cannon has appealed part of his sentence modification denial. He argues that the Delaware Sex Offender Management and Public Safety Statute does not require Cannon to wear a GPS-enabled ankle bracelet during probation for a crime other than the one which resulted in the sex offender registry requirement. We disagree and affirm. I. A. In 1998, Alton Cannon pled guilty to unlawful sexual contact in the first degree. The Superior Court sentenced him to five years in prison followed by probation. The court also required Cannon to register as a Tier III sex offender for 2 the remainder of his life. Tier III is the highest risk designation on the Delaware sex offender registry.2 After Cannon completed his probation for the 1998 offense, the Superior Court judge found him guilty in 2025 for two counts of failure to report as a registered sex offender.3 The court sentenced him to a suspended imprisonment term with credit for time served and Level II probation.4 The Department of Correction required Cannon to wear a GPS-enabled ankle bracelet during his probation. Cannon moved for a time-served accounting and asked the Superior Court to remove the GPS-enabled ankle bracelet condition imposed by probation. The court denied the motion. It held that his credit time was correct and that, under 11 Del. C. § 4121(u), the Department of Correction was required to monitor Cannon with a GPS-enabled ankle bracelet while on probation.5 Cannon has appealed, arguing that the statutory GPS monitoring requirement applies only to probation for the offense that resulted in the registry requirement – not subsequent offenses. He also raises a constitutional challenge. We appointed 2 See 11 Del. C. § 4121(d). 3 11 Del. C. § 4120(k). Cannon chose to proceed pro se with standby counsel and waived his right to a jury trial. 4 App. to Amicus Br. at A27–28 [hereinafter A_] (Corrected Sentence Ord.). 5 A58 (Ord. Denying Mot. for Modification of Sentence). 3 amicus curiae to argue Cannon’s position and to help us resolve the statutory interpretation and constitutional issues.6 B. On appeal, Cannon raises three arguments: (1) under the plain language of the statute, the GPS monitoring requirement applies only to the probation for the offense that resulted in the registry requirement; (2) we should interpret the statute his way to avoid absurd results; and (3) the statute as applied to “unrelated offenses” is an unreasonable search that violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The State agrees with Cannon that the statute is unambiguous but counters that the plain language does not limit GPS monitoring during probation for the offense that resulted in the registry requirement. Further, the State argues that its reading does not cause an absurd result in Cannon’s case, as he is a Tier III sex offender and requiring him to submit to GPS monitoring for failing to register is 6 The Court expresses its appreciation to amicus counsel for his work in this appeal. His volunteer service in this and other appeals is in the finest tradition of the Delaware Bar. While Cannon’s appeal was pending, he was discharged from probation and was no longer required to wear a GPS-enabled ankle bracelet. Cannon and the State requested that, despite the lack of an active controversy, we decide this appeal. We agreed. See Burroughs v. State, 304 A.3d 530, 539– 40 (Del. 2023) (resolving an appeal challenging the constitutionality of Delaware’s cash-bail system despite claims being moot to the defendant, observing that “[t]here are two generally recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine: ‘situations that are capable of repetition but evade review or matters of public importance’” (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. New Castle Cty., 701 A.2d 819, 823 n.5 (Del. 1997))). 4 consistent with the sex offender statutory scheme. Finally, the State contends that Cannon’s constitutional argument was waived and, in any case, is of no moment because the monitoring condition was reasonable under the circumstances. We review constitutional questions and statutory interpretation issues de novo.7 II. When interpreting a statute, “[f]irst, we must determine whether the statute under consideration is ambiguous.”8 The parties’ disagreement about its meaning does not render the statute ambiguous.9 A statute is ambiguous only “if it is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations.”10 If not, “then we give the words in the statute their plain meaning.”11 An unambiguous statute is “conclusive of the legislature’s intent.”12 7 Newark Prop. Ass’n v. State, 350 A.3d 1224, 2025 WL 3157392, at *4 (Del. Nov. 12, 2025) (TABLE) (citing CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1040 (Del. 2011), as corrected (Sept. 6, 2011)). 8 Taylor v. Diamond State Port Corp., 14 A.3d 536, 538 (Del. 2011) (citations omitted). 9 Wilkerson v. State, 338 A.3d 477, 486 (Del. 2025) (citing Chase Alexa, LLC v. Kent Cty. Levy Ct., 991 A.2d 1148, 1151 (Del. 2010)). 10 Taylor, 14 A.3d at 538 (citing Dewey Beach Enter. Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 1 A.3d 305, 307 (Del. 2010)). 11 Id. 12 Abbott v. State, ---A.3d---, 2026 WL 2097090, at *2 (Del. July 21, 2026) (quoting Grand Ventures, Inc. v. Whaley, 632 A.2d 63, 68 (Del. 1993)). 5  If a statute is ambiguous, “then we consider the statute as a whole, rather than in parts, and we read each section in light of all others to produce a harmonious whole.”13 Further, we “ascribe a purpose to the General Assembly’s use of statutory language, construing it against surplusage, if reasonably possible.”14 Section 4121(u) provides that, “[n]otwithstanding any provision of this section or title to the contrary, any Tier III sex offender being monitored at Level IV, III, II or I, shall as a condition of their probation, wear a GPS locator ankle bracelet paid for by the probationer.”15 The statute is not reasonably susceptible to different interpretations. The statute requires “any Tier III sex offender” who is “being monitored at Level IV, III, II, or I” to wear a GPS-enabled ankle bracelet.16 The statute is specific to the offender and supervision level, not to the underlying offense. And “[r]ead naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’”17 13 Taylor, 14 A.3d at 538 (citing Dewey Beach Enters., 1 A.3d at 307). 14 Id. 15 11 Del. C. § 4121(u). 16 Id. (emphasis added). 17 United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (finding no basis in the text “any other term of imprisonment” to limit the statute to federal prison sentences (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1976))). 6  When the statute has only one reasonable meaning, we enforce the statute as written.18 After Cannon’s failure-to-report convictions, he was a Tier III sex offender under Level II supervision. The Superior Court properly found that, under the plain language of the statute, Cannon was subject to GPS monitoring during his probationary period. A. Cannon agrees that Section 4121(u) is unambiguous but offers a different interpretation. He claims that the words “their probation” refers only to probation for the offense that resulted in the registry requirement. He points to the fact that probation is singular, and the word “their” is used instead of “any.” Cannon’s argument is unpersuasive. When interpreting the Delaware Code, unless the statutory context or legislative history directs otherwise, “words used in the singular number include the plural and the plural includes the singular.”19 With no directive otherwise, “probation” can include multiple probations.20 And “their” 18 See Newtowne Village Serv. Corp. v. Newtowne Rd. Dev. Co., 772 A.2d 172, 175–76 (Del. 2001) (“When the language and intent of a statute are clear, no ambiguity exists and the Court will not engage in construing or interpreting the statute.” (first citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Burgess, 545 A.2d 1186, 1191 (Del. 1988); and then citing DiStefano v. Watson, 566 A.2d 1, 4 (Del. 1989))). 19 1 Del. C. § 304(a). 20 See Tolliver v. Moses, 700 A.2d 736, 1997 WL 537308, at *1–2 (Del. Aug. 20, 1997) (TABLE) (holding that 21 Del. C. § 4117(c)’s use of the term “vehicle” includes more than one vehicle). 7 refers back to the subject of the sentence – any Tier III sex offender – not to the offense that resulted in the registry requirement.21 B. Cannon also contends that enforcing the statute as written produces an absurd result not intended by the General Assembly. Specifically, he claims that, after completing his initial sentence for unlawful sexual contact, he was not tracked for decades. Cannon reasons that requiring GPS monitoring now, following his convictions for what he calls an “unrelated” and “non-sex” offense, could not have been intended by the General Assembly.22 Absurdity, however, is “a narrow and delicate interpretive maxim” that is “most appropriately and responsibly invoked only when a statute’s words may be read in two plausible ways.”23 Stated differently, absurdity typically applies when a 21 Cannon also argues that the General Assembly used the words “any subsequent offense” and “any probation” when creating eligibility requirements for a tier reduction. Thus, according to Cannon, the decision not to use “any” in subsection (u) implicitly limited GPS monitoring to the probation for the offense that resulted in the registry requirement. Unless the context requires otherwise, however, “when interpreting a statute, we read language appearing in specific sections or subsections as applying only to those specific portions and their subparts, not the entirety of the statute.” Cornette v. State, --- A.3d ---, 2026 WL 309253, at *5 (Del. Feb. 5, 2026). 22 Amicus Opening Br. 20–21. 23 In re Last Will and Testament of Palecki, 920 A.2d 413, 423 (Del. Ch. 2007); see Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., 492 A.2d 1242, 1247 (Del. 1985) (observing that the golden rule of statutory interpretation is the “unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another”); Home Ins. Co. v. Maldonado, 515 A.2d 690, 694 n.8 (Del. 1986) (describing this Court’s prior refusal to apply the absurdity doctrine to a statute despite interpretation resulting in an “anomalous result” that was “at minimum, poor public policy” because “it is not within the power of the Court to amend clear statutory language.”); see also Cordero v. Gulfstream Dev. 8 court must choose between two possible interpretations of a statute, one of which would produce an absurd result.24 Here, the statute is unambiguous, leaving no room for an absurdity argument. In any event, as applied to Cannon’s case, the statute does not produce an absurd result. The sex offender registration and notification statutes “protect the public from the danger and propensity for recidivism of convicted sex offenders.”25 GPS tracking Tier III sex offenders who fail to report is consistent with the legislative purpose underlying these statutes – to prevent recidivism by monitoring the whereabouts of sex offenders on probation.26 Corp., 56 A.3d 1030, 1037 (Del. 2012) (holding that courts lack the power to rewrite a statute even where interpretation creates “an unfortunate result”). 24 See In re Last Will and Testament of Palecki, 920 A.2d at 423; see also Daniels v. State, 538 A.2d 1104, 1109–1110 (Del. 1988) (“What has been described as the ‘golden rule’ of statutory construction provides that the unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative interpretations of a statute is just cause for rejecting that interpretation in favor of the interpretation that would produce a reasonable result.” (citing Coastal Barge Corp., 492 A.2d at 1247)). 25 Lamberty v. State, 108 A.3d 1225, 2015 WL 428581, at *2 (Del. Jan. 30, 2015) (TABLE) (quoting Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1075 (Del. 2001)). 26 Doe v. Coupe, 143 A.3d 1266, 1276 (Del. Ch. 2016) (observing GPS devices reduce recidivism), aff’d sub nom., Doe No. 1 v. Coupe, 158 A.3d 449, 2017 WL 837689 (Del. 2017) (TABLE). Florida has followed a similar path. As Cannon acknowledges, under Florida law, if certain sex offenders violate their probation by committing any felony offense, and are sentenced to a new term of probation, they are subject to electronic monitoring. Amicus Opening Br. 15–16. See Fields v. State, 968 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (refusing to modify an order requiring electronic monitoring of covered sex offender who violated their probation for felony driving with a revoked license conviction). 9  C. Finally, Cannon raises an as-applied Fourth Amendment challenge to Section 4121(u).27 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,” and that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”28 Although probable cause is usually required for law enforcement to obtain a judicial warrant, “a search unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional . . . ‘when special needs . . . make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’”29 In Griffin v. Wisconsin, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state’s probation system “presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may 27 The State contends that Cannon’s Fourth Amendment argument was not raised below, and thus we should review Cannon’s constitutional claim for plain error. Answering Br. 35. In his motion for sentence reduction and modification, however, Cannon asserted, “the trial court violated . . . protected property interest rights to be free from illegal search and seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to be [exempt] from invasion of Alton’s privacy and freedom of movement . . . . [by placing] a ‘GPS Tracking Device’ on Alton’s (vessel) i.e. (ankle) without his consent.” A32 (Mot. for Sentence Reduction) (first alteration in original) (emphasis added). 28 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 29 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)). 10 justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.”30 In this setting, “the Fourth Amendment suppl[ies] a relaxed standard for reasonableness.”31 The Court of Chancery in Doe v. Coupe considered the special-needs exception for convicted sex offenders on probation for their crimes.32 In that case, three convicted sex offenders on probation or parole for their offenses challenged the facial validity of Section 4121(u) and its GPS monitoring requirement under the Federal and State Constitutions. To evaluate Section 4121(u)’s constitutionality, the court in Doe applied the factors from the U.S. Supreme Court’s Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton decision: (1) “the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search here at issue intrudes”; (2) “the character of the intrusion that is complained of”; and (3) “the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue [in the case], and the efficacy of [the disputed] means for meeting it.”33 When applying the Vernonia factors, the court must engage in “a context-specific inquiry, examining 30 483 U.S. at 873–74. 31 Doe, 143 A.3d at 1274 (alteration in original). 32 143 A.3d at 1273–79. 33 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654, 658, 660). 11 closely the competing private and public interests advanced by the parties,” and considers “the totality of the circumstances.”34 Examining the first factor, the Court of Chancery in Doe concluded that: Plaintiffs voluntarily accepted Section 4121(u)’s GPS monitoring requirement as a condition of their probation or parole to avoid further prison time. And, Plaintiffs cannot seriously contend that they were unaware that their locations were being tracked because the GPS monitors were physically attached to their ankles. Thus, “[e]xamining the totality of the circumstances pertaining to [Plaintiffs’] status as [parolees and probationers], an established variation on imprisonment, . . . [Plaintiffs] [do] not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate.”35 For the second factor, the court held that, although “GPS monitoring can intrude upon an individual’s privacy,” the focus is on the statute’s “incremental effect” on the probationer’s privacy:36 To the extent that Plaintiffs are embarrassed by or ashamed of their GPS monitors, their status as Tier III sex offenders already requires them to notify the community of their criminal history. Such notification “may include door-to-door appearances, mail, telephone, newspapers or notices to schools and licensed day care facilities within the community, or any combination thereof,” and “may also include a photograph of the offender.” A Tier III sex offender also must publicly register as a sex offender and is subject to the registration and community notification requirements “for the remainder of his or her life.” The incremental 34 Id. (first quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997); and then quoting Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 310 (2015)). 35 Id. at 1275 (alterations in original) (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006)). 36 Id. at 1275–76 (alteration in original) (quoting Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 934–35 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding a Wisconsin statute mandating that certain sex offenders are GPS monitored for the remainder of their lives)). 12  imposition into Plaintiffs’ privacy caused by Section 4121(u)’s GPS monitoring requirement, therefore, is not unduly burdensome.37 Finally, for the third factor, the court held: Even if sex offenders do recidivate at a lower rate than other criminals, the Delaware General Assembly reasonably may view sex crimes as more detrimental to public safety than other crimes and could also have concluded that any sex offender recidivism is more egregious than recidivism of other crimes. And, because even the most advanced risk assessment metrics have subjective components, the General Assembly validly exercised its legislative discretion in using the severity of a sex offender’s crime as a proxy for that individual’s future risk to society, even if [the Department of Correction] would more effectively reduce sex offender recidivism by deciding whether to use GPS monitors based on individual risk assessments.38 After weighing the three factors, the court concluded that “the Delaware government’s legitimate interest and chosen means for advancing that interest – i.e., GPS monitoring under Section 4121(u) – outweigh Plaintiffs’ interest in avoiding a relatively slight intrusion into their diminished privacy” and upheld the legislation.39 D. The Court of Chancery’s Doe decision does not map perfectly onto this appeal. As the State acknowledges, for the first Vernonia factor, it is unclear whether Cannon engaged in a calculus to “avoid further prison time” by “voluntarily 37 Id. at 1276 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting 11 Del. C. § 4121(a)(1); and then quoting Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1067 (Del. 2001)). 38 Id. at 1277–78 (citation modified). 39 Id. at 1279. 13 accept[ing] Section 4121(u)’s GPS monitoring requirement as a condition of [his] probation.”40 But even if Cannon did not consent to GPS monitoring, a probationer has a diminished expectation of privacy compared to an ordinary citizen.41 Cannon is a convicted sex offender who must register with the State and is on probation for failing to do so. He has a diminished expectation of privacy “by virtue of [his] status alone.”42 For the second Vernonia factor, as the Court of Chancery held in Doe, the intrusion is not unduly burdensome. Cannon acknowledges that the court’s analysis was “sound,” but argues that “it makes no sense as applied to subsequent probations.”43 He claims the “discomfort, shame, and employment challenges [are] grossly disproportionate for any sentence other than the one originally imposed.”44 40 Id. at 1275. 41 See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874 (“[P]robationers . . . do not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972))). 42 Samson, 547 U.S. at 848–49 (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001); see, e.g., Belleau, 811 F.3d at 935–36 (7th Cir. 2016) (sex offenders on probation that are subject to lifetime GPS monitoring have a diminished expectation of privacy because of recidivism risk); Shea v. Smith, 966 F.2d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 1992) (under Griffin, probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy “by virtue of their status” (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874)); United States v. Chirino, 483 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2007) (a warrantless search was justified in part by the probationer’s diminished expectation of privacy stemming from his status as a probationer). 43 Amicus Opening Br. 24. 44 Id. 14  As explained above, however, we measure the character of the intrusion by the statute’s incremental effects on Cannon. Like the plaintiffs in Doe, Cannon is required to register as a sex offender four times annually with the State Bureau of Identification.45 His name appears in a public database.46 And just as the Doe plaintiffs were subject to lifetime community notification requirements, so too is Cannon.47 At a minimum, the public will be made aware of his last verified address, the specific sex offense conviction, and the date of his conviction.48 These requirements will remain in effect for as long as Cannon is designated a Tier III sex offender. Any additional “embarrassment and shame, [or] occupational inconvenience” not otherwise imposed by the registration and community notification requirements is minimal and proportionate to deterring recidivism.49 Finally, as to the third factor, we agree with the Court of Chancery in Doe that “the General Assembly validly exercised its legislative discretion in using the 45 App. to Answering Br. at B22 (Trial Tr. at 87:14–22). 46 Id. 47 A58 (Ord. Denying Mot. for Modification of Sentence); see 11 Del. C. § 4120(f)(1) (obligating persons required to register as a sex offender to re-register with the Delaware State Police any time they relocate); 11 Del. C. § 4121(i) (requiring police to notify the public “whenever a [Tier III sex offender] provides registration information” under 11 Del. C. § 4120). 48 11 Del. C. §§ 4121(a)(3)(b)(1)–(3). 49 Doe 143 A.3d at 1275–76; see also Belleau, 811 F.3d. at 935 (holding that where a sex offender’s privacy has already been “severely curtailed” by the publication of his criminal records and home address, the incremental effect of any additional loss of privacy that stems from wearing to an ankle monitor “must be slight”). 15 severity of a sex offender’s crime as a proxy for that individual’s future risk to society.”50 As the court held in Doe, the GPS monitoring requirement “has at least some benefits in terms of reducing the rate of or mitigating the harm from recidivism by Tier III sex offenders.”51 Cannon points out that, for decades following his first probation, the State did not track him by GPS. As he argues, being on probation for a “new, unrelated offense” cannot justify the GPS tracking because “[h]e is no more dangerous or likely to recidivate” before his 2025 probation than now.52 Now, however, the State’s concerns are more immediate. Failure to report is not an “unrelated” offense. And when a Tier III sex offender is convicted of failing to report (twice) and is subject to probation, the State is justified in increasing monitoring through more intrusive means to protect the public from recidivism.53 GPS monitoring is another tool to reduce recidivism.54 With GPS monitoring, 50 Doe, 143 A.3d at 1278. 51 Id. at 1277–78. 52 Amicus Opening Br. 25. 53 See Doe, 143 A.3d at 1277–78 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly refused to declare that only the “least intrusive” search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’” (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663)). 54 See Doe, 143 A.3d at 1277 (“Section 4121(u)’s GPS monitoring requirement has at least some benefits in terms of reducing the rate of or mitigating the harm from recidivism by Tier III sex offenders.”). 16 probation officers can intervene before minor violations escalate into serious new offenses.55 Finally, unlike the registration or community notification requirements, GPS monitoring does not require Cannon’s cooperation to be effective. III. Section 4121(u) is unambiguous. The statute required the Department of Corrections to impose GPS monitoring during Cannon’s probation. Also, the statute as applied to Cannon does not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. 55 See id. at 1277 n.87 (“Supervision also provides a crucial means of advancing rehabilitation by allowing a probation agent to intervene at the first sign of trouble.” (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 883 (Blackmun, J., dissenting))); Belleau, 811 F.3d at 935 (observing that Wisconsin’s GPS monitoring of convicted sex offenders is meant to “deter future offenses by making [the sex offender] aware that he is being monitored and is likely therefore to be apprehended should a sex crime be reported at a time, and a location, at which he is present.”). 17