Full Opinion

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed November 9, 2026 S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-25-01054-CV FARIBORZ HADJEBIAN, Appellant V. SANDRA DUNNING, Appellee On Appeal from the 14th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-23-10680 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Kennedy, Clinton, and Rossini Opinion by Justice Kennedy Fariborz Hadjebian appeals from a final judgment in his suit against appellee Sandra Dunning for negligence, negligent entrustment, negligence per se, and vicarious liability. In his first issue, Hadjebian argues the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the trial time to only one day. In his second issue, Hadjebian urges the jury’s award of was supported by factually insufficient evidence. We affirm. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. BACKGROUND Hadjebian and his wife Elnaz Entayatfar filed their original petition in this case, asserting claims against Dunning and others alleged to be involved in an August 2, 2021 car accident. In that petition, Hadjebian claimed Dunning had been driving negligently through an intersection, causing another car to collide with Hadjebian’s car. The case proceeded to trial before a jury. At trial, the following facts of the August 2, 2021 car accident were established. Hadjebian was driving a car that was stopped at a red light on a southbound road. In the lane to his immediate left, a DART bus was also stopped at the same red light. Dunning was driving a car on the cross street that ran west and east. Her car was facing eastbound as she waited in the intersection to make a left to turn northbound. Dunning proceeded to turn left and was struck by a car driven by Ryan Noyes. The impact caused Dunning’s car to spin around in the intersection, while Noyes’s car headed towards the DART bus and Hadjebian’s car. Noyes’s car struck the DART bus and came to rest with the front of the vehicle facing Hadjebian’s car but set off to the left, such that Noyes’s driver’s side wheel rested alongside the driver’s side wheel of Hadjebian’s car. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found that Dunning’s negligence had proximately caused the August 2, 2021 car accident and awarded zero dollars to Hadjebian for “his damages, if any, that resulted from” the August 2, 2021 car –2– accident.1 The trial court signed a take-nothing judgment against Hadjebian and in favor of Dunning and Noyes.2 Hadjebian filed a motion for new trial, complaining that the jury’s award was supported by factually insufficient evidence and that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting trial to one day instead of two, thereby limiting Hadjebian’s ability to call his doctors to testify. The trial court denied Hadjebian’s motion, and this appeal followed. DISCUSSION I. Complaint Regarding Length of Trial Court In his first issue, Hadjebian urges the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the trial to only one day and that, as a result of the time constraints imposed by the trial court on the length of the trial, he did not have sufficient and reasonable time within which to call his treating providers to testify. The rules of evidence require a trial court to exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. See TEX. R. EVID. 611(a). We review a trial court’s imposition of time limits at trial, and the exclusion of evidence due to the imposition of time limits, using an abuse of discretion standard. Cooper v. Cooper, No. 05-24-00766-CV, 2026 WL 2286507, 1 The charge of the court did not include any questions regarding Entayatfar and her claim. 2 The judgment also stated that Entayatfar was present pro se at trial but did not make an appearance or provide any evidence in support of her claim. –3– at *11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 7, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re M.A.S., 233 S.W.3d 915, 924 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied); Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 240–41 (Tex. 2001). However, when a trial court limits the amount of time a party has to present its case, and thereby prevents a party from presenting all of its evidence, the party must object to the time limit and make an offer of proof of the evidence it was prevented from presenting to preserve error on appeal. In re B.P., No. 05-23-01322-CV, 2025 WL 1083615, at *2 (Tex. App.— Dallas Mar. 10, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. In support of his issue, Hadjebian points to the record where his counsel indicated before trial began that she would need “three to four days” to try the case. The trial judge inquired as to how many witnesses Hadjebian intended to call, as well as how many the defendants’ counsel intended to call. After learning that Hadjebian intended to call five witnesses and each defendant intended to present only his or her own testimony, the trial judge stated, “This trial will be done before the end of the day tomorrow.” Hadjebian’s counsel did not object at that time. Hadjebian also points to the record when, after the jury was sworn in but before trial began, a juror indicated he had final exams the following day. Upon learning that the exam was to take place the following afternoon, the judge stated he did not know when trial would conclude but that, “They’ll move faster now knowing that you’ve got to get out of here and take exam.” Hadjebian’s counsel did not object at that time. –4– Hadjebian complains that he was forced to close his case before he had submitted all of his evidence and alleges that, at the conclusion of the first day of trial, he intended to call another witness who was “running a tad bit late.” Review of the record reveals that when Hadjebian’s counsel stated, “We are waiting for our doctor to get here,” the trial judge did not address the intention to call another witness. Instead, the judge asked whether Hadjebian had any testimony other than the doctor’s. Hadjebian’s counsel answered that she intended to recall Hadjebian. When asked if there was any other testimony she wanted to put on, Hadjebian’s counsel responded, “Not other than Plaintiff, Your Honor.” The record does not indicate that Hadjebian or his counsel objected or otherwise made the trial judge aware of any complaint regarding the length of trial or what evidence his doctor witness would provide if trial were extended beyond one day. Hadjebian raised the foregoing arguments in his motion for new trial, but such complaint is not timely. In re S.C.S., No. 05-06-01600-CV, 2008 WL 1973570, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 8, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)). Accordingly, from this record, we cannot conclude that Hadjebian preserved his complaint concerning the length of trial for our review. We overrule his first issue. II. Factual Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting Jury’s Zero Damages Award In his second issue, Hadjebian argues the jury’s zero damage finding was supported by factually insufficient evidence, manifestly too small an award, and –5– against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. He urges he provided an abundance of medical records to support his testimony that he experienced injuries and exacerbation of preexisting chronic pain as a result of the August 2, 2021 car accident. The charge to the jury asked what sum of money would fairly and reasonably compensate Hadjebian for his damages, if any, that resulted from the August 2, 2021 car accident. The jury was asked about the following categories of damages: past medical expenses, future medical expenses, past physical impairment, past physical pain, future physical pain, past mental anguish, and future mental anguish. The jury answered “0” for each category of damages. The jury generally has great discretion in considering evidence on the issue of damages. Grant v. Cruz, 406 S.W.3d 358, 363 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). Matters of pain and mental anguish are necessarily speculative, and it is particularly within the jury’s province to resolve these matters and determine the amounts attributable thereto. Id. When there is uncontroverted, objective evidence of an injury and the causation of the injury has been established, appellate courts are more likely to overturn jury findings of no damages for past pain and mental anguish. Id. However, where the evidence of pain is conflicting, scant, or more subjective than objective, appellate courts are generally more reluctant to determine a jury finding of no damages is contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Id. –6– The mere fact of injury does not prove compensable pain and mental anguish. Id. at 364. A jury may disbelieve a witness, even if the witness’s testimony is uncontradicted. Id. A jury is free to reject the subjective testimony of a plaintiff as to the existence, amount, or severity of the plaintiff’s pain. Id. A jury may also conclude, even when an objective injury is shown, that the injury is attributable to factors other than a defendant’s negligence. Id. Here, the jury found that Dunning’s negligence had proximately caused the August 2, 2021 car accident and awarded zero dollars to Hadjebian for “his damages, if any, that resulted from” the August 2, 2021 car accident. Given these findings, it is clear the jury believed Dunning caused the August 2, 2021 car accident, but the jury did not believe that Hadjebian had established any damages that were caused by that same accident. In support of his claim, Hadjebian offered his own testimony and that of his mother as well as hundreds of pages of medical records. He testified that in 2003, he sustained an injury to his back and had received physical therapy and surgery on the lumbar region of his spine. Hadjebian stated that he had been in a car accident in July 2021 during which he hit his head on the driver’s side window, causing pain to his left shoulder, neck, and face—“just tremendously painful.” At the time of the August 2, 2021 accident, he was seeing Dr. Arif B. Khan “for some mild disturbances and discomfort I was having in my lower back” and that his pain management “was under control.” –7– On August 2, 2021, Hadjebian was on his way from the pain management doctor’s office and sitting at a red light when he “heard a very loud sound that made me really jolt and it was very frightening.” He grabbed the steering wheel and braced for what he saw coming at him, which was Noye’s car. According to Hadjebian, the front grille of Noye’s car hit his windshield. He noticed his hands were stuck in an awkward position and he felt burning and numbness on the left side of his body. He required assistance from emergency medical personnel who dragged him out of his car and placed him into an ambulance. Hadjebian testified that after the August 2, 2021 accident, he experienced a lot of pain mostly on the left side of his body: his neck, left hip, left knee, and left ankle. He stated that all of the pain he had felt before the August 2, 2021 accident had been exacerbated, requiring more injections and more physical therapy, and that all of his preexisting injuries got much worse than before the August 2, 2021 accident. Hadjebian offered hundreds of pages of medical records in support of his claim, many of which documented doctor’s visits, medical imaging, and billing records for visits and treatments that occurred prior to and for two years after the August 2, 2021 accident. Despite the fact that the records included notations that Hadjebian experienced pain in his left hip, left knee, and left ankle since the August 2, 2021 accident, none of the records stated that his pain or injuries were caused by the August 2, 2021, or were the result of same. Additionally, at least one treating physician’s note indicated of Hadjebian’s left ankle pain that it was “[h]ard to say if –8– this pain is coming from his back or if is isolated contusion of his ankle from the accident.” To be sure, Hadjebian’s medical records indicate he has experienced chronic pain in his head, neck, back, and upper and lower extremities for years before the August 2, 2021 accident. Indeed, Dr. Khan’s notes from a visit in April of 2021 indicate Hadjebian has reported “having pain in the back, neck and wrists for many years. The back pain radiates to both the lower extremities. The neck pain is both upper extremities.” In that same record, Dr. Khan reports Hadjebian’s “[s]leep is disturbed due to the pain.” Hadjebian’s medical records also include diagnoses of a history of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome with pain and numbness in his hands and wrists since January 2021. In addition to the foregoing evidence, the jury also reviewed photographs of the accident, which show minor damage to Hadjebian’s vehicle’s driver’s side tire and front fender, as well as video from the DART bus of the accident itself. The records from the emergency medical personnel who transported Hadjebian via ambulance to a hospital after the August 2, 2021 accident include that the vehicle had “moderate damage” and that the airbag did not deploy. We conclude the jury may have determined Hadjebian’s testimony was not credible based on inconsistencies between his testimony and the medical records he offered, the photographs and video of the accident itself, and their own impression of his credibility. See Grant, 406 S.W.3d at 365 (“It was the jury’s role to determine –9– which witnesses to believe or disbelieve and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.”). Moreover, while Hadjebian offered medical records of pain and injuries treated after the August 2, 2021 accident, his evidence that the same were sustained as a result of the accident is far from conclusive or overwhelming. Having reviewed the evidence in the record, we cannot conclude the jury’s zero damages award is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. We overrule Hadjebian’s second issue. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment. /Nancy Kennedy/ NANCY KENNEDY JUSTICE –10–