Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2696-24 ANGELA K. GENTRY, individually and as Executrix of the Estate of TROY LEE GENTRY, Plaintiff, v. HERLIHY HELICOPTERS, INC. a/k/a, d/b/a HELICOPTER FLIGHT SERVICES, INC., CAVE HOLDINGS – FLYING W, LLC, OLER PRODUCTIONS, MCFARLANE AVIATION PRODUCTS, SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, SIKORSKY GLOBAL HELICOPTERS, INC., KEYSTONE HELICOPTER CORPORATION, KEYSTONE HELICOPTER CORPORATION, n/k/a SIKORSKY GLOBAL HELICOPTERS, INC., KEYSTONE HELICOPTER HOLDINGS, INC., A Lockheed Martin Company, and KEYSTONE HELICOPTER HOLDINGS, INC., Defendants. __________________________________ SHEILA ROBINSON, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of JAMES EVAN ROBINSON, deceased, Plaintiff, v. CAVE HOLDINGS – FLYING W LLC, MCFARLANE AVIATION PRODUCTS, SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, SIKORSKY GLOBAL HELICOPTERS, INC., KEYSTONE HELICOPTER CORPORATION, KEYSTONE HELICOPTER CORPORATION, n/k/a SIKORSKY GLOBAL HELICOPTERS, INC., KEYSTONE HELICOPTER HOLDINGS, INC., A Lockheed Martin Company, KEYSTONE HELICOPTER HOLDINGS, INC., LYCOMING, an operating division of AVCO Corporation, AVCO CORPORATION, and AVSTAR FUEL SYSTEMS, INC., Defendants. __________________________________ ANGELA K. GENTRY, individually and as Executrix of the Estate of TROY LEE GENTRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. G&C GROUP USA, INC., a/k/a QSLS Aviation Inc., and/or U.S. Chinese Aviation, Inc., and/or GNC USA, A-2696-24 2 HERLIHY HELICOPTERS, INC., HELICOPTER FLIGHT SERVICES, INC., and AVSTAR FUEL SYSTEMS, INC., Defendants, and AVCO CORPORATION, LYCOMING ENGINES, and AVCO LYCOMING- TEXTRON WILLIAMSPORT, Defendants-Respondents. 1 __________________________________ Argued October 15, 2026 – Decided November 10, 2026 Before Judges Mayer, Smith, and Zazzali-Hogan. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket Nos. L-0369-18, L-1887-19, and L-1901-19. Arthur Alan Wolk (The Wolk Law Firm) of the Pennsylvania bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for appellant (Giansante & Associates, LLC, and Arthur Alan Wolk, attorneys; Alan Arthur Wolk and Louis Giansante, on the briefs). Patrick E. Bradley argued the cause for respondents (Reed Smith LLP, attorneys; Patrick E. Bradley and Catherine Kiernan, on the brief). 1 Defendants, except defendant Avco Corporation d/b/a Lycoming Engines and d/b/a Avco/Lycoming-Textron Williamsport, settled with plaintiff and are not parties on appeal. A-2696-24 3 PER CURIAM Plaintiff Angela K. Gentry, individually and as the executrix of the Estate of Troy Lee Gentry, her deceased husband (decedent), appeals from several pre- trial orders addressing the admissibility of expert testimony at trial. Additionally, plaintiff appeals from a February 4, 2025 order granting summary judgment to defendant Avco Corporation d/b/a Lycoming Engines and d/b/a Avco Lycoming-Textron Williamsport (Avco) and denying her motion for summary judgment. We affirm all orders on appeal. This product liability action stems from a helicopter crash in Medford, New Jersey. Decedent, a musician with the country music band Montgomery Gentry, tragically died in the accident. On September 8, 2017, the band was scheduled to perform a concert at a local airport. Before the concert, decedent accepted an invitation from a pilot at the local airport to take a helicopter sightseeing flight. The pilot was certified but had less than 400 hours of flying time. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot radioed that the aircraft had a problem and he needed to speak to the Assistant Chief Flight Instructor for the airport's flight school, Helicopter Flight Services, Inc. (HFS). The pilot told the Assistant Chief Flight Instructor the engine was running at full power, and he could not reduce A-2696-24 4 power because the throttle was unresponsive. Two other pilots, Robert Hoban, a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Designated Pilot Examiner, and Robert Drapala, an FAA Aviation Safety Inspector, joined the radio conversation with the pilot. The Assistant Chief Flight Instructor contacted Douglas Herlihy, the Chief Flight Instructor, Chief Mechanic, and owner of HFS, regarding the aircraft's situation. The pilot circled the airport for about twenty minutes while troubleshooting with Hoban and Drapala and discussing emergency landing options. At the suggestion of the consulting pilots, the helicopter's pilot attempted a running landing maneuver. However, he was unable to sufficiently slow the aircraft. The pilot then attempted to perform an autorotation landing to glide the helicopter to ground. Drapala instructed the pilot to aim for the middle of the runway. While at an altitude of 950 feet and a quarter of a mile south of the airport's runway, the pilot directed the aircraft toward the middle of the airstrip. At that moment, the Assistant Chief Flight Instructor heard the engine cut out. According to the Assistant Chief Flight Instructor, the pilot-initiated autorotation at the "normal position" and, "[b]ased on where he was, [the pilot] A-2696-24 5 should have made the runway." Drapala thought the pilot started the autorotation "a little bit too soon." The Assistant Chief Flight Instructor and Drapala reported the autorotation appeared to begin normally. However, before the helicopter reached the runway, its horizontal velocity slowed, its descent rate increased rapidly, and the nose of the aircraft pitched downward. The main rotor blades slowed such that the individual blades were visible. During the helicopter's descent, the Assistant Chief Flight Instructor heard a high-pitched whining noise consistent with the sound of an attempt to restart the aircraft's engine. The helicopter hit the ground 220 feet short of the runway. The pilot and plaintiff's husband died from the impact. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued a report regarding the accident. The report confirmed the two-piece throttle control tie rod assembly had disconnected during the flight. The NTSB opined the damage from the wreckage "was consistent with an incorrectly adjusted throttle control tie rod assembly with reduced thread engagement, which led to separation of the rod end bearing from the tie rod and resulted in loss of control of engine rpm via the throttle twist grip control." The NTSB's report noted "[a] review of NTSB reportable accidents and incidents during autorotation . . . indicates that A-2696-24 6 the predominant probable cause is failure to maintain main rotor . . . rpm . . . and airspeed within the . . . specified range, resulting in an excessive and unrecoverable rate of descent." The report further stated that, according to the FAA Helicopter Handbook, "[i]f too much collective pitch is applied too early during the final stages of the autorotation, the kinetic energy may be depleted, resulting in little or no cushioning effect available . . . [which] could result in a hard landing with corresponding damage to the helicopter." According to the NTSB's report, both Hoban and Drapala explained "the pilot was advised 'multiple times' to aim to touch down 'midfield' and not to initiate the engine shutdown and autorotation until over the runway." In her confidential appendix, plaintiff included summaries of statements prepared by different accident investigators. Those summaries asserted both Hoban and Drapala made the statement reflected in the NTSB's report. One summary stated Drapala explained the helicopter came "straight down from where auto started." However, Drapala's own statement did not indicate he told the pilot to initiate autorotation while over the runway or state the helicopter fell to the ground immediately after the engine shut off. At his deposition, Drapala denied telling investigators: (1) he told the pilot to "ensure that the aircraft was over the runway" when he initiated the autorotation because "the aircraft would A-2696-24 7 basically come straight down," noting that a helicopter "never comes straight down" during an autorotation; and (2) the helicopter came straight down, maintaining that the pilot initially had "a perfect angle on the autorotation" and "was where he should be prior to tree-top level." The helicopter involved in the accident was a Schweizer 269C single- engine, two-seat helicopter manufactured in 2000 with a Textron Lycoming HO- 360-C1A piston engine. This engine had an HA-6 model carburetor manufactured in Florida by defendant AVStar Fuel Systems Inc. (AVStar). AVStar used new parts for the carburetor. A carburetor is a control device, metering and mixing fuel with air in appropriate proportion to produce a combustible mixture burned in engine cylinders. AVStar's HA-6 carburetor included a fuel bowl containing a reservoir for fuel in the carburetor. The fuel in the fuel bowl was controlled by a stainless - steel needle valve and a brass float system. The float system was attached to the needle valve with a float valve retraction clip. As fuel demand or engine power changed, the system maintained a constant level of fuel in the fuel bowl. If the volume of fuel in the bowl decreased, the float would go down, retracting the needle valve from the needle valve seat opening and allowing additional fuel to enter the fuel bowl. If the volume of fuel in the bowl increased, A-2696-24 8 the float would rise, pushing the needle valve in the needle valve seat opening and reducing the amount of fuel flowing into the fuel bowl. If the needle valve was completely seated in the needle valve seat opening, the opening would seal and stop fuel from flowing into the fuel bowl. The needle valve was intended to rotate and move freely in the brass seat. When there was an excessive amount of fuel in proportion to the air going into the engine, the engine would run "rich" and could result in engine flooding and stalling. When there was not enough fuel in proportion to the air going into the engine, the engine would run "lean." In 2009, AVStar sold and shipped the carburetor to Avco in Pennsylvania. In April 2010, after the carburetor failed two flow tests, Avco returned the carburetor to AVStar for adjustments. AVStar reset the carburetor and returned it to Avco with an FAA Certificate of Compliance. In July 2011, Avco sold the engine involved in the accident to HFS and shipped it with the carburetor in a separate box. On September 24, 2011, Herlihy removed the existing engine from the helicopter and installed the new engine and carburetor sold by Avco. Between September 24, 2011, and September 20, 2013, the engine had 636.9 operating hours with no maintenance issues related to the carburetor. A-2696-24 9 In December 2013, following 674 operating hours, Herlihy removed the carburetor and sent it to AVStar for an overhaul. During the overhaul, an AVStar repairman certified by the FAA replaced several carburetor components, including the needle valve, needle valve seat, float, and float retractor clip. AVStar tested the overhauled carburetor in accordance with its Overhaul & Repair Manual for the HA-6 model carburetor. The procedures for overhauling AVStar carburetors were developed by AVStar and approved by the FAA. On January 9, 2014, AVStar issued a certificate for the carburetor, certifying it was overhauled in accordance with FAA approved data from the AVStar Overhaul and Repair Manual for HA-6 carburetors. AVStar certified the carburetor as airworthy for return to service. AVStar shipped the overhauled carburetor to Herlihy. Herlihy reinstalled the overhauled carburetor on the helicopter and performed ground runs prior to returning the aircraft to service. Herlihy had difficulty setting the idle mixture. On February 7, 2014, Herlihy removed the overhauled carburetor and sent it to AVStar. An AVStar technician determined "the carb was too rich" and adjusted the carburetor's settings. AVStar issued another certificate for this repair and returned the carburetor to Herlihy. A-2696-24 10 Herlihy again reinstalled the overhauled carburetor and certified the helicopter as "airworthy." The helicopter subsequently operated for three-and- one-half years, flying for 973 hours, without issue. Just prior to the accident, the helicopter operated for 3.3 hours. About two weeks before the accident, Herlihy installed a new throttle control cable in the helicopter. Several years earlier, in 2008, AVStar obtained FAA Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA) for its AVStar HA-6 model carburetor. PMA is a combined design and production approval for aircraft replacement parts by manufacturers that do not hold the original FAA Type Certificate for those parts. According to the FAA, "PMA holders are responsible for the integrity of their designs throughout their articles' service lives. Their continued operational safety depends on three principles: monitoring an article's performance in service, investigating its problems and then providing remedies and problem prevention." At his deposition, Ronald Weaver, the president, owner, and founder of AVStar, confirmed AVStar designed this specific HA-6 carburetor by reverse engineering an original carburetor made by competitor, Marvel-Schebler Aircraft Carburetors LLC (Marvel-Schebler). According to Weaver, his PMA carburetors were not identical to the original trademarked carburetors but A-2696-24 11 performed like the originals by meeting a "fit, form and function" standard. Weaver confirmed AVStar decided to use a carburetor float made of brass rather than blue composite, consistent with the PMA, based on AVStar's analysis of carburetor operating history showing brass to be reliable. Weaver explained Avco did not participate in the reverse engineering of the HA-6 carburetor. He confirmed the design drawings for the HA-6 carburetor were AVStar drawings, not Avco drawings. According to Weaver, Avco's only involvement with the carburetor's design was allowing AVStar to test the carburetor's performance in Avco's engine test cells. Marian Folk, the principal engineering consultant for Lycoming Engines, confirmed that Avco did not analyze, evaluate, or provide input regarding the design of the AVStar HA-6 carburetor. She explained Avco's carburetor performance requirements did not dictate or recommend specific design criteria for internal carburetor components. Rather, Avco's performance requirements consisted of a fuel airflow schedule to ensure a carburetor could provide a sufficient mixture of fuel and air to an engine. Folk averred Avco never recommended specific materials to be used by AVStar for the HA-6 carburetor components. Additionally, she maintained the drawings of the internal carburetor components were AVStar's drawings. A-2696-24 12 Folk testified that once AVStar received PMA approval, Avco sought to obtain the FAA's permission to use AVStar as an alternate supplier of HA-6 model carburetors for its engines. Folk submitted the required certification plan, which included AVStar's proprietary carburetor design information with its design drawings. The plan also included an Avco process specification entitled "AVStar Carburetor Design Criteria" detailing aspects of AVStar's current design of the HA-6 carburetor critical to carburetor performance standards set by Avco. Folk explained "[t]he Avco process specification for AVStar carburetors memorializes AVStar's design requirements to ensure that AVStar w[ould] not change the design of its carburetor without prior notice to Avco. This [wa]s an important requirement because a change in the design of the carburetor could potentially invalidate the engine . . . [c]ertificate." On January 23, 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint against various defendants related to the helicopter accident. Eight months later, plaintiff filed a separate complaint related to the same accident, naming additional defendants based on different allegations. Plaintiff's claims against defendants, except Avco and AVStar, were based on the purported failure of the throttle control. As to Avco and AVStar, plaintiff alleged the accident was caused by a defective carburetor. In the lawsuit against A-2696-24 13 Avco and AVStar, among others, plaintiff asserted claims for negligence, strict liability for design defects, breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranty, breach of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, as well as survivorship and wrongful death claims. These two complaints were consolidated with a separate lawsuit filed by the executrix of the pilot's estate. Plaintiff settled her throttle-related claims. In January 2021, plaintiff settled her claims against AVStar under a confidential settlement agreement. The only remaining claims in the consolidated action were plaintiff's claims against Avco. Prior to trial, the parties filed in limine motions and dispositive motions. The in limine motions addressed the admissibility of testimony by the parties' experts. The dispositive motions included a motion for summary judgment filed by Avco and a motion for summary judgment filed by plaintiff. We first address Avco's in limine motions to limit or preclude entirely the testimony of plaintiff's expert witnesses. Avco moved to exclude the testimony of plaintiff's aviation accident investigators, Donald Sommer, P.E., and A.J. Fiedler. It also moved to exclude the testimony of plaintiff's metallurgist, Mark Hood, P.E.; plaintiff's music industry economic expert, Larry Magid; plaintiff's economic expert, Richard A-2696-24 14 Constand; and plaintiff's medical expert, Thomas L. Bennett, M.D. The trial judge held N.J.R.E. 104 hearings regarding the admissibility of the testimony proffered by Sommer and Magid. Plaintiff waived N.J.R.E. 104 hearings as to her other experts. We first consider the judge's decision to limit Sommer's expert testimony. The decision to admit or exclude expert testimony rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015). The decision of the trial court will only be reversed for an abuse of that discretion. Id. at 53. According to N.J.R.E. 702, [i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. There are three requirements for the admission of expert testimony: ( 1) the testimony must concern a subject that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art such that an expert 's testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony. State v. Arrington, 265 N.J. 88, 99 143 (2026). Generally, "expert testimony is not necessary when the subject can be A-2696-24 15 understood by jurors utilizing common judgment and experience. " Campbell v. Hastings, 348 N.J. Super. 264, 270 (App. Div. 2002). "For an opinion to be admissible under N.J.R.E. 702, the expert must utilize a technique or analysis with 'a sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results so as to contribute materially to the ascertainment of the truth.'" State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393, 409 (2017) (quoting State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 210 (1984)). The theory or technique must have "gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. " State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 280 (2018). The data or information relied upon must be of the type reasonably relied on by experts in the scientific field. In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340, 349-50 (2018). "When a proponent does not demonstrate the soundness of a methodology, both in terms of its approach to reasoning and to its use of data, from the perspective of others within the relevant scientific community, the gatekeeper should exclude the proposed expert testimony on the basis that it is unreliable." Id. at 400. N.J.R.E. 703 requires that "expert opinion be grounded in 'facts or data derived from (1) the expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts. '" A-2696-24 16 Townsend, 221 N.J. at 53 (quoting Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008)). The "net opinion" rule "is a corollary of [N.J.R.E. 703] . . . which forbids the admission into evidence of an expert's conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data." Id. at 53-54. An expert must be able to "'give the why and wherefore' that supports the opinion, 'rather than a mere conclusion.'" Borough of Saddle River v. 66 E. Allendale, LLC, 216 N.J. 115, 144 (2013) (quoting Pomerantz Paper v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 372 (2011)). The expert must "be able to identify the factual bases for their conclusion, explain their methodology, and demonstrate that both the factual bases and methodology are reliable." Townsend, 221 N.J. at 55 (quoting Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 417 (1992)). "Moreover, opinion testimony 'must relate to generally accepted . . . standards, not merely to standards personal to the witness.' . . . A standard which is personal to the expert is equivalent to a net opinion." Taylor v. DeLosso, 319 N.J. Super. 174, 180 (App. Div. 1990) (quoting Fernandez v. Baruch, 52 N.J. 127, 131 (1968)). The trial court must "'distinguish scientifically sound reasoning from that of the self-validating expert'" and exclude unsubstantiated personal beliefs. Accutane, 234 N.J. at 389 (quoting Landrigan, 127 N.J. at A-2696-24 17 414)). The trial court should "prevent[] the jury's exposure to unsound science through the compelling voice of an expert." Id. at 389-90. An expert's opinion should be excluded "if it based merely unfounded speculation and unquantified possibilities." Grzanka v. Pfeifer, 301 N.J. Super. 563, 580 (App. Div. 1997). "Given the weight that a jury may accord to expert testimony, a trial court must ensure that an expert is not permitted to express speculative opinions or personal views that are unfounded in the record. " Townsend, 221 N.J. at 55. "Expert testimony should not be received if it appears the witness is not in possession of such facts as will enable him [or her] to express a reasonably accurate conclusion as distinguished from a mere guess or conjecture." Dawson v. Bunker Hill Plaza Assoc., 289 N.J. Super. 309, 323 (App. Div. 1996); Vuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chem., 240 N.J. Super. 289, 299 (App. Div. 1990). However, "[t]he net opinion rule is not a standard of perfection." Townsend, 221 N.J. at 54. "An expert's proposed testimony should not be excluded 'merely because it fails to account for some particular condition or fact which the adversary considers relevant.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Freeman, 223 N.J. Super. 92, 116 (App. Div. 1988). Any such admission may be explored through cross-examination at trial. Id. at 54-55. A-2696-24 18 In his December 2020 report, Sommer opined that the helicopter pilot was forced to begin the emergency autorotation a few seconds early, which he claimed prevented the helicopter from safely reaching the landing strip. Sommers explained this happened because the engine failed before the pilot could manually shut it off. He further explained the engine failed because the needle valve in the carburetor became stuck in an open position and flooded the engine with fuel. Sommer examined the carburetor after the crash and found a combination of manufacturing and design defects in the carburetor components replaced during the 2013 overhaul. He noted the needle had metal burrs due to defective manufacturing, which caused excessive service-induced wear on both the needle valve and the needle valve seat. Sommer claimed the needle wear was exacerbated by an improper design choice, i.e., the use of a brass float/needle valve seat in combination with a stainless-steel needle valve/retractor clip. According to Sommer's report: The extreme and uneven wear between the needle valve and seat is indicative of friction between the two and the needle running slanted in the seat. This will create a propensity for the two to interact and stick. This creates a[n] overly rich mixture. The most likely time for stickage to occur would be during full throttle operation, especially for a prolonged period of time. A-2696-24 19 This explains the premature engine failure during the approach. Sommer further noted Marvel-Schebler issued an August 31, 2011 Service Bulletin SB-20 (SB-20) entitled "Use of incompatible clip and float can affect float operation" in trademarked Marvel-Schebler HA-6 carburetors. SB-20 warned operators and users of Marvel-Schebler HA-6 carburetors "of combinations of parts in that, if not removed, might lead to partial or complete loss of engine power and serious injury or death." The bulletin stated the "combinations of parts are likely to be found in [Marvel-Schebler] HA-6 carburetors serviced by AVStar, in carburetors installed on factory overhauled Lycoming engines, and in carburetors that have had AVStar float kits installed in them." The parts specified were AVStar floats with part number AV30-768, AVStar clips with part number AV29-182, and Marvel-Schebler clips with part number 29-182. SB-20 directed that subject floats and clips never be used together because the clips could wear into the float frames and cause a notch to form. Sommer's written records pertaining to the 2013 overhaul of the subject carburetor confirmed that the referenced float number was installed. Although A-2696-24 20 the part number for the clip was not identified in the records, Sommer maintained that the carburetor also contained the specified clip. 2 Sommer further opined the "AVStar HA-6 carburetors installed on the helicopter had a long history of problems in service." He wrote that "[a] review of NTSB accident and incident reports along with FAA Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs) revealed numerous incidents of power failures with Schweizer 269 helicopters involving throttle controls and carburetors." In support, Sommer attached a "listing of relevant instances." A review of the "relevant instances" identified by Sommer involved predominantly throttle control problems. Only two "relevant instances" addressed carburetor problems. One of the two problems involving carburetors was unidentified and the other involved a leak. According to Sommer, AVStar carburetors were frequently returned to the manufacturer due to incorrect fuel delivery resulting from faulty needle valves and seats. He noted a listing of warranty returns detailing such instances was produced by AVStar during discovery. Sommer also opined "Lycomings's 2 In a supplemental report, Sommer explained the clip in the accident carburetor conformed to the AVStar drawing for the AV29-182 clip referenced in SB-20. A-2696-24 21 failure to utilize quality control and to require proper testing on carburetors before being put into service is a cause of this crash." In a January 2021 supplemental report, Sommer asserted "[f]ailed or "sticking" needle valve/seats are not unique to the HA-6 carburetor. Any [Avco] carburetor will have a needle valve controlled by a float and this potential for failure will exist. All carburetors for Lycoming engines have a similar needle valve, seat and float assembly." He further opined "[t]he problems created by . . . malfunctioning needle valves and floats have been encountered on numerous occasions and should have put [Avco] on notice that a potentially dangerous situation was present." In an August 2021 rebuttal report, Sommer compared photographs he had taken in this matter with photos from four other investigations involving carburetor failures. According to Sommer, those other carburetors exhibited less wear to the subject parts than was present here and still failed. Regarding the other accidents, Sommer identified the date and location of the carburetor failures but did not address the circumstances of these accidents or the accident investigation results. Sommer acknowledged the subject accident differed from these other accidents because this was the only accident involving engine failure A-2696-24 22 at maximum speed. However, Sommer maintained this fact was irrelevant to his opinions as to the cause of this accident. In an October 2021 affidavit, Sommer disagreed with the defense expert's contention that the HA-6 carburetor was so unique that other models should not be included for comparison. Sommer claimed all carburetors for Lycoming engines had a similar needle valve, seat, and float assembly. At his deposition, Sommer testified that he believed Drapala, one of the three individuals who spoke to the pilot prior to the accident, suggested the pilot begin the autorotation over the runway, and that all three individuals who spoke to the pilot agreed that "he should conduct the autorotation to the runway." However, Sommer conceded Drapala's written statement disclaimed any suggestion that the pilot begin the autorotation over the runway. Sommer also acknowledged that HFS's Assistant Chief Flight Instructor testified the initial profile of the autorotation looked normal. Sommer further stated he had not seen any wear on the retraction clip in the subject carburetor. He maintained the manufacturing burrs he saw increased the propensity for the needle valve to stick. Sommer could not say with certainty that he saw the sticking of a needle valve in other accidents involving an HA-6 carburetor. He also acknowledged he did not test the subject carburetor to A-2696-24 23 determine whether there was any sticking. According to Sommer, such testing was unnecessary. The trial judge held three days of N.J.R.E. 104 hearings related to Sommer's expert opinions. Based on his calculations, Sommer testified that if the pilot had started the autorotation over the runway, then he would have landed on the runway further down the airstrip. Sommer was not concerned that the helicopter had been flown without incident for approximately three and one-half years prior to the accident. According to Sommer, the helicopter had not previously been flown at full throttle for twenty minutes and claimed this triggered the needle valve sticking in the excessively worn carburetor. During the N.J.R.E. 104 hearings, plaintiff's counsel attempted to question Sommer regarding documents addressing past carburetor failures not referenced or discussed in his written report. Those documents included studies from the FAA, SDRs, and warranty claims involving non-AVStar carburetors. The judge sustained defense counsel's objection, noting Sommer did not mention these documents during his deposition. The judge held Sommer could not rewrite his expert report mid-hearing. During the hearing, plaintiff's counsel told the judge he wanted to question Sommer regarding his expert affidavits in other aviation cases. Those affidavits A-2696-24 24 attached SDRs and warranty claims for other accidents. Plaintiff's attorney acknowledged he did not supply those affidavits to defense counsel. The judge denied the request, stating the affidavits should have been included as part of Sommer's expert report and been produced to defense counsel. In an October 12, 2023 order and accompanying statement of reasons, the judge granted Avco's motion, partially limiting Sommer's expert testimony. Specifically, the judge ruled Sommer could testify regarding the opinions set forth in December 14, 2020, January 17, 2021, and August 6, 2021 reports except for the following opinions: (1) Whether and the extent to which HA-6 model carburetors have a long history of problems in service; (2) Whether and the extent to which problems created by malfunctioning needle valves and floats have been encountered on numerous occasions in HA-6 carburetors and should have put Avco on notice of a potentially dangerous situation; (3) Whether and the extent to which Avco had a duty to provide quality control requirements and/or oversight of third-party carburetor vendor AVStar . . . , whether and how Avco allegedly violated such duty, and how such alleged failures by Avco were a cause of the helicopter crash at issue. The judge's written decision explained the reasons for excluding opinions number one and number two: A-2696-24 25 Avco argues that Sommer's assertion that the subject model carburetor has a history of issues with stuck needle valves causing engine failure is speculative. According to Avco, any alleged "problems in service" that are unrelated to the specific defects alleged in this case are irrelevant and do not support Sommer's opinions here. Further, Avco asserts that Sommer's reference to problems created by malfunctioning needle valves and floats occurring on "numerous occasions" that allegedly should have put Avco on notice of the potential dangers that occurred in this case is made without any factual support by Sommer. This [c]ourt agrees. Sommer's use of these reports of other accidents or incidents involving HA -6 or other carburetors is essentially expressing an expert opinion that each of the other incidents was caused by a malfunctioning carburetor, without any analysis or explanation of the factual basis for such opinions. Sommer's expert reports do not provide a factual basis for his opinion that HA-6 carburetors have a "long history of problems in service." Sommer's expert reports do not include any detail about the prior accidents, the circumstances of the prior accidents, who determined, and how it was determined, if at all, that a stuck needle valve caused the accidents or incidents in those prior cases, or the facts upon which this determination was based. As presented, Sommer's opinion with respect to this issue is clearly a net opinion because he has failed "to identify the factual bases for [his] conclusions, explain [his] methodology, and demonstrate that both the factual bases and the methodology are reliable." Townsend, . . . 221 N.J. at 55. Sommer's January 17, 2021 revised report states that HA-6 model carburetors have a "long history of A-2696-24 26 problems in service." With respect to sticking needle valves, Sommer states that "problems created by a [sic] malfunctioning needle valves and floats have been encountered on numerous occasions and should have put Lycoming on notice that a potentially dangerous situation was present." Without further explanation, Sommer refers to . . . a . . . listing of purported incidents attached as Appendix 3 to the report. The summary listing in Appendix 3, however, is not self-explanatory and, more importantly, does not appear to include any reports which on their face, show that the investigator concluded that the needle valve and float assembly malfunctioned and caused the referenced incident. Indeed, a review of Appendix 3 reveals that many of the incidents apparently involved a problem with the throttle cable, and not the needle valve and float assembly. . . . Such reports of incidents involving throttle cable problems are irrelevant, and do not supp